ORDER : 1. The applicant/defendant has preferred this application to reject the plaint under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the Code), as being barred by law, and, in the alternative, to transfer the captioned suit to the appropriate Family Court for trial along with a Petition filed by the plaintiff/ respondent for dissolution of the marriage. 2. The background facts necessary for determination of this application can be stated in brief as under:- [a] The plaintiff is an advocate by profession. Defendant is also engaged in corporate law practice. The defendant is a British citizen. The plaintiff and defendant are Parsis. [b] The marriage of the plaintiff and defendant was solemnized on 29th March, 2012 under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (the Special Marriage Act). On 1st April, 2012 the plaintiff and defendant also solemnized and registered marriage under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 (the Parsi Marriage Act). The plaintiff and defendant are blessed with a daughter and a son. [c] It seems since the year 2019, marital discord struck the life of plaintiff and defendant. Allegations and counter allegations do not deserve to be adverted to, for the purpose of determination of this application. It would be suffice to note that in the year 2021 the marital discord escalated resulting in loss of trust. The plaintiff asserts the plaintiff and defendant could not resolve the matrimonial dispute and decided to part ways amicably and till such time stay together in the matrimonial home. 3. On 7th September, 2022, according to the plaintiff, he received an intimation that the account maintained with ‘Charles Schwab and Co.’ (Schwab account), to which the plaintiff had made the defendant a joint account holder, was debited at the defendant’s instance to the tune of US$ 4 million. Assets totaling US$ 4 million had been transferred by the defendant to her own Schwab account. 4. The plaintiff, thus, claimed to have rushed to the Court with the instant suit seeking recovery of the sum of US$ 4,084,063 which the defendant had allegedly illegally transferred out of the Schwab account, jointly held by the plaintiff and defendant. It was averred that the defendant had no right, title and interest in the funds so transferred. 4. The plaintiff, thus, claimed to have rushed to the Court with the instant suit seeking recovery of the sum of US$ 4,084,063 which the defendant had allegedly illegally transferred out of the Schwab account, jointly held by the plaintiff and defendant. It was averred that the defendant had no right, title and interest in the funds so transferred. The defendant’s intention appeared to be to use the money allegedly siphoned off by her to set up a life abroad. 5. The plaintiff averred since the defendant had left the home with children, passport and other documents, he apprehended that the defendant will take the children out of the country. Once, the defendant leaves the country, the plaintiff’s rights would be irretrievably prejudiced in as much as the recovery of the allegedly siphoned off amount would become virtually impossible. The access to funds would embolden and/or incentivise the defendant to leave the country with their minor children. Hence, plaintiff prayed for a decree in the sum of US$ 4,084,063 along with interest @ 12% p.a. 6. An application for interim/ad-interim relief, being an Interim Application (L) No. 28657 of 2022, was moved for an order and direction that the defendant/respondent re-transfer the aforesaid amount, and not to permit the defendant/respondent to leave the country and further direct the defendant/respondent to deposit her passport along with the minor children passports. 7. On 7th September, 2022 this Court passed an order appointing a senior advocate of this Court as Mediator to explore the resolution of the dispute and ordered status-quo in so far as the amount of US$ 4,084,063 and ZBA partnership firm’s account and also directed that the passports of the plaintiff, defendant and their children, be deposited with the Prothonotary and Senior Master of this Court. It was clarified that the plaintiff and defendant shall have access to the children till further orders. 8. In the intervening period, the plaintiff moved another application for further interim reliefs. The plaintiff also instituted a Parsi Suit No. 20 of 2022 for dissolution of marriage under the Parsi Marriage Act. Simultaneously, the plaintiff instituted a petition, being Petition No. 3217 of 2022, for dissolution of the marriage under the Special Marriage Act before the Family Court, Mumbai. 9. The plaintiff also instituted a Parsi Suit No. 20 of 2022 for dissolution of marriage under the Parsi Marriage Act. Simultaneously, the plaintiff instituted a petition, being Petition No. 3217 of 2022, for dissolution of the marriage under the Special Marriage Act before the Family Court, Mumbai. 9. The defendant has taken out this application for rejection of the plaint on the ground that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide the instant suit. The defendant contends since the marriage has been first solemnized under the provisions of Special Marriage Act and the issues raised in the instant suit are the subject matter of the dispute which squarely fall within the ambit of Explanation to Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (the Family Courts Act) the bar under section 8(a) of the Family Courts Act comes into play and the jurisdiction of this Court is ousted. 