JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has challenged order dated 19.08.2002 whereby an enquiry has been initiated against him. Challenge has also been thrown to enquiry report dated 19.03.2003 submitted by respondent No. 3 to respondent No. 2 and order dated 08.11.2004 issued by respondent No. 2 whereby a show cause notice has been issued to the petitioner in respect of proposed punishment of dismissal from service. 2. Briefly stated case of the petitioner is that he was appointed as cashier-cum-clerk with the respondent-Bank on 07.06.1986. It has been submitted that in the year 1999, the petitioner was posted at Tiger Cinema branch of Punjab National Bank. Vide order dated 03.02.1999, the petitioner was placed under suspension in connection with alleged fraud/embezzlement of money. A charge-sheet dated 08.06.1999 was served upon the petitioner by respondent No.2 wherein certain vague allegations against him were levelled. Reply to the said charge-sheet was submitted by the petitioner in terms of his letter dated 28.06.1999, whereafter, in terms of order dated 20.07.1999, Sh. S.K. Sharma, Manager, Regional Camp Office, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu, was appointed as an Enquiry Officer by the Disciplinary Authority. The petitioner challenged the enquiry proceedings by way of a writ petitioner bearing SWP No. 1764 of 1999. In terms of order dated 02.03.2000, the said writ petition came to be dismissed as withdrawn with a liberty to the respondent-Bank to serve a fresh charge-sheet upon the petitioner. 3. Respondent No. 4 served a fresh charge-sheet upon the petitioner vide memo dated 09.07.2001. As per the charges, the petitioner was alleged to have retained the cash deposited by certain customers unauthorisedly and deposited the same in the relevant accounts of the customers after a gap of 03 to 20 days. He was granted 15 days' time to file his reply to the charge-sheet. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on 31.07.2001 and prior to that i.e. on 26.07.2001, respondent No.3 was appointed as an Enquiry Officer. The petitioner participated in the enquiry proceedings in which Sh. Pankaj Bakshi, Branch Manager, was appointed as the Presenting Officer. It is alleged that the Presenting Officer did not cooperate with the enquiry proceedings and sought several opportunities for filing list of witnesses/documents in support of the charges leveled against the petitioner. Ultimately, on 29.01.2002, the Enquiry Officer gave one last opportunity to the Presenting Officer to file his list of witnesses/ documents. It is alleged that the Presenting Officer did not cooperate with the enquiry proceedings and sought several opportunities for filing list of witnesses/documents in support of the charges leveled against the petitioner. Ultimately, on 29.01.2002, the Enquiry Officer gave one last opportunity to the Presenting Officer to file his list of witnesses/ documents. According to the petitioner, the Presenting Officer failed to produce even a single witness to prove the charges against him. On 14.03.2002, photocopies of certain documents were produced by the Presenting Office and he sought permission to close his side of his case. When the Enquiry Officer asked the petitioner to lead his evidence in defence, he sought permission to inspect the original documents, photocopies whereof were produced by the Presenting Officer on 14.03.2002, but the Presenting Office expressed his inability to produce the original documents, as, according to him, the original record was lying with the previous Presenting officer Sh. Ashok Khazanchi who had been transferred by that time. Time was granted by the Enquiry Officer to the Presenting Officer for production of original documents so as to enable the petitioner to inspect the same, whereafter the Presenting Officer produced the original documents after procuring the same from the previous Presenting Officer. The petitioner is stated to have examined these original documents, but he did not deem necessary to produce any evidence in defence because nothing had been established against him. On 20.03.2002, arguments were concluded and the parties were allowed to file their written arguments within five days. 4. It has been submitted by the petitioner that nothing was heard by him in the matter until he received an impugned order dated 19.08.2002 issued by respondent No. 2 whereby a fresh enquiry was ordered against him. This order was challenged by the petitioner by filing the instant writ petition. However, this Court allowed the respondent-Bank to go ahead with the enquiry proceedings and directed that final order shall not be passed against the petitioner. During pendency of the writ petition, the impugned notice proposing imposition of penalty of dismissal from service upon the petitioner was issued. The petitioner amended the writ petition and laid challenge to the said order also. 5. During pendency of the writ petition, the impugned notice proposing imposition of penalty of dismissal from service upon the petitioner was issued. The petitioner amended the writ petition and laid challenge to the said order also. 5. The petitioner has challenged the impugned order whereby fresh enquiry has been ordered against him as also the enquiry proceedings and the notice of imposition of penalty