JUDGMENT : Anil K. Narendran, J. The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the order of externment No.B3-2795/2023/TSR dated 13.3.2023 of the 2nd respondent Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range, which is one issued in exercise of the powers under Section 15(1)(a) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 ('KAAPA', for short). As per the said order, the involvement of the petitioner in criminal cases is as follows; Sl No Police Station Crime No. Date of the alleged crime Offences u/s Status 1 Wadakkanchery Police Station, Thrissur 1020/2021 21.07.2021 341, 323, 324, 506 r/w 34 of the IPC CC 1819/2021 pending before JFCM, Wadakkanchery 2 Wadakkanchery Police Station, Thrissur 1147/2021 05.09.2021 143, 147, 148, 341, 323, 324, 326, 308 r/w 149 of the IPC SC 1010/2022 pending before Addl. Sessions Court-I, Thrissur 3 Wadakkanchery Police Station, Thrissur 868/2022 21.11.2022 341, 323, 324, 294(b), 506, 427 ,308 of the IPC Final Report filed before JFCM, Wadakkanchery 2. The Station House Officer, Wadakkancherry Police Station submitted a report dated 04.01.2023 through the Assistant Police Commissioner, Kunnamangalam, to the 3rd respondent District Police Chief, Thrissur City, with a request to take appropriate action against the petitioner under the provisions of KAAPA. Based on that report, the 3rd respondent submitted Ext.P1 externment proposal dated 14.02.2023 before the 2nd respondent Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range, with a request to issue an order of externment under Section 15(1)(a) of KAAPA, restricting the petitioner from entering Thrissur Revenue District, for the reason that he was regularly indulging in anti-social activities and causing threat to public peace and tranquillity. After considering the proposal in Ext.P1, the 2nd respondent issued an order dated 04.03.2023 to the petitioner, requiring him to appear before him within 5 days and show cause why an order of externment under Section 15(1)(a) of KAAPA should not be passed against the petitioner. The records relating to the proceedings were also served on the petitioner. Though the petitioner received the notice on 01.03.2023, he failed to appear before the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent issued Ext.P2 order dated 04.03.2023 requiring the petitioner to appear before him on 07.03.2023. He appeared in person on 07.03.2023 and submitted an explanation. The 2nd respondent heard the petitioner on 07.03.2023. Though the petitioner received the notice on 01.03.2023, he failed to appear before the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent issued Ext.P2 order dated 04.03.2023 requiring the petitioner to appear before him on 07.03.2023. He appeared in person on 07.03.2023 and submitted an explanation. The 2nd respondent heard the petitioner on 07.03.2023. After considering the records and the explanation offered by the petitioner, the 2nd respondent passed the order of externment dated 13.03.2023, under Section 15(1)(a) of KAAPA, whereby the petitioner is restricted from entering the jurisdiction of Thrissur District for a period of six months from the date of receipt of that order. Based on the order of externment passed by the 2nd respondent, the Sub Inspector of Police, Wadakkancherry Police Station issued Ext.P3 notice dated nil to the petitioner, whereby he was informed about the order of externment dated 13.03.2023 of the 2nd respondent. In the writ petition, the petitioner has raised a contention that he had not been served with a copy of the order of externment dated 13.3.2023. 3. On 31.5.2023, when this writ petition came up for admission, this Court admitted the matter on file and the learned Public Prosecutor took notice for the respondents. The respondents were directed to file a counter affidavit, within two weeks. 4. The 2nd respondent has filed a counter affidavit dated 22.06.2023, opposing the reliefs sought for in this writ petition. 5. One of the grounds raised in this writ petition is that a copy of the order of externment dated 13.03.2023 of the 2nd respondent Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range, is not served on the petitioner. In the counter affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent, it is stated that the order of externment was served on the petitioner on 17.3.2023. 6. On 05.09.2023, during the course of arguments, the learned Government Pleader has made available for the perusal of this Court the original order of externment dated 13.03.2023, which bears the signature of the petitioner acknowledging the receipt of the same on 17.03.2023. Therefore, by the order dated 05.09.2023, The learned Government Pleader was directed to produce a copy of that order, along with a memo. 7. Along with the memo dated 5.9.2023 filed by the learned Government Pleader, the order of externment dated 13.3.2023 of the 2nd respondent Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range, is placed on record. 