Research › Search › Judgment

Jharkhand High Court · body

2023 DIGILAW 682 (JHR)

A. B. Singh v. Central Coalfields Limited

2023-05-11

ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY

body2023
JUDGMENT : Heard the learned counsels for the parties. 2. Arbitration Appeal No.2 of 2018 has been filed for the following relief: “That the appellant herein prays for setting aside the order dated 17.11.2017 passed by learned Sub-Judge-I, Bermo at Tenughat in Misc. Arbitration Case No.03/2010 whereby and whereunder the said learned court has been pleased to set aside the award dated 19.03.2007 passed by Shri R.D. Roy retired Chairman-cum-Managing Director (in sort CMD) Western Coalfields Limited (in short as WCL) (Sole Arbitrator) on the ground that the Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Arbitration Application No.25/03 alongwith other analogous cases being A.A. No.26, 27 and 28/03 vide order dated 04.11.2003 was pleased to appoint Director (Technical) Project and Planning Division, Central Coalfields Limited, Darbhanga House, Ranchi, but the said Director (Technical) appointed Shir R.D. Roy, former CMD (WCL) as a sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute between the parties without appreciating the fact that said Shri R.D. Roy was appointed by the said departmental arbitrator appointed by the Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi and the Respondent CCL subjected to the jurisdiction of the said sole Arbitrator Shri R.D. Roy without any objection whatsoever.” Arguments of the Appellant 3. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the impugned order to submit that the arbitral award has been set aside on the sole ground that although the High Court had appointed Director (Technical) Project and Planning Relation, CCL Ranchi, as the Arbitrator, but the Director (Technical) operation CCL appointed another person namely R.D. Roy, Former CMD as arbitrator by issuing a letter to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and such appointment was in violation of the order passed by the High Court dated 04.11.2003. 4. Learned counsel has submitted that the learned court below has recorded that such appointment of arbitrator was in violation of clause 95 of contract agreement read with order passed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, but the said point is essentially a point of jurisdiction which was to be raised at an appropriate stage in terms of Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and no such point of jurisdiction was raised at the appropriate stage. 5. 5. He has further submitted that no such ground was raised in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, rather such point was simply argued by the respondent - CCL before the learned court below and the award has been set aside solely on this ground. The learned counsel submits that the grounds set forth in the arbitral award has been quoted in the impugned order itself and none of the grounds are referable to this point. 6. He has also submitted that the circumstances under which Sri R.D.Roy had become the arbitrator is itself is a question of fact which should have been raised before the learned arbitrator at the relevant stage. He has further submitted that the perusal of the award shows that the jurisdiction point was raised in connection with the very exercise of the power of the High Court for appointment of Arbitrator and from perusal of paragraph VI 3 of the award, it appears that in the light of provision of 16 (2) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a ruling was made by the learned arbitrator that the learned arbitrator has full jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, but the ruling under Section 16(2) was neither challenged by the CCL before the learned court below nor the same was even annexed along with the petition filed under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 7. Learned counsel has further submitted that in the instant case, the period of claim was for the period from 01.09.1997 to 30.06.1998 and the dues was to the extent of Rs. 12,26,337/- inclusive of security deposit. He has referred to Paragraph III 11 which gives details of the claim. 8. The learned counsel has referred to internal page 24 of the award, to submit that it has been recorded that the respondent had admitted that the aforesaid amount was due to be paid to the appellant after completion of the contract on 30.06.1999. 9. He has also submitted that the finding of the learned arbitrator is in one paragraph which is based on admission of the respondent and the learned arbitrator has recorded that it was unfortunate that though the work was completed on 30.06.1998, the balance payment of Rs. 12,26,337/-, which has been admitted by the respondents, has not been paid. 9. He has also submitted that the finding of the learned arbitrator is in one paragraph which is based on admission of the respondent and the learned arbitrator has recorded that it was unfortunate that though the work was completed on 30.06.1998, the balance payment of Rs. 12,26,337/-, which has been admitted by the respondents, has not been paid. It was also recorded that even the security money which should have been refunded to the claimant immediately after 30.06.1999 has not been refunded. 