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2023 DIGILAW 694 (GUJ)

State Of Gujarat v. Panchal Kanubhai Chunilal

2023-04-28

NISHA M.THAKORE, S.H.VORA

body2023
JUDGMENT : (Nisha M. Thakore, J.) 1. This is an appeal preferred by the State of Gujarat under Section-378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 challenging the judgment and order of acquittal dated 4th April, 1995 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Vadodara in the Sessions Case No.140 of 1994. By the said judgment and order, the learned Sessions Judge has recorded order of acquittal of present respondent Nos. 1 and 2- original accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offence punishable under sections 302, 324, 114 of Indian Penal Code and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. 2. The gist of the complaint given by Leelaben Mohanbhai Solanki (P.W. No.-1) wife of deceased Mohanbhai Bhupatbhai Solanki is that on 14.01.1994, the complainant was engaged in cooking and while she was inside her house, her husband – deceased Mohanbhai Bhupatbhai Solanki was flying kite in the compound area adjacent to their house. The mother-in-law was also present in the house. It is her case that her deceased husband viz. Mohanbhai Bhupatbhai Solanki was enjoying kite flying and shouted that ‘the kite has gone’. Upon hearing such a shout, the accused No.1 viz. Kanubhai Panchal and accused No.2 -his wife viz.Savitriben who were residing in the neighborhood suddenly came out of their house and the accused No.1 started inflicting knife (katar) blow on the chest of the deceased – Mohanbhai. The complainant immediately rushed out of her house to save her husband from further assault. However, the accused no.2 – Savitriben caughthold of the complainant and pushed her and at the same time, the accused No.1 injured her by inflicting the knife (katar) blow on her right leg while she was trying to intervene. The accused No.1 had further inflicted two blows on the back of the deceased. Upon hearing the screaming of the complainant, one person viz.Rameshbhai Raisingbhai Parmar, P.W.-2 as well as other persons including Mohanbhai Bhikhabhai Chauhan, P.W-3, who were residing in the same faliya came to the scene of offence and caught-hold of both the accused No.1 and accused No.2. The deceased Mohanbhai Solanki was immediately shifted for medical treatment to S.S.G. Hospital. Both the accused were arrested by the police on the spot. However, the doctor on examination of the deceased declared him dead. 3. The deceased Mohanbhai Solanki was immediately shifted for medical treatment to S.S.G. Hospital. Both the accused were arrested by the police on the spot. However, the doctor on examination of the deceased declared him dead. 3. Based on the aforesaid complaint, an F.I.R. came to be registered with the Makarpura Police Station, which was registered as I-C.R.No.9 of 1994 for the offence punishable under Sections-302, 324 r/w.114 of the I.P.C. and Section-135 of the Bombay Police Act, against both the accused persons wherein Panchal Kanubhai Chunilal was arraigned as accused No.1 and his wife Savitriben Kanubhai (respondent No.2) herein was arraigned as accused No.2. At the end of the investigation, a charge-sheet came to be filed against both the aforesaid accused for the offence punishable under Sections-302, 324 r/w.114 of the I.P.C. and Section-135 of the Bombay Police Act. The aforesaid charge-sheet was placed before the Court below and the Sessions Case No.14 of 1994 came to be registered before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Vadodara. The accused were produced before the trial Court and the accused having denied the offence, a charge came to be framed against them vide Exh.5. The accused No.1 was charged for the offence punishable under Section-302 of IPC for causing the death of deceased Mohanbhai Solanki. The accused No.1 was further charged for the offence under Section-324 of the IPC for causing grievous hurt to the complainant with the weapon knife (katar). Further, the accused No.2 was charged with the offence of abetment of the offence committed by the accused no.1 under Sections-302 & 324 of IPC whereby she was alleged to have caught-hold of the complainant and had thereby abetted in the offence committed by the accused No.1 under Section 302 of I.P.C. of causing death of deceased Mohanbhai and causing grievous injury to the complainant for the offence under Section-324 of I.P.C. Further, the accused No.1 was also charged for the offence punishable under Section-135 of the Bombay Police Act for using deadly weapon in the public domain in breach of notification issued by the Police Commissioner, Vadodara. 4. The prosecution has examined 15 witnesses as well as has placed on record 14 documentary evidences to prove the charge against the accused. On the other hand the defence has brought on record 6 documentary evidences. 4. The prosecution has examined 15 witnesses as well as has placed on record 14 documentary evidences to prove the charge against the accused. On the other hand the defence has brought on record 6 documentary evidences. All incriminating evidence was put to the accused persons while recording their statement under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. wherein both had denied all the allegations and alleged false implication. Both the accused had raised specific defence that the deceased was killed by someone. It was alleged that the deceased had teased respondent no.2 and had assaulted her. Thereafter he was killed in some other incident. The trial court upon evaluation of the evidence of both the sides was pleased to record and pass the order of judgment and order of acquittal dated 04.04.1995, thereby acquitting both the accused from the offence punishable under Sections-302, 324 r/w.114 of I.P.C. and Section-135 of the Bombay Police Act. 5. The Trial Court while recording the order of acquittal has taken into consideration the deposition of four eye-witnesses mainly the complainant - Leelaben [p.w.-1, Exh.-9]; Rameshbhai Raisinghbhai [p.w.-2, Exh.14]; Prabhatbhai Chauhan [p.w.-3, Exh.27] and Bhailalbhai Motibhai Mistri [p.w.-11, Exh.35]. The Trial Court upon appreciation of the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses has noticed major contradictions as regards the occurrence of the incident and have ultimately found aforesaid witnesses not reliable, more particularly, considering the fact that the aforesaid witnesses are related to eachother. The trial Court has further noticed while appreciating the cross-examination of the original complainant that apart-from the FIR registered, the original version of the complainant about the occurrence of incident before the PSI, has intentionally been not brought on record. Thus, the trial Court in absence of the first version being not brought on record by the prosecution coupled with the fact about the contradiction noted in the cross-examination of the aforesaid witnesses, has doubted the manner in which the incident is alleged to have taken place by the prosecution. 