of dismissal from service upon him on the ground that during the first enquiry, the Enquiry Officer was appointed even before filing of reply to the charge-sheet by the petitioner. It has also been contended that copy of the first enquiry report was not furnished by the respondent-Bank to the petitioner thereby denying him opportunity to represent against the findings in the first enquiry report. It has also been contended that the fresh enquiry ordered vide the impugned order passed by respondent No. 2 is not sustainable in law and as there is no such provision available in the Bipartite Settlement which governs the procedure regarding holding of enquiry against employees of the respondent-Bank. It has been further contended that, once the petitioner was exonerated of the charges during the first enquiry, it was not open to the Disciplinary Authority to order a fresh enquiry. The same, according to the petitioner, amounts to double jeopardy. Laying challenge to the enquiry report, the petitioner has contended that the findings of enquiry report are based upon no evidence or inadmissible evidence, therefore, the said findings are liable to be set aside. It has been contended that neither receipt of amount from the customers by the petitioner has been proved, nor the charge with regard to deposition of said amount in the accounts of the customers by the relatives of the petitioner is established from the evidence on record. Thus, the findings of the Enquiry Officer in his second report are without any basis. 6. The writ petition has been contested by the respondent-Bank by filing a reply thereto. In its reply, the respondent-Bank has submitted that initially when the charges were framed against the petitioner and the enquiry was initiated against him, Sh. Ashok Khazanchi was appointed as the Presenting Officer by the Disciplinary Authority. After filing of the writ petition by the petitioner and consequent withdrawal of first charge-sheet and framing of fresh charges, a new Presenting Officer was appointed because by that time Sh. Ashok Khazanchi was appointed as the Presenting Officer by the Disciplinary Authority. After filing of the writ petition by the petitioner and consequent withdrawal of first charge-sheet and framing of fresh charges, a new Presenting Officer was appointed because by that time Sh. Ashok Khazamchi had been transferred to Kathua. It has been submitted that the original documents remained in the custody of Sh. Ashok Khazanchi, as such, the same could not be produced before the Enquiry Officer by the new Presenting Officer. It is in these circumstances that the inspection of the original documents could not be allowed to the petitioner. As soon as the original documents were received, the petitioner was allowed to inspect these documents. It has been further submitted that the Disciplinary Authority, after perusing the first enquiry report furnished by the Enquiry Officer, came to the conclusion that the Presenting Officer should produce all the material evidence before the Enquiry Officer and give a chance of fair defence to the employee. It is in these circumstances that the impugned order dated 19.08.2002 came to be passed by the Disciplinary Authority directing further enquiry. According to the respondent-Bank, it is not a case of second enquiry, but it is a case of further enquiry ordered by the Disciplinary Authority after examining the report of the Enquiry Officer. The respondent-Bank has taken a stand that the petitioner has not only participated in the enquiry proceedings, but has been afforded full opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, scrutinizing the documents produced by the respondent-Bank and also to produce his defence. Thus, there has been no breach of principles of natural justice on the part of the respondent-Bank. It has also been contended that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are based on evidence, both documentary and oral and that this Court cannot, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, go into the sufficiency of the material, on the basis of which, findings have been recorded by the Enquiry Officer. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused record of the case. 8. Certain admitted facts, which emerge from the pleadings of the parties, are that initially the charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner after placing him under suspension. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused record of the case. 8. Certain admitted facts, which emerge from the pleadings of the parties, are that initially the charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner after placing him under suspension. The said charge-sheet came to be challenged by the petitioner by way of a writ petition and during the pendency of the writ petition, the respondent-Bank withdrew the said charge-sheet and they sought permission to serve a fresh charge-sheet upon the petitioner. Thereafter, another charge-sheet containing specific allegations against the petitioner was served upon him and he was asked to submit his reply to the charge-sheet. Reply to the chargesheet was submitted by the petitioner in terms of his letter dated 28.06.1999 and prior to that i.e. on 08.06.1999, an Enquiry Officer was appointed by the respondent-Bank. 9. The petitioner has contended that it was not open to the respondent-Bank to appoint an Enquiry Officer prior to submission of his reply to the charge-sheet. However, a perusal of the record shows that, in the charge-sheet dated 08.06.1999, the petitioner was asked to submit his reply within 15 days. When the reply was not received by the Disciplinary Authority within the stipulated period, order dated 20.07.1999 came to be passed by the said Authority appointing Sh. S.K. Sharma as an Enquiry officer. It was not obligatory for the Disciplinary Authority to issue a reminder to the chargesheeted employee for filing his reply. Once the chargesheeted employee fails to file reply within the stipulated time, the Disciplinary Authority can go ahead and appoint an Enquiry Officer without waiting for the reply. