JUDGMENT : 1. Factual matrix of present case, in brief, are that petitioner has suffered with an order dated 18.10.2021 passed under Section 7-A of Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1952”). Being aggrieved petitioner filed a review petition under Section 7-B of Act, 1952 which was dismissed vide order dated 22.09.2022. Both the above referred orders are under challenge before this Court. 2. At the outset, Sri Mukteshwar Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for Respondent-1, raised a preliminary objection that any order passed under Section 7-A of Act, 1952 is appealable under Section 7-I of Act, 1952 as well as the order passed in review petition is an order under Section 7-B(5), therefore, it is also appealable under Section 7-I of Act, 1952 and the present writ petition is not maintainable due to statutory alternative remedy available to petitioner. 3. Sri Amrendra Nath Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Ajay Singh, learned counsel for petitioner, fairly submitted that any order passed under Section 7-A of Act, 1952 is appealable under Section 7-I of Act, however, every order passed under Section 7-B(5) is not appealable under Section 7-I. He referred both the provisions and for reference Section 7-B and 7-I of Act, 1952 are reproduced hereinafter: “7-B. Review of orders passed under section 7-A.—(1) Any person aggrieved by an order made under sub-section (1) of section 7-A, but from which no appeal has been preferred under this Act, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of such order may apply for a review of that order to the officer who passed the order: Provided that such officer may also on his own motion review his order if he is satisfied that it is necessary so to do on any such ground. (2) Every application for review under sub-section (1) shall be filed in such form and manner and within such time as may be specified in the Scheme. (2) Every application for review under sub-section (1) shall be filed in such form and manner and within such time as may be specified in the Scheme. (3) Where it appears to the officer receiving an application for review that there is no sufficient ground for a review, he shall reject the application. (4) Where the officer is of opinion that the application for review should be granted, he shall grant the same: Provided that,— (a) no such application shall be granted without previous notice to all the parties before him to enable them to appear and be heard in support of the order in respect of which a review is applied for, and (b) no such application shall be granted on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence which the applicant alleges was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him when the order was made, without proof of such allegation. (5) No appeal shall lie against the order of the officer rejecting an application for review, but an appeal under this Act shall lie against an order passed under review as if the order passed under review were the original order passed by him under section 7-A.” “7-I. Appeals to Tribunal.—(1) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government, or an order passed by the Central Government or any authority, under the proviso to subsection (3), or sub-section (4), of section 1, or section 3, or subsection (1) of section 7-A, or section 7-B except an order rejecting an application for review referred to in sub-section (5) thereof, or section 7-C, or section 14-B, may prefer an appeal to a Tribunal against such notification or order. (2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed in such form and manner, within such time and be accompanied by such fees, as may be prescribed.” 4. Learned Senior Advocate made reference of the grounds mentioned in review petition specifically Points No. 3 and 4 therein that there was an error apparent on the face of record as well as there were sufficient reason to allow review petition. However, it was rejected summarily without considering specific grounds. Learned Senior Advocate made reference of the grounds mentioned in review petition specifically Points No. 3 and 4 therein that there was an error apparent on the face of record as well as there were sufficient reason to allow review petition. However, it was rejected summarily without considering specific grounds. Points No. 3 and 4 of review petition are reproduced as under: ^^fcUnw laŒ&3 ekuuh; vk;qDr egksn; ds fu.kZ; fnuakd 18-10-2021 dh QkbafMax fjiksVZ ls Li”V gS fd ,sls dkfeZdks dks tks fd o"kZ 1982 es dk;Zjr gh ugh Fks mudks Hkh o"kZ 1982 ls bZŒihŒ,QŒvksŒ ds varZxr yk;k x;k gS ftlds laca/k esa lk{; layXu gSA 'ks"k vU; dkfeZdksa ds laca/k esa lknj fuosnu gS fd o"kZ 1982 ,oa vxzsrj o"kksZ es dk;Zjr jgs dkfeZdksa ds fu;qfDr frfFk@fu;qfDr&i= ds lk{; gsrq vfrfjDr le; iznku djus dh d`ik djsA fcaUnw laŒ4 ;gka mYys[kuh; gS fd laLFkku es lhŒihŒ,QŒ dh O;oLFkk iwoZ ls jgh gS ,oa dkfeZdksa dks fu;ksDrk va'knku Hkh dkfeZdksa ds va'knku ds lkFk fn;k x;k gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa bZŒihŒ,QŒvksŒ }kjk o"kZ 1982 ls vkx.ku djrs gq;s fu;ksDrk va'knku ,oa dkfeZd va'knku dh ns;rk laca/kh vkns'k lLaFkku ds foŸkh; lalk/kuksa ij vR;ar dqizHkkfor djsxk ,oa laLFkku ds 'kSf{kd dk;Z Hkh izHkkfor gksxkA ns;rk vof/k ds e/; laLFkku }kjk iw.kZ Hkqxrku fd;k tk pqdk gSA mi;qDr of.kZr ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq;s laLFkku ds Nk=fgr esa vkils fuosnu gS fd vius dk;kZy; vkns'k 25619@bZih,Q@vkjMh@,,yMh@25066@7,@2021 fnukad 18-10-2021 dk iquZfopkj djrs gq;s ns;rk vof/k ds 1982 ls 2007 ds e/; lsokfuoZ`Ÿk gq;s dkfeZdksa dks ftuds lhŒihŒ,QŒ Hkqxrku iwoZ esa laLFkku }kjk fd;k tk pqdk gS] dks NksM+rs gq;s vU; dkfeZdksa dk ns;rk vkx.ku fopkj djus dk d"V djsA^^ 5. Sri Jagdish Pathak, learned counsel appearing for Respondents-2 and 3, opposed the above submissions and placed reliance on a judgment passed by High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in M/s Punj Security & Housekeeping Services Pvt. Limited vs. Employees Provident Fund Organization and others (CWP No. 12682 of 2022), decided on 01st June, 2022, specifically on para 15, which is reproduced as under: “15. The counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that after passing of the order of rejection of the review the petitioner has been left totally without remedy; because Section 7B (5) of the EPF Act does not provide any appeal against the order of rejection of review passed by the assessing authority. The counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that after passing of the order of rejection of the review the petitioner has been left totally without remedy; because Section 7B (5) of the EPF Act does not provide any appeal against the order of rejection of review passed by the assessing authority. Therefore, only this court is required to intervene and to set aside such an order in exercise of writ jurisdiction. However, even this argument of the counsel for the petitioner is found to be non sustainable. Under the scheme of the EPF Act the assessing authority is required to pass the original assessment order under Section 7A after hearing the parties concerned. That order is made appealable under Section 7-I of the EPF Act. If the petitioner was not satisfied with the order, there was nothing to stop the petitioner from availing the remedy of the appeal; as provided under the above said Section. Hence, he was not remediless. However, he has chosen to file a review. The review has been rejected by the authority finding that no new material has been produced before it. At this stage also the petitioner had the remedy to challenge the original order and raise all the pleas raised by him in the review application. The provision of review is not a remedy ‘alternate’ to the remedy of appeal. Provision for review is only a lateral enabling provision to bring to the notice of the authority passing the original order; some mistake, new material or the apparent error. Even if the authority rejects the lateral remedy of review; the linear and hierarchical remedy of statutory appeal is always available to a party. The right to appeal provided by Sub-Section (5) of section 7B of the Act also does not contemplate any independent appeal against the review order de hors the provision of appeal under section 7-I against original order passed under section 7A. Rather, this provision also re-directs the appeal against the review order to the same linear and hierarchical remedy of appeal as provided under section 7-I of the Act. The language as used in Sub-Section (5) of section 7B, which stipulates that no appeal shall lie against the rejection of the review, is intended for a different purpose. Rather, this provision also re-directs the appeal against the review order to the same linear and hierarchical remedy of appeal as provided under section 7-I of the Act. The language as used in Sub-Section (5) of section 7B, which stipulates that no appeal shall lie against the rejection of the review, is intended for a different purpose. If the rejection of the review, independently and per se, is made appealable then in every case the assessee; like the petitioner; would be able; and would be entitled; to avoid the provision of appeal under section 7-I of the Act against the original order; which requires pre-deposits of the assessed amounts as prescribed under Section 7(O) of the Act. To obviate that possibility only the sub-Section (5) of Section 7B has clarified that the order of rejection of the review would not be appealable in itself. However, the right and remedy to file appeal against the original order passed under section 7A would not be extinguished only because of the rejection of the review under sub-section (3) of the section 7B of the Act. Since the petitioner is having remedy of appeal against the substantive order passed by the Assessing Officer under section 7A of the Act, therefore, this court, otherwise also, does not find it appropriate to interfere in the matter.” 6. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the material available on record. 