6. Further, while scrutinizing the relevant corroborative evidence in the form of the panchnama of place of offence, the inquest panchnama [Exh.20], the arrest panchnama [Exh.22], the discovery panchnama of the weapon [Exh.16], the trial court recorded major shortcomings which does not support the case of the prosecution. The trial Court upon examination of the evidence of various panch-witnesses noted that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The trial Court upon examination of the evidence of various panch-witnesses noted that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The trial Court further found that even panch-witnesses of the discovery panchnama does not prove the recovery of actual weapon used in the commission of alleged offence. Thus, in absence of the corroborative evidence being brought on record, the Court has arrived at conclusion that the case of prosecution is not proved beyond reasonable doubt which has led the trial Court to passed the impugned order of acquittal. Hence, this appeal at the instance of the State. 7. At the stage of admission of this appeal, the State has raised various grounds as reflected in the memo of appeal. The leave to Appeal was granted by this Court vide order dated 04/09/1996 and bailable warrant was issued upon respondent accused. Initially, the bailable warrant issued upon respondent has remained unserved and this Court vide order dated 26.06.2015 had issued non-bailable warrant. The record further reveals that when the appeal was taken up for final hearing, the attention of this Court was invited to the fact that the non-bailable warrant issued by this Court against the respondent no.1 was not executed as it was reported that the respondent no.1 – Kanubhai Chunilal Panchal has expired on 17.05.2005. Hence, this Court vide order dated 29.07.2015 had declared this appeal abetted qua the respondent no.1 – Kanubhai Chunilal Panchal and only respondent no.1 – Savitriben Kanubhai Panchal was to be prosecuted. Thereafter, this Court vide order dated 27.04.2022 had once-again issued fresh bailable warrant against the sole respondent No.2 and in response to such warrant, the respondent No.2 had remained present before this Court. In such circumstances, this Court is required to adjudicate this appeal against the respondent No.2 – original accused No.2 in reference to the charge framed against her by the Trial Court vide Exh.5. 8. We have heard Ms. C.M. Shah, learned APP appearing for the appellant-State and Mr. Prakash G. Pandya, learned advocate for the respondent- original accused No.2. 9. Submissions of Appellant State : 9.1 Ms. C.M. Shah, learned APP appearing for the appellant-State, has drawn attention of this Court to the findings recorded by the trial court. She has further invited attention of the court to the reasons assigned by the trial court while recording the order of acquittal of respondent-accused. 9. Submissions of Appellant State : 9.1 Ms. C.M. Shah, learned APP appearing for the appellant-State, has drawn attention of this Court to the findings recorded by the trial court. She has further invited attention of the court to the reasons assigned by the trial court while recording the order of acquittal of respondent-accused. She has taken us through the original record and proceedings. She has further invited our attention to the evidence of the eye witnesses. She has further referred to the panch witnesses of discovery of weapon and the panchnama of discovery of weapon. She has also taken us through the arrest panchnama of the accused. She has further invited our attention to the external and internal injuries of the deceased as reflected in the post mortem report. The cause of death as reflected in the P.M. Note. She has submitted that upon appreciation of such evidence, the trial court has accepted the case of the prosecution of deceased being murdered. 9.2 She has further submitted that the prosecution has examined Leelaben, who is the wife of deceased and also injured eye witness. She has specifically stated in her deposition that accused No.1 was armed with weapon knife, had come out of his house and had started inflicting blows on chest of deceased Mohanbhai and when she tried to save her husband, the accused No.2-respondent No.2 herein had caught hold of the complainant. At that stage, the accused No.1 had inflicted blow on the leg of the complainant. Ms. Shah, while referring to her deposition along with her version in the complaint, submitted that core part of her deposition has remained non-controversial, however, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, by giving undue weight-age to minor contradictions, which otherwise does not bear any significance on the core evidence of the complainant, discarded the evidence of the complainant. 9.3 She has further submitted that apart from the complainant, the prosecution has examined three eye witnesses, which includes one Rameshbhai Raisinghbhai Parmar (P.W. 2), vide Exh.14 and Prabhatbhai Raijibhai Chauhan, (P.W. No.7) vide Exh.27 and Bhailalbhai Motibhai Mistri, (PW.11) vide Exh.35. By referring to their evidence, Ms. Shah made valiant attempt to accept their evidence in support of case of the prosecution. By referring to their evidence, Ms. Shah made valiant attempt to accept their evidence in support of case of the prosecution. She has urged this Court that it is settled legal position in law that the witness of the injured eyewitness or eyewitnesses cannot be discarded if their evidence is found to be consistent and true. The fact of being a relative cannot be a valid reason to discredit their evidence. In other words, the relations of such witnesses with the deceased could not be considered as a valid factor to affect the credibility of witness and the learned Magistrate ought to have scrutinized their evidence meticulously, with more caution. 9.4 She has further submitted that the medical evidence, which has come on record, supports the case of the prosecution. She has invited our attention to the evidence of Dr. Kishor K. Desai, who has been examined as P.W. 9, vide Exh.3. She has further submitted that the said witness has specifically stated that the injures inflicted on the deceased were sufficient to cause the death of victim in ordinary nature. The said witness has opined that the injury inflicted on deceased is possible by muddamal article knife. Thus, the prosecution has successfully proved that the death of victim is a case of culpable homicide. 