ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. Bhupendra Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr.Avinash K. Mishra, learned Government Advocate appearing for respondent No.1/State and Mr.Dinesh Yadav, learned counsel holding the brief of Mr.Shivendu Pandya, learned counsel for respondent No.2. 2. By way of this petition under Section 482 CrPC, the petitioners have prayed for following relief : “It is, therefore, prayed that Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to allow this petition with consequential relief and quash the impugned proceedings of Court below against the petitioners being Criminal Case # 4724/17 of the Court of JMFC, Raipur registered for offences punishable under Sec.498A read with Sec.34 IPC, Sec.406, 354 IPC, Sec. 3, 4 Dowry Prohibition Act; Sec. 4, 5 Tonhi Pratinishedh Act (Copy of Order Sheet containing registration of case is Annexure – P/1) along with Final Report filed in Crime # 15/16 registered at PS Mahila Thana, Raipur (Copy of Final Report is Annexure P-2).” 3. Brief facts, necessary for disposal of this case, are that a written report was lodged by respondent No.2 i.e. complainant Smt.Smita Mahobia W/o. Shri Alok Thawait at Police Station Mahila Thana, Raipur that her marriage was solemnized on 10.02.2015 at Raipur with Shri Alok Thawait and she had given adequate dowry including air conditioner, sofa, dining table etc. and also given gold and silver ornaments, but immediately after the marriage, her husband and mother-in-law i.e. petitioner No.1 started harassing her by saying that she had not brought adequate dowry and cash amount and she was subjected to cruelty with demand of mobile phone, cash etc., even she was beaten by her husband many times. She has also stated that even when she was carrying pregnancy she was again beaten by her husband and mother-in-law in connection with taking dowry. She has also stated that the said torture and harassment was continued at Raipur and Bilaspur also. Even, the complainant tried to settle her matrimonial dispute with the help of Sakhi Counsling Center, but the counseling was also failed and ultimately the complainant had lodged the written report at Police Station Mahila Thana, Raipur where the offence as aforementioned was registered. During the course of investigation, statements under Section 161 CrPC of Smt.Smita Mahobia (complainant), Smt.Shail Mahobia (mother of the complainant), Kailash Chandra Mahobia, Sweta Mahobia and other witnesses and also independent witnesses namely Pramendra Singh and Dr.Pravina Mishra have been recorded. During the course of investigation, statements under Section 161 CrPC of Smt.Smita Mahobia (complainant), Smt.Shail Mahobia (mother of the complainant), Kailash Chandra Mahobia, Sweta Mahobia and other witnesses and also independent witnesses namely Pramendra Singh and Dr.Pravina Mishra have been recorded. After completion of usual investigation, the charge-sheet was filed before the jurisdictional criminal Court and now the matter is pending before the competent jurisdictional criminal Court against the present petitioners where they are facing trial. 4. Mr.Bhupendra Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners submits as under:- (i) That, the petitioners are in-laws of respondent No.2 and in written complaint filed by respondent No.2, there is no direct allegation or connection of the present petitioners in the aforesaid offences except general and omnibus allegations having no legs to stand. (ii) That, taking contents of charge-sheet and document appended along with charge-sheet as it is, aforesaid offences are not made out against the petitioners as direct allegation is against husband and not against the petitioners herein, as such, in absence of specific allegation and in absence of ingredient of demand of dowry and cruelty, prosecution against the petitioners deserves to be quashed. To bolster his submission, he would rely upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the matters of Geeta Mehrotra and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2012) 10 SCC 741 , Preeti Gupta and another v. State of Jharkhand and another, (2010) 7 SCC 667 , Swapnil v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 567 and Rashmi Chopra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 620 (Para-24). (iii) That, prima facie no offence under Section 406 of the IPC is made out as there is no entrustment of property to the present petitioners and therefore, in the light of judgments of the Supreme Court in the matters of Sardar Singh v. State of Haryana, (1977) 1 SCC 463 and S.W.Palanitkar and others v. State of Bihar and another, (2002) 1 SCC 241 , no offence under Section 406 of the IPC is made out. (iv) That, even otherwise there is no intention of cheating from its inception, as such, no offences under Section 3 & 4 of the Act of 1961 are made out. (iv) That, even otherwise there is no intention of cheating from its inception, as such, no offences under Section 3 & 4 of the Act of 1961 are made out. (v) That, no offence under Section 354 of the IPC to outrage the modesty of the complainant / respondent No.2 is made out agaisnt the petitioners and even no offence under Sections 4 & 5 of the Chhattisgarh Tonahi Pratadna Nivaran Act, 2005 is made out against the petitioners. (vi) That, the divorce has been taken place between Alok Thawait (husband of the complainant) and complainant-Smt.Smita Mahobia by the judgment dated 26.09.2023 and there is no specific allegation against the present petitioners and only bald and omnibus allegations have been made by the complainant / respondent No.2 in the complaint. As such, the petition deserves to be allowed. 5. On the other hand, Mr.Avinash K. Mishra, learned Government Advocate appearing for respondent No.1/State, submits that after due investigation the petitioners have been charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences and prima-facie material collected are sufficient to put the petitioners at trial and they are standing trial also. He further submits that taking into consideration the material available on record, it cannot be held that no prima-facie case against the petitioners for standing trial is made out. He also submits that jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the CrPC is extremely limited as FIR and charge-sheet cannot be quashed particularly when there is sufficient evidence available on record to put the accused persons to trial. 