JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner was engaged as a Daily Wager in the State Forest Corporation in the year 1975 and continued to work as Daily Wager till January 1978. In the year 1978, the petitioner was appointed as Lumber Guard and the nomenclature of Lumber Guard was later changed to Field Assistant. In the year, 1983, appointments and promotions were made in bulk by the official respondent and even some Daily Wagers were directly promoted as Assistant Supervisors. The petitioner was promoted to the post of Assistant Supervisor vide order dated 15.06.1983 and on 04.12.1993, he was promoted along with other employees to the post of Supervisor-1 in the grade of Rs. 1350-50-1500-EB-75-2400 but the promotion of the petitioner was not given retrospective effect i.e. from the year, 1983. It is stated that the date of 1st appointment of the petitioner is 04.02.1978, whereas the date of first appointment of private respondent Nos. 2 & 3 is 08.08.1981 and 24.06.1981 respectively. The petitioner admittedly was senior to the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 but despite that they were promoted ahead of the petitioner. 2. In fact, the respondent No. 2 had represented to the authorities that he was senior to certain persons, who were promoted to the post of Supervisor Grade II in the year 1983, as such, he should have been given the benefit of promotion not from 1993 but 1983. The representation filed by the respondent No. 2 was considered by the official respondent and he was given all the promotional benefits with effect from 1983. His case for placement in the seniority list was also recommended vide order No. 114 of JR/97 dated 09.04.1997. Thereafter, the respondent No. 3 filed a writ petition bearing SWP No. 1534 of 1997 praying therein that the respondent No 2, Azad Khan and others, who were juniors to him were promoted in the year, 1983, therefore, he too was entitled to the same relief and treatment. The writ petition filed by the respondent No. 3 was disposed by the Court on 24.12.1999 with a direction that the petitioner be given the same benefit as has been given to respondent- Azad Khan. The said judgment had attained finality and the case of the respondent No. 3 was also considered and he too was given promotion and monetary benefits by the respondent No. 1. The said judgment had attained finality and the case of the respondent No. 3 was also considered and he too was given promotion and monetary benefits by the respondent No. 1. The petitioner was senior to the respondent No. 3 but despite that, he was not given the similar treatment by the respondent No. 1 and his representations remained un-attended. The petitioner, as such, has approached this Court seeking a direction upon the official respondent to grant the promotional benefits and other benefits at par with private respondent Nos. 2 & 3, as the petitioner is admittedly much senior to them. 3. Counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent No. 1, wherein it has been stated that the instant petition is a belated attempt on the part of the petitioner to agitate issue which has become stale. It is further stated that in case the prayer of the petitioner is allowed at this stage, it would amount to disturbing the settled seniority in the Corporation. It is further stated that respondent Nos. 2 & 3 were appointed in the State Forest Corporation in the year 1981 and both have retired on 30.04.2012 and 31.03.2010 respectively and at this stage, the respondent-Corporation cannot restore the seniority in favour of the petitioner by giving retrospective effect to his promotion since as many as 39 Block Managers are likely to be affected by such exercise and it would result into multiplicity of litigation. More so, the petitioner has retired from service and during his service career he remained quiet and now he cannot make a belated attempt to disturb the seniority. 4. The respondents have admitted that pursuant to the direction of this Court, the effect of promotion was given to Sher Singh-respondent No. 3 as Supervisor Grade-II from 23.06.1983 and as Supervisor Grade-I with effect from 24.09.1984 in order to restore his seniority. The respondent No. 1 has admitted that the petitioner is senior to respondent No. 3, Sher Singh. It is further averred that there are many other Block Managers, who are appointees of 1974 to 1981 and are similarly situated with the petitioner and they can also claim similar treatment as sought by the petitioner, if prayer of the petitioner is allowed. 5. Mr. It is further averred that there are many other Block Managers, who are appointees of 1974 to 1981 and are similarly situated with the petitioner and they can also claim similar treatment as sought by the petitioner, if prayer of the petitioner is allowed. 5. Mr. Abhinav Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the petitioner is admittedly senior to the respondent No. 3 and as such, he is entitled to the same benefit which was granted by the respondent No. 1 to the respondent No. 3. 6. Per contra, Amit Gupta, learned A.A.G for the respondent No. 1 argued that the petitioner is a fence sitter, as such, he is not entitled to any relief. He also submitted that the earlier judgment passed by the Court was judgment in personam and the petitioner cannot derive any benefit from the said judgment. He further submitted that though the petition was admitted to hearing but no finding has been returned in respect of the contention of the respondent No. 1 that the petition suffers from delay and latches. He placed reliance upon the judgment of High Court of Kerala in case titled “Union Bank of India v. K.J.Jose dated 07.03.2022”. 