JUDGMENT : This is a respondents' appeal, arising out of a judgment of the learned Single Judge in Writ-A No. 10967 of 2022, allowing the writ petition. 2. Heard Mr. Sankalp Narain, learned Counsel for the respondent-appellants, Mr. H.N. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Syed Fahim Ahmad, learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-respondent and the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 3. Admittedly, the writ petitioner was an assistant teacher with appellant No.1, a Madarsa governed by the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004 (for short, 'the Act of 2004'). He taught in the primary section of the Madarsa called, 'the Tahtaniya'. Some complaints were made against him, of which the appellants took cognizance and proceeded to hold disciplinary proceedings against the writ petitioner-respondent. The Inquiry Committee, that was constituted, submitted its report dated June 25, 2021. Taking the findings of the Inquiry Committee into account, the appellants passed the impugned order dated July 11, 2021, terminating the writ petitioner-respondent's services. 4. Aggrieved by that order, the writ petitioner-respondent (for short, 'the writ petitioner') instituted Writ-A No. 10967 of 2022, which has been allowed by the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge. The respondent Management have appealed the said order passed by the learned Single Judge by means of the present appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court. 5. The learned Single Judge has primarily proceeded to quash the impugned order of termination from service on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It has been opined by the learned Single Judge that the right of the respondent-appellants to proceed against an employee, including a teacher in their disciplinary jurisdiction, flows from Section 24 of the Act of 2004 and the Regulations framed thereunder, called, The Uttar Pradesh Non-Governmental Arabic and Persian Madarsa Recognition, Administration and Services Regulation, 2016 (for short, 'the Regulations of 2016'). The learned Single Judge has held that the Regulations of 2016 make it imperative that disciplinary proceedings can be taken against an employee or a teacher of an institution governed by the Act of 2004 only in accordance with the duly approved scheme of administration. 6. The learned Single Judge has held that the Regulations of 2016 make it imperative that disciplinary proceedings can be taken against an employee or a teacher of an institution governed by the Act of 2004 only in accordance with the duly approved scheme of administration. 6. The learned Single Judge has looked into the provisions of Government Orders dated January 7, 2022 and January 10, 2022 issued to effectuate the purpose of Regulation 16 of the Regulations of 2016, which have been found to say that any disciplinary action taken against a teacher or other employee of Madarsa, without there being an approved scheme of administration for the institution concerned, would be void. The learned Judge has recorded a finding that the Government Orders dated January 7, 2022 and January 10, 2022 are still in force. There is a further finding that the scheme of administration for the appellant's Institution has been framed and sent for approval to the Government under a Covering Memo dated July 8, 2021. But, the said scheme is pending with the State Government for approval. The learned Judge, therefore, held that there is no approved scheme of administration for the appellant's Institution. 7. The effect of these gamut of statutory provisions is that the wanting State approval to the appellants' scheme of administration has led the learned Judge to hold that bearing in mind the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2004, Regulation 16 of the Regulations and the Government Orders dated January 7, 2022 and January 10, 2022, the appellant-Institution (for short, ‘the appellants’) would have no jurisdiction to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the writ petitioner, unless their scheme of administration is approved. It is on this ground that the learned Judge has found that the appellants do not have the authority to pass the impugned order of termination. 8. Some other submissions by the appellants have been repelled by the learned Judge. One of these is about the estoppel, that would bind the writ petitioner from questioning the appellants' authority to terminate his services, because it is the appellants after all, who have appointed him to their service in the Institution. This contention has been repelled by the learned Judge holding that once there is a statute in the field, no estoppel can apply against statute. This contention has been repelled by the learned Judge holding that once there is a statute in the field, no estoppel can apply against statute. The other submission urged on behalf of the appellants, which has not found favour with the learned Judge, is that the model scheme of administration, that is part and parcel of the Regulations of 2016, would apply until time that the appellants' own scheme of administration submitted for approval, receives it. It has been held by the learned Single Judge that the model scheme appended to the Regulations of 2016 is merely one in the nature of a guideline for the concerned institutions to frame their scheme. The model scheme cannot be fallen back upon by the appellants to draw authority for themselves to take disciplinary proceedings against the writ petitioner. 9. Before us, the learned Counsel for the appellants has been at pains to urge that the scheme of administration envisaged under Section 22 of the Act of 2004, the provisions of Section 24 of that Act and Regulation 16 of the Regulations of 2016 cannot fetter the right of the Management to take disciplinary proceedings and terminate the service of their employees, including a teacher, because any embargo upon that right in the form of a statute or a statutory regulation or a statutorily prescribed scheme would interfere with the appellants' right guaranteed under Article 30 of the Constitution. 