10. The defendant asserts that the disputes between the parties to the present suit arise out of their marital relationship and are the subject matter of section 27 of the Special Marriage Act. In view of the provisions contained in section 7 of the Family Courts Act the Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction to try all the disputes. Adverting to the averments made in the plaint, the interim applications and the affidavits filed in support of the interim applications, especially the prayers therein, the defendant contends all these disputes are subsumed by the provisions contained in section 7 of the Family Courts Act. Moreover, since the plaintiff himself has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Family Court by filing Petition No. 3217 of 2022 for dissolution of marriage under the provisions of Special Marriage Act, the plaintiff would not suffer any loss in the event the instant suit is transferred to the Family Court for trial and determination along with the said petition. 11. The plaintiff resisted the prayers in the instant application by filing an affidavit in reply. The application was stated to be devoid of substance and filed with an oblique motive to delay the consideration of the plaintiff’s application for interim relief seeking re-transfer of the amount. The application is also stated to be wholly misconceived as the defendant has failed to make out a case as to how the suit appears from the statement of the plaint barred by any law. 12. The application is also stated to be wholly misconceived as the defendant has failed to make out a case as to how the suit appears from the statement of the plaint barred by any law. 12. On merits, the plaintiff avers the relief sought in the suit is only for the restitution of the assets which have been wrongfully diverted by the defendant to her individual Schwab account. The interim reliefs in the nature of restraining the defendant from leaving the country along with children, and direction to deposit the passports were sought to prevent the defendant from frustrating the recovery proceeding by fleeing the country. The defendant never had any right or interest in the amount which was transferred from the plaintiff’s Schwab account. A suit for restitution of the property which has been wrongfully converted, does not fall within the purview of the provisions contained in sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act merely for the reason of the marital relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. 13. According to the plaintiff those provisions do not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit for declaration or injunction under the Specific Reliefs Act. Nor a suit seeking restitution of the property illegally and wrongfully transferred. Reference to the matrimonial dispute in the plaint has been made with intent to place full and complete facts before the Court and that does not change the character of the suit. 14. An affidavit in rejoinder and further affidavit came to be filed. 15. In the wake of the aforesaid facts and pleadings, I have heard Mr. Satish Maneshinde, learned counsel for the applicant /defendant and Mr. Aspi Chinoy, learned senior advocate, for the respondent/plaintiff. The learned counsel took the Court through the relevant pleadings and the documents in support of the submissions canvassed across the bar. 16. Mr. Maneshinde submitted that the plaintiff’s case suffers from the vice of Suggestio Falsi and Suppressio Veri. The plaintiff has conveniently suppressed the cruelty which the defendant was made to suffer at the hands of the plaintiff. The transfer of the amount from the joint Schwab account to the defendant’s individual account, according to Mr. 16. Mr. Maneshinde submitted that the plaintiff’s case suffers from the vice of Suggestio Falsi and Suppressio Veri. The plaintiff has conveniently suppressed the cruelty which the defendant was made to suffer at the hands of the plaintiff. The transfer of the amount from the joint Schwab account to the defendant’s individual account, according to Mr. Maneshinde, was only upon the discovery of the fact that the plaintiff had illegally and without prior consent, transferred a huge sum of Rs.66,57,19,315/- from the joint account of plaintiff and defendant with HDFC Demat account to his sole HDFC Demat account by taking undue advantage of pre-signed delivery slips which the defendant was made to sign under the pretext of trading purpose. The said transfer was with a view to protect the interest of the defendant and her minor children. 17. Mr. Maneshinde, would urge that if the averments in the plaint, especially paragraphs 3 to 6 and 9 and 10 are read, it becomes abundantly clear that the genesis of the dispute is the matrimonial discord. In fact, by way of interim application, the plaintiff sought all the reliefs which plainly fall within the province of the Family Court. Laying emphasis on the fact that the plaintiff himself has filed petition for the dissolution of the marriage under the Special Marriage Act which has a overriding effect over the personal laws, being fully cognizant of the fact that the dissolution of the marriage under the Parsi Marriage Act would not disrupt the marital bond between the parties, Mr. Maneshinde strenuously submitted that the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain and try the suit stands expressly barred in view of the provisions contained in sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act. Inviting the attention of the Court to the object of the Family Courts Act, it’s emphasis on conciliation and the Family Court being unshackled of the procedure prescribed under the Code for ordinary suits, Mr. Maneshinde would submit that this Court would not be justified in usurping the jurisdiction exclusively vested in the Family Court. 18. To bolster up the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Maneshinde would submit that this Court would not be justified in usurping the jurisdiction exclusively vested in the Family Court. 