7. Mr. Abhinav Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner countered the argument of learned A.A.G by submitting that once the petition is admitted, the respondent No. 1 cannot raise the issue of delay and laches. He placed reliance upon the following judgments: a. “Bilal Mufti v. V.C Skuast”, 2007(5) SLR 824. b. “Habib Ullah Dar v. Chairman and Ors”, 2006(1) JKJ 205 . 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. The main issue raised by the respondent No. 1 is in respect of the delay and laches on the part of the petitioner to approach this Court. This writ petition was filed by the petitioner in the year 2008 and petitioner is claiming the similar treatment for him, as granted to the respondent No. 3 pursuant to the order dated 24.12.1999 passed by the court in SWP No. 1534/1997. A perusal of the order dated 24.12.1999 passed by this Court reveals that the contesting respondents therein did not choose to file response or counter, resultantly a direction was issued to the respondents therein to grant the petitioner therein, the same benefit as had been granted to Farooq Ahmad. 10. A perusal of the order dated 24.12.1999 passed by this Court reveals that the contesting respondents therein did not choose to file response or counter, resultantly a direction was issued to the respondents therein to grant the petitioner therein, the same benefit as had been granted to Farooq Ahmad. 10. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has made an attempt to persuade this Court that once the writ petition has been admitted, the issue of delay and laches cannot be considered at the time of final hearing of the petition. No doubt, no period of limitation has been prescribed for filing a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India but at the same time, the writ petition must be filed within a reasonable time. The expression “reasonable time” shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in “Habib Ullah Dar v, Chairman and Ors”. [ 2006(1) JKJ 205 ] while relying upon the decision of Division Bench of this Court in “Bashir Ahmad Bhat v. State of J&K and Ors.[ 2004(3) JKJ 189 ], has held that the question of delay and laches should have been projected considered before admission stage and in case it has not been projected, then right to raise the said ground should be reserved. The same proposition was reiterated by the same Bench in another case titled “Bilal Mufti v. V.C SKUAST & Other.[2007(5)SLR 824] 11. Following issues arise for consideration of this court: a. Whether the objection in respect of delay and laches in filing the writ petition can be raised after its admission for final hearing? b. Whether the writ petition is hit by the principle of delay and laches? 12. Whether the objection in respect of delay and laches in filing the writ petition can be raised after its admission for final hearing? (a) The Division bench of this Court in Bashir Ahmad Bhat v. State of J&K and Ors.[ 2004(3) JKJ 189 ] has held as under: “The respondents issued tentative seniority list in the year 1982 showing him junior in the category of Head Assistants. He filed objections to the tentative seniority list. His objections were not decided by the respondent which was not within his competence. The objections of respondent No. 1 should have been decided by the respondents within reasonable time. He filed objections to the tentative seniority list. His objections were not decided by the respondent which was not within his competence. The objections of respondent No. 1 should have been decided by the respondents within reasonable time. The respondents without deciding the representation against the promotions and the objections to the tentative Seniority List issued the final seniority list in the year 1990, wherein the respondent No. 1 was again shown below to them. It has thus provided a fresh cause of action to the petitioner to challenge the final seniority list and the promotions which have been made operating the tentative seniority list. Under these circumstances we feel that instead of blaming the petitioner, the respondents should have decided the grievances of the petitioner before issuance of final seniority list. Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent No. 1 is alone responsible and blameworthy for delay and laches which is contributory because of the inaction of the respondents. It is also the proposition of law that delay and laches should be considered before admission of the writ petition. The petition has not been admitted subject to delay and laches, which were not pressed at the time of its admission. Therefore, the writ petition under such circumstances cannot be dismissed on account of delay and laches.” (emphasis added) (b) The Division Bench of this Court in the judgment (supra) has observed that the delay and laches should be considered before the admission of the writ petition and that the petition has not been admitted subject to delay and laches. The ratio of that judgment is that as matter of principle the issue of delay and laches should be considered at the time of admission of the writ petition and once the writ petition has been admitted to hearing without reserving right to raise issue of delay and laches subsequently, then the issue of delay and laches cannot be raised at a later stage. In fact, not pressing the issue of delay and laches at the time of admission, would amount to waiver of the said objection. This judgment does not lay down any proposition that when the writ petition has been admitted to final hearing in absence of reply of the objectors-respondents, the issue of delay and laches cannot be raised subsequently. In fact, not pressing the issue of delay and laches at the time of