6. Mr.Dinesh Yadav, learned counsel for respondent No.2/complainant submits that after due investigation, the jurisdictional police has submitted charge-sheet against the petitioners and one co-accused Alok Thawait in which there are serious allegations against the petitioners not only for treating respondent No.2 with cruelty, but they also demanded mobile phone and cash, which clearly attracts the offence under Section 406 of the IPC. As such, it is the case where the petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 8. At the outset, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of interference in charge-sheet filed by the police against accused in extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. 9. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 8. At the outset, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of interference in charge-sheet filed by the police against accused in extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. 9. In the matter of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 , the Supreme Court has held that the accused can approach the High Court either under Section 482 of the CrPC or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him. 10. The Supreme Court in the mater of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 laid down the principles of law relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the first information report and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In paragraph 102 of the report, their Lordships laid down the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 of the CrPC should be exercised, which are as under: - “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” 11. The principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) has been followed by the Supreme Court in the matters of Google India Private Limited v. Visaka Industries, (2020) 4 SCC 162 , Ahmad Ali Quraishi and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2020) 13 SCC 435 and Dr Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2019) 18 SCC 191 . The Supreme Court in Google India Private Limited (supra), explained the scope of dictum of Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and “that too in the rarest of rare cases” as indicated in paragraph 103 therein of the report. 12. Having noticed the scope of interference by this Court in the petition relating to quashment of FIR/charge-sheet, reverting to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that in the impugned charge-sheet, four petitioners have been charged for offences under Sections 498-A/34, 406 & 354 of the IPC, Sections 3 & 4 of the Act of 1961 and Sections 4 & 5 of the Chhattisgarh Tonahi Pratadna Nivaran Act, 2005. 13. Chapter XXA of the IPC deals with offence of cruelty by husband or relatives of husband. Section 498A of the IPC defines the offence of cruelty as under:- “498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 14. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that in order to establish offence under Section 498A of the IPC, the prosecution must establish, (i) That, woman must be married; (ii) She has been subjected to cruelty or harassment and (iii) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of the woman or by relative of her husband. The word 'relative' has not been defined in the IPC or in this Chapter, but in order to be covered under Section 498A of the IPC, one has to be relative of the husband by blood, marriage or adoption. The word 'relative' in Section 498A of the IPC would be limited only to blood relation and relations by marriage (See U. Suvetha v. State by Inspector of Police and another, (2009) 6 SCC 757 and also Vijeta Gajra v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2010) 11 SCC 618 ). 15. The word 'cruelty' within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC has been explained in Explanation appended to Section 498A of the IPC. It consists of two clauses namely clause (a) and clause (b). To attract Section 498A of the IPC, it must be established that cruelty or harassment to the wife to coerce her or cause bodily injury to herself or to commit suicide or the harassment was to compel her to fulfill illegal demand for dowry. It is not every type of harassment or cruelty that would attract Section 498A of the IPC. Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC contemplates harassment of woman to coerce or any relation of her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. The complainant if wants to come within the ambit of Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC, she can succeed if it is proved that there was an unlawful demand by the husband or any of his relatives with respect to money or of some valuable security. 16. The Supreme Court in the matter of Priya Vrat Singh and others v. Shyam Ji Sahai, (2008) 8 SCC 232 considered the issue of delay in lodging the complaint as well as role that has been ascribed to the accused therein and quashed the complaint holding the delay of two years in lodging FIR to be fatal and further held that no role has been ascribed to the petitioner/accused therein. It was observed as under:- “8. Further it is pointed out that the allegation of alleged demand for dowry was made for the first time in December, 1994. In the complaint filed, the allegation is that the dowry torture was made some times in 1992. It has not been explained as to why for more than two years no action was taken. 9. Further, it appears that in the complaint petition apart from the husband, the mother of the husband, the subsequently married wife, husband's mother's sister, husband's brother in law and Sunita's father were impleaded as party. No role has been specifically ascribed to anybody except the husband and that too of a dowry demand in February 1993 when the complaint was filed on 6.12.1994 i.e. nearly after 22 months. It is to be noted that in spite of service of notice, none has appeared on behalf of Respondent No.1.” 