Purnendu Singh, J. – Heard Ms. Sweta Raj, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Dr. Anand Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna and Mr. Prabhat Kumar Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the Memo No. 1944 dated 29.06.2016 whereby the petitioner was found guilty of defalcating Rs.1,34,973/- and the respondent had directed for recovery of 25% of the total embezzled amount from head of gratuity. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the petitioner was working as Divisional Accounts Officer in Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna Division. A charge Memo No. 6389 dated 26.10.2007 was issued to the petitioner by which the petitioner was directed to submit a show cause to Shri Yatindra Nath Jha, Director, Vigilance and Security, within 15 days and failure to do so would raise a presumption that he had nothing to say in the matter and decision could be taken ex parte. 4. It is further submitted that, the petitioner had submitted his show cause vide memo No. 4148 dated 07.11.2007, whereby he had denied the charges leveled against him in Memo No.6389 dated 26.10.2007. Subsequently, the petitioner was placed under suspension and a departmental proceeding was initiated. 5. It is submitted that the petitioner retired from service on 31.01.2010, during the pendency of the departmental proceeding initiated against him. 6. Learned counsel submits that, the report of the first departmental inquiry which was conducted by Director, Vigilance and Security, was closed on 21.02.2015. The Audit report Officer shows that there had been no embezzlement no financial loss has been caused to the corporation and that the guilt of the petitioner was not proved. 7. However, defying the procedural norms, the respondent authorities had appointed Chief of Administration as conducting officer vide Memo No. 254 dated 04.05.2011, much before the report of first departmental inquiry was concluded on 21.02.2015. 8. Learned counsel submits that on the same set of charge Memo No. 6389 dated 26.10.2007 the Chief of Administration without following the due process of law had passed order contained in Memo No. 1944 dated 29.06.2016, whereby the petitioner was found guilty of defalcating Rs.1,34,973/- and 25% of the total embezzled amount from head of gratuity was ordered to be recovered from the petitioner. Being aggrieved by the order the petitioner has prayed for setting aside the order of recovery contained in Memo No. 1944 dated 29.06.2016 in view of the audit report. 9. Per Contra, Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-State submits that the petitioner was found to have committed the act of negligence, defalcation and financial irregularity in connivance with the then Cashier and helped him in the embezzlement of the sum of Rs.1,34,973/- by not properly discharging his duty and physically having verified the cash book receipt with malafide intentions. Therefore, in the light of Clause-8(2)(b) of Bihar State Road Transport Corporation Regulation(Annexure-C to the supplementary counter affidavit on behalf of respondent no. 1, 2 and 3), the penalty amount has been recovered from the gratuity amount payable to the petitioner. 10. It is further submitted that the Competent Authority/ Disciplinary Authority did not agree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer(Director, Vigilance and Security) and before passing final order, the Competent Authority sent the file for necessary inquiry to the Chief Accounts Officer. It is submitted that the Competent Authority concluded that the first inquiry conducted by the Director, Vigilance and Security did not conduct said inquiry/investigation properly. Therefore another Inquiry Officer i.e. the Chief of Administration was appointed as conducting officer by Memo No.254 dated 04.05.2011. But the inquiry report could not be submitted by him because he was transferred to other department. Therefore, Chief Account Officer appointed who agreed with the inquiry report submitted by the then inquiry Officer i.e. the Chief of Administration. It is submitted that the Chief Accounts Officer submitted his report in which the charges against the petitioner were found proved. 11. Learned counsel submits that petitioner is covered by the definition of the workman as defined under Section 2 of the Industrial Dispute Act,1947 being an employee of the BSRTC and submits that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the alternative remedy by way of raising an industrial dispute under the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. To substantiate his statement, learned counsel has placed reliance on an order of this Court dated 29.11.2022 passed in LPA No. 822/2015. 12. Heard the parties. 13. It is proper to first examine the preliminary objection raised by the respondent with respect to the maintainability of the present writ in view of alternative remedy under the ID Act. To substantiate his statement, learned counsel has placed reliance on an order of this Court dated 29.11.2022 passed in LPA No. 822/2015. 12. Heard the parties. 13. It is proper to first examine the preliminary objection raised by the respondent with respect to the maintainability of the present writ in view of alternative remedy under the ID Act. On the proper examination of the record, it appears that the writ petition remained pending before this Court since year 2017. The writ petition has been heard on several dates, but the objection of maintainability was for first time raised in the counter affidavit. The respondents have controverted each and every paragraph of the writ petition in the counter affidavit, the pleadings are complete I don’t find to reject the writ petition on mere technical plea of alternative remedy. 14. It is well settled that mere availability of an alternative remedy which the party involving the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of this Court and “render a writ petition not maintainable.” 15. It would be gainful to rely upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. vs. The Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-assessing Authority & OR reported in 2023 LiveLaw(SC) 70. The relevant paragraph has been reproduced below: – “ 4. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition “not maintainable”. 