10. He submits that the learned arbitrator has further awarded interest on the admitted amount. The interest has been awarded @ 14 % from August, 1999 although the claim was made to the extent of 18% and the learned arbitrator has awarded the rate of interest on the outstanding amount of Rs. 12,26,337/- from August, 1999 to February, 2007. He has further submitted that the award has been quantified with interest to an amount of Rs. 25,48,298/- with a direction to pay the amount by 30.04.2007 and if the amount is not paid by such date, the respondent shall in addition to the amount, pay interest as laid down under the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on the total amount of Rs. 25,48,298/- for the period from 01.05.2007 to the date of final payment. The learned counsel submits that post award interest after 01.05.2007 is the statutory interest as per the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Submission of the Respondent 11. Learned counsel for the respondent, while opposing the prayer, has submitted that the learned Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute at all in view of the fact that the claim of appellant was relating to the period 01.09.1997 to 30.06.1998 and as recorded in the arbitral award, NIT was floated on 22.11.1997 and work order was issued on 01.02.1999. Learned counsel has further submitted that the plea of jurisdiction was raised by the respondents before the learned arbitrator which is apparent from paragraph 2 in internal page 8 of the award by stating that there was neither any work order, nor any agreement for the period 01.09.1997 to 30.06.1998. Learned counsel has further submitted that the plea of jurisdiction was raised by the respondents before the learned arbitrator which is apparent from paragraph 2 in internal page 8 of the award by stating that there was neither any work order, nor any agreement for the period 01.09.1997 to 30.06.1998. The learned counsel submits that the arbitrator is bound within the four walls of the contract and during the said period from 01.09.1997 to 30.06.1998, there was no contract and consequently, the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award any amount for the period from 01.09.1997 to 30.06.1998 even if the amount was admitted by the respondent. 12. Learned counsel has further submitted that the arbitrator having travelled beyond the contract, which at best commenced from the issuance of work order i.e. 01.02.1999, therefore the award was not sustainable in the eyes of law. The learned counsel submits that although this is not the reason for setting aside of the award by the learned court below but over and above the reason cited by the learned court below, the jurisdictional point regarding the period of work being prior to the issuance of work order is enough to sustain the impugned order of setting aside the award. 13. The learned counsel has relied upon a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 369, (UOI versus Bharat Enterprises) and has referred to paragraph No. 28 thereof to submit that the arbitrator is bound by four corners of the contract and no claim beyond the contractual period could have been covered. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the High Court had referred the dispute for adjudication by Arbitrator in terms of clause 95 of the agreement and nothing beyond the same. 14. However, during the course of arguments, it is not in dispute that in paragraph 3 page 21 of the award, there is a mention of a separate ruling under Section 16(2) of the Act of 1996 whereby the learned Arbitrator had given full jurisdiction to himself to adjudicate the dispute but neither such order has been annexed with the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 nor the said ruling in terms of Section 16 (2) of the Act of 1996 was under challenge before the learned court below. 15. 15. At this, learned counsel has referred to internal page 9 of the award to submit that the earnest money and security money is said to be relating to period 01.07.1998 to 30.06.1999 and even if the best case of the appellant is taken, only the award relatable to earnest money and security money can be sustained and no more. Rejoinder submissions of the Appellant 16. In response, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that vide page 36, which is a letter dated 30.04.2005 addressed to Shri R.D. Roy, Ex-CMD, WCL, the respondent CCL had themselves appointed Shri R.D. Roy to arbitrate the dispute between the parties for this period and therefore, it is not open to the respondent to say that there was no arbitration agreement. He submits that pursuant to such letter, the parties had acted upon and no objection was taken with regard to the jurisdiction of Shri R.D. Roy, to enter into reference and decide the dispute. He submits that the respondent themselves having appointed the arbitrator cannot take a plea that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction. Findings of this Court 17. The grounds set for the challenging the Arbitral award by the respondent-CCL were as follows: - (a) The ld. Arbitrator should have availed that the claim of the opposite party is not maintainable and the same is illegal, misconceived and against the weight of the material available on the record. (b) The ld. Arbitrator should have ruled out that the Arbitration proceeding is not maintainable and arbitrable in view of the fact that for transportation of coal for the period 01.09.1997 to 30.06.1998 there was no agreement and work order. (c) In the absence of any agreement containing arbitration clause the arbitration proceeding is neither maintainable nor arbitrable. (d) The ld. Arbitrator should not have awarded any amount in absence of any work order or agreement containing arbitration clause. (e) The ld. Arbitrator has failed to take into consideration that there was no arbitration agreement in form of an arbitration clause nor there was any work order nor there was any exchange of letter or document signed by the parties or telex or telegram or exchange of statement of claim agreeing for reference for arbitration. (f) The ld. (e) The ld. Arbitrator has failed to take into consideration that there was no arbitration agreement in form of an arbitration clause nor there was any work order nor there was any exchange of letter or document signed by the parties or telex or telegram or exchange of statement of claim agreeing for reference for arbitration. (f) The ld. Arbitrator was absolutely wrong in awarding