8. Therefore, by the order dated 05.09.2023, The learned Government Pleader was directed to produce a copy of that order, along with a memo. 7. Along with the memo dated 5.9.2023 filed by the learned Government Pleader, the order of externment dated 13.3.2023 of the 2nd respondent Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range, is placed on record. 8. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader for the respondents. 9. The pleadings and materials on record would show that the 4th respondent Station House Officer, Wadakkancherry Police Station submitted report No.09/TDR/WKY/23 dated 04.01.2023 to the 3rd respondent District Police Chief, Thrissur City, through the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Kunnamkulam Sub Division, with a request to take appropriate action against the petitioner under the provisions of KAAPA, wherein it was stated that the petitioner Jithin @ Unnimon is a person regularly indulging in anti-social activities and causing threat to public peace and tranquillity. The petitioner has been involved in 3 cases registered at Wadakkancherry Police Station, within the jurisdiction of Thrissur City Police limits, from the year 2021 to 2022. The offences registered against him come under Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and he has been classified as a 'known rowdy', as defined in Section 2(p)(iii) of KAAPA. A rowdy history sheet has been opened vide order No.53/GL/KSD/2021 dated 10.08.2021 against the petitioner at Wadakkancherry Police Station, to have a close watch on his activities. The Inspector Station House Office, Wadakkancherry Police Station submitted report No.307/TDR/WKY/2021 dated 08.08.2021 to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Thrissur, against the petitioner for taking preventive action under Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and an interim bond was also executed on 17.08.2022. The petitioner violated the condition of the said bond and he was involved in another crime. Subsequently, the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Thrissur, cancelled the bond executed on 17.08.2022 and another bond was executed on 21.12.2022. The concerned court granted bail to the petitioner. While on bail, the petitioner violated the bail conditions and was involved in another crime. Though the Inspector Station House Office, Wadakkancherry Police Station, submitted an application before the concerned court to cancel the bail of the petitioner, that application is pending consideration without any orders. The proceedings initiated against the petitioner were not sufficient to stop his anti-social activities, and he continued his illegal acts, challenging the authorities. 10. Though the Inspector Station House Office, Wadakkancherry Police Station, submitted an application before the concerned court to cancel the bail of the petitioner, that application is pending consideration without any orders. The proceedings initiated against the petitioner were not sufficient to stop his anti-social activities, and he continued his illegal acts, challenging the authorities. 10. On receipt of the report from the Inspector Station House Officer, Wadakkancherry Police Station, the District Police Chief, Thrissur City submitted proposal No.09/KAAPA/SB/RC/2023 dated 14.02.2023 before the 3rd respondent Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range, with a request to issue an order of restricting the petitioner entering Thrissur Revenue District, since he is regularly indulging in anti-social activities and causing threat to public peace and tranquillity. On receipt of that proposal, the 3rd respondent issued show cause notice No.B3-2795/2023/TSR dated 21.02.2023 to the petitioner to present himself directly before the said respondent, within 5 days, and show cause why an order of externment under Section 15(1)(a) of KAAPA Act should not be passed against him. Though the petitioner received the show cause notice on 01.03.2023, he did not present himself before the 3rd respondent. Then another show cause notice dated 04.03.2023 was issued to the petitioner, directing him to present personally on 07.03.2023. The records were also served on the petitioner to enable him to understand the reason for taking action and to submit an effective explanation to that show cause notice. The petitioner appeared before the 3rd respondent and submitted an explanation dated 07.03.2023 and the said respondent heard the petitioner on that day itself. The petitioner denied all the allegations contained in the show cause notice. He submitted a reply, wherein it is stated that he was not involved in the crimes registered against him at Wadakkancherry Police Station. Crime No.1020/2021, Crime No.1147/2021, and Crime No.868/2022 of Wadakkancherry Police Station are false cases. After considering all the materials placed by the District Police Chief, Thrissur City and the explanation offered by the petitioner, the 2nd respondent Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range, passed the order of externment No.B3-2795/2023/TSR dated 13.03.2023, invoking the provisions under Section 15(1)(a) of KAAPA, whereby he was restricted from entering the jurisdiction of the Thrissur Revenue District, for a period of six months from the date of receipt of that order, which was served to the petitioner on 17.03.2023. 