admission, would amount to waiver of the said objection. This judgment does not lay down any proposition that when the writ petition has been admitted to final hearing in absence of reply of the objectors-respondents, the issue of delay and laches cannot be raised subsequently. There may be waiver of the objection in respect of delay and laches, when the objections filed by the objectors-respondents are considered and the writ petition is admitted to hearing, without reserving right to object the petition on the ground of delay and laches at a later stage. This view is fortified by the identical view expressed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in “Syeda Afshana Bhat v. University of Kashmir & Ors” JKJ ONLINE 76272 wherein it has been held as under: “10. I am also not impressed by the argument of Mr. Qayoom that the plea of delay and latches stands waived with the admission of the writ petition. While I am not disputing the proposition put forth by Mr. Qayoom that admission of writ petition after hearing both sides indicates that the Court has set out the petition for final hearing only after being satisfied that the petition deserves hearing on merits. However, in the instant case, the writ petition, as it appears from the order dated 07.05.2022, has been admitted due to failure of the respondents to appear and the failure of respondent No. 6 to file her reply affidavit. It appears that on the date the matter came up for consideration, this Court was persuaded to admit the writ petition in the absence of learned counsel representing the respondents. Indisputably, the University, in its objections has taken a specific preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition. The objection taken by the University was not considered at the time of admission of the writ petition. The order of admission of the writ petition dated 07.05.2022 clearly indicates that the writ petition has been admitted as a matter of course and not after giving hearing to the parties. The objection taken by the University was not considered at the time of admission of the writ petition. The order of admission of the writ petition dated 07.05.2022 clearly indicates that the writ petition has been admitted as a matter of course and not after giving hearing to the parties. Such type of admission cannot be taken to be the consideration and rejection of the objection of the respondents to the maintainability of the writ petition on account of delay and latches.” (emphasis added) (c) In Abdul Rashid Wani Vs UT of J&K, [2023 LiveLaw (JKL) 197], the Division Bench of this Court while dismissing a review petition has observed as under: “8. Keeping in mind the aforesaid provisions and principles of law and reverting back to the case in hand it is an admitted fact that the plea of delay and laches came to be raised and urged by the respondents in the reply affidavit filed to the petition at pre-admission stage as also in the counter affidavit filed at the post-admission stage. Perusal of the record would reveal that the said plea of delay and laches urged at preadmission stage by the respondents in the reply affidavit has not been considered by the court on 15.3.2022 i.e. the date of admission of the petition, therefore, it cannot by any stretch of imagination be said that the respondents could not press the said plea at post-admission stage of the petition, more so, in view of the fact that the said plea of delay and laches came to be reiterated by the respondents in the counter affidavit filed at the post-admission stage and said plea was never either opposed or rebutted by the petitioner by filing a rejoinder affidavit, so much so the said plea was also not controverted by the counsel for the petitioner at the time of final hearing of the petition, but the same is now being controverted by the petitioner in the instant petition on the strength of the judgments referred in the instant petition. (emphasis added) (d) Thus, from the above pronouncements, it is evident that the issue of delay and laches can be raised, notwithstanding the admission of the writ petition to hearing; when the writ petition is admitted to final hearing in absence of the objectors-respondents or when the writ petition is admitted in absence of the reply of the objectors-respondents or when the plea of delay and laches is not considered at the time of admission of writ petition and the said plea is reiterated in the counter-affidavit. (e) A perusal of the record shows that this petition was admitted to hearing on 23.09.2013 in absence of reply of the respondent No.1 i.e. the contesting respondent and the respondent No. 1 was directed to file counter affidavit. The respondent No. 1 filed the counter affidavit on 29.01.2014, wherein besides raising issue of delay and laches, certain other issues were also raised by the respondent No.1. The petitioner never filed any rejoinder to the counter-affidavit but was satisfied with the pleadings made in the writ petition. In such view of the matter, it cannot be said that the respondent No.1 has waived its right to object the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. 