JUDGMENT 1. Petitioner-Pontiff of a Mutt is knocking at the doors of Writ Court for assailing the order dtd. 15/12/2022 passed by the learned II Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Chitradurga, whereby he has been 'restrained from exercising the Powers or discharging the duties of SJM Mutt and other institutions running under the said Mutt as a Pontiff and head of the institution pending conclusion of trial.' This order is made under Sec. 8(2) of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988, (hereafter 1988 Act'). After service of notice, the respondent-State has entered appearance through the learned AGA on record and its case is argued by the learned Advocate General who resists the Petition making submission in justification of the impugned order and the reasons on which it has been structured. 2. FACTS IN BRIEF: (a) Petitioner happens to be the Pontiff of Sri Jagadguru Murugharajendra Bruhanmutt, Chitradurga. The said Mutt originally established by Allamaprabhu who was a 12th-century mysticsaint and a poet who prolifically composed Vachanaas in Kannada. This saint and his order propagated the unitary consciousness of Self and Shiva, being the prominent patrons of the Lingayat movement that reshaped medieval Karnataka. Later, this Mutt was rejuvenated in the 16th century by another saint of great repute Sriman Niranjan Jagadguru Mahaswami and since then, it has been conducting anna daasoha and akshara daasoha to all Sec. of the society regardless of religion, region, race, caste, gender, place of birth or the like. By a long and committed yeoman service, it has carved out a niche for itself. Several educational institutions having been founded are being run successfully under the aegis of Mutt since decades. (b) Website version of Mutt: It is relevant to reproduce the website version of the Mutt with a caveat that the adjudication of these cases did not much warrant verification of its authenticity: "Gurusiddha Swamiji popularly known as Murige Swamiji II succeeded him and remained as the head of Math upto 1729.A.D. He was honoured as the Raja-guru by the rulers Baramanna Nayaka and his son Hire Madakari Nayaka(1721-48.A.D). He was a profound scholar in both Kannada and Sanskrit and had poetic talent. He was a profound scholar in both Kannada and Sanskrit and had poetic talent. He has so many works in both the languages to his credit.The Next succeessors Swadi Channabasava Swamiji, Sirahatti Siddalinga Swamiji, Nayakanahatti(Dodda) Gurupada Swamiji, Murusavirada(Sanna) Gurupada Swamiji, were treated with respect as Raja-gurus by Hire Madakari Nayaka, (Kasturi Rangappa Nayaka II (1748-54 AD) and the last Madakari Nayaka (1754-79AD) the rulers of Chitradurga in the year 1779 A.D., the heritage of the Math continued. Within two or three decades after the establishment of the Math, hundreds of branch maths were established in various parts of South India, due to the religious influence on the people. The local public began to call the branch maths as "Virakta Maths" and "Murige Maths", to show their devotion. For these branch maths, the rulers like those of Keladi, Kodagu(Coorg), Sode(Swadi), Harapanahalli, Mattodu, Tarikere, Hagalawadi, Savanur, Sirasangi, Lakshmeswara, Mysore, Ummattur, Punganur, Kolhapur, etc., including Muslim Nawabs and the subjects of all communities showed respect and released so many grants. This clearly indicates the secularism and greatness of the Math. Remarks of two western scholars of the past century and the beginning of the present century are also the clear evidences for the prominence and the high position of the Math. Edward P. Rice author of " A History of Canarese Literature" states that "Lingayatism was the state religion of the early Wodeyars of Mysore and of Ummatur from 1399-1610 and of the Nayaks of Keladi (Ikkeri or Bednur) from 1550-1763. Their Principal Matha in the Mysore country is at Chitradurga". Edgar Thurston who made a survey of "Tribes and castes of South India"., writing on the Lingayat Maths has pointed out that "Each Virakta Math is directly subject to teh Murige Math at Chitaldurga(Chitradurga), which has absolutely jurisdiction over all the Viraktas" Starting from Sri Murige Swamiji-I to the present Sri Shivamurthy Murugha Sharanaru, twenty Pontiffs have adorned the religious seat of the Math." (c) The Virakt Mutt which practises and professes Basava Tatva, mainly founded on humanitarian principles, has mediately established 105 educational institutions. It is not in dispute that the Pontiff has the decisive role in their management and administration. These institutions have produced thousands of meritorious candidates, many of whom serve in public and private employment. Mutt has a registered Trust Deed dtd. 26/11/2010. It is not in dispute that the Pontiff has the decisive role in their management and administration. These institutions have produced thousands of meritorious candidates, many of whom serve in public and private employment. Mutt has a registered Trust Deed dtd. 