6. At the end of the last century, this Court in paragraph 15 of the its decision reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 (Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others) carved out the exceptions on the existence whereof a Writ Court would be justified in entertaining a writ petition despite the party approaching it not having availed the alternative remedy provided by the statute. The same read as under: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is violation of principles of natural justice; (iii) where the order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (iv) where the vires of an Act is challenged.” (emphasis supplied) 16. Dr. Anand, learned counsel on behalf of respondent has relied upon Regulation 8 of the said Notification particularly sub-clause (b) of Sub-Clause (2) of Regulation to justify the action of recovery, which inter alia is reproduced hereinafter: – “8. (1) The amount of gratuity admissible to an employee shall be calculated as follows: – (a) Half a month’s pay for every completed year of service if satisfactory service has been rendered by the employee. Subject to a maximum of 15 months’ salary or Rs. 15,000/-, whichever is less. In the case of disability or death due to accident in the course of employment under Corporation, gratuity payable shall be in addition to the payment made under the Workman’s Compensation Act, 1923 (Act No. 8 of 1923). (2) The Corporation in its discretion: – (a) May grant the gratuity in one lump sum or in instalments; (b) the gratuity shall be subject to the following deductions namely: – (i) Income tax, if applicable. (2) The Corporation in its discretion: – (a) May grant the gratuity in one lump sum or in instalments; (b) the gratuity shall be subject to the following deductions namely: – (i) Income tax, if applicable. (ii) Any other due which the employee has to pay to the Corporation or under any law for the time being in force.” 17. The Regulation which has been brought by way of Annexure-C to the Supplementary Counter Affidavit doesn’t disclose the date on which it has come into force. It also don’t disclose whether in absence of having fulfilled the mandate of Article 309 or Article 166 of the Constitution of India, it can be considered as Special enactment and will have overriding effect over the Act, 1972. 18. The question arises even otherwise assuming the Rule to be in existence, whether the above provision of Rule 8 is in conformity with the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1972) particularly Section 8 of the Act,1972 which relates to recovery of gratuity is interalia is reproduced hereinafter: – “8. Recovery of gratuity. – If the amount of gratuity payable under this Act is not paid by the employer, within the prescribed time, to the person entitled thereto, the controlling authority shall, on an application made to it in this behalf by the aggrieved person, issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector, who shall recover the same, together with compound interest thereon [at such rate as the Central Government may, by notification, specify], from the date of expiry of the prescribed time, as arrears of land revenue and pay the same to the person entitled thereto : [Provided that the controlling authority shall, before issuing a certificate under this section, give the employer a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the issue of such certificate: Provided further that the amount of interest payable under this section shall, in no case exceed the amount of gratuity payable under this Act.]” 19. Section 8 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 prescribed the procedure and the manner in which the gratuity on any account is recovered. Section 14 of the Act 1972 has overriding effect on other enactments, and the same is reproduced hereinafter: – “14. Act to override other enactments, etc. Section 8 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 prescribed the procedure and the manner in which the gratuity on any account is recovered. Section 14 of the Act 1972 has overriding effect on other enactments, and the same is reproduced hereinafter: – “14. Act to override other enactments, etc. – The provisions of this Act or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act or in any instrument or contract having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act.” 20. This Court finds that the Bihar State Transport Corporation has not made itself aware of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 by not enacting any special Act/or making relevant amendment after commencement of the Act of 1972 which came into force w.e.f. 21.08.1972 which could have an overriding effect. 21. The Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Dharam Prakash Sharma, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 221 , has held as under in para 2: – “2. The short question that arises for consideration is whether an employee of the MCD would be entitled to payment of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act when the MCD itself has adopted the provisions of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “the Pension Rules”), whereunder there is a provision both for payment of pension as well as of gratuity. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant in this Court is that the payment of pension and gratuity under the Pension Rules is a package by itself and once that package is made applicable to the employees of the MCD, the provisions of payment of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act cannot be held applicable. We have examined carefully the provisions of the Pension Rules as well as the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act. The Payment of Gratuity Act being a special provision for payment of gratuity, unless there is any provision therein which excludes its applicability to an employee who is otherwise governed by the provisions of the Pension Rules, it is not possible for us to hold that the respondent is not entitled to the gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act. The Payment of Gratuity Act being a special provision for payment of gratuity, unless there is any provision therein which excludes its applicability to an employee who is otherwise governed by the provisions of the Pension Rules, it is not possible for us to