17. Similarly, in the matter of Sunder Babu and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2009) 14 SCC 244 delay in filing complaint against accused therein was taken note of by their Lordships of the Supreme Court holding the case to be covered by Category Seven of para-102 highlighted in Bhajan Lal's case (supra), the prosecution for offence under Section 498A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was quashed. 18. Similarly, in the matter of Geeta Mehrotra (supra), the Supreme Court held that casual reference to the family member of the husband in FIR as co-accused particularly when there is no specific allegation and complaint did not disclose their active involvement. It was held that cognizance of matter against them for offence under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 and 304-B of the IPC would not be justified as cognizance would result in abuse of judicial process. 19. In the matter of K. Subba Rao and others v. State of Telangana represented by its Secretary, Department of Home and others, (2018) 14 SCC 452 their Lordships of the Supreme Court delineated the duty of the criminal Courts while proceeding against relatives of victim's husband and held that the Court should be careful in proceeding against distant relatives in crime pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths and further held that relatives of husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations, unless specific instances of their involvement in offences are made out. 20. In the matter of Rashmi Chopra (supra) it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court relying upon the principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) that criminal proceedings can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed and further held that judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment and the High Court should not hesitate in exercising the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings if the proceedings deserve to be quashed in line of parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) and further held that in absence of specific allegation regarding anyone of the accused except common and general allegations against everyone, no offence under Section 498A IPC is made out and quashed the charges for offence under Section 498A of the IPC being covered by category seven as enumerated in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) by holding as under:- “24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations against the appellants for offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding for divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra. 25. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra. 25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one of the applicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. “they started harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry of one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother’s sister and husband of mother’s sister have been roped in clearly indicate that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the applicants.....” 21. Having noticed the legal position qua quashing the FIR and charge-sheet, the question would be whether taking the contents of the FIR and charge-sheet as it is, offence under Section 498A/34 of the IPC is made out against the petitioners who are relatives of husband of respondent No.2/complainant being mother-in-law, father-in-law, sister-in-law and brother-in-law ? 22. A written report was lodged by respondent No.2 i.e. complainant Smt.Smita Mahobia W/o. Shri Alok Thawait at Police Station Mahila Thana, Raipur that her marriage was solemnized on 10.02.2015 at Raipur with Shri Alok Thawait and she has given adequate dowry including air conditioner, sofa, dining table etc. and also given gold and silver ornaments, but immediately after the marriage her husband and mother-in-law i.e. petitioner No.1 started harassing her by saying that she had not brought adequate dowry and cash amount and she was subjected to cruelty with demand of mobile phone, cash etc., even she was beaten by her husband many times. She has also stated that even when she was carrying pregnancy she was again beaten by her husband and mother-in-law in connection with taking dowry. She has also stated that the said torture and harassment was continued at Raipur and Bilaspur also. 23. A careful perusal of the aforesaid complaint would show that so far as the allegation of demand of phone and cash is concerned, that is on Alok Thawait, husband of the complainant/respondent No.2 herein. Similarly, allegation of physical assault and harassment is also on Alok Thawait. The only allegation against these petitioners is that immediately after marriage they taunted respondent No.2 that she had not brought sufficient dowry and cash amount in her marriage. Similarly, allegation of physical assault and harassment is also on Alok Thawait. The only allegation against these petitioners is that immediately after marriage they taunted respondent No.2 that she had not brought sufficient dowry and cash amount in her marriage. As such, main allegation is on Alok Thawait (her husband) and omnibus and general allegations without any particulars of involvement have been made against the petitioners. Even in the statement made under Section 161 CrPC, there is no specific allegation against the petitioners except general and vague allegations stating that the petitioners have treated her with cruelty and demanded dowry. 24. Thus, upon the basis of above-stated analysis, following broad facts are apparent on the face of record, (i) The allegation of abusing, assaulting and intimidating the complainant/respondent No.2 is on Alok Thawait (complainant's husband). (ii) Only general and unspecific allegations have been made against the present petitioners without particulars of the said demand alleging that the complainant had not brought sufficient dowry and cash amount in her marriage and she was taunted by the petitioners all the time. 25. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice that the petitioners have also been charged for offence under Section 4 of the Act of 1961. Section 4 of the Act of 1961 states as under:- “4. Penalty for demanding dowry.