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard is without any merit. 10. It seems that the petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet in terms of his letter dated 28.06.1999 and thereafter challenged the charge-sheet by way of a writ petition. As already stated, the writ petitioner was disposed of and the respondent-Bank was permitted to serve a fresh charge-sheet upon the petitioner. Accordingly, vide letter dated 09.07.2001, fresh charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner and the same was responded to by the petitioner in terms of his letter dated 31.07.2001. Thereafter, the enquiry proceedings started. As already stated, the writ petitioner was disposed of and the respondent-Bank was permitted to serve a fresh charge-sheet upon the petitioner. Accordingly, vide letter dated 09.07.2001, fresh charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner and the same was responded to by the petitioner in terms of his letter dated 31.07.2001. Thereafter, the enquiry proceedings started. The petitioner, it appears, has participated in the said enquiry proceedings and ultimately, the Enquiry Officer made his report wherein a recommendation was made to the Disciplinary Authority to consider remitting back the case for recording further evidence. The Disciplinary Authority, after considering the report of the Enquiry Officer, issued the impugned order dated 19.08.2002 directing holding of enquiry by the Enquiry Officer from the stage of presentation/witnesses so as to arrive at the truth or otherwise of the charges leveled against the petitioner. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the impugned order directing fresh enquiry against the petitioner is not sustainable in law, as it has been issued in violation of the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of K.R. Deb vs. The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, (1971) 2 SCC 102 . Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment of High Court of Calcutta in the case of Balbir Singh vs. Union of India, 2010 4 CalLT 340 , judgment of Jharkhand High Court in the case of Bachoo Singh vs. State of Jharkhand and others, 2013 JBCJ 59 , Judgment of Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Nath Singh vs. State of U.P, (2002) 3 AWC. It has been contended that in the aforesaid judgments, it has been clearly laid down that a Disciplinary Authority cannot be allowed the liberty to hold further enquiry for indefinite period repeatedly as the same would amount to harassment to a public servant. Learned counsel has contended that, in the instant case, there was no reason for the Disciplinary Authority, much less a plausible reason to direct further enquiry, once in the first enquiry, the respondent-Bank had failed to establish the charges against the petitioner and the Enquiry officer had concluded that the charges against the petitioner are not conclusively established. Learned counsel has contended that, in the instant case, there was no reason for the Disciplinary Authority, much less a plausible reason to direct further enquiry, once in the first enquiry, the respondent-Bank had failed to establish the charges against the petitioner and the Enquiry officer had concluded that the charges against the petitioner are not conclusively established. It has been contended that the Presenting Officer in the first enquiry had closed the case of the petitioner, as such, there was no occasion for the Disciplinary Authority to direct further enquiry after submission of report by the Enquiry officer. 12. In order to test the merits of the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be apt to refer to the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in K.R. Deb's case (supra). In the said case, the Supreme Court while considering the scope of provisions contained in Rule 15 of C.C.S (C.C.A), Rules 1957 observed as under: "13. It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one inquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report- of, the Inquiring Officer or Officers does not appeal to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under rule 9. 14. In our view the rules do not contemplate an action such as was taken by the Collector on February 13, 1962. It seems to us that the Collector, instead of taking responsibility himself, was determined to get some officer to report against the appellant. The procedure adopted was not only not warranted by the rules but was harassing to the appellant. 