11. 11. Relying on the decisions of this Court in Shamnad Amiyan v. State of Kerala [ 2023 (1) KLD 690 : 2023 KHC OnLine 271] and Asker Ali v. State of Kerala [2022:KER: 69271], the learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that there is unexplained delay from 05.01.2023, the date on which the Station House Officer made the proposal, and 14.2.2023, the date on which the District Police Chief made recommendation by submitting a report before the 2nd respondent Deputy Inspector General of Police. Hence, the live link for passing an order of externment under Section 15(1)(a) of KAAPA has been lost, and in such circumstances, the order of externment is liable to be interfered with. Learned counsel for the petitioner would also point out the only explanation offered in paragraph 13 of the order of externment, which reads thus: 12. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader would place reliance on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Stalin C.V. v. State of Kerala and Others [ 2011 (1) KHC 852 ], in which a Division Bench of this Court had drawn a distinction between an order of preventive detention under Section 3 and an order of externment under Section 15(1)(a) of KAAPA. The learned Government Pleader would also place reliance on the judgment of this Court in Harikrishnan v. State of Kerala [2023:KER:35595]. In the decision in Stalin C.V. [ 2011 (1) KHC 852 ], the time taken for passing an order under Section 15(1) of KAAPA from the last prejudicial act was around six months and that in Harikrishnan [2023:KER:35595] it was around seven months. The learned Government Pleader would submit that the explanation offered in paragraph 13 of the order of externment has to be read along with that offered in paragraphs 2 to 12. Paragraphs 2 to 12 of the order of externment read thus; 13. In the order of externment, it is stated that the petitioner is a person frequently indulging in anti-social activities by causing hurt, attempting to commit culpable homicide, engaging in criminal intimidation, and threatening the people in the locality. The activities of the petitioner are very dangerous, and the offences registered against him under the Indian Penal Code are of a grave and serious nature and are causing disturbance to the public at large. The activities of the petitioner are very dangerous, and the offences registered against him under the Indian Penal Code are of a grave and serious nature and are causing disturbance to the public at large. He is a person who committed acts against public tranquillity and also intimidated the people of the locality. He has been involved in 3 criminal cases registered at Wadakkancherry Police Station, within the jurisdiction of the Thrissur City Police limits, from 2021 to 2022, referred to in sub-paragraphs (1) to (3) of paragraph 5 of the order of externment. A Rowdy History sheet has been opened against the petitioner at the Wadakkancherry Police Station, vide order No.53/GL/KSD/2021 dated 10.08.2021 to have a close watch on the petitioner. On 08.08.2021, the Inspector Station House Officer, Wadakkachery Police Station submitted report No.307/TDR/WKY/2021 dated 08.08.2021 to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Thrissur, for taking proceedings against the petitioner under Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Sub Divisional Magistrate, Thrissur initiated proceedings against the petitioner as M.C.No.295 of 2021. As part of this proceeding, the petitioner executed an interim bond on 17.08.2022. Within the period of interim bond, the petitioner committed Crime No.868/2022 of Wadakkancherry Police Station under Sections 341, 323, 324, 294(b) 506, 427, 308 of the Indian Penal Code. Then the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Thrissur cancelled the interim bond and executed another bond on 21.12.2022. The ordinary magisterial law initiated against the petitioner was not sufficient to prevent him from committing further criminal activities. While granting bail by the District Sessions Court, Thrissur in Crime No.1147/2021 of Wadakkancherry Police Station under Sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 323, 324, 326, 308 read with 149 of the Indian Penal Code, a condition was imposed that the petitioner shall not get himself involved in any offence while on bail. But he was involved in Crime No.868/2022 of IPC Wadakkancherry Police Station under Sections 341, 323, 324, 294(b), 506, 427 and 308 of the Indian Penal Code. Hence, the Inspector Station House Officer, Wadakkancherry Police Station submitted an application to cancel the bail of the petitioner before the District Sessions Court, Thrissur, on 24.11.2022, which is pending consideration before that court. It was very essential to prevent the petitioner from engaging in further anti-social activities. Hence, the 2nd respondent Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range, initiated proceedings against the petitioner under Section 15(1)(a) of KAAPA. 