JUDGMENT : M. K. THAKKER, J. 1. The appellant- State of Gujarat has preferred this appeal under Section 378 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 27.12.2001 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mehsana in Sessions Case No.95 of 2001 thereby, the respondent-accused was acquitted from the charges punishable under Sections 302, 323, 504 of Indian Penal Code and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. 2. It is the case of the prosecution that on 6.3.2001, complainant, namely, Jagatsinh Rajusinh Parmar, was on his Pan Shop and in the night hours, around 9 O’Clock, one Gokusinh Ramsinh Parmar residing in the same village came with Dhariya and asked for the Masala on credit. The complainant denied for the same and therefore, a slap was given by said Gokusinh Ramsinh to the complainant and abused by using filthy language. The complainant immediately went to the house, which is in the field and informed to the father with regard to the behaviour of Gokusinh. The father went for scolding Gokusinh. The complainant and the mother had followed the father and when they reached to the field of Bharatsinh Malusinh and they met to Gokusinh and at that time also, Gokusinh was armed with Dhariya i.e. scythe. When the father scolded Gokusinh saying that my son, namely, Jagatsihh is handicapped and when he denied to give Masala on credit basis, why you have assaulted him? Gokusinh got enraged and assaulted the father by Dhariya on his head. When second time, he tried to cause injury by Dhariya, father raised his left hand and at that time, the fingers were cut and also received the injury on his left palm. Father fallen down in the pool of blood. Complainant and the mother reached to the father and on screaming Udesinh Pruthvisinh and uncle Chelsinh Halusinh and Chhatrasinh Malsinh etc. came at the place. They took father to the Hospital in the car of one Chelsinh Harisnh where during the treatment, father succumbed to the injury. The Medical officer informed to the Kheralu Police Station by writing the vardhi, on reaching Police Sub Inspector, Kheralu Police Station to the Hospital, complaint came to be lodged by said Jagatsinh against Gokusinh Ramsinh Parmar. They took father to the Hospital in the car of one Chelsinh Harisnh where during the treatment, father succumbed to the injury. The Medical officer informed to the Kheralu Police Station by writing the vardhi, on reaching Police Sub Inspector, Kheralu Police Station to the Hospital, complaint came to be lodged by said Jagatsinh against Gokusinh Ramsinh Parmar. With the aforesaid allegations, First Information Report came to be lodged before the Kheralu Police Station by Zero Number which was transferred to Satlasana Police Station being C.R.No.I-17 of 2001 for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 323, 504 of Indian Penal Code and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. 3. On setting Criminal Law in motion, the investigation was carried out, the accused was arrested, the statement of witnesses were recorded, the weapon was discovered and sent to the FSL and on conclusion of investigation, charge-sheet came to be submitted before the Competent Court at Kheralu. As the case was triable by Court of Sessions, the same came to be committed to the Court of Sessions under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. Learned Judge framed the charge against the respondent-accused at Exh.2 for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 323, 504 of Indian Penal Code and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. The charge was read over and explained to the respondent – accused, who pleaded not guilty to the offence and claimed to be tried. 5. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, prosecution examined 16 witnesses and produced list of 21 documentary evidences. 6. Learned Public Prosecutor has examined before the trial Court following persons: P.W. No. Name Particular Exh. 1 Jagatsinh Rajjuji Parmar Complainant 6 2 Rajuba Rajjusinh Mother of the complainant and wife of the deceased 7 3 Hathesinh Rajusinh Younger brother of the complainant 8 4 Ajitsinh Balusinh Relative of the deceased 9 5 Chintusinh Seghusinh Driver of the car who brought deceased to the Hospital 10 6 Amarbhai Manabhai Who registered complaint at Kheralu Police Station and subsequently it was transferred to Satlasana Police Station. 11 12 7 Pruthvisinh Vandansinh Panch-witness of place of offence 13 8 Ratansinh Malsinh panch-witness of inquest panchnama and supported the case of prosecution 15 9 Mauvatsinh Kalusinh Panch witnesses of discovery of weapon/s. 17 10 Manubhai Ranchhodbhai PSO serving at Kheralu Police Station 20 11 Babulal Maganlal Goya Police Sub Inspector who served at Satlasana Police Station who conducted investigation 25 12 Ganpatsinh Kesharisinh Vaghela Further investigated the matter 32 14 Dr. Karsanbhai Somabhai Patel Who conducted autopsy of the body of the deceased 40 16 Bahadursinh Dolatsinh The charge-sheet came to be submitted 47 7. The prosecution has also produced documents, namely, complaint, the panchnama of discovery of weapon, inquest panchnama, FSL Report, P.M. Report, etc. which was proved through the aforesaid witnesses. 