7. Before considering rival submissions on merit it would be appropriate to refer a recent judgment of Supreme Court in S. Madhusudhan Reddy vs. V. Narayana Reddy and others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1034, where scope of any Court to jurisdiction of review has been reiterated as under: “31. As can be seen from the above exposition of law, it has been consistently held by this Court in several judicial pronouncements that the Court's jurisdiction of review, is not the same as that of an appeal. A judgment can be open to review if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record, but an error that has to be detected by a process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise its powers of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercising powers of review, the Court can correct a mistake but not substitute the view taken earlier merely because there is a possibility of taking two views in a matter. A judgment may also be open to review when any new or important matter of evidence has emerged after passing of the judgment, subject to the condition that such evidence was not within the knowledge of the party seeking review or could not be produced by it when the order was made despite undertaking an exercise of due diligence. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision as against an error apparent on the face of the record. An erroneous decision can be corrected by the Superior Court, however an error apparent on the face of the record can only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction. Yet another circumstance referred to in Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a judgment has been described as “for any other sufficient reason”. The said phrase has been explained to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule”(Refer : Chajju Ram v. Neki Ram and Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius).” 8. Few paragraphs of a judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Chandra Shekhar Azad University of Agriculture and Technology vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II, Kanpur and another (Writ-C No. 1914 of 2019), decided on 19.08.2019 are also relevant and mentioned hereinafter: “13. A reading of the provisions of Section 7-B of the Act makes it clear that an Application for Review that is rejected, leads to an order from which no appeal lies. If an order rejecting an Application for Review were to be challenged, certainly a writ petition would be competent from that order alone. In that challenge, the Court would be required to see whether the Authority was right in rejecting the Application for Review. In a petition of that kind, the order passed under Section 7-A of the Act, that has not been reopened by granting the Review, would not be under scrutiny of this Court. In that challenge, the Court would be required to see whether the Authority was right in rejecting the Application for Review. In a petition of that kind, the order passed under Section 7-A of the Act, that has not been reopened by granting the Review, would not be under scrutiny of this Court. This would be so because an application under Section 7-B of the Act rejecting an Application for Review would leave the order under Section 7-A not only intact, but there would be no merger with the order passed under Section 7-B, in such a case. It is only that awaiting decision of this Court as to legality of the order rejecting an application under Section 7-B, this Court may consider restraining consequences of the order under Section 7-A of the Act by way of recovery etc, with or without terms, in aid of the writ petition before it, to judge the validity of the Section 7-B order. Again, to emphasize, in that situation the order under Section 7-A would not be under challenge. In that situation alone, a writ petition would not be confronted with the bar of alternative remedy under Section 7-I of the Act. In the event, however, the Review were to be formally granted, and the order originally made under Section 7-A laid open with a fresh order to follow after hearing parties, there would be clearly a merger of the earlier order with that passed under Section 7-B. And, if this were the nature of the order passed under Section 7-B, it would be appealable under Section 7-I, going by the provisions of Section 7-B(5) of the Act. There is yet another class of cases, which Sri Kartikeya Saran and Sri Satyendra Chandra Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondents and the beneficiary employees, respectively urge would fall under Section 7-B(5) of the Act.This is those class of cases where without expressly granting the Review, the Authority seized of the Review Application, does not summarily turn it down, but at the stage of considering the Review Application, passes an order that deals with the merits of the assessee's case. In the submission of the learned counsel, this kind of an order would fall under Section 7-B(5) as the order passed is one under Review, from which an appeal would lie, treating it to be an original order under Section 7-A of the Act.”