13. Whether the writ petition is hit by the principle of delay and laches? (a) Now, it is to be seen as to whether the petition suffers from delay and laches or not. The petitioner has rested his case entirely on the basis of the claim of respondent No. 3, which was allowed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 24.12.1999. The petitioner has filed the instant petition in the year 2008 i.e. approximately after nine years of the disposal of the writ petition. This is also borne from the judgment dated 24.12.1999 itself that order was not in „rem? but “personam?. There is nothing on record to say that the petitioner at any point of time made any representation with the respondents for consideration of his case except a bald statement in the writ petition that he made representations to the official respondent. In fact, the very foundation of the claim of the petitioner is the order dated 24.12.1999 passed by this court. In fact, the very foundation of the claim of the petitioner is the order dated 24.12.1999 passed by this court. (b) In the context of delay and laches, it would be proper to take note of the various pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court, where in the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has considered the scope of principle of delay and laches. The Apex Court in BSNL v. Ghanshyam Dass, (2011) 4 SCC 374 , by placing reliance upon its earlier decision in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana [ (1997) 6 SCC 538 ], has held as under: 28. Since the respondents preferred to sleep over their rights and approached the Central Administrative Tribunal only in 1997, they cannot get the benefit of the order dated 7-7-1992 of the Tribunal in Santosh Kapoor case [Santosh Kapoor v. Union of India, OA No. 1455 of 1991, order dated 7-7-1992 (CAT)] and will only be entitled to the benefit of the Circular dated 13-12-1995 which was in force in 1997. (emphasis added) (c) In State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179 , it has been held as under: 26. Presently, sitting in a time machine, we may refer to a two-Judge Bench decision in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. [ (1975) 1 SCC 152 ] , wherein it has been laid down that: “2. … A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters.” 28. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled principles and even would not remotely attract the concept of discretion. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled principles and even would not remotely attract the concept of discretion. We may hasten to add that the same may not be applicable in all circumstances where certain categories of fundamental rights are infringed. But, a stale claim of getting promotional benefits definitely should not have been entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court. (emphasis added) (d) In Union of India v. Chaman Rana, (2018) 5 SCC 798 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held as under: 8. Manifestly, the cause of action first arose to the respondents on the date of initial supersession and again on the date when rejection of their representation was communicated to them, or within reasonable time thereafter. Even if the plea based on Dev Dutt [Dev Dutt v. Union of India, (2008) 8 SCC 725 ] be considered, the cause of action based thereon accrued on 12-5-2008. There has to be a difference between a cause of action and what is perceived as materials in support of the cause of action. In service matters, especially with regard to promotion, there is always an urgency. The aggrieved must approach the Court at the earliest opportunity or within a reasonable time thereafter as third-party rights accrue in the meantime to those who are subsequently promoted. Such persons continue to work on the promotional post, ensconced in their belief of the protection available to them in service with regard to seniority. Any belated interference with the same is bound to have adverse effect on those already promoted affecting their morale in service also. Additionally, any directions at a belated stage to consider others for promotion with retrospective effect, after considerable time is bound to have serious administrative implications apart from the financial burden on the Government that would follow by such orders of promotion. (emphasis added) (e) The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India, (2012) 7 SCC 610 , refused to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal and High Court on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the petitioners, by observing as under: 35. (emphasis added) (e) The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India, (2012) 7 SCC 610 , refused to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal and High Court on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the petitioners, by observing as under: 35. In the case at hand it is evident that the appellants had slept over their rights as they perceived waiting for the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court would arrest time and thereafter further consumed time submitting representations and eventually approached the Tribunal after quite a span of time. In the meantime, the beneficiaries of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, as we have been apprised, have been promoted to the higher posts. To put the clock back at this stage and disturb the seniority position would be extremely inequitable and hence, the Tribunal and the High Court have correctly declined to exercise their jurisdiction. (emphasis added) 14. In view of what has been discussed above, this Court is of the considered view that cause of action to file the writ petition accrued in favour of the petitioner in the year 1993 when the benefit of promotion was not given to him with effect from 1983 and even if some leverage is given to the petitioner, still he did not choose to take recourse to a legal remedy when the writ petition filed by respondent No. 3 was decided by the Court in the year 1999 but he continued to sleep over his rights and woke up only in the year 2008, when he filed the present writ petition. 15. Thus, the present writ petition suffers from delay and laches. Accordingly, the same is dismissed.