8. That on completion of examination of the witnesses, the closing pursis came to be filed, thereafter, the learned Judge has explained the circumstances and incriminating material put by the prosecution against the respondent-accused and recorded his further statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 where the accused had denied the charges levelled against him and pleaded false implication in the offence. 9. Thereafter, learned advocate of the parties were heard by the learned Additional Sessions Court, Mehsana and dealt with documentary evidence as well as oral evidence in the form of depositions and after discussing the same with reasoning, has come to the conclusion that prosecution failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt against the respondent-accused. That after appreciating evidence on record, the learned trial Judge has observed that evidence produced by the prosecution does not inspire confidence and therefore, respondent-accused is entitled to be acquitted from the charges levelled against him. In view of the above referred conclusion, learned trial Judge acquitted the respondent-accused for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 323, 504 of Indian Penal Code and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act, giving rise to the above numbered appeal. 10. Heard the learned advocates for the parties. 11. Learned APP, Ms.Vrunda Shah, relied upon the oral evidence and assailed the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mehsana in Sessions Case No.95 of 2001. Ms.Shah, learned APP has submitted that despite ample evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has committed grave error in acquitting the respondent-accused from the charges levelled against him. Ms. 11. Learned APP, Ms.Vrunda Shah, relied upon the oral evidence and assailed the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mehsana in Sessions Case No.95 of 2001. Ms.Shah, learned APP has submitted that despite ample evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has committed grave error in acquitting the respondent-accused from the charges levelled against him. Ms. Shah, learned APP has submitted that the complainant, who was examined at PW-1, namely, Jagatsinh Parmar had deposed to before the Court below that he is an eye-witness to the incident where the respondent-accused had caused injury to the father by Dhariya on the head as well as on the finger. Ms.Shah, learned APP further submitted that even prior to the incident, he heard the hot altercations between the deceased father and the respondent-accused. That though prosecution had proved the case against the respondent-accused through this witness and the same was supported by the medical evidence, the learned Judge had committed error in ignoring the complainant’s evidence and coming to the conclusion that presence of the complainant is highly doubtful. Ms.Shah, learned APP further relied on the evidence of PW- 2,namely, Rajuba Rajusinh mother of the complainant and wife of the deceased and in her evidence, she submitted that she was present at the time of incident when accused came with Dhariya in his hand. However, learned trial Court had disbelieved the aforesaid evidence and thereby committed grave error in appreciating the evidence of the mother in true letter and spirit. Ms. Shah, learned APP further submitted that the learned trial Court had committed error in ignoring the evidence of PW-3, Hathesinh Rajusinh, brother of the complainant, who also consistent in his version and supported the case of the prosecution by reiterating the facts narrated by earlier two witnesses in their depositions. Ms.Shah, learned APP further relied upon the evidence of Ajitsinh Balusinh, who candidly deposed before the trial Court that there was motive for assaulting the deceased as prior to incident, the complainant was assaulted by the respondent-accused and in his presence, the deceased left his house along with complainant, mother and brother to scold the respondent-accused. This witness had further deposed to before the learned trial Court that he heard chaos after incident and when he reached to the place, he saw that the deceased was lying in the pool of blood. This witness had further deposed to before the learned trial Court that he heard chaos after incident and when he reached to the place, he saw that the deceased was lying in the pool of blood. Ms.Shah, learned APP further relied on the evidence of the Doctor at Exh.40 who performed postmortem and at the end, he had deposed to that injuries can be caused by the muddamal weapon, which was discovered at the instance of the accused. Ms.Shah, learned APP further submitted that there was no any material discrepancies found during the cross-examination on oath. The prosecution had proved the case beyond the reasonable doubt. However, learned trial Court had committed grave error in acquitting the respondent-accused from the charges levelled against him and the learned trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in its’ true and correct perspective. Therefore, Ms.Shah, learned APP prayed to allow this appeal and convict the respondent-accused for the charges levelled against him. 12. On the other hand, learned advocate, Mr.Pratik Barot, appearing on behalf of Respondent-accused had strongly supported the findings of the learned trial Judge on the ground that prosecution had not produced any evidence, which inspired the confidence, presumption of the innocence in favour of the accused, which is further strengthen by order of acquittal. 