26/11/2010. PetitionerDr.Shivamurthy Murugha Sharanaru came to be installed as the Pontiff of the Mutt on 31/1/1991 by his predecessor Sri Mallikarjuna Swamaji, again a tall saint of Basava Tatva Darshanaas. There is a Vidya Peetha that has been registered as a society under the provisions of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 vide Certificate of Registration dtd. 21/6/1966. The Pontiff happens to be the President of the Trust, ex officio and he is described as the 'supreme authority'. (d) On 13/10/2022, Nazarbad Police, Mysore, registered against the Petitioner-Pontiff Crime No.155/2022 for the offences punishable under Sec. 376(2)(i), 376(3), read with Sec. 149 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under Sec. 17, 5(1) and (6) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereafter 'POCSO Act'). The Fast Track Court at Mysore transferred the investigation to the Rural Police, Chitradurga, on the ground of territoriality of offences. Accordingly, the said Police have registered Crime No.387/2022 for the same offences. The Pontiff having been arrested has been continuing in judicial custody. The investigation having been completed, the Police have filed the two charge sheets as 'A' and 'B' in Crime No.387/2022. The Spl. Court at Chitradurga, having taken cognizance of alleged offences, has registered Spl.C.(P).No.181/2022 & Spl.C.(P).No.182/2022. (e) The Petitioner-Pontiff had filed application on 6/9/2022 seeking a direction from the Jail Authorities to permit him to affix his signatures on cheques and other instruments inter alia for the purpose of organizing disbursement of salaries and other expenses to the staff of Mutt and of the educational institutions run by it. Learned Spl. II Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Chitradurga, vide order dtd. 20/9/2022 dismissed the said application. This having been challenged in Crl.P.No.9654/2022, a Coordinate Bench of this court vide order dtd. 30/9/2022 granted the prayer in the subject application. Accordingly, Petitioner has executed two registered GPAs in favour of one Sri Basavaprabhu Swamiji. When above was the position, the government vide order dtd. 13/12/2022 has appointed the Administrator, which is the subject matter of challenge in W.P.No.25316/2022 C/w W.P.No.25318/2022 that are posted for pronouncement of judgment, this day. 30/9/2022 granted the prayer in the subject application. Accordingly, Petitioner has executed two registered GPAs in favour of one Sri Basavaprabhu Swamiji. When above was the position, the government vide order dtd. 13/12/2022 has appointed the Administrator, which is the subject matter of challenge in W.P.No.25316/2022 C/w W.P.No.25318/2022 that are posted for pronouncement of judgment, this day. On the application of the prosecution, the impugned order has been made. 3. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES (i) Learned Sr. Advocate, Mr. C.V. Nagesh appearing for the petitioner, in his inimitable style, submitted that: the 1988 Act, is a 'special legislation' brought about by the Parliament in the wake of serious strife that happened in the 1980s in the State of Punjab and around; a Sec. of the society was trying to trigger disruptive activities, attempting to threaten sovereignty and integrity of the country; the militant groups were engaged in 'antinational' activities in the precincts of the Holy Golden Temple, in Amritsar and in such other places. This background needs to be kept in mind while deciding the scope and applicability of the 1988 Act and in construing its provisions. Viewed from this angle, he said, the provisions of the Act do not apply to the fact matrix of the case projected by the Respondent State. (ii) Mr. Nagesh, secondly contended that Sec. 8(2) of the 1988 Act is invocable only when the trial of the criminal case is pending and not otherwise. In the instant case, trial having not commenced, the question of its pendency would not arise. Thirdly, even if, the 1988 Act is applicable and Sec. 8(2) is invocable, the restraint order that can be made thereunder has to confine to the religious institutions and cannot transcend to educational institutions run under its aegis. This aspect has not been adverted to by the learned Judge of the Court below, and therefore, the impugned order has an error apparent on its face. This aspect has not been adverted to by the learned Judge of the Court below, and therefore, the impugned order has an error apparent on its face. (iii) Learned Advocate General appearing for the Respondent made submission in justification of the impugned order and the reasons on which it has been constructed, contending that: while construing a legislation as a whole and its provisions in species, legislative history pales into insignificance; the 1988 Act should be construed in its literal sense, keeping in view its objects and reasons; the definition clauses given in Sec. 2 should be liberally construed to effectuate the object of legislation; if so construed, the term 'religious