ORDER : 1. The instant intra-court appeal, preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 03.09.2019 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 378 of 2001 whereby and whereunder while allowing the writ petition, the Award dated 08.06.2000 passed in Reference No. 97 of 1995 by Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad answered in favour of the workman directing the Management of BCCL to regularize the concerned workmen from the date of reference, has been set aside. 2. Brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ proceeding, which are required to be enumerated herein, read as under: The writ petitioner, management of North Tisra Colliery, is an unit of M/s BCCL and M/s Rawal Transcon (P) Limited was allotted the contract of transportation of coal from the colliery to the railway siding on the basis of the work order issued to him and all the work was to be carried out mechanically, no manual labour was required to be engaged on the job of loading of coal at the depot and unloading of coal at the railway siding. The contractor firm selected and recruited its own men for operating the machines and vehicles used in connection with transportation of coal and in that process some unskilled labours were engaged. The union taking advantage of the situation enrolled few contract workers and raised the dispute to provide employment to 75 persons. The union also raised an industrial dispute with regard to regularization of 75 persons in which conciliation failed and a failure report was submitted to the appropriate government and the appropriate government did not refer the dispute for adjudication. The union, thereafter, filed a writ petition being CWJC No. 1333 of 1995 (R) in which vide order dated 28.06.1995, the appropriate government was directed to refer the dispute for adjudication. In pursuance of the aforesaid direction, the dispute was referred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad which was registered as Ref. No. 97/95 in which due notices were issued and after hearing both the sides, award dated 08.06.2000 was passed in favour of the workmen. Being aggrieved with the same, writ petition being CWJC No. 378 of 2001 was preferred which had been allowed by quashing the award dated 08.06.2000 passed in Reference Case No. 97/95. 3. Mr. No. 97/95 in which due notices were issued and after hearing both the sides, award dated 08.06.2000 was passed in favour of the workmen. Being aggrieved with the same, writ petition being CWJC No. 378 of 2001 was preferred which had been allowed by quashing the award dated 08.06.2000 passed in Reference Case No. 97/95. 3. Mr. Kalyan Roy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted by referring to the impugned order wherein the Award passed by the learned Tribunal has been reversed. The reference of the last but one paragraph of the impugned order has been made wherein the reference of the power of judicial review to be exercised by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been referred wherein, according to Mr. Roy, although, the learned Single Judge has given an observation that an Award can only be interfered with if there is any perversity in the Award, but in the subsequent paragraph the learned Single Judge has come out with the finding that the Award is perverse and, therefore, a question has been raised that when on the issue of perversity the Award has been reversed, then a discussion ought to have been made by taking into consideration the testimonies of the witnesses, both produced on behalf of the Management and on behalf of the workmen, so as to test the perversity since, perversity means that wrong appreciation of the material evidence or non-consideration of the evidence produced before the Adjudicator. According to him, merely by referring to the word perversity, the court of law cannot be allowed to come to the conclusion by taking decision of perversity of Award which is based upon the consideration of the testimony. It has been contended by Mr. Roy that there might be any perversity but the conclusion regarding the said perversity can only be arrived at if the testimony of the witnesses will be considered by the higher forum, therefore, submission has been made that the order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be proper and hence not sustainable in the eyes of law. 4. While on the other hand, Mr. 4. While on the other hand, Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, learned counsel appearing for BCCL, has submitted that the learned Single Judge has considered the provision of Rules 72 and 73 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1971) and has come to the finding that merely because the amount has been disbursed that does not mean that there is relationship of employer and employee. The learned Single Judge after appreciating the aforesaid finding recorded by the learned Tribunal in the award has come to the conclusion that even in absence of cogent evidence, the relationship of employer and employee has been found to be in existence, hence, the award has been reversed. According to Mr. Mehta, the aforesaid reason assigned in the order passed by the learned Single Judge is well founded basis upon which, if the finding of perversity has been given, the same cannot be said to suffer from error. 5. We are not in dispute so far as the compliance of the legal requirement as provided under the Contract Labour Regulation Rule, 1971 but since we are sitting in the intra-court appeal, therefore, what has been argued by Mr. Mehta before us ought to have been argued before this learned Single Judge itself and not before the intra-court appeal. 6. Since we are sitting in intra-court appeal to look into the order passed by the learned Single Judge, therefore, it is not available for Mr. Mehta to supplement the order impugned passed by the learned Single Judge by way of improving the same. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 8. Admittedly, as would appear from the ward that the dispute is for answering the reference that “Whether the demand of the Union for the regularisation of services of S/Shri Naresh Paswan and others (As per list enclosed) by the management of North Tisra Colliery of M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited is justified? If so, to what relief are the concerned workmen entitled?” 9. The Tribunal has proceeded to answer the aforesaid reference. Notice was issued upon the management. Parties have adduced their evidences as also the testimonies have been recorded. If so, to what relief are the concerned workmen entitled?” 