18. To bolster up the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Maneshinde placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Balram Yadav vs. Fulmaniya Yadav, (2016) 13 SCC 308 ; a Full Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Romila Jaidev Shroff vs. Jaidev Rajnikant Shroff, 2000 (3) Mh.L.J. 468 , and the judgments of learned single Judges of this Court in the case of Ravindra Sukhdev Ghadge vs. Swati Ravindra Ghadge, 2019 (2) Mh.L.J. 110 ; Ashu Khurana Dutt vs. Aneesha Ashu Dutt, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 550. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Amina Bharatram vs. Sumant Bharatram and Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3929; and the judgments of the learned single judges of the said Court in the case of Jasmeet Kaur vs. Navtej Singh, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12511 and M vs. A, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8005. 19. In opposition to this, Mr. Chinoy, countered the submissions of Mr. Maneshinde with a matching tenacity. It was urged that the application is wholly misconceived. The defendant has misconstrued the nature of the suit. In fact, the defendant is guilty of selective reading of the plaint. Mr. Chinoy stoutly submitted that the instant suit is for return of specific movable property wrongfully converted, pure and simple. 20. Mr. Chinoy strenuously submitted that, it is a misconception that the Family Court is the Court of substantive jurisdiction. The Family Court is merely a special forum established by the legislature to deal with the disputes arising under the laws which govern the substantive rights of the parties like Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954 etc. The jurisdiction which was exercised by the Courts in relation to the said Acts is now exercised by the Family Court. 21. Mr. Chinoy urged that it is not the relationship between the parties which is determinative of the jurisdiction of the Court but the nature of the dispute. The jurisdiction which was exercised by the Courts in relation to the said Acts is now exercised by the Family Court. 21. Mr. Chinoy urged that it is not the relationship between the parties which is determinative of the jurisdiction of the Court but the nature of the dispute. In a given case, the fact that the parties are related by marriage does not change the nature of the dispute and confer jurisdiction on the Family Court to decide the dispute if it otherwise does not relate to the substantive laws which fall within the umbrella of section 7of the Family Courts Act. A suit for declaration, for instance, under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, so also a suit for recovery of the property, urged Mr. Chinoy. 22. Mr. Chinoy further submitted that the controversy sought to be raised by the defendant is no longer Res Integra and is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Samar Kumar Roy vs. Jharna Bera, AIR 2018 SC 334 . Mr. Chinoy further submitted that a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Pearl Chesson vs. Sean Lawrence and Ors., MANU/MH/0127/2018, after following the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Samar Roy (supra) has, in terms, ruled that a suit in respect of property which is owned as an individual by a party to the marriage, does not vest jurisdiction in the Family Court for the reason that the parties happened to be husband and wife. 23. To buttress the submission that post Samar Roy (supra), the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Family Court under section 7 of the Family Courts Act is considered in a refined perspective, attention of the Court was invited to the judgment of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Harjyot Singh vs. Manpreet Kaur, MANU/DE/4195/2019. To lend support to the submission that the Family Courts Act is not a standalone act and draws sustenance from the other cognate laws, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of N. Rajendran vs. S. Valli, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 157. 24. To lend support to the submission that the Family Courts Act is not a standalone act and draws sustenance from the other cognate laws, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of N. Rajendran vs. S. Valli, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 157. 24. The Family Courts Act was enacted to provide for the establishments of Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy settlement of, the dispute relating to marriage and family affairs. It was made obligatory to make an endevour to explore the possibility of re-conciliation or settlement of the dispute between the parties to a family dispute. The Family Courts were unburdened of the strict rules of evidence and procedure so as to enable them to deal effectively with a dispute in furtherance of the object of the establishment of the Family Courts. 25. In the light of the controversy at hand, it may be apposite to note the relevant provisions of the Family Courts Act. The relevant part of section 7 which confer jurisdiction on the Family Court reads as under:- 7. Jurisdiction.— (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall— (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any district court or any subordinate civil court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the explanation; and ……… …… Explanation.— The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely:— …….. …….. (c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them; ……. ….. (g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor. 26. Section 8 which bars the jurisdiction of the other Courts reads as under:- 8. Exclusion of jurisdiction and pending proceedings.