15. Before the Judicial commissioner the point was put slightly differently and, it was urged that the proceedings showed that the Disciplinary Authority had made up its mind to dismiss the appellant. The procedure adopted was not only not warranted by the rules but was harassing to the appellant. 15. Before the Judicial commissioner the point was put slightly differently and, it was urged that the proceedings showed that the Disciplinary Authority had made up its mind to dismiss the appellant. The Judicial Commissioner held that on the facts it could not be said that the Disciplinary Authority was prejudiced against the appellant. But it seems to us that on the material on record a suspicion does arise, that the Collector was determined to get some Inquiry Officer to report against the appellant. In the result we hold that no proper inquiry has been conducted in the case and, therefore, there has been a breach of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order dated June 4, 1962 quashed. and it is declared that the appellant should be treated as still continuing in service. He should be paid his pay and allowances for the period he has been out of office. The appellant will have his costs here and in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. Fees shall be payable by the appellant to his advocate and be allowed on taxation. 13. The High Court of Calcutta, in Balbir Singh's case (supra) while interpreting the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in K. R. Deb's case (supra) has held that, if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the enquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the Disciplinary Authority would be within its right to call upon the Enquiry Officer to record further evidence. It was further held that further enquiry may be ordered only if there is improper enquiry. 14. In Bachoo Singh's case (supra), the Jharkhand High Court after noticing the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in K.R. Deb's case (supra) observed that, once a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated, the same must be brought to its logical end meaning thereby, a finding is required to be arrived at as to whether the delinquent officer is guilty of charges leveled against him or not. It was further held that, in a given situation further evidences may be directed to be adduced but the same would not mean that despite holding a delinquent officer to be partially guilty of the charges leveled against him another inquiry would be directed to be initiated on the self same charges. Similar views have been expressed by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Nath Singh (supra). 15. From the foregoing analysis of law on the subject, it is clear that the Disciplinary Authority has the power to ask the Enquiry officer to record further evidence in case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or in a case where some important witnesses were not available at the time of the enquiry or were not examined for some other reason. It is also manifest that, once a finding of guilt or exoneration from the charges is recorded by the Enquiry officer after holding the enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority cannot direct further enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority may differ with the conclusion drawn by the Enquiry officer and form its own opinion independent of the opinion of the Enquiry officer, but it cannot order further enquiry, once a delinquent official has been exonerated of the charges or has been found guilty of the charges by the Enquiry officer. 16. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, the Enquiry officer in his first report has observed that because of inadequacy of documentary or oral evidence, the charges against the petitioner could not be proved conclusively, but, at the same time, the Enquiry officer has recorded that all relevant material was not brought on record. It has also been recorded by the Enquiry officer that letters written by the petitioner were quoted in brief, but they were not produced during the enquiry proceedings. After recording these comments, the Enquiry Officer has made a recommendation to the Disciplinary Authority for remitting back the case for recording further evidence. Form this, it is clear that the Enquiry officer was also of the view that a serious defect has crept into the enquiry and important documents have not been produced before him. Taking all these facts into view, the Disciplinary Authority, by virtue of impugned order dated 19.08.2002, directed further enquiry from the stage of presentation of witnesses. 17. Form this, it is clear that the Enquiry officer was also of the view that a serious defect has crept into the enquiry and important documents have not been produced before him. Taking all these facts into view, the Disciplinary Authority, by virtue of impugned order dated 19.08.2002, directed further enquiry from the stage of presentation of witnesses. 17. It is not that as per the ratio laid down in K.R Deb's case (supra) by the Supreme Court only non-availability of witnesses at the time of enquiry, would give a cause for holding a fresh enquiry, but in the said judgment, the Supreme Court has clearly kept a window open for holding a fresh enquiry in cases where some serious defect has crept into the enquiry or some important witnesses were not examined or for some other reason. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in K.R Deb's case (supra) came up for deliberation in the latter judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & ors vs. P. Thayagarajan, 1991 1 SCC 733. The Supreme Court, after referring to K.R Deb's case, observed as under: "A careful reading of this passage will make it clear that this court notices that if in a particular case where there has been no proper enquiry because of some serious defect having crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence but that provision would not enable the Disciplinary Authority to set aside the previous enquiries on the ground that the report of the Enquiry Officer does not appeal to the Disciplinary Authority. In the present case the basis upon which the Disciplinary Authority set aside the enquiry is that the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer was contrary to the relevant rules and affects the rights of the parties and not that the report does not appeal to him. When important evidence, either to be relied upon by the department or by the delinquent official, is shut out, this would not result in any advancement of any justice but on the other hand result in a miscarriage thereof. When important evidence, either to be relied upon by the department or by the delinquent official, is shut out, this would not result in any advancement of any justice but on the other hand result in a miscarriage thereof. Therefore, we are of the view that Rule 27(c) enables the Disciplinary Authority to record his findings on the report and to pass an appropriate order including ordering a de-novo enquiry in a case of present nature " 18. From the above, it is clear that the Disciplinary Authority is not precluded from ordering further enquiry after recording its findings on the Enquiry Report. The power of the Disciplinary Authority to order further enquiry in appropriate cases is not unknown to law. 19. In the instant case, the original documents could not be produced before the Enquiry Officer at the time of the first enquiry and even witnesses were not produced before the Enquiry Officer to prove the charges against the petitioner. Therefore, there were gross shortcomings and procedural irregularities arising out of non-production of important documents and non-examination of important witnesses. The Disciplinary Authority was, therefore, well within its jurisdiction to order further enquiry, particularly in view of the recommendations made by the Enquiry officer himself. Thus, no fault can be found in the course adopted by the Disciplinary Authority while issuing the impugned order dated 19.08.2002. 20. The other ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no evidence on record to support the conclusions arrived at by the Enquiry officer. It has been contended that even if it is assumed that relatives of the petitioner had deposited the misappropriated amount in the accounts of the customers, still then, on the basis of admission of relatives of the petitioner, the Enquiry officer could not have held the petitioner guilty of the charges, particularly when there was no evidence on record to show that he had received any sum from the customers. 21. Before dealing with the above contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be apt to notice the scope of power of the Writ Court in interfering with the findings recorded in a Departmental Enquiry. 21. Before dealing with the above contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be apt to notice the scope of power of the Writ Court in interfering with the findings recorded in a Departmental Enquiry. The Supreme Court has, in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors., 1995 6 SCC 749 ruled that the judicial review against the findings of departmental enquiry is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. The Supreme Court observed that power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives a fair treatment and to ensure that the conclusion which the Authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. The Court held that power of judicial review does not act as appellate power, and it does not involve re-appreciation of the evidence. In the context of this case, it would be apt to refer to paras (12) and (13) of the judgment. The same are reproduced as under: "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof off act or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by SN,J the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented. The appellate authority has co- extensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 781], this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued". 22. From the foregoing analysis of law on the subject, it is clear that the scope of judicial review on the findings of the departmental enquiry is very limited. It is only in cases where the Enquiry officer has taken into consideration irrelevant facts or where the findings of the Enquiry officer is based upon no evidence or that the conclusions drawn by the Enquiry officer are on the face of it perverse, that the Court can interfere in the findings of the Enquiry Officer. 