the transportation of coal at the rate of Rs.38.60 per M.T. (g) The entire award has been passed by the ld. Arbitrator under Misconception of the fact and law. 18. The learned court below has set-aside the arbitral award by holding as follows: - “In the present case, the arbitrator appointed by the Hon’ble High Court vide A.A. No. 25/03 along with A.A. No. 26, 27 & 28/03 dated 04.11.03 was the Director (technical) Project and Planning Division, C.C.L. Ranchi. But, the Director (technical) Operation, C.C.L. vide his letter No. C.G.M. (T) C.C.L.’s letter appointed another Sri R. D. Rai, former C.M.D. as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute between the parties in violation of Hon’ble High Court order dated 04.11.03, referred above in A.A. No. 25/03 along with A.A. No. 26, 27 & 28/03 dated 04.11.03. The said appointment of the sole arbitrator in terms of the C.G.M. (T) C.C.L’s letter do not show that under what circumstance the arbitrator appointed by the Hon’ble High Court was substituted by another arbitrator by a letter issued by the Director (Technical) Operation, C.C.L. The arbitral award passed by the Ld. Arbitrator on 19.03.07 was in violation of the Clause 95 of the contract agreement r.w.s. 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that the arbitral award being in violation of the aforesaid act as well as Clause 95 of the agreement, is fit to be set aside and, accordingly, arbitral award passed by the arbitrator on 19.03.07 is, accordingly, set aside.” 19. The learned court below was also of the view that after the arbitrator appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6) did not give the award, fresh procedure for appointment of arbitrator was to be followed under Section 15 of the aforesaid Act of 1996. 20. The learned court below was also of the view that after the arbitrator appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6) did not give the award, fresh procedure for appointment of arbitrator was to be followed under Section 15 of the aforesaid Act of 1996. 20. This Court finds that it is not in dispute that a petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was filed before this Court for appointment of independent Arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and the application was allowed by appointing the Director (Technical) Project and Planning Division, CCL, as Arbitrator vide High Court’s order dated 04.11.2003 and the Arbitrator was directed to enter upon the reference without delay and render his award within 9 months upon entering into reference. It is important to note that even at the time of appointment of arbitrator at the stage of 11(6), the parties joined issues on the point of existence of arbitration clause and the plea of the respondent-CCL on the point of existence of arbitration agreement between the parties was rejected after interpreting clause 95 of the agreement by a speaking order and the arbitrator was appointed as per the will of the respondent CCL to appoint the Director Technical, Project & Planning Division, Central Coalfields Limited, Ranchi. The operative portion of the order is quoted as under: - “On a reading of Clause – 95 of the agreement between the parties, I find that the parties agreed that all the disputes arising out of the contract shall be referred to the Director Technical, Project & Planning Division, Central Coalfields Limited, Ranchi and the decision of the Director shall be final and binding on the contractor. Therefore, this is a case where the contract itself fixed the Arbitrator as the Director Technical. Now, what the respondents have submitted is that they are willing to appoint the Director Technical, Project & Planning Division, Central Coalfields Limited, Ranchi, as the Arbitrator in terms of Clause – 95. In the light of the contractual provision, regarding arbitration, I am of the view that this is not a case where the Chief Justice should even at the first instance appoint an Arbitrator on his own. In the light of the contractual provision, regarding arbitration, I am of the view that this is not a case where the Chief Justice should even at the first instance appoint an Arbitrator on his own. It is really a case of ensuring that the arbitration clause agreed upon between the parties is implemented in the first instance and only on the failure of the parties to do so, this court should exercise its jurisdiction under Section 11 (6) of the Act to appoint an independent Arbitrator. Though, counsel for the petitioner sought to argue that a serving officer of the Company cannot be appointed as an Arbitrator and even a retired officer of the Company can be appointed as an Arbitrator, I am not satisfied that there is any justification to accept that argument. After all, the parties were at arm’s length and they entered into the agreement and under clause – 95, named the Arbitrator to settle the dispute between the parties. I am, therefore, satisfied that it will not be improper to accept the suggestion made by the respondents and to appoint the Director Technical, Project & Planning Division, Central Coalfields Limited, Ranchi as the Arbitrator in term of Clause – 95 of the Contract, to arbitrate upon all the disputes between the parties. Though, the Company has offered to appoint the Director Technical, Project & Planning Division, Central Coalfields Limited, Ranchi as the Arbitrator to arbitrate upon all the disputes between the parties. I think it appropriate to appoint the Director Technical, Project & Planning Division, Central Coalfields Limited, Ranchi as the Arbitrator in this proceeding itself, so that the Arbitrator can enter upon the reference at the earliest and render his Award without delay. The Arbitrator obviously has the duty to consider the claim and the counter claim of the respective parties, including the claim regarding anything that might have been done by the Company pending these proceedings. These applications are, therefore, allowed to the extent of appointing the Director Technical, Project & Planning Division, Central Coalfields Limited, Ranchi, as the Arbitrator to arbitrate upon all the disputes arising between the parties involved in these cases. The Arbitrator will enter upon the reference without delay and will render his Award, in any event, within nine months of entering upon the reference.” 