9. The Tribunal has proceeded to answer the aforesaid reference. Notice was issued upon the management. Parties have adduced their evidences as also the testimonies have been recorded. The Tribunal, for the purpose of answering the reference, has formulated three issues as would appear from para-5 of the impugned award, which reads as under: “(i) Is the reference legally maintainable? (ii) Is there relationship of employer and employee in between the management and the concerned persons, namely, Naresh Paswan and 74 others? If so, were they employed in a permanent and perennial nature of job? (iii) Is the demand of the sponsoring union, Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union for regularization of Naresh Paswan and 74 others in the employment of the management of North Tisra colliery of M/s. B.C.C. Ltd. justified? If so, to what relief are the concerned workmen entitled?” 10. The second issue, i.e. the relationship of employer and employee in between the management and the concerned persons, namely, Naresh Paswan and 74 others has been taken up first. The sponsoring union has pleaded that the concerned persons are the workmen of M/s. B.C.C. Ltd. working at No. 6 Siding of North Tisra Colliery since the year 1991 and they are doing the permanent nature of job of breaking coal, shale picking, line cleaning and wagon levelling. These jobs are of permanent nature and the concerned persons, Naresh Paswan and 74 others are regularly doing the job for more than 240 days in a calendar year from the year 1991. The management has taken the plea that Naresh Paswan and few others mentioned in the list of reference are the workmen of contractor firm M/s. Rawal Transoon (P) Ltd. which was a contractor firm engaged by the Railway for transportation of coal from the colliery to Railway siding on the basis of work order issued to that firm. But most of them are not even contractor's workmen, rather, they are all job seekers and they have joined with a view to for getting job through litigation. But most of them are not even contractor's workmen, rather, they are all job seekers and they have joined with a view to for getting job through litigation. The Tribunal, in order to examine as to whether the concerned workmen were doing the job of coal breaking, shale picking, wagon levelling and lime cleaning on regular basis as alleged by them, has considered the xerox copy of fortnightly labour payment-sheet M/s. Rawal Transoon Pvt. Ltd. which are for the period of 16.08.1993 to 30.09.1993 and again from 01.12.1993 to 28.02.1994 which have been marked Ext.W-1 series. The workmen witness, WW-2- Modhusudan Benrjee has stated that in these attendance sheets contains the signature of Sri A.B.Sinha, Personnel Officer. The management has examined Sri A.B. Sinha who is MW-3 who has admitted that he has supervised the payment of the contractor's workers by the contractor. He has not denied that he has not put his signature in Ext. W-1 series. The learned Tribunal, therefore, based upon Ext. W-1 series came to the conclusion that the concerned persons were working in the job of coal breaking, shale picking, wagon levelling and lime cleaning under M/s. Raw Transcon Pvt. Ltd. and they were being paid their wages under the supervised of Sri A.B. Sinha, Personnel Officer of the management. The sponsoring union has filed a petition calling for payment sheets for the years 1982-95 and master-roll for the same period along with Cap Lamp Issue Register for the said period but the management has not filed the same nor have they explained as to why they did not file the same. The management has only filed a photo copy of wage-sheet of contractor's workers from 06.12.1994 to 31.12.1994 from which it appears that the concerned workmen were working under a contractor G.T.S. Coal Sales from 16.12.1994 to 31.12.1994 and they have been paid wages for the said period under the supervision of the management. The Tribunal has further considered the Xerox copy of the wage-sheet for the said period, i.e. from 16.12.1994 to 31.12.1994 marked as Ext. W-2. Further, another wage sheet-cum-muster roll from 01.01.1995 to 15.01.1995 has been filed which according to the Tribunal suggest that they were working under G.T.S. Coal Sales in the job of shale picking, coal breaking at Railway siding No. 6 of Lodna Area under which North Tisra is situated. W-2. Further, another wage sheet-cum-muster roll from 01.01.1995 to 15.01.1995 has been filed which according to the Tribunal suggest that they were working under G.T.S. Coal Sales in the job of shale picking, coal breaking at Railway siding No. 6 of Lodna Area under which North Tisra is situated. The Tribunal, on the ground of non-filing of Cap Lamp Issue Register or Muster -Roll-cum-Payment sheet for the concerned period by the management, has without any explanation, drawn adverse inference against the management. The Tribunal has also considered the work-order issued to M/s. Rawal Transcon Pvt. Ltd. marked as Ext.M-1 proved by MW-1 Chandrama Singh, Mines Surveyor, working at North Tisza Colliery. He has also proved certain bills submitted by the contractor and accordingly payments made by the management which have been marked Ext.M-2. The seven bills for fortnightly period have also been exhibited. The first bill being from 01.12.1993 to 15.12.1992, followed by 16.12.1992 to 19.12.1992, 01.02.1993 to 15.02.1993, 16.02.1993 to 28.02.1993, 01.03.1993 to 15.03.1993, 01.04.1993 to 15.04.1993 and 17.05.1993 to 28.05.1993 have been produced by which the. From Ext.M-1 the learned Tirbunal has found that M/s. Rawal Transcon Pvt. Ltd. was ordered to do the transporting job of coal and allied job from North Tisra, South Tisra, Jeangora collieries to Railway siding of Lodna Area. It has further been found by the learned Tribunal that the contractor was also ordered to do the job of picking of shale/stone or any other extraneous materials from coal stock. The Tribunal has also asked to see the license issued under the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 but the same has not been produced, as such, came to the conclusion that the management has failed to assert and prove that the so-called contractor M/s. Rawal Tran con Pvt. Ltd. was having any licence under the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act. The Tribunal has further come to the finding by considering the Ext. M-1 by which the contractor was liable for maintenance of statutory records but no such records have been either