14. It was very essential to prevent the petitioner from engaging in further anti-social activities. Hence, the 2nd respondent Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range, initiated proceedings against the petitioner under Section 15(1)(a) of KAAPA. 14. The learned Government Pleader would point out that the antecedents of the petitioner clearly show that the bail condition imposed by the court is not sufficient to prevent him from committing further offences since he was involved in another offence while the bail condition is alive. The order of externment is one passed after considering all material aspects, giving an opportunity to the petitioner to submit his explanation and after complying with all the procedures described in KAAPA. There is no inordinate delay in passing the order of externment after the last prejudicial activity. The date of the last prejudicial activity is 21.11.2022 in Crime No.868/2022 of Wadakkancherry Police Station under Sections 341, 323, 324, 294(b), 506, 427, 308 of the Indian Penal Code. In that case, the petitioner was arrested on 22.11.2022 and remanded. The Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Wadakkcherry granted bail to the petitioner on 24.11.2022, by imposing bail conditions, and he was released. After his release, the Inspector Station House Officer, Wadakkancherry Police Station submitted a proposal to the District Police Chief, Thrissur City for taking preventive measures against the petitioner under the KAAPA, on 05.01.2023. The time taken to submit the report is only the time to collect the documents of the three crimes, which is justifiable, and no undue delay occurred on the part of the Inspector Station House Officer. After the receipt of the report from the Inspector Station House Officer, the District Police Chief, Thrissur City submitted a report to the 2nd respondent Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range, on 14.02.2023. On receipt of the proposal, the Deputy Inspector General of Police issued a show cause notice on 21.02.2023 to the petitioner to present himself directly before the said respondent within 5 days and show cause why an order of externment under Section 15(1)(a) of KAAPA should not be passed against him. The petitioner received the show cause notice on 01.03.2023. But he did not present himself before the 2nd respondent. Therefore, another notice was issued on 04.03.2023, with direction to present on 07.03.2023. The petitioner received the show cause notice on 01.03.2023. But he did not present himself before the 2nd respondent. Therefore, another notice was issued on 04.03.2023, with direction to present on 07.03.2023. Records were also served on the petitioner to understand the reason for taking action against him, in order to give him an opportunity to submit an effective explanation to the show cause notice. The petitioner directly appeared before the 2nd respondent and submitted his explanation on 07.03.2023 and he was heard on that day itself. Thereafter, on a careful analysis of the explanation submitted by the petitioner and the report of the District Police Chief, Thrissur City, the 2nd respondent passed the order of externment on 13.03.2023, which was served on the petitioner on 17.03.2023. 15. The learned Government Pleader would submit that the time taken between the last prejudicial activity and the date of the externment order is the time taken for collecting the documents in respect of the crimes and for following the mandatory procedures enumerated in KAAPA. Since the externee was in judicial custody until 24.11.2022, the live link has not snapped and there is no inordinate or unreasonable delay between the last prejudicial activity and the date of the externment order. Since the petitioner was involved in Crime No.868/2022 of IPC Wadakkancherry Police Station under Sections 341, 323, 324, 294(b), 506, 427 and 308 of the Indian Penal Code, while on the bail granted by the District Sessions Court, Thrissur in Crime No.1147/2021 of Wadakkancherry Police Station, the Inspector Station House Officer submitted an application to cancel the bail of the petitioner before the District Sessions Court, Thrissur, on 24.11.2022, which is pending consideration before that court, indefinitely. Moreover, the time taken to issue the externment order and the last prejudicial activity were explained in the externment order issued by the 2nd respondent. The cases registered against the petitioner are very serious in nature and the petitioner comes under the definition of 'known rowdy' in Section 2(p)(iii) of KAAPA. 16. Section 3 of KAAPA deals with the power to make orders for detaining ‘known goondas’ and ‘known rowdies’. The cases registered against the petitioner are very serious in nature and the petitioner comes under the definition of 'known rowdy' in Section 2(p)(iii) of KAAPA. 