institution' would include the educational institutions run under its aegis; any other interpretation would defeat the statutory purpose. (iv) Learned AG also contended that, the term 'pending trial' employed in Sec. 8(2) of the 1988 Act, should be interpreted to mean "pendency of a criminal case" on the cognizance of the offences being taken, whether trial has actually commenced or not; a restrictive meaning to such a term would not serve the purpose of the Act inasmuch as, in our system, long time is taken for trial to commence in any criminal matter, regard being had to the mounting pendency of cases; the provisions like Sec. 8(2) of the Act, essentially has the characteristics of civil law, though they occur in a criminal statute; words used in civil law, have to be liberally construed, keeping in view the object of the Act. So contending he sought dismissal of the Writ Petition. 4. Having heard at length the learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the Petitioner and the learned Advocate General appearing for the State and having perused the Petition Papers & adverted to relevant of the Rulings cited at the Bar, I am inclined to grant indulgence in the matter for the following reasons: A. THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS (PREVENTION OF MISUSE) ACT, 1988 IN A NUTSHELL: (i) This Act is a small statute in all comprising of ten Sec. . Its one line Preamble reads: 'An Act to prevent the misuse of religious institutions for political and other purposes.' Sec. 1 gives the title; sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 1 gives the Act a pan-India application; subsec. (3) fixes 26/5/1988 as the date w.e.f. which the Act has come into force. Sec. (2) is the 'dictionary clause' of the statute. Its one line Preamble reads: 'An Act to prevent the misuse of religious institutions for political and other purposes.' Sec. 1 gives the title; sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 1 gives the Act a pan-India application; subsec. (3) fixes 26/5/1988 as the date w.e.f. which the Act has come into force. Sec. (2) is the 'dictionary clause' of the statute. It inter alia defines the terms like ammunition, arms, political activity, political party, religious institution, manager of such institution, etc. (ii) Sec. 3 of the statute prohibits use of any religious institution or its premises for promotion of political activity, harboring of any accused/convict or for storing arms and ammunitions; it also bars commission of any unlawful or subversive acts or any act which promotes disharmony, hatred, enmity or ill-will between communities/groups of people. Further, its prohibits extends to any act calculated to insult the National Honour. Sec. (4) prohibits, subject to certain exceptions, entry of arms/ammunition or persons carrying them into religious institution. Sec. 5 prohibits use of funds and properties of 'religious institutions' for political party or activity or for the commission of any offence. Sec. 6 prohibits allowing of any ceremony, festival, congregation, procession or assembly organized by or for any political party into the religious institution. (iii) Sec. 7 of the statute prescribes the penalties; sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 8 provides for disqualification & removal of employees of any religious institution on conviction for the offence under this Act; sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 8 empowers the Criminal Court to injunct the accused from exercising the powers and duties of his office/post in the religious institution 'pending trial' of criminal cases; sub-sec. (3) provides for filling of vacancy in such a contingency arising out of order of removal/restraint. Sec. 9 enjoins employees of the religious institutions with a duty to give information to the Police about the contravention of any provisions of the Act; it also prescribes penalty for infraction of this duty. Sec. 10 repeals the ordinance that preluded this Act. B. AS TO APPLICABILITY OF THE 1988 ACT TO THE CASE OF THE PONTIFF: (i) Petitioner-Pontiff happens to be one of the accused in the subject criminal cases and he having been arrested, continues to be in the judicial custody since 1/9/2022. Sec. 10 repeals the ordinance that preluded this Act. B. AS TO APPLICABILITY OF THE 1988 ACT TO THE CASE OF THE PONTIFF: (i) Petitioner-Pontiff happens to be one of the accused in the subject criminal cases and he having been arrested, continues to be in the judicial custody since 1/9/2022. After investigation, the Police have filed the charge sheet and the trial Court has taken cognizance of the alleged offences which prima facie involve moral turpitude; these offences are punishable under Secs. 376(2)(n), 376(3) read with Sec. 149 of IPC and Sec. 17, 5(l) and 6 of POCSO Act, 2012, is apparent from the prosecution papers. As already mentioned above, the Government Order dtd. 13/12/2022 appointing the Administrator for the Mutt and its institutions, was put in challenge inter alia by the Petitioner and