21. The Arbitrator will enter upon the reference without delay and will render his Award, in any event, within nine months of entering upon the reference.” 21. It is further not in dispute that the Director (Technical), on his appointment as Arbitrator, entered into reference, but could not make any headway. In such circumstances, Sri R.D. Roy, Former CMD (CCL) was appointed as sole arbitrator by Director (Technical) Operation, CCL vide letter dated 30.04.2005 issued by the respondent CCL themselves. The action of changing the arbitrator was taken by the respondent-CCL by citing reasons that the arbitrator appointed by the High Court could not make any head way and another arbitrator was appointed by issuing a letter of appointment. Thereafter, the parties duly participated in the arbitration proceedings before Sri R.D. Roy, Former CMD (CCL) resulting in passing of the award. The background under which Sri R.D. Roy, Former CMD (CCL) was appointed is recorded in the award itself. The fact that the learned arbitrator appointed by the High Court in the arbitration application could not make any headway, although he entered into reference, is not in dispute by either party. 22. Section 14(1) (a) of the Act of 1996, interalia, provides that the mandate of the arbitrator shall terminate, if he becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his functions or by other reasons fails to act without undue delay. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 provides that if a controversy remains concerning any of the grounds mentioned in section 14(1) (a), a party may, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, apply to the court to decide on the termination of the mandate. Section 15(2) of the aforesaid Act of 1996 provides that where the mandate of an arbitrator terminates, a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed according to the rules that were applicable to the appointment of arbitrator being replaced. 23. In the present case, admittedly, the arbitrator appointed by the High Court entered into reference, but could not make any headway in the matter. In such circumstances, his mandate stood terminated by virtue of Section 14(1) (a). This was followed by appointment of another arbitrator i.e. Sri R.D. Roy, Former CMD (CCL) by none less than the respondent-CCL themselves. 23. In the present case, admittedly, the arbitrator appointed by the High Court entered into reference, but could not make any headway in the matter. In such circumstances, his mandate stood terminated by virtue of Section 14(1) (a). This was followed by appointment of another arbitrator i.e. Sri R.D. Roy, Former CMD (CCL) by none less than the respondent-CCL themselves. None of the parties raised any objection/controversy with regard to the appointment of another arbitrator and accordingly, there was no controversy with regard to the termination of the mandate of the earlier arbitrator and appointment of new arbitrator by respondent-CCL. In such circumstances, there was no occasion for any of the party to go to the court for a decision on the termination of the mandate of the earlier arbitrator. 24. The learned arbitrator has analyzed the submissions of both the parties under paragraph VI of the award commencing from internal page 19 of the award with particular reference to the point of jurisdiction. As already recorded in the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent that during the course of arguments, it was not in dispute that in paragraph 3 page 21 of the award, there is a mention of a separate ruling under Section 16(2) of the Act of 1996 whereby the learned Arbitrator had given full jurisdiction to himself to adjudicate the dispute, but neither such order has been annexed with the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, nor the said ruling in terms of Section 16 (2) of the Act of 1996 was under challenge before the learned court below. The learned arbitrator has further recorded his findings on the point of jurisdiction at para 4 of the internal page 21 of the award. The findings of the learned arbitrator on the point of jurisdiction as recorded in the award is quoted are under:- “3. After going through the counter affidavit filed by the respondent and the orders of the Hon’ble High Court and submissions of both the parties carefully and in the light of the provision of section 16 (2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 I have already given my ruling that the arbitrator has got full jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute. 4. 4. On the issue of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction I would like to add that from the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent himself it is implied that if there is any correspondence between the parties whereby they have agreed to adjudication of a dispute through arbitration, the arbitration proceeding would be maintainable and the arbitrator would have jurisdiction to arbitrate upon the dispute. In the present case both the parties have agreed to get the dispute adjudicated upon through arbitration before the Hon’ble High Court. Therefore there is no justification to raise the question of non-existence of the agreement or to challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitrator at this stage. Further as per Section 16 (2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 a plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence. However under section 16 (4) of the