hold that the respondent is not entitled to the gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act. The only provision which was pointed out is the definition of “employee” in Section 2(e) which excludes the employees of the Central Government and State Governments receiving pension and gratuity under the Pension Rules but not an employee of the MCD. The MCD employee, therefore, would be entitled to the payment of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act. The mere fact that the gratuity is provided for under the Pension Rules will not disentitle him to get the payment of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act. In view of the overriding provisions contained in Section 14 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, the provision for gratuity under the Pension Rules will have no effect. Possibly for this reason, Section 5 of the Payment of Gratuity Act has conferred authority on the appropriate Government to exempt any establishment from the operation of the provisions of the Act, if in its opinion the employees of such establishment are in receipt of gratuity or pensionary benefits not less favourable than the benefits conferred under this Act. Admittedly MCD has not taken any steps to invoke the power of the Central Government under Section 5 of the Payment of Gratuity Act. In the aforesaid premises, we are of the Considered opinion that the employees of the MCD would be entitled to the payment of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act notwithstanding the fact that the provisions of the Pension Rules have been made applicable to them for the purpose of determining the pension. Needless to mention that the employees cannot claim gratuity available under the Pension Rules.” 22. The Apex Court in Y.K. Singla vs. Punjab National Bank reported in (2013)3 SCC 472 clinches the issue. It has been held in following paragraphs as follows: – “22. Needless to mention that the employees cannot claim gratuity available under the Pension Rules.” 22. The Apex Court in Y.K. Singla vs. Punjab National Bank reported in (2013)3 SCC 472 clinches the issue. It has been held in following paragraphs as follows: – “22. In order to determine which of the two provisions (the Gratuity Act or the 1995 Regulations) would be applicable for determining the claim of the appellant, it is also essential to refer to Section 14 of the Gratuity Act, which is being extracted hereunder: 14. Act to override other enactments, etc. – The provisions of this Act or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act or in any instrument or contract having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act.” (emphasis supplied) A perusal of Section 14 leaves no room for any doubt that a superior status has been vested in the provisions of the Gratuity Act vis-a-vis any other enactment (including any other instrument or contract) inconsistent therewith. Therefore, insofar as the entitlement of an employee to gratuity of an employee is not regulated under the provisions of the Gratuity Act, the legislature having vested superiority to the provisions of the Gratuity Act over all other provisions/enactments (including any instrument or contract having the force of law), the provisions of the Gratuity Act cannot be ignored. The term “instrument” and the phrase “instrument or contract having the force of law” shall most definitely be deemed to include the 1995 Regulations, which regulate the payment of gratuity to the appellant. 24. Furthermore, from the mandate of Section 14 of the Gratuity Act, it is imperative to further conclude that the provisions of the Gratuity Act would have overriding effect reference to any inconsistency therewith in any other provision or instrument.” 23. Considering the aforesaid fact as well as the pure question of law in the present case the Notification as contained in Annexure-C can only be held to be unworkable and contrary to the provision of Central Act, 1972. The action taken by the respondent by passing an order of recovery of alleged defalcated amount of Rs., 33,744/- from the gratuity is without authority of law. 24. On the examination of the merits of the case also the present writ petition under consideration is fit to be allowed. The action taken by the respondent by passing an order of recovery of alleged defalcated amount of Rs., 33,744/- from the gratuity is without authority of law. 24. On the examination of the merits of the case also the present writ petition under consideration is fit to be allowed. The respondent authority had issued Charge Memo No. 6389 dated 26.10.2007 wherein it was demanded from the petitioner that he submit a show cause to Shri Yatindra Nath Jha, Director, Vigilance and Security, within 15 days. The petitioner submitted his show cause vide memo No. 4148 dated 07.11.2007, whereby he denied the charges leveled against him in Memo No.6389 dated 26.10.2017. Subsequently, a departmental proceeding was initiated. The report of the first departmental inquiry which was conducted by Director, Vigilance and Security, was closed on 21.02.2015. The Audit Officer submitted that there had been no embezzlement in this case and there has been no financial loss to the corporation and that the guilt of the petitioner was not proved. The respondent authorities had appointed Chief of Administration as conducting officer vide Memo No. 254 dated 04.05.2011, much before the report of first departmental inquiry was concluded on 21.02.2015.Report of second departmental inquiry conducted by Chief of Administration was submitted on 18.05.2016, wherein the petitioner was found guilty of charges as mentioned in Charge Memo No. 6389 dated 26.10.2007. Pursuant to the same, the respondent authority issued Memo No. 1944 dated 29.06.2016, whereby the petitioner was found guilty of defalcating Rs.1,34,973/- and 25% of the total embezzled amount from head of gratuity was ordered to be recovered from the petitioner. 25. What irks this Court more is the inefficiency of Disciplinary Authority in discharge of its quasi judicial function to provide a reasoned order before issuing Memo No. 1944 dated 29.06.2016 and has mechanically placed reliance on the report of the second inquiry submitted on 18.05.2016. The vague claim of the respondent that the Director, Vigilance and Security did not conduct the first inquiry properly seems unfounded and contrary to the findings of the first inquiry report wherein it has been explicitly stated that the Audit Officer has submitted that there has been no embezzlement and there has been no financial loss to the corporation. The Petitioner was exonerated of the charges leveled against him in the report submitted after the conclusion of the first enquiry on 21.02.2015. 