others in two Writ Petitions Nos. 25316/2022 and 25318/2022. This Court has handed the judgment today invalidating the said appointment, of course with some observations. Be that as it may. (ii) Learned Sr. Advocate Mr.C.V.Nagesh appearing for the Petitioner argued that going by the intent and policy content of the 1988 Act, there is absolutely no scope for the invocation of any of its provisions and therefore, the impugned order is liable to be voided. This is disputed by the learned AG. In construing the nature, scope & application of plenary legislations like the one at hands, courts are entitled to take into account such external & historical facts as may be necessary. They can also have regard to the surrounding circumstances that obtained at the time whilst the statute was enacted. This is the practice in all the civilized jurisdiction. Lord Halsbury in HERRON vs. RATHMINES AND RATHGAR IMPROVEMENT COMMISSIONERS, (1892) AC 498 observed at page 502 as under: "...The subject-matter with which the Legislature was dealing, and the facts existing at the time with respect to which the Legislature was legislating are legitimate topics to consider in ascertaining what was the object and purpose of the Legislature in passing the Act...". Lord Atkinson in KEATES vs. LEWIS MERTHYR CONSOLIDATED COLLIERIES LTD, (1911) AC 641, said: "...In the construction of statutes it is, of course, at all times and under all circumstances permissible to have regard to the state of things existing at the time the statute was passed and to the evils, which, as appears from the provisions, it was designed to remedy...". The US Supreme Court in GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY vs. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (1942) 315 US 262 observed as under: "...We are not limited to the lifeless words of the statute and formalistic cannons of construction in our search for the intent of Congress and Courts in construing a statute, may with propriety refer to the history of the times when it was passed...". The above decision is approved by our Apex Court in HARI PRASAD SHIVSHANKAR SHUKLA vs. A.D. DIVELKAR, 1957 SCR 121 . Similarly, Lord Wilberforce in R vs. IRELAND, (1997) 4 ALL ER 225 observed as under: "...In interpreting an Act of Parliament it is proper, and indeed necessary, to have regard to the state of affairs existing, and known by Parliament to be existing, at the time. It is a fair presumption that Parliament's policy or intention is directed to that state of affairs...". (iii) The 1988 Act came to be enacted by the Parliament when there was terrorism and turmoil in the State of Punjab and around perpetrated by an unscrupulous individuals attempting to threaten the sovereignty and integrity of the nation; a sort of secessionist tendency was exhibited by generating fear amongst the masses; the shrines and religious places as holy as the Golden Temple in Amritsar were being misused for creating communal disharmony and hatred. These nefarious acts and other of the kind, the statute in question seeks to proscribe and makes them punishable. All other offences howsoever gruesome, would not fit into the restrictive framework of the statute, notwithstanding the enomity of moral turpitude involved therein. (iv) Courts should be less willing to extend express meanings if it is clear that the statute in question was designed to be restrictive or circumscribed in its operation rather than liberal or permissive. How liberally a statute is to be construed depends on the nature of enactment, and strictness or otherwise of the words in which the legislature has expressed its intent. Therefore there is force in the vehement submission of Mr.Nagesh that the 1988 Act mainly focuses on serious and distinct acts of nefarious designs that have something to do with secessionist tendencies, terrorism, or such other offences, ejusdem generis. This view gains support from the texture and architecture of the various provisions in the Act, namely, the charging and penal Sec. . This view gains support from the texture and architecture of the various provisions in the Act, namely, the charging and penal Sec. . The offences alleged against the Petitioner - Pontiff apparently lack the nature and kind of the acts contemplated by the Act, although what is alleged against him are grave. Therefore, this Act is not applicable. C. AS TO INVOKABILITY OF Sec. 8(2) OF THE 1988 ACT: (i) Mr. C V Nagesh secondly contended that provisions of Sec. 8(2) of the 1988 Act were not invokable in the given fact matrix of the case, assuming that the said Act is otherwise applicable. He structures this argument on the basis of the expression "pending trial" employed in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 8. He also told the Court that trial is a concept obtaining in criminal jurisprudence; there is no indication the provision in question has employed the term with a different meaning; and that, according to him, unless the trial commences, the question of pendency of trial would not