Research › Search › Judgment

Jharkhand High Court · body

2023 DIGILAW 690 (JHR)

Basant Prasad Barnwal, son of Sri Wakil Modi v. State of Jharkhand

2023-05-12

RATNAKER BHENGRA, SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR

body2023
ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. Mr. Pankaj Kumar, the learned Public Prosecutor has tendered a copy of the prescription dated 25th March 2002 of Parwati Clinic Pvt. Ltd., Ranchi Patna Road, Jhumri Telaiya. 2. Taken on record. 3. Basant Prasad Barnwal who is the father of Sunita Devi has challenged the judgment in Sessions Trial No. 35 of 2004 by which the husband of Sunita Devi and the other family members have been acquitted of the charge under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. 4. On the basis of the written report of Basant Prasad Barnwal given to the Officer Incharge of Jainagar PS on 2nd April 2002, a First Information Report vide Jainagar PS Case No. 35 of 2002 was registered against Vijay Kumar, Basudeo Modi, Geeta Devi, Sanjay Kumar @ Munna, Ajay Kumar and Ashok Modi. After the investigation, Final Form was submitted in favour of the above-named accused persons and on the basis of the Protest-cum-Complaint Petition, Sessions Trial No. 35 of 2004 was registered against them. 5. During the trial, the prosecution has examined six witnesses out of whom PW1 is the uncle, PW2 is the brother, PW3 is the mother and PW4 is the father of Sunita Devi. 6. The accused persons have set-up a defence that Sunita Devi has died due to cardiac arrest and in support thereof have produced Dr. Hari Darshan Singh who was examined as DW3. The accused persons have also examined Sunil Kumar who was the driver of the vehicle which was sent for bringing the parents of Sunita Devi at the hospital. DW2 who was the neighbour and the photographer and DW4 who was the investigating officer of the case have also tendered evidence in support of the defence put forth by the accused. 7. The learned trial Judge has held that the prosecution was unable to establish demand of dowry by the accused persons soon before the death of Sunita Devi. The trial Judge has also accepted that the prosecution has failed to explain delay of nine days in lodging the First Information Report. 8. The trial Judge in its order dated 25th August 2007 passed in Sessions Trial No. 35 of 2004 has held as under: “28. The trial Judge has also accepted that the prosecution has failed to explain delay of nine days in lodging the First Information Report. 8. The trial Judge in its order dated 25th August 2007 passed in Sessions Trial No. 35 of 2004 has held as under: “28. So far the defence witness is concerned, I find that P.W.1 is the driver of Commander Jeep No. BR 47/6613 by which the accused Basudeo Modi came at Barasingha on 26.3.02 and informed Basant Modi (informant) about the death of his daughter-in-law Sunita Devi. While D.W.2 is the photographer who had taken the pictures of the dead body of the deceased Sunita Devi. According to his evidence the father-in-law and brother-in-law of Vijay Kumar (the husband of the deceased Sunita Devi) came on 26.3.02 at Telaiya Dam and participated in cremation ceremony of the deceased D.W.3 is the expert witness i.e. Dr. Hari Darshan Singh. D.W.4 is the police personnel who investigated Jainagar (Telaiya Dam) P.S. Case No. 35/02 and submitted the final form. While P.W.5 is on the point of the cause of death of the deceased in the cremation ceremony of the deceased. Out of these 5 witnesses the evidence of D.W.3 has already been discussed in the above paras. From perusal of Ext.A series I find that on the death of the deceased the accused Vijay Kumar and his family members were engaged in preparation for starting the cremation ceremony and also the presence of the informant. All these pictures prove the fact that the cremation ceremony have been performed according to Hindu custom and in presence of villagers. So thee proofs also create serious doubt on the allegation of the informant that the deceased has been killed by way of administering their poisonous injection or by way of subjecting to her cruelty due to the non fulfillment of the dowry demand. From perusal of the above paras of the judgment I find that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its own case as well as the charge against the accused persons. Therefore, in my opinion, there is no need to discuss at length the defence evidence. 29. From perusal of the above paras of the judgment I find that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its own case as well as the charge against the accused persons. Therefore, in my opinion, there is no need to discuss at length the defence evidence. 29. From the above discussed my own opinion, now I find that there is no any sufficient, reasonable and cogent evidence or materials on record to hold the guilty for the charge of the offence punishable U/s 304B of the I.P.C. against any of the accused persons, accordingly, all these accused persons are being acquitted there under. On perusal of the case record it also transpires that all accused persons of this case are on bail, hence, they are discharged from the liabilities of their respective bail bonds.” 