ORDER : 1. The petitioner has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being aggrieved by order/notice dated 22.08.2015 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Dean of Late Shri Baliram Kashyap Memorial Government Medical College/Respondent No. 3, whereby the services of the petitioner from the post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist has been terminated giving one month prior notice. 2. Brief facts of the case, as projected by the petitioner, are that on 01.05.2014, an advertisement (Annexure P/3) had been issued by the Respondent No. 3 for various posts and applications were invited from the eligible candidates. In the aforesaid advertisement, two posts of Speech Therapist/Audiologists were advertised by the Respondent No. 3, out of which, one was reserved for Schedule Tribe and the another one was for the unreserved category. The petitioner having fulfilled the eligibility criteria, applied for the post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist against unreserved category. After scrutiny of the applications, the candidates were called for the written examination which was to be held on 26.08.2014. Subsequently, on 19.10.2014, the respondents declared the result (Annexure P/5) of the said examination and the successful candidates were called for verification of the documents vide letter dated 21.11.2014 (Annexure P/6). After verification of documents, final selection list was published by the Respondent No. 3. Thereafter, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist vide appointment order dated 08.01.2015 (Annexure-P/7) and joined her services on 12.01.2015. In the meanwhile, a writ petition bearing W.P. (S) No. 6343/2014 was filed by one Raj Kishore Mishra, who was in waiting list, pleading therein that the post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist is a District Cadre, therefore, in the light of circular issued by the State Government, the said post shall be filled up by only Bastar Division domicile candidates. In the said petition, notices were issued to the parties and an order was passed by this Hon'ble Court that the appointment of the present petitioner shall be subject to the final outcome of the petition (WPS No. 6346/2014). According to the petitioner, she duly filed the reply in the writ petition and took her stand that the post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist is not a district cadre post for the reason that same has been sanctioned by the State Government in the Medical College in light of the Chhattisgarh Medical Education Department (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rule, 2011 (Annexure P/9). According to the petitioner, she duly filed the reply in the writ petition and took her stand that the post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist is not a district cadre post for the reason that same has been sanctioned by the State Government in the Medical College in light of the Chhattisgarh Medical Education Department (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rule, 2011 (Annexure P/9). According to the petitioner, the appointment of the petitioner was sub-judice before this Hon’ble High Court and no order has been passed by the Hon'ble Court against the petitioner and only directed the respondent college to file an affidavit in this regard. 3. Thereafter, despite the selection process and the appointment on the post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist under 2 years probation period and completion of 8 months service, a notice dated 22.08.2015 (Annexure P/1) was issued to the petitioner informing her that her services would automatically be terminated after expiry of one month from the date of issue of this notice on the ground that there is no mention regarding the post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist or anything related to it in the recruitment Rules, 1989. Hence, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following reliefs: “10.1. This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ quashing and setting aside the order dated 22.08.2015 (Annexure P/1) passed by the respondent No. 3. 10.2 The Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue writ/writs/order/orders/direction/ directions/ relief/relief's, which this Hon'ble Court may think fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the reason given by the Respondent No. 3 in the impugned order dated 22.08.2015 (Annexure P/1) is against the rule of law and it is totally arbitrary, discriminatory, shows the biasness, mala-fide intention of the respondents and it is clear violation of principles of natural justice as well as Article 14, 16, 21, 309-B, 311 (2) of the Constitution of India and it is equally unjust, unfair and improper. The action of respondents are unjustified, actuated from their biasness and mala-fide intention to suppress the statutory rights of the petitioner on the pretext of her probation period and, therefore, is violative of Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India as also settled principles of natural justice. The action of respondents are unjustified, actuated from their biasness and mala-fide intention to suppress the statutory rights of the petitioner on the pretext of her probation period and, therefore, is violative of Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India as also settled principles of natural justice. Learned counsel further submits that the respondent/college is bound to act according to the rules of law, and in absence of that, the impugned order dated 22.08.2015 is bad in the eye of law. The discretionary power vested in any statutory authority could not be exercised arbitrarily in a high-handed manner. The action of the respondent No. 3, prima-facie, seems to be discriminatory and violative of fundamental rights of the petitioner. Learned counsel also submits that the impugned order itself indicated that the impugned order of termination of the service of the petitioner was pre-determined and it was only in serious contravention of services rules but also made in contravention of Articles 21, 309-B, 311, 311 (20 and 313) of the Constitution of India. 5. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court in the matter of Ku. Sunanda Dutta vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others, 2015 SCC Online Chh 1707 : (2015) 5 CGLJ 35, Dr. Shruti Khare vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others, 2022 SCC Online Chh 108 and decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Satyajit Kumar and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and Others, 2022 SCC Online SC 954. 6. On the other hand, learned State counsel strongly opposed the prayer of the petitioner and submits that the respondent No. 3/College issued an advertisement on 01.05.2014 for recruitment of various posts along with two posts of Speech Therapist/Audiologist in the College as per the Madhya Pradesh Lok Swaasthya Avam Pariwar Kalyan (Sanchalnalaya Swasthya Sewayen) Tritiy Shreni Lipik Vargiya Seva Bharti Niyam, 1989 (for short 'The Niyam, 1989”). The petitioner has also submitted her candidature on the post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist along with the other candidates. After due process of recruitment, the petitioner and one Ajay Kumar Basod were appointed on the post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist vide appointment order dated 08.01.2015. Learned State counsel further submits that on perusal of the Niyam 1989, it came to the knowledge that the post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist has not been mentioned in the Niyam 1989. After due process of recruitment, the petitioner and one Ajay Kumar Basod were appointed on the post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist vide appointment order dated 08.01.2015. Learned State counsel further submits that on perusal of the Niyam 1989, it came to the knowledge that the post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist has not been mentioned in the Niyam 1989. Therefore, as per Shashkiya Seva (Sthayee and Ardhsthayee) Seva Niyam, 1960 (for short ‘the Niyam 1960’) vide letter dated 22.08.2015, a notice was issued to the petitioner along with one Ajay Kumar Basod for termination of their service after one month from the notice. Learned State counsel further submits that according to the Service Recruitment Rules 2013, the post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist is Class-II post, which can only be filled by the Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission. Therefore, the appointment of the petitioner on the post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist is illegal. There is no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order dated 22.08.2015 (Annexure P/1), as such, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed. 7. Learned State counsel also submits that since the selection process for the post of Speech Therapist/Audiology was irregular and illegal, the entire selection process has been cancelled and orders of termination have been issued. The petitioner is not entitled to raise any of the ground contained in the writ petition. The petitioner is not entitled for any relief as claimed by her in the petition as the petitioner is not a confirmed employee, she was on probation period and her termination after giving one month notice is in accordance with law. 8. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Governming Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology, Bangalore vs. Dr. Pandurang Godwalkar and Another, (1992) 4 SCC 719 , Ganganagar Zila Dughd Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Ltd. and Another vs. Priyanka Joshi and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 214 and Rajasthan High Court vs. Ved Priya and Another, (2021) 13 SCC 151 . 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 10. Admittedly, the petitioner was appointed vide order dated 08.01.2015 (Annexure P/7) and her appointment was subject to the conditions as mentioned in the said appointment order. The condition No. 2 of the said order (Annexure P/7) specifically deals with Niyam, 1960. For ready reference, the condition Nos. 10. Admittedly, the petitioner was appointed vide order dated 08.01.2015 (Annexure P/7) and her appointment was subject to the conditions as mentioned in the said appointment order. The condition No. 2 of the said order (Annexure P/7) specifically deals with Niyam, 1960. For ready reference, the condition Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 are reproduced herein as under: ^^1- fu;qDr deZpkjh dk vkns'k tkjh gksus dh frfFk 15 fnol ds vanj inHkkj xzg.k djuk vfuok;Z gksxkA vU;Fkk mudh fu;qfDr fujLr ekuh tkosxhA 2- NRrhlxढ+ 'kkldh; lsok ¼LFkk;h rFkk v)ZLFkk;h½ lsok fu;e 1960 ds vuqlkj lacaf/kr O;fDr dh lsok,a fdlh Hkh le; fdlh Hkh ,d i{k }kjk ,d ekg dk uksfVl nsdj mlds ,ot esa 01 ekg dk osru rFkk HkRrs nsdj lekIr dh tk ldsxhA lacaf/kr O;fDr }kjk ,d ekg dk uksfVl nsdj ;k mlds ,ot esa 01 ekg dk osru rFkk HkRrs dk Hkqxrku fd;s fcuk 'kkldh; lsok NksM+us ij mDr 'krksZ ds varxZr ,d ekg ds osru ds cjkcj ns; jkf'k lacaf/kr O;fDr ls Hkw&jktLo dh cdk;k Hkkafr olwyh tk;sxhA 3- p;fur ÁR;k'kh dks inLrhdj.k ds LFkku rd tkus gsrq fdlh Hkh Ádkj dk ;k=k HkRrk ns; ugha gksxkA 4- ;g fu;qfDr nks o”kZ dh ifjoh{kk vof/k ij gksxhA 5----------** 11. Aforesaid conditions of the order manifestly clear that the appointment of the petitioner was provisional and was on probation period for two years & the impugned order of termination which is in the form of one month's notice, was issued on 22.08.2015 i.e. after seven months of appointment of the petitioner. 