JUDGEMENT 1. Petitioner seeks quashing of the FIR no. 15/2022 for commission of the offences punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, registered in the police station Nishat in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The case set up by the petitioner is that he was posted as SHO police station Parimpora and was transferred and posted as SHO police station Nishat on 27.01.2022. In terms of Order No. 353 of 2022 dated 26.03.2022, petitioner was attached to DPL, Srinagar. It is stated that a false and frivolous complaint was filed by respondent no. 8 against petitioner and respondent no. 7 with respondent no. 2, stating therein that he holds the contract of Tulip Garden but SHO P/S Nishat with one of the cops was asking for bribe and unnecessarily harassing him and as such, action be taken against petitioner and the cop. The complaint was forwarded to respondent no. 3 for action as warranted under law, who in turn forwarded the same to respondent no. 4, who also endorsed the complaint to respondent no.6 for his information. Respondent no. 6 registered impugned FIR no. 15/2022 against petitioner and respondent no. 7. In terms of Order No. 355 of 2022 dated 27.03.2022, petitioner was placed under suspension. Departmental enquiry was initiated against him. Deputy Superintendent of Police Hqrs, Srinagar, was directed to conduct department enquiry against petitioner. 3. Response has been filed by official respondents, wherein they have stated that on 26.03.2022, respondent no. 8, who had procured ticketing contract at Tulip Garden appeared before the office of respondent no. 2 with a written complaint alleging therein that petitioner and respondent no. 7 were compelling him to pay illegal gratification to the tune of Rs. 4.00 to Rs. 5.00 Lacs and also Rs. 5000/- on daily basis and harassed him and that complainant/respondent no.8 alleged that petitioner and respondent no. 7 were threatening him that they would divert the traffic to cause loss to his business and respondent no. 7 was compelling him to meet him with illegal gratification of Rs. 50,000/- as an interim amount. It is also averred that considering urgency and sensitivity of the matter, immediate action/cognizance was taken and a memo of cash, which complainant was going to give to respondent no. 7 was compelling him to meet him with illegal gratification of Rs. 50,000/- as an interim amount. It is also averred that considering urgency and sensitivity of the matter, immediate action/cognizance was taken and a memo of cash, which complainant was going to give to respondent no. 7, was prepared and the serial numbers of currency notes were noted down in presence of two witnesses and complainant/respondent no.8 was advised to proceed to the spot where the accused respondent no. 7 had called him to meet. Near Tulip Garden, respondent no. 7 after receiving alleged illegal gratification from complainant, threw it into police vehicle which was parked near place of occurrence. SPO (Driver) Ishfaq Ahmad No. 1945/SPO, who was present inside vehicle who during course of investigation also has deposed/testified before a Magistrate that respondent no. 7 threw the money into the police vehicle after finding out that SSP, Srinagar, and his PSOs were standing nearby. The said driver has testified the fact that the moments after this, the PSOs of SSP Srinagar reached the vehicle and asked for money that respondent no. 7 had thrown into the vehicle; the serial numbers of currency notes were scrutinized and found matched with the memo and found to be the same. Accordingly impugned FIR came to be registered and investigation was set into motion. It is also stated that during course of investigation, the amount of Rs. 50,000/- was seized and seizure memo was prepared in front of witnesses and statement of witnesses was recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.; out of them statement of witness-driver Ishfaq Ahmad was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the court of 2nd Additional Munsiff, Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Srinagar, on 31.03.2022. 4. Response/objections have also been filed by respondent no. 8. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and considered the matter. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the impugned FIR is based on false and frivolous grounds made by respondent no. 8. As contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the respondents were required to first conduct the enquiry into the matter under Rule 349 of the Police Rules and that it was not open for them to register the FIR against the petitioner without the permission of the District Magistrate. 8. As contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the respondents were required to first conduct the enquiry into the matter under Rule 349 of the Police Rules and that it was not open for them to register the FIR against the petitioner without the permission of the District Magistrate. It is further stated that the basic ingredients of Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act have not been satisfied because the petitioner is not alleged to have obtained any illegal gratification from respondent no. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner also states that the respondents had no authority, power or jurisdiction to register the impugned FIR against the petitioner and respondent no. 7 as on receipt of the complaint, the matter was to be reported to District Magistrate and it was he, who had to decide whether he investigation of the case was to be conducted by a police officer or by a Magistrate. It is also contended that impugned FIR nowhere mentions that the petitioner had either obtained or accepted or attempted to obtain from the complainant any undue advantage with the intention to perform or cause performance of the public duty improperly or dishonestly and therefore, respondent no. 2 had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint insofar as the petitioner is concerned and get the impugned FIR registered against him. It is also submitted that the petitioner has not committed any crime. He has not only been placed under suspension illegally and improperly but the impugned FIR has also been registered against him without any authority of law. While making reference to State of Haryana v. Chowdhary Bhajan Lal & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 604 , the learned counsel for the petitioner also states that even if the allegations levelled in the impugned FIR are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, still they do not make out a prima facie case which constitute any offence against petitioner. The learned counsel for petitioner has also placed reliance on Mohammad Wajid & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors., 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2023 INSC 683 . 7. The learned counsel for petitioner has also placed reliance on Mohammad Wajid & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors., 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2023 INSC 683 . 