produced by the management or the same has been noticed to be produced by the said contractor. The Tribunal has further come to the finding by considering the Ext. M-1 by which the contractor was liable for maintenance of statutory records but no such records have been either produced by the management or the same has been noticed to be produced by the said contractor. Further as per work order the contractor was liable to make provident fund payment with respect to contract labour but the management has neither pleaded nor produced any document to prove that the so-called contractor was making payment of provident fund to its workmen engaged by it. The contractor was also liable to make payment of wages to contractual workers as per Wage Board applicable in this State and under Section 21 of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970, the management is required to supervise the payment of wages but the management has not filed any document or register regarding payment of wages by the so-called contractor under the supervision of the officer of the management. However, the management has taken a plea that the workmen since were the workers of the contractor but the said plea was discarded by taking into consideration the xerox copy of wage-sheet filed by the management marked as Ext.M-2 for the period of 16.12.1994 to 31.12.1994. Further, the management has also given specific finding on the issue that the management has produced only one work order to M/s. Rawal Transcon Pvt. Ltd, which was for a period of five years starting from 24.08.1992 and ending on 23.08.1997 but the copy of wage sheet- cum-muster-roll produced by the management under the signature of Deputy Chief Personnel Manager, Lodna Area, has suggested that there was another contractor, GTS Coal Sales from 16.12.1994 to 31.12.1994. But, the management has not explained how and under what circumstances payments were made to the workmen of another contractor where the workers were the same set of persons whose case has been referred to this Tribunal. The Tribunal, therefore, came to the conclusion that the management by simply changing the contractors for the same work with same set of persons, the workmen herein. The Tribunal, therefore, came to the conclusion that the management by simply changing the contractors for the same work with same set of persons, the workmen herein. The learned Tribunal, therefore, came to the conclusion that the plea which is being taken that the workmen to be the employee of the contractor is nothing but a sham and camouflage transaction by making payment in favour of the contractor through the intermediary so as to deprive the workmen from their legitimate claim of regularization. The learned Tribunal, on the basis of the aforesaid factual aspect, came to the conclusion that the relationship of employer and employee is existed and accordingly, the issue no. 1 and 3 has also been answered in favour of the workmen. 11. This Court for the purpose of appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the workmen/appellant has come to the finding of perversity of the award. There is no dispute about the position of law that on the ground of perversity there can be interference by the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by exercising the power of judicial review as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others, AIR 1964 SC 477 . Paragraph no. 7 of the said judgment is being reproduced as under: “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955 (1) SCR 1104 : AIR 1955 SC 233 ; Nagendra Nath vs. Commr. of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : AIR 1958 SC 398 and Kaushalya Devi vs. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 ). of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : AIR 1958 SC 398 and Kaushalya Devi vs. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 ). In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Others, AIR 1955 SC 233 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held at paragraph no. 21 as under: “With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” In Sawarn Singh and Another vs. State of Punjab and Others, (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra) 13. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra) 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In Heinz India (P) Ltd. and Another vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.66 and 67 as under: “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. vs. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. 67. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. vs. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” In Thansingh Nathmal vs. Supdt. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 Supreme Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which requires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. In Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships, while discussing the scope of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference into the finding of the Tribunal, has been pleased to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para-14 as under: “14. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal vs. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh vs. Amarnath that the …......power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways vs. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose vs. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J. as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” In General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and Others vs. Giridhari Sahu and Others, (2019) 10 SCC 695 the Hon'ble Apex Court has delved upon the issue about scope of issuance of writ of certiorari by the High Court and has laid down that, if the finding recorded by the court is erroneous and based upon perversity, the order is fit to be quashed/set aside. 12. The law has been laid down in Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others (supra) regarding the jurisdiction to interfere with the award. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hyrdo Electric Project, Orissa and Others vs. Giridhari Sahu and Others, (2019) 10 SCC 695 has interfered with the award on the basis of perversity and the incorrect appreciation of the document by the adjudicator as would appear from the finding so recorded by the Hon'ble Apex Court at para-10, which reads as under: “26. In Durga Das Basu's Commentary on the Constitution of India, 9th Edn., in regard to the concept of no evidence, we find the following discussion: “ “No evidence” does not mean only a total dearth of evidence. It extends to any case where the evidence taken as a whole is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding, or where, in other words, no tribunal could reasonably reach that conclusion on that evidence. This “no evidence” principle clearly has something in common with the principle that perverse or unreasonable action is unauthorised and ultra vires. An order made without “any evidence” to support it is in truth, made without order made without “any evidence” is worthless, it is equal to having “no evidence” jurisdiction.” (Emphasis supplied) 27. In fact, in the decision relied upon by the applicants viz. S. Viswanathan [Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. S. Viswanathan, (2005) 3 SCC 193 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 372, it is, inter alia, held as follows: (SCC p. 196, Para 12) “12. Normally, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, is the final court of facts in these types of disputes, but if a finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence the High Court exercising a power either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. But before going into such an exercise it is necessary that the writ court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any such defect in the order of the Labour Court the writ court will not enter into the realm of factual disputes and finding given thereon.” (Emphasis supplied) 28. On the conspectus of the decisions and material, we would hold as follows: the jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari is supervisory and not appellate. The Court considering a writ application of certiorari will not don the cap of an appellate court. It will not re-appreciate evidence. The writ of certiorari is intended to correct jurisdictional excesses. A writ of prohibition would issue when a tribunal or authority has not yet concluded its proceedings. Once a decision is rendered by a body amenable to certiorari jurisdiction, certiorari could be issued when a jurisdictional error is clearly established. It will not re-appreciate evidence. The writ of certiorari is intended to correct jurisdictional excesses. A writ of prohibition would issue when a tribunal or authority has not yet concluded its proceedings. Once a decision is rendered by a body amenable to certiorari jurisdiction, certiorari could be issued when a jurisdictional error is clearly established. The jurisdictional error may be from failure to observe the limits of its jurisdiction. It may arise from the procedure adopted by the body after validly assuming jurisdiction. It may act in violation of principles of natural justice. The body whose decision which comes under attack may decide a collateral fact which is also a jurisdictional fact and assume jurisdiction. Such a finding of fact is not immune from being interfered with by a writ of certiorari. As far as the finding of fact which is one within the jurisdiction of the court, it is ordinarily a matter “off bounds” for the writ court. This is for the reason that a body which has jurisdiction to decide the matter has the jurisdiction to decide it correctly or wrongly. It would become a mere error and that too an error of fact. However, gross it may amount to, it does not amount to an error of law. An error of law which becomes vulnerable to judicial scrutiny by way of certiorari must also be one which is apparent on the face of the record. As held by this Court in [Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 ], as to what constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record, is a matter to be decided by the court on the facts of each case. A finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence would be perverse and in fact would constitute an error of law enabling the writ court to interfere. It is also to be noticed that if the overwhelming weight of the evidence does not support the finding, it would render the decision amenable to certiorari jurisdiction. This would be the same as a finding which is wholly unwarranted by the evidence which is what this Court has laid down [See Parry and Co. It is also to be noticed that if the overwhelming weight of the evidence does not support the finding, it would render the decision amenable to certiorari jurisdiction. This would be the same as a finding which is wholly unwarranted by the evidence which is what this Court has laid down [See Parry and Co. Ltd. vs. P.C. Pal, AIR 1970 SC 1334 : (1969) 2 SCR 976 ].” Therefore, the award can be interfered with but there must be specific finding to the effect of perversity based upon the cogent reason, i.e. by discussing one or the other evidence before coming to such conclusion. 13. The perversity is one of the grounds of showing interference by the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and as such, the meaning of “perversity” is required to be considered. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal and Others vs. M/s Gopi Nath and Sons and Others, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 312 wherein, at paragraph 7, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court to re-appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness—as distinguished from the legal permissibility-of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness—as distinguished from the legal permissibility-of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law.” It is, thus, evident that “perversity” means if a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 14. This Court, in order to access the finding so recorded by the learned Single Judge by which the award has been interfered with on the ground of perversity, has gone across the order/judgment of the learned Single Judge and has found therefrom that it has already been discussed therein that the learned Tribunal has passed the award based upon the evidence and the testimony of the witnesses recorded in course of adjudication. But, it would be evident from the order passed by the learned Single Judge wherein none of the documents as has been assessed and discussed as also the oral testimony of the witnesses either of the workmen or of the management have been discussed by giving specific finding as to what led the learned Single Judge to come to the conclusion of perversity rather it would be evident from the order passed by the learned Single Judge that after taking note of the award and the reference