23. In the backdrop of aforesaid legal position, let us now examine the impugned enquiry report rendered by the Enquiry officer, according to which, charge against the petitioner has been established. 23. In the backdrop of aforesaid legal position, let us now examine the impugned enquiry report rendered by the Enquiry officer, according to which, charge against the petitioner has been established. As already noted, the charge against the petitioner is that he has accepted deposits from various customers of the respondent-Bank and instead of crediting the said deposits into the respective accounts, he has retained the same and after considerable delay, the amount has been credited in the accounts of the customers. According to the charge, the amount has been credited into the accounts of the customers on the basis of the deposits made by the relatives of the petitioner. The record shows that the respondent-bank has examined MW-1 Father Sebastian, MW-2 V.K. Phoa, MW-3 Col. J.B.S Sambyal, MW-4 Col. D.S. Sangra. Father Sebastian, Col. Sangra and Col. J.B.S. Sambyal have confirmed in their statements that they deposited the amounts with the respondent-bank on behalf of their respective employers. They have also stated that the amount was not immediately credited into their respective accounts. The documents produced on record by the Department also substantiate these facts. 24. It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no material on record to suggest that the aforesaid deposits were received by the petitioner. The contention is without any substance because there is no dispute to the fact that, at the relevant time, the petitioner was functioning as a cashier in the relevant Branch of the respondent-bank. During the course of enquiry, the original vouchers have been produced before the Enquiry officer which reflect deposit of amounts by these customers. MW-2 Phoa, who is an employee of the Bank and was working with the petitioner at the relevant time has stated that these vouchers have been written and signed by the petitioner. He has also stated that he was contacted by the petitioner and his family members, who promised that they will refund the missing credits, whereafter, they started depositing the missing credits. This material is sufficient to prove the charge of misappropriation against the petitioner. 25. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Enquiry officer has relied upon the letter written by brother of the petitioner wherein he has undertaken to deposit amounts in the accounts of the complainants/customers, but the said letter has not been proved during the enquiry proceedings. 25. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Enquiry officer has relied upon the letter written by brother of the petitioner wherein he has undertaken to deposit amounts in the accounts of the complainants/customers, but the said letter has not been proved during the enquiry proceedings. He has further contended that it has also not been established that relatives of the petitioner deposited the amounts in the accounts of the complainants/customers, but still then, the Enquiry officer has concluded that that the amount was deposited by the relatives of the petitioner. 26. It is true that brother of the petitioner has not admitted deposition of amount or writing of the letter and it is also a fact that the relatives of the petitioner have not been examined to prove that they deposited the amount, but it is also a fact that the original record produced by the respondent-Bank during the enquiry proceedings shows that amounts stood deposited in the accounts of the customers on different dates and these amounts, as per the deposit slips, were deposited by the relatives of the petitioner including his brother. The petitioner has not contested this position during the enquiry proceedings. The deposition of the amount by the relatives of the petitioner may not be a read as an admission against the petitioner, but it is certainly a circumstance which is incriminating against him and there is no explanation of petitioner in this regard. Why would relatives of the petitioner deposit lacs of rupees in different accounts of the customers of the bank. In the absence of any explanation from the petitioner, the only inference that can be drawn is that the persons close to him wanted to save him from any disciplinary action. It is a settled law that technical rules of evidence are not applicable to the disciplinary proceedings, nor proof beyond reasonable doubt is a requirement in such proceedings. The standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings is of a lower degree and the technical rules of evidence do not apply. Therefore, inference drawn by the Enquiry officer on the basis of the circumstances which have been established on the basis of material on record, do not call for any interference by this Court in its writ jurisdiction. 27. The standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings is of a lower degree and the technical rules of evidence do not apply. Therefore, inference drawn by the Enquiry officer on the basis of the circumstances which have been established on the basis of material on record, do not call for any interference by this Court in its writ jurisdiction. 27. For the forgoing reasons, I do not find any merit in this writ petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.