7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents has stated that the case stands registered under the exigent circumstances and the cognizance in the case has been taken under the special law which has been augured by the circumstances and the facts inasmuch as the cognizance of the facts was rendered pertinent and warranted in furtherance whereof action under law was taken by the investigating agency. The steps for investigation have been undertaken as laid down under law and procedure to lend complete transparency and sanctity to the actions undertaken and that allegations are bearing indictment over members of police force. The police, besides having purport of prevention and detection of crime, is protector of life and property of the masses and any allegation to the extent of extortion of bribe from members of public by police officials have to be put to through scrutiny. Learned counsel for respondents would also state that the investigation of the matter is at its threshold and the culpability of petitioner is yet to be worked out, but the act of impeding the furtherance of investigation by the petitioner lends a colour of guilty conscious to him and guilty conscious does not need any excuse. It is being also stated that petitioner has failed to address or carve out a case for quashment within the situations indicated in Bhajan Lal's case (supra). While referring to Union of India & Ors. v. B.R. Bajaj & Ors., it is contended by learned counsel for respondents that the Supreme Court while reiterating the guidelines laid down in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) has observed that FIR containing some of the important allegations which make out cognizable offence at that stage and registration of FIR was only beginning of investigation and quashing of FIR by the High Court was held not proper. He has relied upon M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2021) 19 SCC 401 , and judgement dated 17.12.2020, passed by a Bench of this Court in CRM(M) no. 265/2019 titled as Sarwan Singh v. State. 8. The petitioner seeks exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the impugned FIR. He has relied upon M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2021) 19 SCC 401 , and judgement dated 17.12.2020, passed by a Bench of this Court in CRM(M) no. 265/2019 titled as Sarwan Singh v. State. 8. The petitioner seeks exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the impugned FIR. The scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C. is well defined and inherent powers could be exercised by the High Court to give effect to an order under the Code, to prevent abuse of the process of the court; and to otherwise secure the ends of justice. This extraordinary power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae. However, in exercise of such powers, it is not permissible for the High Court to appreciate the evidence as it can only evaluate the material documents on record to the extent of its prima facie satisfaction about the existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and the court cannot look into materials, acceptability of which is essentially a matter for the trial. 9. The judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of the powers vested in it under Section 482 Cr.P.C., if answer to all the steps, as enumerated herein after, is in affirmative, has been so said by the Supreme Court in Rajiv Thapar v Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 :- “Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: i. Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? ii. Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. iii. iii. Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? iv. Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?" 10. The case in hand, when examined on the touchstone of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, does not at all persuade this Court to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioner in the instant petition. It is well settled law that Section 482 Cr.P.C. empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent powers to prevent abuse of the process of Court. The Supreme Court in State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani, reported in (2017) 2 SCC 779 , has held that the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to quash the FIR, is to be exercised in a very sparing manner as is not to be used to choke or smother the prosecution that is legitimate. The inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. Such power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. The inherent powers in a matter of quashing FIR have to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only when such exercise is justifying by the test specifically laid down in the provision itself. The power under Section 482 Cr.PC, is a very wide, but conferment of the wide power requires the Court to be more conscious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court. 11. The Supreme Court in State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani, reported in (2017) 2 SCC 779 , has held that the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to quash the FIR, is to be exercised in a very sparing manner as is not to be used to choke or smother the prosecution that is legitimate. Inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. Such power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. Inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. Such power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. Inherent powers in a matter of quashing FIR have to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only when such exercise is justifying by the test specifically laid down in provision itself. Power under Section 482 Cr.PC, is a very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the Court to be more conscious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court. 12. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the background of quashing the proceedings in the criminal investigation. After noticing the various earlier pronouncements, the Supreme Court made certain categories of cases by way of the illustration, where the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. can be exercised to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or secure the ends of justice. The paragraph 102, which gives seven categories of cases where power can be exercised under Section 482 Cr. P.C. are reproduced as follows: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 13. In another case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy, reported in (2004) 6 SCC 522 , the Supreme Court, while dealing with inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C., has observed and held as under: “5. Exercise of power under Section 482of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. P.C., has observed and held as under: “5. Exercise of power under Section 482of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the Section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquidaliqueconcedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsaesse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the Section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercises of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. xxxxxx 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the Section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short- circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. At the same time the Section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short- circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)...... xxxxxxx 8. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See : The Janata Dal etc. v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors., etc. ( AIR 1993 SC 892 ), Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar & Anr. ( AIR 1964 SC 1 )). It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint/F.I.R. has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant or disclosed in the F.I.R. that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint/F.I.R. is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceeding.” 