9.5 She has taken us through the evidence of Dr. Narayanbhai Punjabhai Parmar, who is examined as P.W. No.10 vide Exh.32. By referring to his evidence, leaned APP has submitted that the said witness has examined and had given treatment to Leelaben- original complainant. The injuries certificate of complainant has been proved by the prosecution vide Exh.42, which goes to suggest that the complainant had received injury. The cause of the assault with weapon knife. Even the doctor, who has given her treatment (P.W. No. 10) has opined that such injury received by the complaint was possible with muddamal knife. 9.6 She has further invited our attention to the evidence of panch witnesses and has submitted that the prosecution has proved the place of offence, the discovery of weapon knife recovered from accused No.1. The recovery of clothes of the deceased as well as of the complainant as muddamal articles has come on record, the aforesaid muddamal articles along with weapon knife has been forwarded to the FSL, where in serological report confirms the presence of blood. The recovery of clothes of the deceased as well as of the complainant as muddamal articles has come on record, the aforesaid muddamal articles along with weapon knife has been forwarded to the FSL, where in serological report confirms the presence of blood. 9.7 Lastly, she has taken us through the police witnesses, which includes PSI Mr. Gavarkar Mirkhan Baloch (P.W. No.13) vide Exh.39, Police Inspector Mr. Ramesh Sharma (P.W. No.14) Exh.47 and Hasmukhbhai Mohanbhai Chavda P.W. No.12 vide Exh.37 and has submitted that the recovery of muddamal knife has been made in presence of PSI Mr. Baloch, whose evidence has come on record. She therefore, submitted that even in absence of the evidence of panch witness, the discovery of weapon stands proved by the prosecution. 9.8 By referring to the aforesaid evidence, Ms. Shah has submitted that the substantive evidence in the form of evidence of the eye witness stood corroborated from the discovery of weapon knife from accused No.1. Thus, it was contended that the learned Sessions Judge has committed error in not believing the case of the prosecution and on erroneous appreciation of the evidence of the eye witnesses has wrongly given benefit of doubt to the accused. 9.9 She has further submitted that in fact the defence raised by the accused in Section 313 of Cr.P.C. statement and the evidence which has brought on record, goes to indicate that involvement of accused in the commission of offence as in the same incident, the accused have received injury. She therefore, urged this court to quash and set aside the judgment and order of learned Sessions Judge recording acquittal of respondent-accused. 10. Submission of the Respondent – original accused : 10.1 On the other hand, the aforesaid submissions of learned APP, has been strongly objected by the learned advocate on record for respondent No.2. Mr. Prakash J. Pandya, learned advocate had also placed reliance upon the findings and reasons recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. He has submitted that the evidence of the eye witnesses were not found to be reliable. In such circumstances, noticing the contradictions in their deposition as against their statements under Section 164 of Cr.P.C, the learned Sessions judge had rightly discarded their evidence. 10.2 He has taken us through the further statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. Mr. In such circumstances, noticing the contradictions in their deposition as against their statements under Section 164 of Cr.P.C, the learned Sessions judge had rightly discarded their evidence. 10.2 He has taken us through the further statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. Mr. Pandya had also invited attention to the evidence brought on record by the defence, more particularly, the injury certificate of accused at Exh.33. The application in the form of the complaint given by accused No.1. By referring to the aforesaid documents, he has submitted that the said complaint was registered as N.C. Complaint with the Makarpura Police Station, which raises serious doubt in manner, in which the incident has taken place. Mr. Pandya has made attempt to demonstrate that the incident had occurred due to the harassment being mated to the wife of the accused No.1 present respondent No.2 at the instance of the deceased which has laid to sudden fight. He had submitted that this was a case of self defence and the accused were rightly given benefit of doubt in absence of the actual version of incident being not brought on record by the prosecution. 10.3 He lastly submitted that it is a settled legal position that once the trial court has acquitted the accused, the Appellate Court while excising jurisdiction in appeal under Section 378 should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. He therefore, urged this Court to not to entertain the present appeal. 11. At this stage, it would be essential to consider the scope of present appeal in light of the subsequent event which has come on record of this appeal having held abetted qua respondent No.1- principal accused. The only question which falls for our consideration is whether the accused No.2 solely can be held guilty for the offense under section 302 and section 324 of IPC with the aid of Section 114 of IPC ? 12. At the outset, it would be germane to mention that in view of the death of accused No.1 and the appeal being held abated qua respondent No.1, the present acquittal appeal is left out to examine the acquittal order of trial court in case respondent No.2- original accused No.2. 12. At the outset, it would be germane to mention that in view of the death of accused No.1 and the appeal being held abated qua respondent No.1, the present acquittal appeal is left out to examine the acquittal order of trial court in case respondent No.2- original accused No.2. Before we proceed for the examination of case on hand qua the charge alleged against the original accused No.2- present respondent, it would be essential to consider the charge alleged against her. The impugned order of acquittal of respondent No.2 has to be examined in light of the evidence which has come on record before trial court, however, if one looks at the charge framed by the trial court vide Exh.5, the charge alleged is of abetment with the aid of section 114 of IPC for the offence alleged to have been committed under sections 302 and 324 of IPC attributed to accused No.1. We are of the view that the appeal filed by the State against the acquittal of the principal accused for alleged offence under section 302 and 324 of IPC, has abated, the charge of abetment framed against the accused no.2 can be independently decided on merits. 13. We have carefully gone through the record and have reappreciated the evidence of the witnesses examined before the trial court. At this stage, apt would be to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Shahahja @ Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh Vs. State of Maharshtra, reported in 2022 Supreme Court Cases Online SC 883, wherein the court observed as under: “27. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straight-jacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. There is no fixed or straight-jacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When eye-witness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. VI. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guess work on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross examination by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The sub- conscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. The sub- conscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the later statement, even if the later statement is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness. [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, 1983 Cri LJ 1096 : AIR 1983 SC 753 , Leela Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1999 SC 3717 , and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1959 SC 1012 ] 28. To put it simply, in assessing the value of the evidence of the eye- witnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence. In respect of both these considerations, the circumstances either elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which a Court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a mere denial, yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined on its own merits, where the accused raise a definite plea or puts forward a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken into account while assessing the value of the prosecution evidence. 29. There is nothing palpable or glaring in the evidence of the two eye-witnesses on the basis of which we can take the view that they are not true or reliable eyewitnesses. Few contradictions in the form of omissions here or there is not sufficient to discard the entire evidence of the eye-witnesses. 30. 29. There is nothing palpable or glaring in the evidence of the two eye-witnesses on the basis of which we can take the view that they are not true or reliable eyewitnesses. Few contradictions in the form of omissions here or there is not sufficient to discard the entire evidence of the eye-witnesses. 30. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Anil Singh, AIR 1988 SC 1998 , wherein in para 15, it is observed thus : “15. It is also our experience that invariably the witnesses add embroidery to prosecution story, perhaps for the fear of being disbelieved. But that is no ground to throw the case overboard, if true, in the main. If there is a ring of truth in the main, the case should not be rejected. It is the duty of the court to cull out the nuggets of truth from the evidence unless there is reason to believe that the inconsistencies or falsehood are so glaring as utterly to destroy confidence in the witnesses It is necessary to remember that a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. One is as important as the other Both are public duties which the Judge has to perform.” In light of the aforesaid principles of appreciation of evidence, we proceed to examine the evidence which has come on record in the present case. 14. Analysis: (a) Evaluation of the evidence of the injured eye witness : The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Raju@ Balachanddran & ors. vs. State of Tamilnadu, reported in AIR 2013 SC 983 held that the evidence of the injured eye witness who are treated as star witness by the prosecution is given high credence. The evidence of a related or interested witness should be meticulously and carefully examined. In a case where there are related witness and interested witness if having some enmity with the assailant, the bar would need to be raised and the evidence of the witness would have to be examined by applying a standard discerning scrutiny. This is only a rule of prudence and not one of law. In a case where there are related witness and interested witness if having some enmity with the assailant, the bar would need to be raised and the evidence of the witness would have to be examined by applying a standard discerning scrutiny. This is only a rule of prudence and not one of law. It is a settled legal proposition that before the evidence of the witness is relied upon, the court is expected to judge the credibility of the witness, the one who is reliable and trustworthy. This has to be gathered from the entire statement of the witness and the demeanor of the witness. The PW No.1 Leelaben Mohanbhai Solanki, who is the original complainant is the wife of the deceased. She is the injured eyewitness of the alleged incident. In such circumstances, she can be considered a star witness of the prosecution. No doubt, the credentials of the testimony of the injured eye witness stands on a higher pedestal than other witnesses. However, this does not prevent this court from evaluating her deposition with the lens of legal provisions, once the trial court, having noticed major contradictions, variations and discrepancies, has found her not reliable. Upon close examination of testimony of the injured eye witness Leelaben Mohanbhai, she can be considered a star witness of the prosecution. The evaluation of her evidence though one can notice the improvisation made in deposition as compared to her original version in the form of complaint, she has denied such improvisation when put to her in cross examination. This goes to suggest her approach to make incorrect statements before the court. In her deposition, she has stated before the Court that there was no dispute with accused no.1 but then in cross examination, the defence has been successful in bringing on record the civil litigations filed in respect of adjoining open plot. Again, in her cross examination she has initially denied that Police had reached her house before they left for hospital however, in the later deposition she has admitted that PSI Baloch (PW no.13) had arrived before they left for hospital. She has gone to the extent of deposing before the court that Mr. Baloch had recovered her clothes in presence of Raisingbhai and drawn the said facts on papers. She has deposed that her statement was recorded by Mr. Baloch and her thumb impression was taken. She has gone to the extent of deposing before the court that Mr. Baloch had recovered her clothes in presence of Raisingbhai and drawn the said facts on papers. She has deposed that her statement was recorded by Mr. Baloch and her thumb impression was taken. With such evidence of the complainant, though she is the wife of the deceased and being injured in the incident however, she has emerged as a related and interested witness whose evidence is found shaky and cannot be solely relied upon for conviction. In such circumstances, before her evidence is relied upon the corroboration of the facts is required to be obtained from surrounding material which has been brought on record. (b) When the prosecution witnesses consist of related witnesses : The prosecution has projected Rameshbhai Raisingbhai