arise. Learned AG disputed this contending that the term should receive a liberal interpretation to include all criminal cases wherein, on the filing of the charge-sheet the cognizance of offence has been taken by the Court. He hastened to add that Sec. 8(2) has the characteristic of civil law although it is enacted in a penal statute and therefore, strict construction is not warranted. (ii) Let me examine the nature, scope and meaning of Sec. 8(2) which has the following text: "Where any manager or other employee of a religious institution is accused of an offence under this Act and a charge-sheet for the prosecution of such person is filed in any court and the court is of the opinion, after considering the charge-sheet and after hearing the prosecution and the accused, that a prima facie case exists, it shall pass an order or direction restraining the person from exercising the powers or discharging the duties of his office or post pending trial." This provision authorizes the trial judge to injunct any manager or other employee of a religious institution who happens to be an accused, from exercising the powers or discharging the duties of his office or post 'pending trial'. The questions, what is meant by 'trial' and when the 'trial commences', are no longer res integra. The questions, what is meant by 'trial' and when the 'trial commences', are no longer res integra. The following observations of the Apex Court at paragraph 38 of HARDEEP SINGH vs. STATE OF PUNJAB, (2014) 3 SCC 92 are a complete answer to the said questions: "...the law can be summarized to the effect that as 'trial' means determination of issues adjudging the guilt or the innocence of a person, the person has to be aware of what is the case against him and it is only at the stage of framing of the charges that the court informs him of the same, the 'trial' commences only on charges being framed. Thus, we do not approve the view taken by the courts that in a criminal case, trial commences on cognizance being taken..." Admittedly, in the subject criminal cases, the investigation having been completed, charge sheet has been filed and the trial court has taken cognizance of the offences, is true. However, the charges are yet to be framed after hearing the prosecution and the accused, as prescribed by this Sec. . In the light of the observations in HARDEEP SINGH, the trial cannot be said to have commenced; trial that has not commenced, cannot be said to 'pend'. If that be so, it is not a case of 'pending trial', as contemplated by Sec. 8(2). Thus, the pendency of trial as being a sine qua non for the invocation of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 8, the subject application could not have been moved in the court below. (iii) The vehement contention of learned AG that the expression 'pending trial' employed in Sec. 8(2) should receive liberal construction since that provision has characteristics of a 'civil law', is difficult to countenance, regard being had to its text. The provision which employs concepts of criminal law, such as, 'accused', 'offence', 'charge sheet', 'prosecution', etc, as its building blocks. Merely because, it empowers Criminal Court, to issue restraint order, one cannot at once hastily jump to the contra conclusion. Thus, the said provision having in its muscle criminal law elements in abundance, cannot be treated as a piece of civil law. It hardly needs to be stated that normally, penal laws are construed with usual strictness; the argued case of the Respondent - State, does not carve out an exception to this general norm. Thus, the said provision having in its muscle criminal law elements in abundance, cannot be treated as a piece of civil law. It hardly needs to be stated that normally, penal laws are construed with usual strictness; the argued case of the Respondent - State, does not carve out an exception to this general norm. (iv) It is not uncommon that a penal statute may have a few provisions civil in nature. Illustratively, Sec. 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides for awarding maintenance and, Sec. 357A provides for awarding compensation to the victims of crime; such provisions arguably can be construed as being civil in nature. However, that is not the case when it comes to the text and context of Sec. 8(2) of the 1988 Act. When the Parliament has made a dictionary clause for whole of the Act, leaving the term 'pending trial' undefined; there is no reason for not construing the said term as belonging to the realm of criminal jurisprudence. If something different was intended, the Parliament would have indicated the same by an appropriate text. Courts by interpretative process cannot rewrite the statute. (v) The above approach of this Court to the provisions of Sec. 8(2) gains support from the following observations at paragraphs 42, 43 and 44 of HARDEEP SINGH, supra: "...It is a settled principle of law that an interpretation which leads to the conclusion that a word used by the legislature is redundant, should be avoided as