said Act the arbitral tribunal may admit a later plea if it considers the delay justified. In the present case the question of arbitrator’s jurisdiction was not raised by the respondent, while submitting the affidavit before the Hon’ble High Court or its statement of defence i.e. the counter statement nor has any justification been given by the counsel for the respondent for delay while raising this issue in course of the hearing. For all these reasons I reiterate my ruling given earlier and hold that the arbitration proceeding is maintainable and the arbitrator has full jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute.” 25. This Court finds that the point of jurisdiction as raised by the respondent before the learned arbitrator was duly considered and rejected by a separate order passed under Section 16 of the aforesaid Act of 1996 and also by further deliberations in the impugned award. The findings of the learned arbitrator in the separate order under Section 16 was neither assailed in the petition under Section 34 nor brought on record by the respondent before the learned court below and was accordingly not the subject matter of discussion by the learned court below while passing the impugned order whereby the award has been set-aside on the ground that the arbitrator was appointed in violation of the High Court’s order under Section 11(6) and that the arbitral award was in violation of clause 95 of the agreement. 26. 26. This Court finds that the learned court below has not at all looked into the findings of the learned arbitrator on the point of jurisdiction nor the findings of the learned arbitrator in the order passed under Section 16 were challenged by the respondent before the learned court below. One of the grounds on the basis of which the plea of jurisdiction as raised by the respondent before the learned arbitrator was rejected was that the objection to jurisdiction was not raised while submitting the counter statement nor there was any justification for delay in raising the ground of jurisdiction in the course of hearing. This Court is of the considered view that the aforesaid reason for rejection the objection to jurisdiction is in consonance with the ratio of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Union of India v. Pam Development Private Limited reported in (2014) 11 SCC 366 . 27. In the aforesaid judgment, the objection raised later on the point of jurisdiction of the arbitrator was rejected on the ground that no such objection was taken at the appropriate stage before the learned arbitrator and it was held that such point is deemed to have been waived when the parties had fully participated in the proceedings before the arbitrator without any objection to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. Paragraph- 16 to 19 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under: - “16. As noticed above, the appellant not only filed the statement of defence but also raised a counterclaim against the respondent. Since the appellant has not raised the objection with regard to the competence/jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal before the learned arbitrator, the same is deemed to have been waived in view of the provisions contained in Section 4 read with Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. 17. Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 provides that the Arbitral Tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction. Section 16 clearly recognises the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz. Section 16(2) mandates that a plea that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence. 17. Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 provides that the Arbitral Tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction. Section 16 clearly recognises the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz. Section 16(2) mandates that a plea that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence. Section 4 provides that a party who knows that any requirement under the arbitration agreement has not been complied with and yet proceeds with the arbitration without stating his objection to such non-compliance without undue delay shall be deemed to have waived his right to so object. 18. In our opinion, the High Court has correctly come to the conclusion that the appellant having failed to raise the plea of jurisdiction before the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be permitted to raise for the first time in the Court. Earlier also, this Court had occasion to consider a similar objection in BSNL v. Motorola India (P) Ltd. Upon consideration of the provisions contained in Section 4 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, it has been held as follows: (SCC p. 349, para 39) “39. Pursuant to Section 4 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a party which knows that a requirement under the arbitration agreement has not been complied with and still proceeds with the arbitration without raising an objection, as soon as possible, waives their right to object. The High Court had appointed an arbitrator in response to the petition filed by the appellants (sic respondent). At this point, the matter was closed unless further objections were to be raised. If further objections were to be made after this order, they should have been made prior to the first arbitration hearing. But the appellants had not raised any such objections. The appellants therefore had clearly failed to meet the stated requirement to object to arbitration without delay. As such their right to object is deemed to be waived.” 19. In our opinion, the obligations are fully applicable to the facts of this case. The appellant is deemed to have waived the right to object with regard to the lack of jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal.” 28. As such their right to object is deemed to be waived.” 