Parmar ( Pw no. 2), Prabhatbhai Raijibhai Chauhan ( Pw no. 3) , Bhailalbhai (Pw no.11) as eyewitnesses , who are the relatives or the known person to the deceased. It is an equally settled position of law that merely a witness is related to the deceased that should not be the criteria to discard their evidence. However, the courts are required to be guarded while scrutinizing such evidence which requires corroboration to a material extent. Here, the acceptance of evidence is dependent upon two factors viz., first, scrutiny by the court and, second, caution while considering such evidences by seeking sufficient corroboration. Prosecution has examined Rameshbhai Raisingbhai Parmar ( PW no.2), who is projected as an eyewitness by the prosecution. In his cross examination, improvisation and contradiction has emerged as against his original statement under section 164 crpc, which raises serious doubts about being eyewitness to the occurrence of the incident. He has admitted that in cross that he is not aware about the altercation which has taken place between the deceased and accused no.1. As against his initial claim of position of his house being situated near the house of the deceased, the defence has been successful in bringing on record the fact that the house of said witness is not near the house of the deceased. The defence through panch witness Mohanbhai (PW No.3) has successfully dislodged the aforesaid evidence of eyewitness Rameshbhai Raisingbhai ( PW No. 2), who has categorically denied the fact of the situation of the house of Rameshbhai near the house of the deceased. The defence through panch witness Mohanbhai (PW No.3) has successfully dislodged the aforesaid evidence of eyewitness Rameshbhai Raisingbhai ( PW No. 2), who has categorically denied the fact of the situation of the house of Rameshbhai near the house of the deceased. We have further noticed from the map drawn by the circle inspector does not mentions about the house of said witness near the house of the deceased. The prosecution has further examined one Prabhatbhai Raijibhai Chauhan (PW No.7) who is also projected as an eyewitness to the occurrence of the incident. He claims to be present at the time of offense. He has specifically deposed that present respondent no.2- original accused had caught hold of complainant Leelaben while she had tried to intervene. In cross examination of Prabhatbhai Raijibhai Chauhan (PW No.7) , the defence has successfully brought out contradictions and improvisations being made as against his statement under section 164 Cr.P.C. The said witness has accepted the fact that the complainant is a cousin sister. Though he claims to be an eyewitness, it has come on record that he resides at Japa pol which is away from the place of offense. In such circumstances, his presence at the time of occurrence of offense in absence of any explanation offered, is doubtful. Again, he has shown his ignorance about the injuries of the accused. Thus, he cannot be accepted as an independent witness but interested witness whose evidence cannot be relied upon. The prosecution has further examined Bhailalbhai Motilal Mistri (P.W.No.11). The prosecution has projected him as an eye witness to the occurrence of the incident. He has claimed that while he was returning with cereals, he had heard some altercations and had seen accused No.1 causing death of deceased Mohanbhai. He has further deposed before the Court of accused no.1 holding a muddamal weapon knife and had inflicted blows in chest and back. Complainant Leelaben had entered and tried to save the deceased. At that stage, accused No.1 had caused injury on her right leg. He has further deposed that such incident had taken place in the front door of the house of the deceased and the accused was arrested on the spot. He has identified the muddalmal article knife and the accused before the court. In his cross examination, he has denied that his statement was not recorded on the date of incident. He has further deposed that such incident had taken place in the front door of the house of the deceased and the accused was arrested on the spot. He has identified the muddalmal article knife and the accused before the court. In his cross examination, he has denied that his statement was not recorded on the date of incident. He has avoided the fact of having good relations with the deceased since residing in the same Mohalla. At one stage of cross examination, he was unable to meet with the questions of the defence as to whether he had come back to the house or had directly left for the factory. His evidence gives an impression that he has been tutored, as actual injury received by the complainant was on her left thigh and not right leg. From the evaluation of the evidence of Bhailalbhai Motibhai Mistri ( PW no. 11), the defence has been successful in raising doubt about his presence at the time of commission of the offense. He has mainly denied the questions put forward by the defence about the situation prevailing after the occurrence of the incident. Various discrepancies and contradictions have come out in his evidence as against his statement recorded under section 164 of Cr.P.C. The overall appreciation of the evidence of all the aforesaid witnesses does not inspire confidence to treat them as reliable witnesses, as they are either known to or related to the deceased. We are conscious established position of law that interested witnesses evidence should not be outrightly discarded merely on the ground that they are related or interested witnesses of the deceased. However, for the reasons stated above we have carried the impression of them being implanted witnesses. (C) Corroborative evidence : In light of the aforesaid evaluation of testimony of eyewitnesses, we have looked for corroboration from the other evidence which has come on record. The prosecution has been able to bring on record the panchnama of place of offense - Exh. 18, wherein the place of offense is the front door space of the house of the deceased. Further corroboration can be derived from the Map produced on record vide Exh.38, drawn by the circle inspector (Pw no. 12 ). The Inquest panchnama and the recovery of the clothes from the dead body has been established vide Exh.20. 18, wherein the place of offense is the front door space of the house of the deceased. Further corroboration can be derived from the Map produced on record vide Exh.38, drawn by the circle inspector (Pw no. 12 ). The Inquest panchnama and the recovery of the clothes from the dead body has been established vide Exh.20. The Post mortem report Exh.31 has come on record proved by the prosecution through PW no. 9 Dr. Kishorkumar Pramodrai. The recovery of clothes of the complainant has been made by drawing panchnama vide 24 which is proved through the evidence of panch witness PW no. 6 Fatehsinh Mohanbhai Solanki. Thus, on appreciation of the aforesaid evidence, the evidence of the star witness-complainant finds corroboration to the extent about the unnatural death of the deceased but the defence has been able to raise questions about her version of the occurrence of the incident involving the accused, which leads us to go further about evaluation of discovery panchnama of weapon knife. 