—If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees: Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.” 26. The term 'dowry' has been defined under Section 2 of the Act of 1961 which states as under:- “2. Definition of ‘dowry'. The term 'dowry' has been defined under Section 2 of the Act of 1961 which states as under:- “2. Definition of ‘dowry'. —In this Act, “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly— (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include] dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. Explanation II.— The expression “valuable security” has the same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” 27.The aforesaid provision of Section 2 of the Act of 1961 clearly defines the word 'dowry' by holding that any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage or in connection with the marriage of the said parties. 28. The Supreme Court in the matter of Appasaheb and another v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721 while considering the definition of 'dowry' under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act clearly held that correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential and further held that demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as demand for dowry. It was observed by their Lordships as under:- “11. In view of the aforesaid definition of the word "dowry" any property or valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well-known social custom or practice in India. Being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well-known social custom or practice in India. It is well settled principle of interpretation of Statute that if the Act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business or transaction knows or understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning. (See Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd., (1996) 10 SCC 413 and Chemical and Fibres of India v. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 664 ). A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses of for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for "dowry" as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure. Since an essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC viz., demand for dowry is not established, the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained.” 29. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of aforesaid definition of 'dowry' as considered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Appasaheb (supra), it is quite vivid that it is the case of the prosecution relying upon the complaint made by respondent No.2 that cash was said to have been demanded by husband of respondent No.2, as such, no offence under Sections 4 & 5 of the Act of 1961 is made out particularly against the petitioners herein. 30. On the basis of aforesaid discussion, I am of the considered opinion that prima-facie no offences under Section 498A/34 and Sections 4 & 5 of the Act of 1961 are made out for prosecuting the petitioners for the above-stated offences and the prosecution against them for the aforesaid offences is covered by Category 1, 3 & 7 of para-102 of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) and as such, liable to be quashed. 31. The petitioners have also been charged for commission of offence under Sections 406 and 354 of the IPC. 32. 31. The petitioners have also been charged for commission of offence under Sections 406 and 354 of the IPC. 32. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 405 of the IPC which states as under:- “405. Criminal breach of trust.—Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits “criminal breach of trust”.” 33. Offence under Section 405 of the IPC is punishable under Section 406 of the IPC which states as under:- “406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.-Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.” 34. Criminal breach of trust consists of any one of the four positive acts namely, misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal of that property. The ingredients of offence of criminal breach of trust are, (i) That, accused must have been entrusted with the property or dominion over it, (ii) The accused must have misappropriated the property or disposed of that property in violation of subtract, as such, offence under Section 405 of the IPC can be said to have been committed only when all ingredients of that offence as defined in statute are found to have been satisfied. 35. In the matter of Velji Raghavji Patel v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 1433 the Supreme Court has clearly held that in order to establish “entrustment or dominion” over property to an accused person, mere existence of that person's dominion over property is not enough. It must be further shown that his dominion was the result of “entrustment”. 36. In the matter of State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal, AIR 1968 SC 700 the Supreme Court has held that the expression “entrustment” carries with it the implication that the person handing over any property or on whose behalf that property is handed over to another, continues to be its owner. 36. In the matter of State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal, AIR 1968 SC 700 the Supreme Court has held that the expression “entrustment” carries with it the implication that the person handing over any property or on whose behalf that property is handed over to another, continues to be its owner. Further the person handing over the property must have confidence in the person taking the property so as to create fiduciary relationship between them. 37. In Sushil Kumar Gupta v. Joy Shankar Bhattacharjee, AIR 1971 SC 1543 the Supreme Court has held that offence of criminal breach of trust is committed when a person who is entrusted in any manner with property or with dominion over it, dishonestly misappropriates it, or converts it to his own use.... The appellant's manner of dealing with the money entrusted to his custody clearly constitutes criminal breach of trust. 