9. Mr. Amarendra Kumar, the learned counsel for the appellant has contended that there are clinching circumstantial evidence against the accused persons such as (i) harassment and torture of Sunita Devi in her matrimonial home (ii) her death in suspicious circumstance (iii) cremation taking place in a hurried manner, and (iv) non-disclosure of information to the parents of Sunita Devi. 10. In a prosecution under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code the prosecution is required to lead cogent, clear and consistent evidence so as to establish that (i) death has occurred within seven years of marriage (ii) death was under circumstance otherwise than normal circumstance and (iii) soon before her death the woman was subjected to harassment and torture in connection to demand of dowry by her husband and/or other family members. 11. The provision under section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act shall come into play only when the prosecution has shown a prima-facie case. Therefore, this is not the law that in every case of dowry death inference under section 106 of the Evidence Act must be drawn merely because a woman has died in her matrimonial home [refer, “Ranjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab” (2011) 15 SCC 285 ]. 12. The case of the prosecution that Sunita Devi has died in suspicious circumstances is based on a suspicion arising out of the fact that in the past there was demand of motorcycle, colour TV etc. State of Punjab” (2011) 15 SCC 285 ]. 12. The case of the prosecution that Sunita Devi has died in suspicious circumstances is based on a suspicion arising out of the fact that in the past there was demand of motorcycle, colour TV etc. However, we find that the prosecution has failed to establish that there was demand of dowry and in connection therewith Sunita Devi has suffered harassment and torture at the hands of the accused persons. 13. There is no eyewitness of the occurrence who could have spoken in the Court the circumstances under which Sunita Devi had died. In a case based on circumstantial evidence the prosecution is required to produce circumstances which must be of definite character and the effect of all the circumstances taken together must be the one and the only one, that accused has committed the crime. This is also a requirement in law that in the process of examination of the incriminating circumstances every hypothesis of innocence of the accused is ruled out. 14. In “Ram Singh v. Sonia” (2007) 3 SCC 1 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “39. The principle for basing a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence has been indicated in a number of decisions of this Court and the law is well settled that each and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible. This Court has clearly sounded a note of caution that in a case depending largely upon circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof. The court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of events have been established clearly and such completed chain of events must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. It has also been indicated that when the important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped and the other circumstances cannot in any manner, establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. It has also been indicated that when the important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped and the other circumstances cannot in any manner, establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. It has been held that the court has to be watchful and avoid the danger of allowing the suspicion to make the place of legal proof, for sometimes unconsciously it may happen to be a short step between moral certainty and legal proof. It has been indicated by this Court that there is a long mental distance between “may be true” and “must be true” and the same divides conjectures from sure conclusions.” 15. The defence set-up by the accused persons particularly the evidence of DW3 who is the doctor who first examined Sunita Devi on 25th March 2002 has probabilised the defence version that Sunita Devi has died due to cardiac arrest. A copy of the prescription dated 25th March 2002 which was laid in evidence during the trial by the defence vide Exhibit-C has been produced by the learned Public Prosecutor. This document shows that DW3 has recorded his impression on clinical examination of Sunita Devi, that she had complained of chest pain. The doctor has further recorded that blood pressure and pulse did not seem to be recordable. However, there is no observation by the doctor that the patient has a vomiting tendency which would be a normal condition in all cases of poisoning. 16. This is well-settled practice which attained the status of rule of law that the High Court while acting as the appellate Court shall not interfere with the judgment of acquittal unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. 17. In “Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura” (2011) 9 SCC 479 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “13. It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, it being the final court of fact, is fully competent to reappreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, it being the final court of fact, is fully competent to reappreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, the law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal.” 18. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we find no error in the judgment of acquittal dated 25th August 2007 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Koderma in Sessions Trial No. 35 of 2004 and, accordingly, Acquittal Appeal No. 18 of 2008 is dismissed. 19. Let the lower Court records be transmitted to the Court concerned, forthwith. 20. Let a copy of the Judgment be transmitted to the Court concerned through FAX.