26. The Petitioner was exonerated of the charges leveled against him in the report submitted after the conclusion of the first enquiry on 21.02.2015. 26. The record of the the present case, reveals that the Disciplinary Authority without jurisdiction proceeded arbitrary, disregarding the first inquiry even before the first enquiry could be concluded and recording of reasoned order to discredit its findings. This is against the settled law that another inquiry could not be directed to be initiated on the self-same charges which could not be proved in the first inquiry. It is pertinent to take note of Apex Court decision in the case of Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. vs. Masood Ahmed Khan reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496, it is held as under: – “47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731- 37] .) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija vs. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] , wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”. 27. The Memo No.1944 dated 29.06.2016 is based on the findings of the second enquiry report dated 18.05.2016, wherein the petitioner was found guilty of charges as mentioned in Charge Memo No.6389 dated 26.10.2007. It is to be noted that the second enquiry was initiated even before the first enquiry could be concluded. This deviation from the the established procedure and rules can only be termed as an arbitrary act which is a blatant violation of the principles of natural justice. It is to be noted that the second enquiry was initiated even before the first enquiry could be concluded. This deviation from the the established procedure and rules can only be termed as an arbitrary act which is a blatant violation of the principles of natural justice. Regard can made to the settled proposition of law as laid by the Apex Court in the case of Kanailal Bera vs. Union of India, reported in (2007) 11 SCC 517 , in that regard paragraph no. 6 and 7, are inter-alia reproduced hereinbelow: – “ 6. ...Once a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated, the same must be brought to its logical end meaning thereby a finding is required to be arrived at as to whether the delinquent officer is guilty of charges levelled against him or not. In a given situation further evidences may be directed to be adduced but the same would not mean that despite holding a delinquent officer to be partially guilty of the charges levelled against him another inquiry would be directed to be initiated on the selfsame charges which could not be proved in the first inquiry. 7. In K.R. Deb vs. CCE [ (1971) 2 SCC 102 ] this Court while considering the provisions contained in Rule 15(1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 held as under : (SCC p. 105, paras 12-13) “12. It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one inquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the disciplinary authority may ask the inquiry officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report of the inquiring officer or officers does not appeal to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9. 13. In our view the Rules do not contemplate an action such as was taken by the Collector on 13.2.1962. The disciplinary authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9. 13. In our view the Rules do not contemplate an action such as was taken by the Collector on 13.2.1962. It seems to us that the Collector, instead of taking responsibility himself, was determined to get some officer to report against the appellant. The procedure adopted was not only not warranted by the Rules but was harassing to the appellant.” (emphasis supplied) 28. The writ was filed in the year 2017 and this Court finds that apart from the above legal infraction the petitioner was not afforded any reasonable opportunity to show cause before the order to conduct second inquiry was made by the respondent authority. If anything, such an act by the respondent can only be viewed as an intentional omission to afford any opportunity the the petitioner to defend his case. The principle of affording opportunity of hearing is the cornerstone of the principle of natural justice and the law has been well setlled in this regard in the case of A.K. Kraipak vs. Union of India reported in (1969) 2 SCC 262 at page 272, in para 20 of the judgement which is reproduced hereunder: – “20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry.” 29. Any Authority before assuming jurisdiction to exercise power must first decide the jurisdictional facts and assume jurisdiction in accordance with the statutory provision. The proceeding which was pending before the District Magistrate remained an empty formality without attaining its finality. This Court finds that the procedure adopted by the respondent authorities is without jurisdiction. The impugned order contained in Memo No. 1944 dated 29.06.2016 proceeded to recover Rs.33,744/- (i.e. 25% of the total embezzled amount of Rs.1,34,973/-) from gratuity of the petitioner is not warranted by the Rules but for harassing the petitioner, therefore, it is hereby set aside. 30. In light of the above judgments of the Apex Court and considering the facts of the present case, the order dated 29.06.2016 contained in Memo No. 1944, passed by the respondent authority is held to be without jurisdiction and without authority of law. Even otherwise the notification contained in Annexure-C can only be held to be unworkable contrary to the provision of Gratuity Act, 1972, the order of recovery contained in Memo No. 1944 dated 29.06.2016 is hereby set aside and quashed. The recovered amount of Rs. 33,744/- shall be returned back to the petitioner. 31. With the above observations, the present writ is allowed. The recovered amount of Rs. 33,744/- shall be returned back to the petitioner. 31. With the above observations, the present writ is allowed. 32. There shall be no order as to cost.