— Where a Family Court has been established for any area,— (a) no district court or any subordinate civil court referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7 shall, in relation to such area, have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of any suit or proceeding of the nature referred to in the Explanation to that subsection. ….. ……. (b) ….. (c) ….. 27. ….. ……. (b) ….. (c) ….. 27. Section 20 of the Family Courts Act which gives an overriding effect to the Family Courts Act, reads as under:- 20. Act to have overriding effect.— The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act. 28. It would be contextually relevant to note the relevant provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Section 13 makes a certificate of marriage issued thereunder a conclusive evidence of the fact of marriage solemnized under the said Act. It reads as under:- 13. Certificate of marriage.? (1) When the marriage has been solemnized, the Marriage Officer shall enter a certificate thereof in the form specified in the Fourth Schedule in a book to be kept by him for that purpose and to be called the Marriage Certificate Book and such certificate shall be signed by the parties to the marriage and the three witnesses. (2) On a certificate being entered in the Marriage Certificate Book by the Marriage Officer, the Certificate shall be deemed to be conclusive evidence of the fact that a marriage under this Act has been solemnized and that all formalities respecting the signatures of witnesses have been complied with. 29. Section 27(1) of the Special Marriage Act provides that subject to provisions of the said Act and the Rules made thereunder, a petition for divorce may be presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife on the ground enlisted therein. 30. Section 42 of the Special Marriage Act reads as under:- Saving. Nothing contained ? Nothing contained in this Act shall in this Act shall affect the validity of any marriage not solemnized under its provisions; nor shall this Act be deemed directly or indirectly to affect the validity of any mode of contracting marriage. 31. Laying emphasis on the provisions contained in sub clause (c) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Family Courts Act, read with clause (a) of section 8 of the Family Courts Act, Mr. 31. Laying emphasis on the provisions contained in sub clause (c) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Family Courts Act, read with clause (a) of section 8 of the Family Courts Act, Mr. Maneshinde urged with a degree of vehemence that, even the principal relief relating to the property of the plaintiff, even if taken at par, (though the defendant contested the plaintiff’s claim that the plaintiff had exclusive title to the funds in the Schwab account the suit would clearly fall within the province of the Family Court. Mr. Maneshinde further submitted that if the plaint is read as a whole, the context of the matrimonial dispute is indubitable. The fact that the plaintiff had been pursuing remedies which relate to the family dispute becomes even more explicit from the interim reliefs like custody of, and access to, the children. The contention that the claim in the suit represents the property dispute is a mere subterfuge, urged Mr. Maneshinde. 32. In the case of Balram Yadav (supra), on which a strong reliance was placed by Mr. Maneshinde, the appellant therein had instituted a suit before the Family Court for declaration that the respondent was not his legally wedded wife. The High Court set aside the declaratory decree holding that the Family Court lacks jurisdiction to deal with the matter as a negative declaration was outside the jurisdiction of the Family Court. The Supreme Court after adverting to the provisions contained in section 7(1) Explanation (b) and section 8 and 20 of the Family Courts Act enunciated that in case there is a dispute as regards the matrimonial status of any person a declaration in that regard had to be sought only before the Family Court. The nature of the declaration sought namely, affirmative or negative, did not matter. The observations in paragraph 7 read as under:- 7. Under Section 7(1) Explanation (b), a suit or a proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of both marriage and matrimonial status of a person is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court, since under Section 8, all those jurisdictions covered under Section 7 are excluded from the purview of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. In case, there is a dispute on the matrimonial status of any person, a declaration in that regard has to be sought only before the Family Court. In case, there is a dispute on the matrimonial status of any person, a declaration in that regard has to be sought only before the Family Court. It makes no difference as to whether it is an affirmative relief or a negative relief. What is important is the declaration regarding the matrimonial status. Section 20 also endorses the view which we have taken, since the Family Courts Act, 1984, has an overriding effect on other laws. 33. A full Bench of this Court in the case of Romila Shroff (supra) considered the question as to whether this Court in exercise of Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction would fall within the scope of the expression “district court” and thus would not have the jurisdiction to deal with a dispute which was covered by the provisions contained in Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act. The Full Bench concluded that when the High Court exercises its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction in relation to the matters under the Family Courts Act, it would be a District Court as understood therein and would, therefore, lose its jurisdiction. Observations in paragraphs 26 to 28 and 31 of the said judgment are relevant and, hence, extracted below:- 26. In this background, one has to turn to the provisions of section 20 where the Act shall have overriding effect, which reads as under: "20. Act to have overriding effect.--- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act." 27. Letters Patent would be included in expression any law for the time being in force, and would certainly be covered the expression "instrument". The overriding effect given to the Act is thus confined not only to the Code of Civil Procedure but also to the Evidence Act. The Evidence Act is also an instrument having effect by virtue of law. Looking to the provision of the restricted right of an Advocate to appear in a matter obviously, the Advocates Act of 1961 also has effect to that extent. 28. Virtually, the litigation before the Family Court is a mixture of inquisitorial trial, participatory form of grievance redressal and adversorial trial. Looking to the provision of the restricted right of an Advocate to appear in a matter obviously, the Advocates Act of 1961 also has effect to that extent. 28. Virtually, the litigation before the Family Court is a mixture of inquisitorial trial, participatory form of grievance redressal and adversorial trial. As the Family Court is left to devise its own practice, it can have a judicious mixture of all three of them and can as well proceed under any of-them exclusively. …… ………… 31. When thus interpreted, in our opinion, the conclusion would be inescapable that when the High Court exercises its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction in relation to the matters under the Family Court Act, it would be a District Court as understood therein. It would, therefore, lose its jurisdiction. The reference is answered accordingly. 34. The aforesaid Full Bench judgment was followed by the Delhi High Court, in the case of Amina Bharatram (supra). The Division Bench answered the reference made to it as under:- 48. Therefore, the reference is answered as follows:- "Point No.1: It is held that the Delhi High Court is a "district court" under Section 8 in respect of all matters enumerated in Explanation to Section 7(1) of the Act; Point No.2: The Delhi High Court does not possess jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide cases and causes referred to in Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act." 35. As against this line of decisions, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Samar Kumar Roy (supra) which constitutes the sheet anchor of the submissions of Mr. Chinoy draws a distinction between the dispute in relation to matters which arise out of the laws referred to in the Explanation to sub section (1) of section 7 and suits for declaration of legal character filed under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 36. In the case of Samar Kumar Roy (supra) the deceased plaintiff had instituted a suit against respondent/defendant therein for a declaration that the defendant was not the legally wedded wife of the plaintiff and consequential relief of injunction restraining the defendant from claiming that the plaintiff was her husband. Upon the death of the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff’s mother applied to implead her as a legal representative of the plaintiff. Upon the death of the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff’s mother applied to implead her as a legal representative of the plaintiff. Assailing the order of the trial Court substituting the deceased plaintiff with his mother, the defendant had moved the High Court; which was persuaded set aside the order of the trial Court holding that after the death of the plaintiff, no right to sue survived in favour of the plaintiff's mother. 37. In the aforesaid context, a submission was canvassed before the Supreme Court that even otherwise the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction in view of the provisions contained in section 7 and 8 of the Family Court. After adverting to the provisions contained in section 7(1) and 8 of the Act, 1984, the Supreme Court in Samar Kumar Roy (supra) enunciated the law as under:- 13. It is obvious that a suit or proceeding between parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage, all have reference to suits or petitions that are filed under the Hindu Marriage Act and/or Special Marriage Act for the aforesaid reliefs. There is no reference whatsoever to suits that are filed for declaration of a legal character under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Indeed, in Dhulabhai vs. Madhya Pradesh (1968) 3 SCR 662 , this Court had occasion to consider whether the civil court's jurisdiction was expressly or impliedly barred by statute. After referring to a number of judgments, this Court laid down 7 propositions of law, of which two are of relevance to the present case: (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.” 