13. Mr.Barot, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that after appreciating the entire evidence oral as well as documentary, on record, learned trial Judge rightly came to the conclusion that there is no direct evidence, which supports the case of the prosecution and therefore, learned trial Judge has rightly acquitted the respondent-accused from the charges levelled against him. 14. Mr.Barot, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that as is known to the Hon’ble Court that it is the first and foremost as well as the preliminary duty on the prosecution to bring home guilt of the accused beyond shadow of doubt and it is also the duty of the prosecution to prove involvement and complicity of the accused in alleged offence beyond reasonable doubt. 15. Mr.Barot, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that PW-1 and PW-3 who claimed to be eye-witnesses of the incident, admittedly and undisputedly suffered from physical handicapness and usually they walked slowly as emerging out in their own evidence. 15. Mr.Barot, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that PW-1 and PW-3 who claimed to be eye-witnesses of the incident, admittedly and undisputedly suffered from physical handicapness and usually they walked slowly as emerging out in their own evidence. Mr.Barot, further submitted that version of all three eye-witnesses i.e.PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 as to sequence / chronology reaching the scene of offence, witnessing the actual occurrence, does not appear so truthful on material particulars vis-a-vis individual version of each of them is getting belied on important aspects, going to the root of the matter. 16. Mr.Barot, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that according to PW-1, he along with PW-2 and PW-3 and the deceased, all of them together went to scold the deceased. According to PW-2, it is only after deceased left his house in order to scold the respondent-accused, she along with her two sons (PW-1 and PW-3) proceeded to the scene of occurrence. PW-2 once having reached to the scene of occurrence has only seen her husband (deceased) lying in a bleeding condition. Likewise PW-3 who again tries to support the case of prosecution by deposing that he in the company of his brother (PW-1) and his mother (PW-2) left together towards the scene of occurrence and in his cross-examination, it is clarified that his father (deceased) left the house to scold respondent-accused. It is clarified that his mother (PW-2) reached the scene of occurrence first and thereafter since he himself and PW-3 were nearby, they also reached to the place where father (deceased) was lying in pool of blood. It is further clarified in the deposition of PW-3 that within 2–3 seconds, his brother also reached to his father by relying upon these witnesses’ evidence, Mr.Barot learned advocate for the respondent submitted that if individual version of all the three important eye-witnesses do not tally or reconcile on material aspect of witnessing the occurrence, therefore, the trial Court rightly disbelieved the evidence of aforesaid three witnesses, who claimed to be eye-witnesses and acquitted the respondent – accused. Mr.Barot, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that if at all, three eye-witnesses reached the scene of occurrence in time and could witness the incident in question, they could have intervened or tried to rescue the deceased from being assaulted. Mr.Barot, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that if at all, three eye-witnesses reached the scene of occurrence in time and could witness the incident in question, they could have intervened or tried to rescue the deceased from being assaulted. Mr.Barot, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that looking to the distance of 6-7 fields between the place of occurrence and house of the respondent-accused, time to reach is around 10-15 minutes, as coming out from the evidence of the Investigating Officer, possibility cannot be ruled out of not witnessing the incident at all, but somehow projecting themselves as eye-witnesses. 17. Mr.Barot, learned advocate for the respondent relied on the decision in the case of Suresha V/s. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 2020 SC 1407 and submitted that the similar identical case was like the present one, applicant before the Hon’bel Apex Court where the testimony of PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 was disbelieved by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 18. Mr.Barot, learned advocate for the respondent relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Devatha Venkata Swamy Rangaih v/s. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh reported in 2003 (10) SCC 700 whereby Honb’le Apex Court disbelieved the testimony of two important eye-witnesses i.e. PW-3 and PW-7. 19. Mr.Barot, learned advocate for the respondent next cited the judgment in the case of Prem Singh V/s. State of Haryana reported in 2013(14) SCC 88 where also, the similar facts was there before the Hon’ble Apex Court in which Hon’ble Apex Court had disbelieved the version of two witnesses. 20. Similarly, reliance was placed by Mr.Barot, learned advocate for the respondent in the case of Mohan @ Srinivas @ Seena @ Tailor Seena V/s. State of Karnataka reported in 2021 (15) Scale 184 . 21. The next judgment cited is in the case of Mahendrasinh and Others v/s. State of M.P. reported in 2022(7) SCC 157 . 22. Thereafter, another decision Mahavirsinh V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2016 (10) SCC 220 . 23. 21. The next judgment cited is in the case of Mahendrasinh and Others v/s. State of M.P. reported in 2022(7) SCC 157 . 22. Thereafter, another decision Mahavirsinh V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2016 (10) SCC 220 . 23. Decision in the case of Badam Singh V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2003 (12) SCC 792 and submitted that mere fact that witnesses are consistent and what they say is not a sure guarantee of the truthfulness, the witnesses are subjected to cross-examination to bring out facts which may persuade the Court to hold that though consistent, their evidence is not acceptable for any other reason. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the conduct of the whiteness is such that it renders the case of prosecution doubtful or incredible, or that their presence at the place of occurrence as eye-witness is suspect, the Court may reject their evidence, that is why, it is necessary for the High Court to critically scrutinize the evidence in some detail, it being the final Court of fact, High Court ought not to have disturbed the findings recorded by the trial Court. 24. Mr.Barot, learned advocate for the respondent further relied on the evidence of the Doctor, who conducted postmortem at Exh.40 and the Column No.17 of the postmortem report where it transpired that alleged injuries inflicted by different weapons. Injury No.1 was inflicted upon the head of the deceased, which was in the nature of CLW, however, injury No.2 in the finger was in the nature of incised wound. Therefore, Mr.Barot, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that there is a variance in the medical evidence. To support this argument, learned advocate Mr.Barot, had relied on the decision rendered in the case of Prem Singh V/s. Sukhdevsinh reported in 2019 (9) SCC 683 where also, Hon’ble Apex court found variance in number of injuries sustained by the deceased as against version reported by PW-1 and PW-2 one eye witness of the occurrence and by giving the benefit of doubt, the Hon’ble Apex Court had acquitted them and on confirming the acquittal and dismissed the appeal at the instance of original first informant. At last, Mr.Barot, learned advocate for the respondent had relied upon the decision in the case of Subramanya V/s. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 2022 SC 510 in which it is held that unless the appellate Court finds finding of the trial Court manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable in absence of such satisfaction, High Court should not disturb a well reasoned judgment of the trial Court. 25. That Mr.Barot, learned advocate for the respondent lastly submitted that the view arrived at by the trial Court and reasoning assigned by the learned Judge cannot be said to be perverse, not in conformity with evidence on record, palpably wrong and demonstrably unsustainable. It being only possible view, the judgment and order of acquittal as recorded by the learned Judge may kindly be confirmed and appeal filed against the judgment and order of acquittal be dismissed. 26. This Court has taken the complete and comprehensive appreciation of all vital views of the case and entire evidence on record with reference to broad and reasonable probabilities of the case. It is evident that PW-1, namely, Jagatsinh Parmar, who is complainant and eye-witness of the occurrence, had deposed to in his evidence that prior to the incident, the assault was made by the respondent-accused on denial of providing Masala on credit. On informing the aforesaid incident to the deceased father, brother, mother and complainant himself went to place of occurrence to scold Gokusinh, respondent-accused. Respondent-accused was having Dhariya in his hand and on reprimanded by the father with regard to assault on the complainant, the respondent-accused got enraged and assaulted by Dhariya on the head of the deceased. When he tried to assault again, the deceased-father had tried to rescue himself by raising his hand and thereby, he received the injury on his finger and the palm. Father became unconscious and fallen down and they took father to the