of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in different cases, has come to the finding that the concerned workmen were employed by the contractor and they were being paid salary by the contractor. The salary was being ensured by the management that is the statutory liability of the principal employer. The salary was being ensured by the management that is the statutory liability of the principal employer. The reference of Rules 72 and 73 of the Act, 1971 has been made based upon which the conclusion has been arrived at that the management since is releasing the wages that itself cannot be a ground of holding the management to be principle employer. The learned Single Judge, thereafter, has come to the finding that the learned Tribunal has committed fundamental error by recording employer and employee relationship on the basis of logic/reason/inference which is not permissible. The said reasoning, according to the our considered view, ought to have been given by appreciating the testimony of the witnesses and exhibits but the finding since is based upon by not giving due consideration of the said documents as to how these documents can be discarded in accepting the relationship of employer and employee in between the workmen and the management rather the learned Singe Judge by making reference of the provision of Rules 72 and 73 has come to the conclusion that the management is not the principal employer but the finding which has been recorded by the learned Single Judge apart from the above as recorded in the preceding paragraphs to the effect that the disbursement of amount in favour of the workmen of another contractor, i.e. GTS Coal Sales and the payment through intermediaries which led the learned Tribunal to come to the conclusion that engagement of the workmen in the perennial nature of work is sham and camouflage. 15. This Court also considers it fit to refer the issue which is to be considered for passing the award of regularization. The reference of judgment rendered in Air India Statutory Corporation and Others vs. United Labour Union and Others, (1997) 9 SCC 377 , is required to be made wherein the law has been laid down that if the workers are being engaged through contractor, they will automatically be absorbed but the said position of law has been over-ruled by the Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Limited and Others vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Others, (2001) 7 SCC 1 . The position of law after the judgment pronounced by the Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Limited and Others vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Others (Supra) and the law laid down in International Airport Authority of India Limited vs. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union and Another, (2009) 13 SCC 374 , wherein it has been laid down that in absence of any notification under Section 10(1) of the Act, 1970 and in the absence of any allegation and/or finding that the contract was sham or camouflage, there cannot be any order of reinstatement. Prior to the law laid down by the Constitution Bench, the law prevailing was, as per the judgment pronounced in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation and Others v. United Labour Union and Others (Supra) that the legal consequence of the prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the Act, 1970 prohibiting employment of contract labour was that the concerned workman would be entitled to be treated as regular employee from the day on which the contract labour system in the establishment for the work which they are doing gets abolished. But the effect of the prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the Act, 1970 issued by the appropriate Government at the later stage came to be examined by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Limited and Others vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Others (Supra) and it was held that there is no provision under CLRA Act whether expressly or necessarily implication which provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuance of a notification by the appropriate Government under Section 10(1), prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any other establishment and overruled the judgment rendered in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation and Others v. United Labour Union and Others (Supra) making it clear that neither Section 10 nor any other provision in the CLRA Act provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuance of notification by the appropriate Government under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act and consequently, the principal employer is not required by operation of law to absorb the contract labour working in the establishment. It is evident from the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Steel Authority of India Limited and Others vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Others (Supra) that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the Act, 1970, prohibiting employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by it for that purpose. The condition is that if the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications other than technical qualifications. Reference in this regard be made to paragraphs Nos. 68, 88, 105 and 125 of Steel Authority of India Limited and Others vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Others, (Supra) which are being quoted hereunder: 68. Reference in this regard be made to paragraphs Nos. 68, 88, 105 and 125 of Steel Authority of India Limited and Others vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Others, (Supra) which are being quoted hereunder: 68. We have extracted above Section 10 of the CLRA Act which empowers the appropriate Government to prohibit employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment, lays down the procedure and specifies the relevant factors which shall be taken into consideration for issuing notification under sub-section (1) of Section 10. It is a common ground that the consequence of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting employment of contract labour, is neither spelt out in Section 10 nor indicated anywhere in the Act. In our view, the following consequences follow on issuing a notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act: (1) contract labour working in the establishment concerned at the time of issue of notification will cease to function. (2) the contract of principal employer with the contractor in regard