15. Discovery of weapon : Prosecution witness Mohanbhai Bhikhabhai Chauhan (PW No. 3), examined by the prosecution is one of the panch witness of the scene of offence ( Exh.18) and also of the panchnama of the recovery of the weapon knife from the accused no.1 ( Exh.16). At one stage, he has admitted in his cross that the panchnama was written by the writer of PSI Mr. Baloch and they have signed panchnama. He has further refused to identify the muddamal knife shown to him. The medical officer examined have accepted that the injuries sustained by the deceased is possible through the weapon knife but at the same time they having examined the muddamal knife noticing blunt edge of the weapon knife has opined that the injury with the said weapon is not possible. The FSL report has also been called for wherein it has transpired that presence of blood has been confirmed but fact remains that recovery of weapon has not been established in absence of corroboration of panch witness. Thus, the incriminating material involving accused no.1 has not been established by the prosecution 16. The First version of the incident; 16.1. The main reason assigned by the trial court while finding the evidence of the complainant not reliable as regards the occurrence of the offense is the gross contradictions noticed in her cross examination. Thus, the incriminating material involving accused no.1 has not been established by the prosecution 16. The First version of the incident; 16.1. The main reason assigned by the trial court while finding the evidence of the complainant not reliable as regards the occurrence of the offense is the gross contradictions noticed in her cross examination. As against the version of complainant in the form of FIR, it has transpired in the evidence of the PSI Mr. Baloch (PW no.13) that when he was on duty in bandobast, he had received a mobile message from control room about some fight having taken place at Atladar chowk. It is further deposed by said witness that on his way to the incident he had seen a complainant and deceased in a rickshaw, who were on their way to the hospital. Mr. Baloch in cross has admitted that when he reached the scene of the offense neither the deceased nor the complainant were present. He has also denied having met the complainant on scene of offense and then leaving for hospital. He has further refused to have inquired from the mother or brother of the deceased or even recorded any statement. 16.2 As against the aforesaid deposition of PSI the original complainant has admitted in her later part of cross examination that PSI Baloch had arrived before they left for hospital. She has further submitted that her statement was recorded by Mr. Baloch and she had given her thumb impression. 16.3 On comparison of the evidence of complainant ( PW No.1) and evidence of Mr. Baloch PSI ( PW No.13), the contradictions and discrepancies in the version of the complainant and said witness cannot be treated as minor. 16.4 The defence has raised serious suspicion from such contradictions about the very first version of the occurrence of the incident being not brought on record. The trial court has taken notice of the fact that the first version of the FIR in the form of the wardhi, station diary entry about the occurrence of the incident though being reported has not been brought on record. 16.5 In such circumstances, a strong defence has come on record about the existence of the First version and intentionally being not produced. 16.5 In such circumstances, a strong defence has come on record about the existence of the First version and intentionally being not produced. Additionally, the court notices that even in the injury certificate of the complainant, in the “History” she has simply submitted of having received injury due to assault but no details about the present accused is mentioned. 16.6 Apt would be refer to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sevi and another vs. State of Tamil nadu, reported in 1981 Cr.L.J. 736. The court, considering the defence raised by the accused and the non production of the relevant entries in the station diary, which otherwise would have dispelled the suspicion raised by the accused, found force in the submission of the accused in the given circumstances, that the original FIR has been suppressed. 16.7 Thus, in absence of aforesaid documents being not brought on record by the prosecution, the adverse inference can be drawn as regards existence of the contrary as provided under Section 106 read with Section 111 of the Evidence act. 17. No explanation offered by prosecution about injuries received by the accused : At no stage before the trial court, either of the eye witnesses led by the prosecution has deposed about the injuries sustained by the accused in the alleged incident. The said fact has emerged in evidence of the defence, whereby the injury certificate of both the accused have come on record. Their arrest panchnama indicates the external injuries at the time of arrest. It is evident on the appreciation of the injury certificate that the injury sustained by the accused is more serious in nature as compared to the simple injury sustained by the complainant. The defence in cross examination of the eye witnesses has put specific question about anyone else being injured in the incident to which the complainant and other witnesses except for PW No.2, has blatantly denied. This is another reason to find the aforesaid eye witnesses interested. In such circumstances, the question arises on the actual turn of events in occurrence and manner in which the incident must have taken place. The evidence of the witnesses becomes a weak piece of evidence which cannot be trusted. This is another reason to find the aforesaid eye witnesses interested. In such circumstances, the question arises on the actual turn of events in occurrence and manner in which the incident must have taken place. The evidence of the witnesses becomes a weak piece of evidence which cannot be trusted. It is settled legal position that non explanation of injury sustained by the accused will affect the case of prosecution more so when the prosecution witnesses are interested and inimical witnesses. In such circumstances, the burden is heavy upon prosecution to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt. The court can draw adverse inference that the version of the prosecution is not clear and true and therefore may extend the benefit of doubt to the accused. 