Hospital with help of the other witnesses and during the treatment around 11 O’clock, father succumbed to the injury. In cross-examination, PW-1 deposed to that he and his brother is handicapped since their childhood. They walked slowly and “he further deposed to that he did not disclose to the police that on reaching home, he informed to the father about assault made by the respondent-accused, and on informing the same the father left the house to scold the respondent-accused”. In cross-examination, PW-1 deposed to that he and his brother is handicapped since their childhood. They walked slowly and “he further deposed to that he did not disclose to the police that on reaching home, he informed to the father about assault made by the respondent-accused, and on informing the same the father left the house to scold the respondent-accused”. According to PW-2, who is wife of the deceased, it is only after deceased left his house in order to scold respondent-accused, she along with her two sons proceeded towards the scene of occurrence. PW-2 deposed to that once having reached to the scene of occurrence, she only seen that her husband lying in bleeding condition and she is not witness of actual occurrence. PW-3 deposed to that in the company of the brother (PW-1) and his mother PW-2 left together towards scene of occurrence and in cross examination, it is clarified that his father left first to scold the respondent-accused and mother reached first to the place of occurrence and he himself and PW-1 were nearby reached to the father and saw blood oozing out of him. That on scrutinizing the evidence of Investigating Officer, who stated that distance between the place of occurrence and house of the accused is 6 to 7 fields and time to reach is around 10 to 15 minutes, which is for the normal person. Indisputably, the complainant and the brother suffering from physical handicapness and they walked slowly, therefore, chances of reaching to the place of occurrence prior to the mother are less and mother deposed to that she is not the witness of occurrence and she saw only the condition of the husband lying in the pool of blood. Therefore, the actual assault claimed by the eye-witnesses, i.e. PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 is highly doubtful. From the aforesaid evidence, it can be emerged that when they reached to the place, they saw that deceased is lying in the pool of blood but actual assault is not witnessed by these witnesses. 27. The learned trial Judge has rightly disbelieved the evidence of these three witnesses by branding as a wholly unreliable witnesses as their version witnessing the actual occurrence does not appear to be so truthful on material particulars vis-a-vis in the original version of each of them getting belied on important aspect. 27. The learned trial Judge has rightly disbelieved the evidence of these three witnesses by branding as a wholly unreliable witnesses as their version witnessing the actual occurrence does not appear to be so truthful on material particulars vis-a-vis in the original version of each of them getting belied on important aspect. The evidence of PW-4, in his examination-in-chief, deposed to that he was present when Rajusinh (deceased) had left the house and complainant, brother and mother had followed thereafter. This also confirms that actual occurrence, which has not been witnessed by any of the witnesses as Rajusinh (deceased) reached first and thereafter, all three witnesses reached to the place. Therefore, we find difficult to accept the evidence of PW-1, 2 and 3 to convict the accused in absence of other acceptable evidence on record. 28. This Court has also considered the FSL Report wherein blood group ‘A’ was found, which also matching with blood group collected from the control sample. However, discovery panchnama, which is produced at Exh.19, if considered that, it appears that it is not as per section 27 of the Evidence Act. No any primary panchnama was drawn when the accused was arrested and disclosed that he concealed the Dhariya in the very field from where he is arrested. This shows that after he was arrested and no primary panchnama was drawn, he was not taken to the place where weapon was concealed. Therefore, this does not fulfil the requirement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. However, merely, recovery of the weapon without proving that he is author of crime would be remote circumstance to infer that it was used by him or the conviction cannot be based merely it was recovered from the applicant. Moreover, the place from which the weapon was recovered was accessible to all. There is a road passing nearby and it is an open space, therefore, also, it is risky to base the conviction on the basis of the recovery panchnama. 29. After analysing, sifting and assessing the evidence on record with particular reference to its trustworthiness and truthfulness by a process of dispassionate judicial scrutiny, this Court finds that there was no evidence to connect the accused with the crime. Prosecution failed to prove the case beyond the reasonable doubt, therefore, respondent is entitled to benefit of doubt. 