to the contract labour comes to an end. (3) no contract labour can be employed by the principal employer in any process, operation or other work in the establishment to which the notification relates at any time thereafter. (4) the contract labour is not rendered unemployed as is generally assumed but continues in the employment of the contractor as the notification does not sever the relationship of master and servant between the contractor and the contract labour. (5) the contractor can utilise the services of the contract labour in any other establishment in respect of which no notification under Section 10(1) has been issued where all the benefits under the CLRA Act which were being enjoyed by it, will be available. (6) if a contractor intends to retrench his contract labour, he can do so only in conformity with the provisions of the ID Act. The point now under consideration is: whether automatic absorption of contract labour working in an establishment, is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA Act and follows as a consequence on issuance of the prohibition notification thereunder. We shall revert to this aspect shortly. 88. The point now under consideration is: whether automatic absorption of contract labour working in an establishment, is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA Act and follows as a consequence on issuance of the prohibition notification thereunder. We shall revert to this aspect shortly. 88. If we may say so, the eloquence of the CLRA Act in not spelling out the consequence of abolition of contract labour system, discerned in the light of various reports of the Commissions and the Committees and the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, appears to be that Parliament intended to create a bar on engaging contract labour in the establishment covered by the prohibition notification, by a principal employer so as to leave no option with him except to employ the workers as regular employees directly. Section 10 is intended to work as a permanent solution to the problem rather than to provide a one-time measure by departmentalizing the existing contract labour who may, by a fortuitous circumstance be in a given establishment for a very short time as on the date of the prohibition notification. It could as well be that a contractor and his contract labour who were with an establishment for a number of years were changed just before the issuance of prohibition notification. In such a case there could be no justification to prefer the contract labour engaged on the relevant date over the contract labour employed for a longer period earlier. These may be some of the reasons as to why no specific provision is made for automatic absorption of contract labour in the CLRA Act. 105. The principle that a beneficial legislation needs to be construed liberally in favour of the class for whose benefit it is intended, does not extend to reading in the provisions of the Act what the legislature has not provided whether expressly or by necessary implication, or substituting remedy or benefits for that provided by the legislature. We have already noticed above the intendment of the CLRA Act that it regulates the conditions of service of the contract labour and authorizes in Section 10(1) prohibition of contract labour system by the appropriate Government on consideration of factors enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act among other relevant factors. We have already noticed above the intendment of the CLRA Act that it regulates the conditions of service of the contract labour and authorizes in Section 10(1) prohibition of contract labour system by the appropriate Government on consideration of factors enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act among other relevant factors. But, the presence of some or all those factors, in our view, provides no ground for absorption of contract labour on issuing notification under sub-section (1) of Section 10. Admittedly, when the concept of automatic absorption of contract labour as a consequence of issuing notification under Section 10(1) by the appropriate Government, is not alluded to either in Section 10 or at any other place in the Act and the consequence of violation of Sections 7 and 12 of the CLRA Act is explicitly provided in Sections 23 and 25 of the CLRA Act, it is not for the High Courts or this Court to read in some unspecified remedy in Section 10 or substitute for penal consequences specified in Sections 23 and 25 a different sequel, be it absorption of contract labour in the establishment of principal employer or a lesser or a harsher punishment. Such an interpretation of the provisions of the statute will be far beyond the principle of ironing out the creases and the scope of interpretative legislation and as such, clearly impermissible. We have already held above, on consideration of various aspects, that it is difficult to accept that Parliament intended absorption of contract labour on issue of abolition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act. 125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus: (1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in view of the definition of the expression “appropriate Government” as stood in the CLRA Act, on the answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government. (b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act; if (i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the Central Government, or (b) by a railway company; or (c) by a specified controlled industry, then the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the appropriate Government. (2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the appropriate Government: (1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the case may be. (2) having regard to (i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the establishment in question. (ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 10. (b) Inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented. (3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any establishment. (3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any establishment. Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working in the establishment concerned. (5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder. (6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications other than technical qualifications.” The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of International Airport Authority of India Limited v. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union and Another (Supra) has been pleased to hold at paragraph 38 regarding the test to be applied to find out whether a person is an employee or independent contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour agreement is a sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage, for ready reference, paragraphs 38 and 39 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted hereunder as:- “38. The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour agreement is a sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For example, if the contract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor. 39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour, when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. 39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour, when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short, worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that is secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.” Recently also, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kirloskar Brothers Limited vs. Ramcharan and Others, (2023) 1 SCC 463 has been pleased to hold after taking into consideration the judgment rendered by Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in Steel Authority of India Limited and Others v. National Union Waterfront Workers and Others (Supra) and International Airport Authority of India Limited vs. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union and Another (Supra) that in absence of any notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act and in absence of any allegation and/or findings that the contract was sham and camouflage, there cannot be any order of reinstatement or absorption of the workmen. 16. This Court has considered the issue on different angles also as to whether the work which was being taken from these workmen, i.e. coal breaking, shale picking, wagon levelling and lime cleaning has been notified to be under the prohibited category or not. It appears from the notification issued by the Ministry of Labour as contained in Notification No. S.O. 3460 dated December, 11 1990 published in the Gazette of India, Part II Section 3(ii) dated 22nd December, 1990, for ready reference the same is being referred hereunder as: “Ministry of Labour, Noti. It appears from the notification issued by the Ministry of Labour as contained in Notification No. S.O. 3460 dated December, 11 1990 published in the Gazette of India, Part II Section 3(ii) dated 22nd December, 1990, for ready reference the same is being referred hereunder as: “Ministry of Labour, Noti. No. S.O. 3460, dated December 11, 1990 published in the Gazette of India, Part II, Section 3(ii), dated 22nd December, 1990, p. 5633 [U.23013/31/87-LW] In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (37 of 1970), the Central Government, after consultation with the Central Board, hereby prohibits the employment of contract labour in the works/operations specified in the following Schedule, in the coal washery in the country, with effect from the date of publication of this notification in the Official Gazette. SCHEDULE (i) Transport of middling. (ii) Removal of slurry.” Reference of another notification by the Ministry of Labour as contained in Notification No. S.O. 2063 dated June 21, 1988 published in 1989 CCL-III-12 is also required to be made, which reads as under: “Ministry of Labour, Noti. No. S.O. 2063 dated June 21, 1988, published in 1989 CCL-III-12 In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (37 of 1970) and in super-session of the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Labour, Noti. No. S.O. 488, dated the 1st February, 1975, published in the Gazette of India, Part II, Section 3, sub-section (ii), dated the 15th February, 1975, the Central Government after consultation with the Central Board, hereby prohibits employment of contract labour in the work specified in the Schedule annexed hereto in all coal mines in the country. THE SCHEDULE 1. Raising or raising-cum-selling of coal. 2. Coal loading and unloading. 3. Over-burden removal and earth cutting. 4. Soft coke manufacturing. 5. Driving of stone drifts and miscellaneous stone cutting underground: Provided that this notification shall not apply to the following categories: (a) quarries in the North-East Coal Fields which can only be worked for a few months every year due to heavy rainfall in the area. Coal loading and unloading. 3. Over-burden removal and earth cutting. 4. Soft coke manufacturing. 5. Driving of stone drifts and miscellaneous stone cutting underground: Provided that this notification shall not apply to the following categories: (a) quarries in the North-East Coal Fields which can only be worked for a few months every year due to heavy rainfall in the area. (b) quarries located by the side of the river in Punch valley and similar other patch deposits which can only be worked when the level of rive has gone down and during non-rainy seasons. (c) loading coal when there is mechanical failure, failure of power or irregular supply of wagons by the Railways. (d) cutting stone drifts/faults which cannot be detected in advance and are of short duration, say up to six months. 17. In the instant case, the nature of work that the work which was being performed by the workmen was of coal breaking, shale picking, wagon levelling and lime cleaning. 18. The aforesaid notification reflects that the transport of middling and removal of slurry has been notified to be under the prohibited category. Herein also, the aforesaid nature of work is under the category of transport of middling since the work was of coal breaking and wagon levelling also. 19. It is, thus, evident from bare perusal of the award that the workmen were on the job of coal breaking, shale picking, wagon levelling and lime cleaning which is under the prohibited category and there is specific finding of sham and camouflage transaction by taking work from the workmen through the contractors. The said finding is based upon the conduct of the management that the MW-1 has proved the wage-sheet and his supervisory work as also the license issued under the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 has not been produced as also no record was produced by which the contractor was liable for maintenance of statutory records, even though called for but not produced and as such, the finding of sham and camouflage transaction has been arrived at by the learned Tribunal. 20. 