JUDGMENT : K.S. HEMALEKHA, J. 1. The legal heirs of defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 are assailing the order passed in R.A. No. 36/2014 dated 02.01.2016 on the file of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gadag, whereby the application-I.A. No. 1 filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 2 years 5 months 15 days (865 days) in preferring the appeal, consequently dismissing the regular appeal on the ground of delay and confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. 2. The parties herein are referred to as per their ranking before the Trial Court for the sake of convenience. 3. The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for partition and separate possession. The said suit came to be decreed on 02.01.2012. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the defendants preferred appeal before the first Appellate Court and there was a delay of 865 days in preferring the first appeal, along with the appeal the defendant filed application-I.A. No. 1 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking to condone the delay in preferring the appeal. The plaintiff filed objections to the said application. The first appellate court after hearing both the parties has held that the defendant has failed to make out satisfactory and acceptable ground for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal and dismissed I.A. No. 1 and consequently, dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation. 4. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal of the application and the appeal, the present appeal by the defendants. 5. The appeal has been admitted by this Court on 01.03.2018 by framing the following substantial question of law: “The counsel for the Appellant brings to my notice that the Regular Appeal filed against the order of the Court below partly decreeing the suit, was dismissed on the ground of delay by misconstruing the provisions under Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963, inasmuch as the Section speaks of three year limitation period to be reckoned from the date of knowledge of fraud involved. On this ground, the counsel says, the Regular Second Appeal is admitted. In this connection, substantial question of law No. 1 is framed although in a little different language.” 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the substantial question of law framed by this Court. 7. On this ground, the counsel says, the Regular Second Appeal is admitted. In this connection, substantial question of law No. 1 is framed although in a little different language.” 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the substantial question of law framed by this Court. 7. The question of law framed by this Court is with regard to whether the appellants have made out sufficient ground to condone the delay in preferring the appeal before the first Appellate Court. 8. Facts reveal that the plaintiff filed a suit for partition and separate possession in respect of three items as mentioned at S. No. 1(A), 1(B) and 1(C). According to the plaintiff, item No. 1(A) was fallen to the share of plaintiff and defendant No. 1, in light of the partition among their brothers, mutation entry has been effected. Suit item No. 1(B) was fallen exclusively to the share of the plaintiff in the partition and the mutation entry has been effected and item No. 1(C) is also the exclusive property of the plaintiff. It appears from the plaint averments that the suit was filed contending that the defendants were interfering and obstructing the rights of the plaintiffs by which the plaintiffs were constrained to file the suit. 9. The summons was issued to the defendants and the defendant appeared through their counsel. However, inspite of sufficient opportunity afforded to the defendant, the defendant did not file written statement nor led evidence and the written statement was taken as Nil, cross-examination and evidence of defendants were also taken as Nil due to the absence of the defendants and their counsel as is evident from paragraph No. 4 of the judgment of the Trial Court. 10. The Trial Court, answered the issues in favour of the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff has proved that he is entitled for partition and separate possession of his half share in suit item 1(A), declaring the plaintiff as absolute owner of suit item 1(B) and suit of the plaintiff was dismissed in respect of item No. 1(C). 10. The Trial Court, answered the issues in favour of the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff has proved that he is entitled for partition and separate possession of his half share in suit item 1(A), declaring the plaintiff as absolute owner of suit item 1(B) and suit of the plaintiff was dismissed in respect of item No. 1(C). The judgment and decree of the Trial Court was challenged by the defendants with the delay of 865 days on the ground that the defendants were not served with the summons by the Trial Court and the defendants had not entrusted case to any advocate nor have signed the vakalathnama. Further, it is urged that the respondent-plaintiff have committed fraud by signing the vakalath on behalf of the defendants, as defendant No. 1 never used to sign and only affix his thumb impression and the filing of vakalath by the appellants before the Trial Court is seriously disputed. It is contended that since the appellants were unaware about the filing of the suit as the summons was not duly served upon him, hence they could not file written statement nor cross-examine the plaintiff and lead any evidence on their behalf and would contend that the reasons for non-filing of the appeal within limitation was due to the forgoing reasons and there is sufficient cause shown by the appellants-defendants and they should be given a liberal construction and the appeal before the first Appellate Court under Section 96 of CPC being a statutory right requires to be condoned in the interest of justice, when there is no gross negligence or deliberate inaction by the appellant seeking to condone the delay. 