19. In our opinion, the obligations are fully applicable to the facts of this case. The appellant is deemed to have waived the right to object with regard to the lack of jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal.” 28. This Court is of the considered view that applying the aforesaid principle of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the present case, the respondent-CCL is deemed to have waived the right to object with regard to the lack of jurisdiction of the learned arbitrator as the objection was not raised at the appropriate stage. This Court is of the considered view that the learned arbitrator had rightly rejected the point of jurisdiction having been raised at a belated stage of the proceedings. This is over and above the fact that it was the respondent-CCL themselves who had appointed the learned arbitrator. This Court is of the considered view that the learned court below while setting aside the award has totally ignored the findings of the learned arbitrator on the point of jurisdiction which in turn was based on sound principles of law and as per the specific provisions of the aforesaid Act of 1996. Accordingly, the impugned order setting aside the award on the point of jurisdiction is perverse and beyond the permissible ground of interference under Section 34 of the aforesaid Act of 1996. Merits of the grounds raised under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 29. So far as the other grounds for setting aside the award are concerned, the learned court below has not specifically dealt with such grounds as raised in the petition under Section 34 of the aforesaid Act of 1996. However, the following discussion would reveal that even prima-facie, no ground for interference was made out. 30. The learned Arbitrator has passed a reasoned award and ultimately recorded its findings in para VII of the award and partly allowed the claim under each head as stated above. “VII. Findings: 1. On perusal of the entire case comprehensively, I find that delay in payment of the legal dues of the claimant has taken place due to lapses on the part of the respondent. “VII. Findings: 1. On perusal of the entire case comprehensively, I find that delay in payment of the legal dues of the claimant has taken place due to lapses on the part of the respondent. The concerned officials of the respondent should have taken timely action to process the case and obtain the approval of the competent authority so that the payment to the claimant of its legal dues could be made in time. i.e. immediately after the completion of the work. It is unfortunate that though the work was completed on 30.06.1998 the balance payment of Rs.12,26,337.40 which has been admitted by the respondent has not been made till today. Even the security money which should have been refunded to the claimant immediately after 30.06.1999 has not been refunded so far. Since the legal dues of the claimant have been withheld unreasonable and unjustifiably by the respondent for a long time, under the Indian Contract Act 1872 and the Interest Act 1978 and also in the light of several decisions of the court on such matters the claimant is entitled to claims to the extent as shown below and I give my award accordingly.” 31. The following chart reflects the head of claim, claimed amount and the awarded amount: Sl. No. Head Claimed Amount Awarded Amount 1 Remaining Amount held up for the transportation for the period 01.09.1997 to 30.06.1998. Rs.10,16,069.60 Rs.9,37,910.00 2. Amount held up for towards Earnest Money and security money Rs.2,88,427.00 Rs.2,88,427.00 3. Interest from August 1999 to February 2007 (7 years 7 months) Claimed @ 18% Awarded @ 14% Rs.13,01,961.00 4. Loss of Business due to blockade of funds Rs.30,98,179.43 Nil 5. Cost of litigation and Arbitration Rs.62,500 Rs.20,000/- 32. The learned Arbitrator directed payment of total Rs.25,48,298/- to the claimant by 30.04.2007 and it was also directed that if the amount is not paid, in addition to this amount, interest @ 18% per annum as laid down in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on the total amount of Rs.25,48,298/- will be paid from 01.05.2007 till the date of final payment or realization. 33. No cross objection or cross appeal has been filed by CCL against the impugned order. 34. This Court finds that the Award passed by the learned Arbitrator is a well speaking award on every aspect of the matter. 33. No cross objection or cross appeal has been filed by CCL against the impugned order. 34. This Court finds that the Award passed by the learned Arbitrator is a well speaking award on every aspect of the matter. The learned Arbitrator has taken into consideration that the entire transportation of coal had taken place on instruction and approval of respondent-CCL and part amount of Rs. 12,26,337/- though admitted but remained unpaid. Even the security money was not refunded and was unreasonably and unjustifiably withheld was directed to be refunded. The learned Arbitrator has referred to the Interest Act, 1978 to award interest to the claimant on the belated payment made by respondent-CCL as discussed in the findings recorded above. 35. In view of the aforesaid discussions, none of the grounds raised by the respondent -CCL under Section 34 of the aforesaid Act of 1996 as quoted in Para-17 above calls for any interference in the award. Further, the grounds on the merits of the matter based on appreciation of evidence and materials on record do not fall within the permissible grounds for interference in the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 36. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings, the impugned order passed by the learned court below on the point of jurisdiction is set-aside. This Court finds no merit in the grounds for setting aside the award. The award is hereby made the rule of the court. 37. Office is directed to prepare a decree accordingly.