20. The law is well settled that the document which is relevant for the purpose of adjudication of lis, if called for by the court of law and if not produced, the same amounts to fraud upon the Court and the adverse inference is to be drawn against the party who is in custody of the document but not producing it before the adjudicator. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath, AIR 1994 SC 853 wherein their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraphs 7 and 8 as follows: “7……..The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of like find the court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. 8…….A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side than he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party.”” Further in Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin and Another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 , wherein at paragraph-24, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under: “24. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the issue of drawing adverse inference is required to be decided by the court taking into consideration the pleadings of the parties and by deciding whether any document/evidence, withheld, has any relevance at all or omission of its production would directly establish the case of the other side. The court cannot lose sight of the fact that burden of proof is on the party which makes a factual averment. The court has to consider further as to whether the other side could file interrogatories or apply for inspection and production of the documents, etc. The court cannot lose sight of the fact that burden of proof is on the party which makes a factual averment. The court has to consider further as to whether the other side could file interrogatories or apply for inspection and production of the documents, etc. as is required under Order 11 CPC. Conduct and diligence of the other party is also of paramount importance. Presumption of adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional and a relevant factor to be considered in the background of facts involved in the case. Existence of some other circumstances may justify non-production of such documents on some reasonable grounds. In case one party has asked the court to direct the other side to produce the document and the other side failed to comply with the court's order, the court may be justified in drawing the adverse inference. All the pros and cons must be examined before the adverse inference is drawn. Such presumption is permissible, if other larger evidence is shown to the contrary.” Further in MCD vs. State of Delhi and Another, (2005) 4 SCC 605 , wherein at paragraph-21, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under: “21. This apart, the respondent did not also disclose the fact in the criminal revision filed before the High Court that he has also been convicted in another Criminal Case No. 202 of 1997 by the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House, New Delhi. Thus, the contesting respondent has come to the High Court with unclean hands and withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side. In our opinion, he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party. A person whose case is based on falsehood can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the court and he can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. In the instant case, non-production of the order and even non-mentioning of the conviction and sentence in Criminal Case No. 202 of 1997 tantamounts to playing fraud on the Court. A litigant who approaches the court is bound to produce all documents which are relevant to the litigation. In the instant case, non-production of the order and even non-mentioning of the conviction and sentence in Criminal Case No. 202 of 1997 tantamounts to playing fraud on the Court. A litigant who approaches the court is bound to produce all documents which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party. The second respondent, in our opinion, was not justified in suppressing the material fact that he was convicted by the Magistrate on an earlier occasion. Since the second respondent deliberately suppressed the crucial and important fact, we disapprove strongly and particularly, the conduct of the second respondent and by reason of such conduct, the second respondent disentitled himself from getting any relief or assistance from this Court. We, however, part with this case with a heavy heart expressing our strong disapproval of the conduct and behaviour but direct that the second respondent to pay a sum of Rs 10,000 by way of cost to the appellant herein.” 21. The position of law is well settled that if the prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the Act, 1970 and even if the work is being taken from the contractor, the same is nothing but sham and camouflage and in order to pass an award of regularization, the twin test, i.e. a prohibition notification under Section 10(1) and there must be a finding of sham and camouflage, is required to be there before answering the reference of regularization. However, herein, there is no reference of the notification under Section 10(1) of the Act, 1970 but the question would that when the statutory mandate is there to have the prohibitory notification under Section 10(1) of the Act, 1970 and even if the same has not been referred by the workmen, the same cannot be said to be taken adverse to the interest of the worker since we are dealing with beneficial legislation and if the statutory mandate is there, even if there is no reference of Section 10(1) notification before the adjudicator although is if found that the job in which the workmen were engaged are coming under the fold of the prohibition by virtue of notification issued under Section 10(1) of the Act, no adverse inference can be drawn rather the court of law is to go through the statutory mandate. Hence, herein, in view of the prohibitory notification as under Section 10(1) of the Act, coupled with the finding as is available from the award of sham and camouflage transaction, the same qualifies the twin test for passing the award of regularization. 22. This Court, on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove, is of the view that the order which has been passed by the learned Single Judge requires interference, accordingly, the same is, hereby, quashed and set aside. 23. In the result, the instant appeal stands allowed, accordingly, disposed of. 24. Pending interlocutory application, if any, also stands disposed of.