38. The Supreme Court in the matter of The Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. S.K.Roy, (1974) 4 SCC 230 has held that there are two distinct parts involved in the commission of the offence of criminal breach of trust. The first consists of the creation of an obligation in relation to the property over which dominion or control is acquired by the accused. The second is a misappropriation or dealing with the property dishonestly and contrary to the terms of the obligation created. 39. In the matter of Onkar Nath Mishra and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another, (2008) 2 SCC 561 the Supreme Court quashed the complaint against the petitioner's therein for offence under Section 406, IPC finding that there is no averment as to entrustment of any kind of property by the complainant to the accused person. It was observed as under:- “18. It was observed as under:- “18. In the present case, from a plain reading of the complaint filed by the complainant on 8-11-1994, extracted above, it is clear that the facts mentioned in the complaint, taken on their face value, do not make out a prima facie case against the appellants for having dishonestly misappropriated the Stridhan of the complainant, allegedly handed over to them, thereby committing criminal breach of trust punishable under Section 406 I.P.C. It is manifestly clear from the afore- extracted complaint as also the relevant portion of the charge- sheet that there is neither any allegation of entrustment of any kind of property by the complainant to the appellants nor its misappropriation by them. Furthermore, it is also noted in the charge-sheet itself that the complainant had refused to take articles back when this offer was made to her by the Investigating Officer. Therefore, in our opinion, the very pre- requisite of entrustment of the property and its misappropriation by the appellants are lacking in the instant case. We have no hesitation in holding that the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court erred in law in coming to the conclusion that a case for framing of charge under Section 406 IPC was made out.” 40. Following its earlier decisions including Onkar Nath Mishra (supra) the Supreme Court again in the matter of V.P. Shrivastava v. Indian Explosives Limited and others, (2010) 10 SCC 361 quashed the complaint for offence under Sections 405 and 406 of the IPC holding that there is nothing in the complaint, which even remotely suggest that complainant/IEL had entrusted any property to the appellant / accused and appellant / accused had dominion over any of such properties dishonestly converted to their own use. 41. From the principle of law flowing from the aforesaid judgments rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court (supra), it is absolutely clear that the accused being in any manner entrusted with property or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of legal contract, express or implied, then only offence under Section 405 IPC can be said to be made out. 42. 42. So far as the registration of offence under Section 354 of the IPC is concerned, there is no allegation made by the complainant / respondent No.2 to outrage her modesty against the petitioners or against any other person. Only general and unspecific allegations have been made against the present petitioners without particulars of the said demand alleging that the complainant had not brought sufficient dowry and cash amount in her marriage and she was taunted by the petitioners all the time. As such, no offence under Section 354 of the IPC is made out against the petitioners. 43. Section 4 of the Chhattisgarh Tonahi Pratadna Nivaran Act, 2005 deals punishment for identifying Tonahi and Section 5 deals with punishment for harassment which read as under:- “4. Punishment for identifying Tonahi.-Whoever identifies any person as Tonahi by any means shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years and also with fine. 5. Punishment for harassment.-Whoever causes physical or mental harassment or damage to any person identified by him or any person as Tonahi shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to 5 years and also with fine.” 44. A careful perusal of the complaint dated 14.12.2016 would show that respondent No.2/complainant has made written complaint against her husband, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law regarding physical and mental harassment made by them, but no allegation has been levelled that the petitioners had identified the complainant as “tonahi”. As such, taking the contents of the FIR as it is and documents as filed by the prosecution in shape of charge-sheet, it cannot be held that the petitioners have committed the offence under Sections 498A/34, 406 & 354 of the IPC, Sections 3 & 4 of the Act of 1961 and Sections 4 & 5 of the Chhattisgarh Tonahi Pratadna Nivaran Act and the petitioners' case is covered by the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) and prosecution against them for the above-stated offences deserves to be quashed. 45. 45. As a fallout and consequence of the above-stated legal analysis, proceedings pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur (Chhattisgarh) in Criminal Case No.4724/2017 for offences under Sections 498A/34, 406 & 354 of the IPC, Sections 3 & 4 of the Act of 1961 and Sections 4 & 5 of the Chhattisgarh Tonahi Pratadna Nivaran Act along with final report filed in Crime No.15/2016 registered at Police Station Mahila Thana, Raipur to the extent of petitioners herein namely Smt.Piyushlata Thawait, Aniruddh Thawait, Trilok Thawait and Smt.Sweta Thawait are hereby quashed. However, prosecution against Alok Thawait (husband of the complainant/respondent No.2) shall continue. It is made clear that all the observations made in this order are for the purpose of deciding the petition filed by the petitioners hereinabove and this Court has not expressed any opinion on merits of the matter and concerned Court will decide criminal case pending against one of the co-accused strictly in accordance with law without being influenced by any of these observations made hereinabove. 46. The petition under Section 482 CrPC is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. No cost(s). 47. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this order to the concerned trial Court for necessary information and compliance.