11. The Apex Court in the case of Bhivchandra Shankar More vs. Balu Gangaram More and Others, (2019) 6 SCC 387 held at paragraph Nos. 12, 15, 16 and 17 as under: “12. The right of appeal under Section 96(2) CPC is a statutory right and the defendant cannot be deprived of the statutory right of appeal merely on the ground that the application filed by him under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC has been dismissed. In Bhanu Kumar Jain vs. Archana Kumar, the Supreme Court considered the question whether the first appeal was maintainable despite the fact that an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC was filed and dismissed. In Bhanu Kumar Jain vs. Archana Kumar, the Supreme Court considered the question whether the first appeal was maintainable despite the fact that an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC was filed and dismissed. Observing that the right of appeal is a statutory right and that the litigant cannot be deprived of such right, in Paras (36) and (38), it was held as under: (SCC pp. 799-800) “36.......A right to question the correctness of the decree in a first appeal is a statutory right. Such a right shall not be curtailed nor shall any embargo be fixed thereupon unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication says so. (See Deepal Girishbhai Soni vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Chandragupta P.K. vs. C.K. Saji) *** *** *** 38. The dichotomy, in our opinion, can be resolved by holding that whereas the defendant would not be permitted to raise a contention as regards the correctness or otherwise of the order posting the suit for ex-parte hearing by the trial court and/or existence of a sufficient case for nonappearance of the defendant before it, it would be open to him to argue in the first appeal filed by him under Section 96(2) of the Code on the merits of the suit so as to enable him to contend that the materials brought on record by the plaintiffs were not sufficient for passing a decree in his favour or the suit was otherwise not maintainable. Lack of jurisdiction of the court can also be a possible plea in such an appeal. We, however, agree with Mr. Chaudhari that the “Explanation” appended to Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code shall receive a strict construction as was held by this Court in Rani Choudhury vs. Suraj Jit Choudhary, P. Kiran Kumar vs. A.S. Khadar and Shyam Sundar Sarma vs. Pannalal Jaiswal.” 15. It is a fairly well-settled law that “sufficient cause” should be given liberal construction so as to advance sustainable justice when there is no inaction, no negligence nor want of bona fides could be imputable to the appellant. After referring to various judgments, in B. Madhuri, this Court held as under: (SCC p. 696, Para 6) “6. It is a fairly well-settled law that “sufficient cause” should be given liberal construction so as to advance sustainable justice when there is no inaction, no negligence nor want of bona fides could be imputable to the appellant. After referring to various judgments, in B. Madhuri, this Court held as under: (SCC p. 696, Para 6) “6. The expression “sufficient cause” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. No hard-and-fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years courts have repeatedly observed that a liberal approach needs to be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated only on the ground of delay.” 16. Observing that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, in N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy, this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 127-128, Para 11) “11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.” 17. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.” 17. As pointed out earlier, an appeal under Section 96 CPC is a statutory right. Generally, delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned, in the interest of justice, where there is no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay.” 12. The appeal under Section 96 of CPC being a statutory right, generally delay in preferring the appeal are required to be condoned in the interest of justice, where there is no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. 13. The Apex Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 at paragraph Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 held that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, which reads as under: “9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain vs. Kuntal Kumari and State of West Bengal vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality. 13. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain vs. Kuntal Kumari and State of West Bengal vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala-fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 14. In the present case, the appeal under Section 96 of CPC before the first appellate Court, there was a delay of 865 days in filing the appeal and in light of the decisions of the Apex Court as stated supra is that, acceptability of explanation of delay is the sole criteria, length of delay is not relevant. It is pertinent to note that the reasons assigned by the appellants for the delay in preferring the appeal is on the ground of fraud having been committed, and Section 17 of the Limitation Act prescribes three years from the date the applicant has discovered the fraud. The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay. It is pertinent to note that the reasons assigned by the appellants for the delay in preferring the appeal is on the ground of fraud having been committed, and Section 17 of the Limitation Act prescribes three years from the date the applicant has discovered the fraud. The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay. By enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the legislature has conferred the power to condone the delay in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on “merits.” The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice and that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts and refusing to condone the delay can result in miscarriage of justice. 15. For the foregoing reasons, the substantial question of law needs to be answered in the affirmative and the appeal to be remanded back to the first Appellate Court by condoning delay of 865 days in filing the appeal with a direction to consider the appeal on merits after affording sufficient opportunity to both the parties. However, looking into the delay there needs to be imposition of reasonable cost on the appellants. 16. Accordingly, this Court pass the following: ORDER: (i) The present second appeal by the defendants is hereby allowed. (ii) The order on I.A. No. 1 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 dated 03.01.2016 in R.A. No. 36/2014 on the file of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gadag is hereby set aside and I.A. No. 1 is allowed. Delay of 865 days in filing the appeal is condoned subject to the appellants paying cost of Rs. 20,000/- to the plaintiff on or before 19/06/2023. (iii) The matter is remitted back to the first Appellate Court and the parties are directed to appear before the first Appellate Court on 19.06.2023 and the first Appellate Court to consider the appeal on merits after affording sufficient and reasonable opportunity to both the sides. (iv) The first Appellate Court to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible within an outer limit of six months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this judgment. (v) All the contentions of the parties are kept open.