14. On a reading of the aforesaid propositions, it is clear that the examination of the remedies provided and the scheme of the Hindu Marriage Act and of the Special Marriage Act show that the statute creates special rights or liabilities and provides for determination of rights relating to marriage. The Acts do not lay down that all questions relating to the said rights and liabilities shall be determined only by the Tribunals which are constituted under the said Act. Section 8(a) of the Family Courts Act excludes the Civil Court's jurisdiction in respect of a suit or proceeding which is between the parties and filed under the Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriage Act, where the suit is to annul or dissolve a marriage, or is for restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation. It does not purport to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court if a suit is filed under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act for a declaration as to the legal character of an alleged marriage. Also as was pointed out, an exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not readily inferred. Given the line of judgments referred to by the High Courts, and given the fact that a suit for declaration as to legal character which includes the matrimonial status of parties to a marriage when it comes to a marriage which allegedly has never taken place either de jure or de facto, it is clear that the civil court's jurisdiction to determine the aforesaid legal character is not barred either expressly or impliedly by any law. (emphasis supplied) 38. (emphasis supplied) 38. The Supreme Court has thus, in terms, enunciated that section 8 of the Act, 1984 does not purport to bar the Civil Court’s jurisdiction if a suit is filed under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act for declaration as to the legal character of an alleged marriage. With reference to the scheme of Hindu Marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act, the Supreme Court specifically postulated that those Acts do not lay down that all the questions relating to the rights and liabilities enshrined thereunder should be determined only by the Tribunals which are constituted under the said Acts. Exclusion of jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of section 8(a) is to the extent of a suit or proceeding which is between the parties and filed under those enactments. 39. The aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court was followed by a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Pearl Chesson (supra). In the said case, the plaintiff/wife had sought a declaration against her husband and mother-in-law that she was the owner of the suit flat and neither of the defendants had any right over the suit flat and also sought a perpetual injunction to restrain the defendants from dealing with the suit flat. Drawing heavily from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Samar Kumar Roy (supra), the learned single Judge, in the light of the aforesaid facts of the said case, expounded the legal position as under:- 8. Coming now to the facts of our case, it is clear that the present suit does not arise out of or in any way concern any of the provisions under Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriage Act. Though the parties here simply happen to be husband and wife, the suit is in respect of a property, which is owned as an individual by the Plaintiff-wife. In the suit, she is seeking a declaration as to her title or right to the property against two individuals, who happen to be her husband and father-in-law, both of whom are interested in denying that title or right to her. The suit is typically a suit under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and not a proceeding between a husband and a wife relating to property coming within Clause (a) of the Explanation to Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. The suit is typically a suit under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and not a proceeding between a husband and a wife relating to property coming within Clause (a) of the Explanation to Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. The suit not being covered under the provisions of Section 7, it cannot be said to be barred under Section 8 for the civil courts to exercise their jurisdiction. (emphasis supplied) 40. The judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Harjyot Singh (supra) proceed on the same lines. 41. In the case of R. Kasturi and Others vs. M. Kasturi and Others, (2018) 5 SCC 353 the suit was instituted in a situation where the legal heirship obtained by the appellant/plaintiff was sought to be challenged by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 who claimed to be the wife and son of late Gunaseelan whom plaintiff No. 1 also claimed to be her husband. The decree passed by the trial Court was affirmed in the First Appeal. In the Second Appeal, the High Court held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit which lay within the domain of the Family Court and thus reversed the decree. 42. Dis-agreeing with the High Court, the Supreme Court remanded the matter back to the High Court opining, inter alia, that the dispute between the parties was purely a civil dispute. Paragraphs 5 to 7 read as under:- 5. Sections 13, 14 and 15 of the Act spell out a special procedure. The other provisions of the Act i.e. Section 4(4) would indicate that a major objective behind the enactment of the Act is to have a specialized body to preserve and save the institution of marriage. 6. In the present case, there is no family dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants. The dispute arose after the demise of Gunaseelan to whom both the plaintiff No.1 and the defendant No.1 claim to be married. The other plaintiffs and defendant No.2 are the children claimed to be born out of the respective marriages. 7. The above would indicate that the dispute between the parties is purely a civil dispute and has no bearing on any dispute within a family which needs to be resolved by a special procedure as provided under the Act. The other plaintiffs and defendant No.2 are the children claimed to be born out of the respective marriages. 