29. After analysing, sifting and assessing the evidence on record with particular reference to its trustworthiness and truthfulness by a process of dispassionate judicial scrutiny, this Court finds that there was no evidence to connect the accused with the crime. Prosecution failed to prove the case beyond the reasonable doubt, therefore, respondent is entitled to benefit of doubt. As propounded by the Supreme Court, every accused is entitled to benefit of reasonable doubt regarding his guilt and when the trial Court acquitted him, he would retain that benefit in the appellate Court also. In our view, acquittal of the respondent can hardly be regarded as illegal or erroneous on the basis of evidence on record. 30. We have gone through the ratio laid down in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Harijana Thirupala and others V/s. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. reported in AIR 2002 Supreme Court p. 2821 and in the case of Kunju Mohammed V/s. State of Kerala reported in JT 2003 (7) SCC 114.The Apex Court has held as under: "Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an order of acquittal or conviction as a Court of first appeal has full power to review the evidence to reach its own independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court would not be justified to interfere with order of acquittal merely because it feels that sitting as a trial Court would have proceeded to record a conviction: a duty is cast on the High Court while reversing an order of acquittal to examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If the High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity." 31. This Court has also considered the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Jafarudheen and others V/s. State of Kerala reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 more particularly para- 25, which is reproduced herein below. “25. If the High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity." 31. This Court has also considered the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Jafarudheen and others V/s. State of Kerala reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 more particularly para- 25, which is reproduced herein below. “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC, the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the Trial Court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters”. 32. This Court has also gone through the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs The State Of Gujarat reported in 1996(9) SCC 225 para-7 reproduced herein below. “7. Before proceeding further it will be pertinent to mention that the entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal was patently wrong for it did not at all address itself to the question as to whether the reasons which weighed with the trial Court for recording the order of acquittal were proper or not. Instead thereof the High Court made an independent reappraisal of the entire evidence to arrive at the above quoted conclusions. This Court has repeatedly laid down that the mere fact that a view other than the one taken by the trial Court can be legitimately arrived at by the appellate Court on reappraisal of the evidence cannot constitute a valid and sufficient ground to interfere with an order of acquittal unless it comes to the conclusion that the entire approach of the trial Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellant Court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial Court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellant Court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellant Court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then - and then only - reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions. In keeping with the above principles we have therefore to first ascertain whether the findings of the trial Court are sustainable or not”. 33. Lastly in the case of Mahavirsinh V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2016 (10) SCC 220 , the Hon’ble the Apex Court in para-12 of the said decision, has reminded the Hon’ble Court to remain very cautious in interfering with an appeal against acquittal unless there are compelling and substantial grounds to interfere with the order of acquittal. 34. It is, therefore, that this Court in acquittal appeal will be slow in interfering with the findings of fact arrived at by the learned trial Judge on scrutiny of evidence on record and, when two views are possible even on re-appreciation of evidence, benefit of doubt must go in favour of the accused as per the settled law, and therefore, in the present case, no infirmity in appreciating the evidence by the learned trial Judge is found and, therefore, the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court does not require any interference by this Court. 35. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Muddamal to be disposed of in terms of the directions given by the learned Judge in the judgment impugned in the appeal. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the court concerned forthwith.