the presumption is that the legislature has deliberately and consciously used the words for carrying out the purpose of the Act. The legal maxim "A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum" which means, "from the words of law, there must be no departure" has to be kept in mind...The court cannot proceed with an assumption that the legislature enacting the statute has committed a mistake and where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the court cannot go behind the language of the statute so as to add or subtract a word playing the role of a political reformer or of a wise counsel to the legislature. The court has to proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said and even if there is some defect in the phraseology etc., it is for others than the court to remedy that defect. The court has to proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said and even if there is some defect in the phraseology etc., it is for others than the court to remedy that defect. The statute requires to be interpreted without doing any violence to the language used therein. The court cannot re-write, recast or reframe the legislation for the reason that it has no power to legislate...No word in a statute has to be construed as surplusage. No word can be rendered ineffective or purposeless. Courts are required to carry out the legislative intent fully and completely. While construing a provision, full effect is to be given to the language used therein, giving reference to the context and other provisions of the Statute. By construction, a provision should not be reduced to a "dead letter" or "useless lumber". An interpretation which renders a provision an otiose should be avoided otherwise it would mean that in enacting such a provision, the legislature was involved in "an exercise in futility" and the product came as a "purposeless piece" of legislation and that the provision had been enacted without any purpose and the entire exercise to enact such a provision was "most unwarranted besides being uncharitable..." D. AS TO THE PHRASE 'carrying on of any unlawful or subversive act' EMPLOYED UNDER Sec. 3(f) OF THE 1988 ACT: (i) Mr. Nagesh, draws attention of the court to the expression 'carrying on of any unlawful or subversive act' employed in clause (f) of Sec. 3 and contended that the said phrase is used in distinction to the phrase the 'commission of any unlawful act'; this according to him is to signify that the alleged pernicious act should have elements of continuity and seriousness, not only as an ordinary offence defined under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, but something more and distinct. This submission merits acceptance and, reasons for this are not far to seek: The 1988 Act has been enacted keeping in view the turmoil created by 'anti-national' acts that were perpetrated mainly within the precincts of shrines, temples & other religious institutions in Punjab and around, as already discussed above. The historical background of the statute needs to be borne in mind whilst construing its provisions, need no reiteration. The historical background of the statute needs to be borne in mind whilst construing its provisions, need no reiteration. The phrase 'carrying on of any unlawful or subversive act', employed in Sec. 3(f) of the Act obviously means such serious acts that are not just committed as sporadic acts, but those which have the factors of continuity, in their perpetration or effect. In other words, they do not have sporadicity, but have continuity, both in degree and duration. Otherwise, the Parliament would have employed the usual phrase such as 'commission of an act'. (ii) Mr. Nagesh's reliance on K.P.S. SATHYAMOORTHY vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU, (2003) SCC OnLine Mad 95 in a measure come to his aid. The Madras High Court at paragraph 24, observed as under: "...So far as the third above Sec. i.e. Sec. 3(g) of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 is concerned, it requires the premises or the religious institution i.e. the Kanchimatt to have been used to promote disharmony or feeling of enmity or hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or religion groups or castes or communities. Here again, the Sec. requires the use of the premises or religious institution as a place or instrument for promoting disharmony or hatred or ill-will. That the framers of law have not intended an isolated event or utterance but made use of the term "use", which would mean habitual, welldesigned with continuity making use of the premises or institution for repeated commission of the act in the usual manner and therefore an isolated or casual utterance or reference made cannot be construed to mean using the premises or the religious institution since the term "use", at this juncture, has got wider connotation in the context of the case..." (iii) To put it in a grammatical sense, P.C. Wren and H. Martin, 'High School, Enligsh Grammar and Composition', 67 - 72, (2018) , there