10. It is argued that the appellants are a religious minority institution and have the right not only to establish, but administer an educational institution of their choice. The right to employ and terminate teachers and other employees in the institution is a concomitant of the right to administer a minority educational institution vested in the appellants in this case. It is urged, therefore, that the appellants by falling back upon the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2004 and Regulation 16 of the Regulations of 2016 or the Government Orders issued, cannot abridge the appellants' right to dispense with the services of the writ petitioner. It is also argued that once the appellants are empowered to appoint, the learned Single Judge has gone wrong in holding that the power to terminate the writ petitioner's services would be subject to regulation by the Act of 2004 or the Regulations of 2016. 11. It is also argued that once the appellants are empowered to appoint, the learned Single Judge has gone wrong in holding that the power to terminate the writ petitioner's services would be subject to regulation by the Act of 2004 or the Regulations of 2016. 11. We have keenly considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides. 12. In this case, the State have enacted a legislation relating to Madarsa education in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the objects and reasons whereof read: “STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS In para 55 of the Education Code the Registrar, Arabi-Pharasi Examinations, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad had been authorised to recognise the Arabi-Pharasi Madarsas in the State and for conducting the examinations of such Madarsas. These Madarsas were managed by the Education Department. But with the creation of the Minority Welfare and Wakfs Department in 1995 all the works relating to such Madarsas were transferred from Education Department to the Minority Welfare Departments by virtue of which all the works relating to Madarsas are being performed under the control of the Director, Minority Welfare, Uttar Pradesh and the Registrar/Inspector Arabi-Pharasi Madarsas, Uttar Pradesh. The Arabi-Pharasi Madarsas were being administered under the Arabi-Pharasi Madarsas Rules, 1987 but since the said rules have not been made under an Act, many complication arose in running the Madarsas under the said rules. Therefore with a view to removing the difficulties arisen in running the Madarsas, improving the merit therein and making available the best facility of study to the students studying in Madarsas it was decided to make a law to provide for the establishment of a Board of Madarsa Education in the state and for the matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Since the State Legislature was not in session and immediate legislative action was necessary to implements the aforesaid decision the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Ordinance, 2004 (U.P. Ordinance no. 12 of 2004) was promulgated by the Governor on September 3, 2004. This Bill is introduced to replace the aforesaid Ordinance.” 13. It is not the appellants' case that they question the vires of the Act of 2004 or the Regulations of 2016. So long as the appellants do not do that, it is not open to the appellants to relieve themselves of whatever obligations are imposed upon them under the statutory regime. It is not the appellants' case that they question the vires of the Act of 2004 or the Regulations of 2016. So long as the appellants do not do that, it is not open to the appellants to relieve themselves of whatever obligations are imposed upon them under the statutory regime. A duly enacted legislation by a competent legislature or statutory regulations made thereunder cannot be collaterally questioned in proceedings where the vires is not called in question. Section 24 of the Act of 2004 provides as follows: “24. Conditions of service of head of institution, teachers and other employees.–(1) The head of institution, teachers and other employees of an institution shall be governed by such conditions of service as may be prescribed by regulations and any agreement between the Committee of Management and such head of institution, teachers or employees, as the case may be, in so for as it is inconsistent, with the provisions of this Act or the regulations, shall be void. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) the regulations may provide for,- (a) the code of conduct, the period of probation, the conditions of confirmation and the procedure and conditions for promotion and punishment including suspension pending or in contemplation of inquiry or during the pendency of investigation, inquiry or trial in any criminal case for an offence involving moral turpitude and the allowances for the period of suspension and termination of service with notice; (b) the scales of pay and payment of salaries; (c) grant of leave and provident fund and toner benefits; and (d) maintenance of record of work and service.” 14. Section 22 of the Act of 2004 provides: “22. Scheme of Administration.–(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, document or decree or order of a court or other instrument, there shall be a Scheme of Administration for every institution, whether recognised before or after the commencement of this Act. The Scheme of Administration shall amongst other matters provide for the constitution of a Committee of Management vested with authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. The Head of the institution and two teachers thereof, belonging to Muslim-Minority, who shall be selected by rotation according to seniority in the manner prescribed by regulations, shall be ex-officio members of the Committee of Management with a right to vote. The Head of the institution and two teachers thereof, belonging to Muslim-Minority, who shall be selected by rotation according to seniority in the manner prescribed by regulations, shall be ex-officio members of the Committee of Management with a right to vote. (2) No member of the Committee of the Management shall either attend the meeting of the Committee or exercise his right to vote whenever a charge concerning his personal conduct is under discussion. (3) The Scheme of Administration shall also describe subject to any regulation, the respective powers, duties and functions of the Head of the institution and Committee of Management in relation to the institution. (4) Where more than one recognised institutions are maintained by a body or authority, there shall be a separate Committee of Management for each institution unless otherwise provided in the regulations for any class of institutions. (5) The Scheme of Administration of every institution shall be subject to the approval of the Board and no amendment to, or change in, the Scheme of Administration shall be made at any time without the prior approval of the Board: Provided