7. The above would indicate that the dispute between the parties is purely a civil dispute and has no bearing on any dispute within a family which needs to be resolved by a special procedure as provided under the Act. No issue with regard to the institution of marriage and the need to preserve the same also arises in the present case. That apart, the dispute between the parties can only be resolved on the basis of evidence to be tendered by the parties, admissibility of which has to be adjudged within the four corners of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In such a proceeding it would be clearly wrong to deprive the parties of the benefit of the services of counsel. 43. In the light of the aforesaid provisions and pronouncements the propositions which emerge can be summarized as under:- [1] The exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not to be readily inferred. [2] To confer the Family Court with exclusive jurisdiction, the matter in dispute should be relatable to the rights and obligations emanating from the enactments like Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriage Act etc. or the uncodified law, wherever the parties are governed by uncodified law, in relation to marriage, divorce, custody, guardianship and family disputes arising out of a matrimonial relationship. [3] Mere marital relationship between the parties is not a determinative factor to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. [4] Rather, it is the nature of the dispute and not the admitted or disputed marital status of the parties which has a determinative significance. [5] If the declaratory or injunctive reliefs are sought which are traceable to the provisions contained in the Specific Relief Act and partake the character of civil dispute, in contradistinction to family dispute, bar under section 8 of the Family Courts Act, may not be attracted. [6] In contrast, if the suit or proceeding is between the parties to a marriage or the persons claiming through either of them and it falls within any of the clauses of Explanation to Sub section (1) of Section 7, the Family Courts would have exclusive jurisdiction. 44. [6] In contrast, if the suit or proceeding is between the parties to a marriage or the persons claiming through either of them and it falls within any of the clauses of Explanation to Sub section (1) of Section 7, the Family Courts would have exclusive jurisdiction. 44. In the light of the aforesaid exposition, reverting to the facts of the case at hand, it is necessary to keep in view, the nature of a plea for rejection of the plaint. It proceeds on a demurrer. It is well neigh settled that while considering an application for rejection of the plaint only the averments in the plaint and the documents annexed with it are required to be taken into account. Plaint, in turn, is required to be read in a meaningful and not formal manner. 45. A meaningful reading of the plaint, in the instant case, indicates that the plaintiff has indeed adverted to the marital status of the parties, marital discord between them and the causes for the same. Reference to those facts, however, is required to be construed in the context of the cause of action for the suit and the principal relief. The plaint proceeds on the premise that the amount allegedly transferred from Schwab account was the exclusive property of the plaintiff and, taking undue advantage of being a joint account holder, the defendant surreptitiously transferred the funds to her individual Schwab account. The plaintiff thus seeks a decree for the said amount along with interest thereon. Implicit in these prayers is a declaration that the defendant has no right, title and interest to the said funds and there was a wrongful transfer of the funds to her individual account. 46. Mr. Maneshinde made an endevour to demonstrate that the interim reliefs sought by the plaintiff, initially, to restrain the defendant from leaving the country along with children and, later on, the interim custody of and access to the children, all fall in the arena of matrimonial disputes cognizable by the Family Court. 47. I find it difficult to accede to the aforesaid submission. Again a meaningful reading of the plaint would indicate that the plaintiff asserted that the defendant was a British citizen and once the defendant leaves India, along with children, the recovery of the funds, which were allegedly wrongfully diverted would be impossible. 47. I find it difficult to accede to the aforesaid submission. Again a meaningful reading of the plaint would indicate that the plaintiff asserted that the defendant was a British citizen and once the defendant leaves India, along with children, the recovery of the funds, which were allegedly wrongfully diverted would be impossible. Injunctive reliefs against the defendant thus, prima facie, emanated from the apprehension of the impediments in the restitution of the funds. 48. The subsequent applications and prayer for further interim reliefs in the nature of access to the children, are also required to be appreciated in the light of the fact that they were moved with an allegation that despite the order of the Court dated 7th September, 2022, the plaintiff was restrained from having access to the children. If this context is kept in view, the fact that certain interim reliefs were sought by the plaintiff which related to the issues which are amenable to the jurisdiction of the Family Court, would not change the primary nature of the suit. 49. For the foregoing reasons, I am persuaded to hold that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide the instant suit. Resultantly, neither the prayer for rejection of the plaint nor for transfer of the suit to the Family Court for trial along With Petition No. 3217 of 2022 merits acceptance. Hence, the following order. ORDER [1] The application stands dismissed. [2] Costs in cause.