is a subtle difference between 'commission of an act' and 'carrying on of an act; the former roughly falls into past perfect tense, whereas the latter fits into the present perfect continuous tense. In DEEPAK AGGARWAL vs. KESHAV KAUSHIK, (2013) 5 SCC 277 , the Apex Court has said: "...present perfect continuous tense is used for a position which began at some time in the past and is still continuing...". In DEEPAK AGGARWAL vs. KESHAV KAUSHIK, (2013) 5 SCC 277 , the Apex Court has said: "...present perfect continuous tense is used for a position which began at some time in the past and is still continuing...". It hardly needs to be stated that in the construction of statutes, their words and phrases must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the context, or in the object of the statute in which they occur or in the circumstances in which they are used, to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense vide CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF VICTORIA vs. BISHOP OF VANCOUVER ISLAND, AIR 1921 PC 240 . Added, the offences alleged against the Petitioner under IPC and POCSO, apparently having elements of sporadicity, do not fit into the architecture of Sec. 3(f) of 1988 Act. The contra contention of learned AG if accepted, would bring into precincts of the statute which textually speaking the Parliament did not even remotely intend. E. AS TO MEANING OF THE TERM 'religious institution' UNDER Sec. 2(f) OF THE 1988 ACT: (i) There is force in the submission of learned Senior Advocate Mr. Nagesh that in the dictionary clause of the Act, 'religious institution' has been defined and the impugned order transcends this definition in extending the restraint beyond the Mutt, to even the educational institutions run under its aegis. The operative portion of the said order has the following text: "Requisition given by the Investigating Officer dtd. 28/11/2022 to pass an order under Sec. 8(2) of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 is allowed. Accused No.1 is restrained from exercising the Powers or discharging the duties of SJM Mutt and other institutions running under the said Mutt as a Pontiff and head of the institution pending conclusion of trial.' Learned AG appearing for the State contended that the Mutt and its educational institutions in all numbering 105, in terms of their management are so intertwined with each other that they constitute a singularity and, the Pontiff manages and administers both of them; he draws attention of the Court to a paragraph in the registered Trust Deed, which indicates that the Pontiff shall be the 'supreme authority', there being none above nor below who can veto his decisions. Therefore, he had sought for placing a liberal interpretation on this term, to include such institutions thickly associated with the religious institution. He highlights the possible consequences of placing restrictive meaning on the said term. (ii) Let me examine the definition itself as given in Sec. 2(f); it has the following text: "'religious institution' means an institution for the promotion of any religion or persuasion, and includes any place or premises used as a place of public religious worship, by whatever name or designation known." Penal statutes in a modern State are actuated with some policy to curb some public evil. Such statues are primarily directed to the problems before the Legislature based on information derived from past and present experiences. They may also be designed by use of general words to cover similar problems arising in the future. Therefore, ordinarily, the legislatures in their wisdom employ a 'dictionary clause', so that the words and phrases employed in the statute are construed as provided in its definition clause and, not in their common parlance. It hardly needs to be stated that, in any language, words do not have fixed contours as eruditely said by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in TOWNE vs. EISNER, (1918) 245 U.S. 418 "...A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought, and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used..." Similarly, it is apt to recall what Maxwell, P.St.J. Langan, 'Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes', Twelfth Edition, Lexis Nexis, 76 - 78, (1962) writes in this regard: "...The words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonize with the subject of the enactment. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject, or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject, or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. Grammatically, words may cover a case; but whenever a statute or document is to be construed, it must be construed not according to the mere ordinary general meaning of the words, but according to the ordinary meaning of the words as applied to the subject matter with regard to which they are used, unless there is something which renders it necessary to read them in a sense, which is not their ordinary sense in the English language so applied..." (iii) If, at the beginning was the word, the word changes its meaning as soon as it is put to the test of reality. Statutes change not only by formal legislative amendment but also and even more by an imperceptible metamorphosis of the established thought, political usages and habits. It is pertinent to see what Justice G.P. Singh, Justice G.P. Singh, 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation', 14th Edition, Lexis Nexis, 4 - 6, (2019) says: "...The problem of interpretation is a problem of meaning of words and their effectiveness as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. A word is used to refer to some object or symbol in the real world and this object or symbol has been assigned a technical name referent. Word and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. But words of any language are capable of referring to different referent in different contexts and times. More over, there is always the difficulty of borderline cases falling within or outside the connotation of a word. Language, therefore, is likely to be misunderstood. In ordinary conversation or correspondence it is generally open for the parties to obtain clarification if the referent is imperfectly communicated. The position is, however, different in the interpretation of statute law. A statute as enacted cannot be explained by the individual opinions of the legislators, not even by a resolution of the entire Legislature. After the enacting process is over the Legislature becomes functus officio so far as that particular statute is concerned, so that it cannot itself interpret it. The position is, however, different in the interpretation of statute law. A statute as enacted cannot be explained by the individual opinions of the legislators, not even by a resolution of the entire Legislature. After the enacting process is over the Legislature becomes functus officio so far as that particular statute is concerned, so that it cannot itself interpret it. The Legislature can no doubt amend or repeal any previous statute or can declare its meaning but all this can be done only by a fresh statute after going through the normal process of law making..." (iv) Sec. 2(f) is a case of 'means and includes' definition. The Legislature has power to define a word even artificially. So the meaning of a word in the definition clause of a statute may either be restrictive or expansive. When a word is defined to mean such and such, the definition is prima facie restrictive and exhaustive. Where the definition of a word is inclusive, its meaning is prima facie extensive. When the inclusive part of a definition specifically states what all is included, Courts in the interpretative process cannot widen such inclusion. The Apex Court in P. KASILINGAM vs. P.S.G. COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY, (1995) Supp 2 SCC 348 has discussed the matter as under: "...A particular expression is often defined by the Legislature by using the word 'means' or the word 'includes'. Sometimes the words 'means and includes' are used. The use of the word 'means' indicates that "definition is a hard-and-fast definition, and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than is put down in definition"... The word 'includes' when used, enlarges the meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the clause declares that they shall include. The word 'includes' when used, enlarges the meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the clause declares that they shall include. The words "means and includes", on the other hand, indicate "an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions"...The use of the words "means and includes" in Rule 2(b) would, therefore, suggest that the definition of 'college' is intended to be exhaustive and not extensive and would cover only the educational institutions falling in the categories specified in Rule 2(b) and other educational institutions are not comprehended..." (v) The term 'religious institution' employed in Sec. 8(2) does not have elasticity which the learned AG wants this Court to ascribe to it. It does not admit anything that is not provided in the inclusive part of the definition under Sec. 2(f). Even in this inclusive part, the educational institutions of the Mutt do not fit, because of the employment of the qualifying expression in the inclusive part, namely, 'a place of public religious worship'. The educational institutions are certainly not such a place. Thus, the impugned order transcends the statutory definitions to the prejudice of the Petitioner and therefore, suffers from an added legal infirmity. In the above circumstances, this Petition succeeds; a Writ of Certiorari issues quashing the impugned order, costs having been made easy. Nothing herein above observed shall cast its shadow on the trial and decision making in the subject criminal cases. This Court places on record its deep appreciation for the research and assistance rendered by its official Law Clerk Cum Research Assistant, Mr. Faiz Afsar Sait.