that where the Management of an institution is aggrieved by an order of the Board refusing to approve an amendment or change in the Scheme of Administration, the State Government, on the representation of the Management, may, if it is satisfied that the proposed amendment or change in the Scheme of Administration is in the interest of the institution, order the Board to approve the same and thereupon the Board shall act accordingly. (6) Every institution shall be administered or managed in accordance with the Scheme of Administration framed under and in accordance with the sub-section (1) to sub-section (5). (7) In the case of an institution recognised before the commencement of this Act a draft of the Scheme of Administration shall be prepared and submitted to the Board for its approval within six months from such commencement alongwith the application for recognition. (7) In the case of an institution recognised before the commencement of this Act a draft of the Scheme of Administration shall be prepared and submitted to the Board for its approval within six months from such commencement alongwith the application for recognition. (8) If an institution fails to comply with the provision of sub-section (7) within the period provided therefore, the Board shall, by notice in writing, require such institution to submit the Scheme of Administration within a further period of three months: Provided that on a representation by the institution prior to the expiry of the extended period, the Board may in its discretion allow a further extension for a period of three months but not beyond that and the Committee of Management of the institution shall comply with the provisions of this section in such further extended period.” 15. Likewise, Regulation 16 of the Regulations of 2016 that deals with disciplinary proceedings relating to teachers and other employees of the institution lays down as follows: “16. Disciplinary proceedings.– Investigation and trial of disciplinary proceedings, suspension, punishment and any crime under moral incapability and misconduct against principal, teaching and non-teaching staff will be according to the approved, by Board of Madarsa, scheme of service and administration.” 16. Here, it is not in dispute that the appellants' scheme of administration has been submitted for approval by the Board of Madarsa on July 8, 2021, but so far it has not been approved. Regulation 16, in our opinion, has been rightly understood by the learned Single Judge to impose a complete embargo upon the appellants' power of initiating any disciplinary proceedings against any employee or teacher of theirs, unless the scheme of administration is approved. The source of jurisdiction to initiate disciplinary proceedings against employees is the scheme of administration. So long as the scheme is not approved, Regulation 16 of the Regulations of 2016 would fetter the power of the appellants to take any disciplinary proceedings or inflict punishment upon the writ petitioner. 17. It has been argued by the learned Counsel for the appellants that on the same issue, the order of termination dated July 11, 2021, impugned in the writ petition, was invalidated by the Registrar, Uttar Pradesh Education Board, but that order upon challenge was stayed in Writ-A No. 9695 of 2021 vide order dated September 16, 2021. 17. It has been argued by the learned Counsel for the appellants that on the same issue, the order of termination dated July 11, 2021, impugned in the writ petition, was invalidated by the Registrar, Uttar Pradesh Education Board, but that order upon challenge was stayed in Writ-A No. 9695 of 2021 vide order dated September 16, 2021. It is argued that the learned Single Judge erred in proceeding to decide the writ petition without a decision in Writ-A No. 9695 of 2021, which involves the same issue. 18. The learned Judge has remarked that the issue involved in Writ-A No. 9695 of 2021 is different. We agree with the conclusions of the learned Single Judge, because the order impugned in Writ-A No. 9695 of 2021 is a general order relating to various disciplinary actions taken against employees of the appellants and that order has been stayed by the learned Single Judge in Writ-A No. 9695 of 2021 on ground of lack of jurisdiction with the Registrar, Uttar Pradesh Madarsa Education Board. That issue or the pendency of the writ petition does not in any manner affect the writ petitioner's right in questioning the order of termination before this Court in a writ petition on the ground that it has been passed dehors the Regulations of 2016 by an ultra vires act of the appellants. 19. Besides the above issue, this Court has looked into the impugned order of termination, which apparently has been passed on vague charges, such as conspiring against the Headmaster of the Madarsa and the Managing Committee, forcibly signing the staff attendance register, without specifying the date, time and place of the event. Apart from that, the writ petitioner’s conduct post inquiry when he appeared before the Managing Committee, that was not subject matter of the charge-sheet, has also been taken into consideration. We also find that the inquiry leading to the report dated June 25, 2021, though one that was held ex-parte because the writ petitioner is said not to have appeared before the Committee or participated in the proceedings, does not indicate that any date, time and place of the inquiry was fixed and intimated to the writ petitioner. 20. We also find that the inquiry leading to the report dated June 25, 2021, though one that was held ex-parte because the writ petitioner is said not to have appeared before the Committee or participated in the proceedings, does not indicate that any date, time and place of the inquiry was fixed and intimated to the writ petitioner. 20. The position of law, settled overtime, is that if an inquiry is held ex-parte, the ex-parte delinquent must be put to notice of the date, time and venue of the inquiry, where, if he so chooses, he can exercise his right to cross-examine the establishment witnesses. But this has not been apparently done as the course of proceedings evident from the inquiry report would show. 21. On an overall view of the proceedings and the order impugned, we do not think that in this casual fashion, on vague charges, the service of a permanent employee could be dispensed with by the management. 22. No other point was pressed. 23. We do not find any infirmity in the order impugned passed by the learned Single Judge. 24. The special appeal fails and is dismissed.