18. Scope of Appellate jurisdiction under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. Recently the Hon’ble supreme Court in the case of Ravi Sharma vs. State (NCT of Delhi) , reported in 2022 (8) SCC 536 , held that the High Court while acting under appellate jurisdiction under section 378 of CRPc should come with more stronger and cogent reasons to reverse the order of acquittal into conviction. The relevant observations are reproduced as under: 8. Before venturing into the merits of the case, we would like to reiterate the scope of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) while deciding an appeal by the High Court, as the position of law is rather settled. We would like to quote the relevant portion of a recent judgment of this Court in Jafarudheen and Others v. State of Kerala (2022 SCC Online SC 495) as follows: 25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC, the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the Trial Court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters. 9. Thus, the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the Trial Court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters. 9. This Court in the aforesaid judgment has noted the following decision while laying down the law: Precedents: Mohan alias Srinivas alias Seena alias Tailor Seena v. State of Karnataka, [2021 SCC OnLine SC 1233] as hereunder: “20. Section 378 CrPC enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal. Section 384 CrPC speaks of the powers that can be exercised by the Appellate Court. When the trial court renders its decision by acquitting the accused, presumption of innocence gathers strength before the Appellate Court. As a consequence, the onus on the prosecution becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence. Certainly, the Court of first instance has its own advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The Appellate Court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of not only the evidence before it, but is duty bound to satisfy itself whether the decision of the trial court is both possible and plausible view. When two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty along with the advantage of having seen the witnesses. Article 21 of the Constitution of India also aids the accused after acquittal in a certain way, though not absolute. Suffice it is to state that the Appellate Court shall remind itself of the role required to play, while dealing with a case of an acquittal. 21. Every case has its own journey towards the truth and it is the Court's role undertake. Truth has to be found on the basis of evidence available before it. There is no room for subjectivity, nor the nature of offence affects its performance. We have a hierarchy of courts in dealing with cases. An Appellate Court shall not expect the trial court to act in a particular way depending upon the sensitivity of the case. Truth has to be found on the basis of evidence available before it. There is no room for subjectivity, nor the nature of offence affects its performance. We have a hierarchy of courts in dealing with cases. An Appellate Court shall not expect the trial court to act in a particular way depending upon the sensitivity of the case. Rather it should be appreciated if a trial court decides a case on its own merit despite its sensitivity. 22. At times, courts do have their constraints. We find, different decisions being made by different courts, namely, trial court on the one hand and the Appellate Courts on the other. If such decisions are made due to institutional constraints, they do not augur well. The district judiciary is expected to be the foundational court, and therefore, should have the freedom of mind to decide a case on its own merit or else it might become a stereotyped one rendering conviction on a moral platform. Indictment and condemnation over a decision rendered, on considering all the materials placed before it, should be avoided. The Appellate Court is expected to maintain a degree of caution before making any remark. 23. This court, time and again has laid down the law on the scope of inquiry by an Appellate court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC. We do not wish to multiply the aforesaid principle except placing reliance on a recent decision of this court in Anwar Ali v. State of Himanchal Pradesh, (2020) 10 SCC 166 : 14.2. When can the findings of fact recorded by a court be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under: [Babu v. State of Kerala, [ (2010) 9 SCC 189 ]: “20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [ (1984) 4 SCC 635 ], Excise & Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [1992 Supp (2) SCC 312], Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665], Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [ (2001) 1 SCC 501 ], Aruvelu v. State, [ (2009) 10 SCC 206 ] and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. [ (2009) 10 SCC 636 ]).” It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [ (1999) 2 SCC 10 ], that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse, and the findings would not be interfered with. 14.3. In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, [ (2019) 5 SCC 436 ], this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 CrPC and the interference by the High Court [State of Karnataka v. Vijay Mohan Singh, 2013 SCC OnLine Kar 10732] in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered a catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In para 31, it is observed and held as under: “31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat, [ (1978) 1 SCC 228 ]. In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: ‘10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: ‘10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.’ 31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, [ (1998) 5 SCC 412 ], the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: ‘8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Doshi case [Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 ] viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well- considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.’ 31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, [ (1999) 3 SCC 309 ], after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P., [ AIR 1955 SC 807 ], in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: ‘5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well- established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State [1951 SCC 1207]; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. [1951 SCC 898]. In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.’ 