12. While dealing with the scheme of probation of an employee, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Rajasthan High Court (supra) held in Para 14, 15, 18 and 19 as under: “14. The present case is one where the first respondent was a probationer and not a substantive appointee, hence not strictly covered within the umbrella of Article 311. The purpose of such probation has been noted in Kazia Mohammed Muzzammil vs. State of Karnataka: (SCC p. 172, Para 25) “25. The purpose of any probation is to ensure that before the employee attains the status of confirmed regular employee, he should satisfactorily perform his duties and functions to enable the authorities to pass appropriate orders. In other words, the scheme of probation is to judge the ability, suitability and performance of an officer under probation.” 15. The purpose of any probation is to ensure that before the employee attains the status of confirmed regular employee, he should satisfactorily perform his duties and functions to enable the authorities to pass appropriate orders. In other words, the scheme of probation is to judge the ability, suitability and performance of an officer under probation.” 15. Similarly, in Rajesh Kumar Shrivastava vs. State of Jharkhand, it was opined: (SCC p. 449, Para 9) “9....A person is placed on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his suitability for continuation in the service and also for confirmation in service. There are various criteria for adjudging suitability of a person to hold the post on permanent basis and by way of confirmation. At that stage and during the period of probation the action and activities of the probationer (appellant) are generally under scrutiny and on the basis of his overall performance a decision is generally taken as to whether his services should be continued and that he should be confirmed, or he should be released from service.” 18. Furthermore, there is a subtle, yet fundamental, difference between termination of a probationer and that of a confirmed employee. Although it is undisputed that the State cannot act arbitrarily in either case, yet there has to be a difference in judicial approach between the two. Whereas in the case of a confirmed employee the scope of judicial interference would be more expansive given the protection under Article 311 of the Constitution or the Service Rules but such may not be true in the case of probationers who are denuded of such protection(s) while working on trial basis. 19. Probationers have no indefeasible right to continue in employment until confirmed, and they can be relieved by the competent authority if found unsuitable. It is any in a very limited category of cases that such probationers can seek protection under the principles of natural justice, say when they are “removed” in a manner which prejudices their future prospects in alternate fields or casts aspersions on their character or violates their constitutional rights. In such cases of “stigmatic” removal only that a reasonable opportunity of hearing is sine qua non. In such cases of “stigmatic” removal only that a reasonable opportunity of hearing is sine qua non. Way back in Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of India, a Constitution Bench opined that: (AIR p. 49, Para 28) “28.........In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with.” 13. In the case in hand, as per appointment order (Annexure P/ 7), it is clear that when the termination order (Annexure P/1) was issued, the petitioner was on probation for a period of two years and she had completed seven months & as per condition No. 2 of the appointment order, before termination one month's prior notice to the probationer was essential. As per termination order (Annexure P/1), which is in the form of one month prior notice, the petitioner services was automatically stands terminated after expiry of one month as it clear from the operative Para of order dated 22.08.2015 (Annexure P/1). The operative Para of order dated 22.08.2015 (Annexure P/1) is as under: ^^LokLF; foHkkx esa HkrhZ fu;e] 1989 dk v/;;u djus ij ;g ik;k tkrk gS fd LihpFksjsfiLV@vkfM;ksykftLV in ds laca/k esa mDr HkrhZ fu;e esa LihpFksjsfiLV@vkfM;ksykftLV in vFkok rRlca/k es fdlh Ádkj dk mYys[k ugha gSA vr% 'kkldh; lsok ¼LFkk;h rFkk v)ZLFkk;h½ lsok fu;e] 1960 ds Áko/kku ds varxZr bl laLFkk esa vufUre :i esa vkns'k Øekad@298&301 fnukad 08-01-2015 ds rgr inLFk ÁR;k'kh dqŒ vafdrk 'kekZ firk Jh lat; 'kekZ ,oa Jh vt; clksM firk Jh Qdwjke clksM LihpFksjsfiLV@vkfM;ksykftLV dks ,rn~}kjk vkt fnukad 22-08-2015 dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mudh lsok;sa bl lwpuk ds tkjh gksus ds fnukad ls 01 ekg ds lekfIr mijkUr Lor% lekIr ekuh tkosxh] ,ot esa mUgsa ,d ekg ds osru ,oa HkRrk fu;ekuqlkj ÁkIr djus dh ik=rk gksxhA** 14. There was no allegation of misconduct against the petitioner nor there was anything adverse report with regard to performance of the petitioner. Since the petitioner was on probation period and her appointment was not in accordance with rule and as specified in the appointment order that the services of the petitioner can be terminated by giving one month prior notice, the Respondent No. 3 terminated the services of the petitioner. This Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the order impugned. 15. In view of aforesaid discussion and in view of the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Rajasthan High Court (supra), this petition has no merit and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.