14. The above settled position of law has also been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Priti Saraf & Anr. v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr., 2021 SCC Online SC 206, and it has been said that inherent power of the High Court is an extraordinary power which has to be exercised with great care and circumspection before embarking to scrutinize a complaint/FIR/ charge-sheet in deciding whether the case is the rarest of rare cases, to scuttle the prosecution at its inception. It is settled that whether the allegations in the complaint were true, is to be decided on the basis of evidence during the trial. It is settled that whether the allegations in the complaint were true, is to be decided on the basis of evidence during the trial. In the matter of exercise of inherent power by the High Court, the only requirement is to see whether continuance of the proceedings would be a total abuse of the process of the Court. 15. Even the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Arun Gulab Gawali (2010) 9 SCC 701 , set-aside the order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, whereby the criminal complaint/FIR was quashed on the prayer made by the complainant himself. While quashing and setting-aside the order passed by the High Court, the Supreme Court in paras 13 and 27 to 29 has observed and held as under: “13. The power of quashing criminal proceedings has to be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases and the Court cannot be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of allegations made in the F.I.R./Complaint, unless the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion. The extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice. However, the Court, under its inherent powers, can neither intervene at an uncalled for stage nor it can `soft-pedal the course of justice' at a crucial stage of investigation/ proceedings. The provisions of Articles 226, 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called as 'Cr.P.C.') are a device to advance justice and not to frustrate it. The power of judicial review is discretionary, however, it must be exercised to prevent the miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave errors and to ensure that esteem of administration of justice remains clean and pure. However, there are no limits of power of the Court, but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. However, there are no limits of power of the Court, but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. (Vide State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha [ (1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 283 : AIR 1982 SC 949 ], Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate [ (1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400], G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. [ (2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513 : AIR 2000 SC 754 ] and Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [ (2003) 3 SCC 11 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 703] ) xxx xxxxxxxx 27. The High Court proceeded on the perception that as the complainant himself was not supporting the complaint, he would not support the case of the prosecution and there would be no chance of conviction, thus the trial itself would be a futile exercise. Quashing of FIR/Complaint on such a ground cannot be held to be justified in law. Ordinarily, the Court of Sessions is empowered to discharge an accused under Section 227 Cr.P.C. even before initiating the trial. The accused can, therefore, move the Trial Court itself for such a relief and the Trial Court would be in a better position to analyse and pass an order as it is possessed of all the powers and the material to do so. It is, therefore, not necessary to invoke the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for the quashing of a prosecution in such a case. The reliance on affidavits by the High Court would be a weak, hazy and unreliable source for adjudication on the fate of a trial. The presumption that an accused would never be convicted on the material available is too risky a proposition to be accepted readily, particularly in heinous offences like extortion. 28. A claim founded on a denial by the complainant even before the trial commences coupled with an allegation that the police had compelled the lodging of a false FIR, is a matter which requires further investigation as the charge is leveled against the police. If the prosecution is quashed, then neither the Trial Court nor the Investigating Agency has any opportunity to go into this question, which may require consideration. The State is the prosecutor and all prosecution is the social and legal responsibility of the State. If the prosecution is quashed, then neither the Trial Court nor the Investigating Agency has any opportunity to go into this question, which may require consideration. The State is the prosecutor and all prosecution is the social and legal responsibility of the State. An offence committed is a crime against a society and not against a victim alone. The victim under undue pressure or influence of the accused or under any threat or compulsion may resile back but that would not absolve the State from bringing the accused to book, who has committed an offence and has violated the law of the land. 29. Thus, while exercising such power the court has to act cautiously before proceeding to quash a prosecution in respect of an offence which hits and affects the society at large. It should be a case where no other view is possible nor any investigation or inquiry is further required. There cannot be a general proposition of law, so as to fit in as a straitjacket formula for the exercise of such power. Each case will have to be judged on its own merit and the facts warranting exercise of such power. More so, it was not a case of civil nature where there could be a possibility of compromise or involving an offence which may be compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C., where the Court could apply the ratio of the case in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia [ (1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234 : AIR 1988 SC 709 ].” 16. In the above backdrop it may be appropriate to mention here that Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court. The High Court, while forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C., must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude, it has to be exercised to secure the ends of justice or to prevent an abuse of the process of any court. P.C., must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude, it has to be exercised to secure the ends of justice or to prevent an abuse of the process of any court. 17. Perusal of the instant petition and the contents contained therein require and demand full dress trial and examination of facts by this Court as if this Court is in appeal and acting as an appellate court and to draw its own conclusion vis-à;-vis impugned FIR, complaint and proceedings emanating therefrom. This is not the aim and objective of the provisions of Section 482 Cr. P.C., particularly when the petition on hand does not unveil any ground muchless cogent or material one, to indicate that the inherent powers are to be exercised to prevent abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice. The reference made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the judgements are distinct in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In that view of the matter, the impugned FIR does not call for any interference and consequently, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed. 18. For the reasons discussed above, the instant petition is without any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed with connected CM(s). Interim direction, if any, shall stand vacated.