31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., [ (1979) 1 SCC 355 ], this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.” N. Vijayakumar v. State of T.N., [ (2021) 3 SCC 687 ] as hereunder:— “20. Mainly it is contended by Shri Nagamuthu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that the view taken by the trial court is a “possible view”, having regard to the evidence on record. It is submitted that the trial court has recorded cogent and valid reasons in support of its findings for acquittal. Under Section 378 CrPC, no differentiation is made between an appeal against acquittal and the appeal against conviction. By considering the long line of earlier cases this Court in the judgment in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, [ (2007) 4 SCC 415 ] has laid down the general principles regarding the powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. Para 42 of the judgment which is relevant reads as under: (SCC p. 432) “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. 4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 21. Further in the judgment in Murugesan v. State, [ (2012) 10 SCC 383 ] relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, this Court has considered the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal recorded by the trial court. In the said judgment, it is categorically held by this Court that only in cases where conclusion recorded by the trial court is not a possible view, then only the High Court can interfere and reverse the acquittal to that of conviction. In the said judgment, distinction from that of “possible view” to “erroneous view” or “wrong view” is explained. In the said judgment, it is categorically held by this Court that only in cases where conclusion recorded by the trial court is not a possible view, then only the High Court can interfere and reverse the acquittal to that of conviction. In the said judgment, distinction from that of “possible view” to “erroneous view” or “wrong view” is explained. In clear terms, this Court has held that if the view taken by the trial court is a “possible view”, the High Court not to reverse the acquittal to that of the conviction. xxx xxx xxx 23. Further, in Hakeem Khan v. State of M.P., [ (2017) 5 SCC 719 ] this Court has considered the powers of the appellate court for interference in cases where acquittal is recorded by the trial court. In the said judgment it is held that if the “possible view” of the trial court is not agreeable for the High Court, even then such “possible view” recorded by the trial court cannot be interdicted. It is further held that so long as the view of the trial court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, verdict of the trial court cannot be interdicted and the High Court cannot supplant over the view of the trial court. Para 9 of the judgment reads as under; (SCC pp.722- 23) “9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the trial court's judgment is more than just a possible view for arriving at the conclusion of acquittal, and that it would not be safe to convict seventeen persons accused of the crime of murder i.e. under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code. The most important reason of the trial court, as has been stated above, was that, given the time of 6.30 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. of a winter evening, it would be dark, and, therefore, identification of seventeen persons would be extremely difficult. This reason, coupled with the fact that the only independent witness turned hostile, and two other eyewitnesses who were independent were not examined, would certainly create a large hole in the prosecution story. This reason, coupled with the fact that the only independent witness turned hostile, and two other eyewitnesses who were independent were not examined, would certainly create a large hole in the prosecution story. Apart from this, the very fact that there were injuries on three of the accused party, two of them being deep injuries in the skull, would lead to the conclusion that nothing was premeditated and there was, in all probability, a scuffle that led to injuries on both sides. While the learned counsel for the respondent may be right in stating that the trial court went overboard in stating that the complainant party was the aggressor, but the trial court's ultimate conclusion leading to an acquittal is certainly a possible view on the facts of this case. This is coupled with the fact that the presence of the kingpin Sarpanch is itself doubtful in view of the fact that he attended the Court at some distance and arrived by bus after the incident took place.” 24. By applying the abovesaid principles and the evidence on record in the case on hand, we are of the considered view that having regard to material contradictions which we have already noticed above and also as referred to in the trial court judgment, it can be said that acquittal is a “possible view”. By applying the ratio as laid down by this Court in the judgments which are stated supra, even assuming another view is possible, same is no ground to interfere with the judgment of acquittal and to convict the appellant for the offence alleged. From the evidence, it is clear that when the Inspecting Officer and other witnesses who are examined on behalf of the prosecution, went to the office of the appellant-accused, the appellant was not there in the office and office was open and people were moving out and in from the office of the appellant. It is also clear from the evidence of PWs 3, 5 and 11 that the currency and cellphone were taken out from the drawer of the table by the appellant at their instance. There is also no reason, when the tainted notes and the cellphone were given to the appellant at 5.45 p.m. no recordings were made and the appellant was not tested by PW 11 till 7.00 p.m.” 10. There is also no reason, when the tainted notes and the cellphone were given to the appellant at 5.45 p.m. no recordings were made and the appellant was not tested by PW 11 till 7.00 p.m.” 10. Applying the said principles and after going through the judgment rendered by the trial Court as well as the High Court, we do feel that it is a case where the High Court has not acted within the legal parameters. 19. Conclusion : We would like to remind ourselves that the principal offender original accused no.1 who has been charged with offence of sections 302 and 324 of IPC has expired and the present appeal has already stood abated qua said respondent accused. Even otherwise noticing the aforesaid analysis of the evidence and the legal principles relied on, we are of the view that no stronger and cogent material has emerged on record to take a different view and the substantive offence has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. In such circumstances, the present respondent No.2 cannot be convicted under the aid of abetment under section 114 of IPC, who has been sought to be rope in alleging her presence during commission of offence and facilitating accused no.1 in committing the crime. The benefit of doubt is extended to respondent No.2. The appeal fails. Bailable warrant stands discharged. Let the record and proceedings be sent back forthwith.