(emphasis added) 9. Learned Senior Advocate has fairly accepted that order passed under Section 7-A of Act, 1952 is appealable under Section 7-I of Act, 1952, therefore, the prayer to quash the order dated 18.10.2021 is rejected with liberty to petitioner to file appeal under relevant provisions of Act, 1952. 10. In order to consider the submission with regard to order passed on review application, the relevant part of impugned order is mentioned hereinafter: “ORDER (1) From a bare perusal of Section 7B, is evident that scope of review under the said section is not absolute rather it has been restricted by providing following conditions as precedent/ precondition to exercise said power:- (a) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced at the time when the order was made. (b) or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. (c) or for any other sufficient reason-here the expression “any other sufficient reason” has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds. As evident from the language of section 7B of the Act, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made: it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found: it may also be exercised for any other sufficient reason. After considering the review application filed by the establishment, it is observed that none of the conditions provided as precondition under section 7B of the Act is satisfied. The establishment has failed to place on record any new evidence or information that could have any bearing on the outcome of the order u/s 7A of the Act. After considering the review application filed by the establishment, it is observed that none of the conditions provided as precondition under section 7B of the Act is satisfied. The establishment has failed to place on record any new evidence or information that could have any bearing on the outcome of the order u/s 7A of the Act. Similarly, the establishment has also failed to point out any mistake or error apparent on the fact of record which respect to said order u/s 7A necessitating its review u/s 7B of the Act. The information, documents filed/ relied upon by the establishment along with its review application and the contentions made therein have already been dealt with in an elaborate manner and disposed in the order passed u/s 7A of the Act. As per the above discussion, the review application filed by the establishment is found to be not fulfilling any of the preconditions as provided in section 7B of the Act, to make it admissible and therefore the same is ordered to be rejected accordingly. Copy of the order be sent to all concerned.” 11. Now this Court has to consider, whether the above referred part of impugned order is an order which would fall under Section 7-B(3) or later part of Section 7-B(5) of Act, 1952, i.e., the above order is an order which can be treated as an original order passed under Section 7-A of Act, 1952 and if answer is in negative, whether review was rightly rejected or not. 12. By order quoted above, review application was rejected on the ground that none of the requisite condition to consider review application was pointed out by aggrieved petitioner. In strict sense impugned order cannot be deemed to be an order passed treating it to be an original order passed under Section 7-A of Act, 1952. Therefore, it cannot be strictly appealable under the provisions of Section 7-I of Act, 1952. 13. The Court now proceed to consider, whether conditions to entertain review, i.e., discovery of new and important matter or evidence, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record or for any other sufficient reason, was pointed out by petitioner. 14. 13. The Court now proceed to consider, whether conditions to entertain review, i.e., discovery of new and important matter or evidence, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record or for any other sufficient reason, was pointed out by petitioner. 14. Grounds mentioned in review application are on merit, i.e., interpretation of observation of report as well as with regard to exclusion of certain employees, which cannot be deemed to fall under the purview of error on the fact of record or mistake or discovery of new and important matter or evidence. Said grounds are essentially a challenge to impugned order on merit to which review cannot lie. As held in S. Madhusudhan Reddy (supra), if impugned decision is erroneous, same can be corrected by superior Court and not in the garb of exercising review jurisdiction. I do not find any ground mentioned in review application worth merit to correct any error by exercising review jurisdiction. Therefore, though the writ petition is maintainable against impugned order dated 22.09.2022, however, there is no illegality in impugned order whereby review application was dismissed. 15. Writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, petitioner is at liberty to challenge order dated 18.10.2021 passed under Section 7-A of Act, 1952 by filing appeal under Section 7-I of Act, 1952 and it is made clear that observations made in this judgment will not be construed to be a reflection on merit of case and in case appeal is filed, Appellate Authority may decide the same on its own merit.