16. Section 3 of KAAPA deals with the power to make orders for detaining ‘known goondas’ and ‘known rowdies’. As per sub-section (1) of Section 3, the Government or an officer authorised under sub-section (2), may, if satisfied on information received from a Police Officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police with regard to the activities of any known goonda or known rowdy, that, with a view to prevent such person from committing any anti-social activity within the State of Kerala in any manner, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. As per sub-section (2) of Section 3, if having regard to the circumstances prevailing, or likely to prevail in any area, the Government, if satisfied that it is necessary so to do, may, by order in writing, direct that during such period as may be specified in the said order, the District Magistrate having jurisdiction may exercise the powers under sub-section (1) in respect of such persons residing within his jurisdiction or in respect of such persons not so resident who have been indulging in or about to indulge in or abet any anti-social activities within such jurisdiction. As per sub-section (3) of Section 3, when any order is made under this section by the authorised officer under sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the Government and the Director General of Police, Kerala, together with a copy of the order and supporting records which, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter and no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days, excluding public holidays, from the date of detention of such Known Goonda or Known Rowdy, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the Government or by the Secretary, Home Department if generally so authorised in this regard by the Government. 17. Section 15 of KAAPA deals with the power to make orders restricting the movements of certain persons. 17. Section 15 of KAAPA deals with the power to make orders restricting the movements of certain persons. As per sub-section (1) of Section 15, the District Magistrate or a police officer of and above the rank of Deputy Inspector General having jurisdiction, if satisfied on information received in respect of a known goonda or known rowdy, after having given him an opportunity to be heard by notice served on him or pasted at his ordinary place of residence, if any in Kerala, that he is indulging in or about to indulge in or likely to indulge in anti-social activities and with a view to prevent him from so acting at any place within the jurisdiction of such magistrate or officer, may make an order (a) directing that, except in so far as he may be permitted by the conditions made in the order, he shall not visit any such area or place as may be specified in the order, for a period not exceeding one year; (b) requiring him to report his movements within the State, in such manner, at such times, and to such authority or person as may be specified in the order, for a period not exceeding one year. As per the proviso, a copy of the order along with the grounds for issuing such order shall be communicated to the Government through the Director General of Police. As per sub-section (2) of Section 15, any person aggrieved by an order issued under sub-section (1) may represent before the Advisory Board within fifteen days of the date of service of the order and the Board on receipt of such representation, consider the same, and after enquiring into the facts and circumstances in such manner as it may deem fit, shall within thirty days of the date of receipt of such representation, annul, amend or confirm the order, either in part or in full. As per sub-section (3) of Section 15, the Government or the authority which issued the order under sub-section (1) may, on its own motion, annul or amend the order at any time either in part or in full. As per sub-section (3) of Section 15, any person violating an order under sub-section (1) shall be liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years. As per sub-section (3) of Section 15, any person violating an order under sub-section (1) shall be liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years. As per sub-section (15) of Section 15, if an order issued under sub-section (1) above has ceased to have effect for any reason, a new order under the said sub-section may be issued against the same person, if he continues to be a person falling within the definition of known rowdy or known goonda as given in Section 2(o) or Section 2(p) and if, after such cessation, he has again involved, in an offence of the nature described in Section 2(o) or Section 2 (p) at least in one instance. 18. The learned counsel for the petitioner would place reliance on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Shamnad Amiyan v. State of Kerala [ 2023 (1) KLD 690 : 2023:KER:19423], wherein, it was held that, as the delay has not been properly explained and the delay being inordinate, the link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of externment has been likely snapped, as also the live link and proximate link has been snapped, which invites the interdiction of the order of externment by the High Court, in judicial review. Paragraphs 17 to 19 of the said decision read thus; “17. In the instant case, it appears that the crime was committed on 22.01.2022, the petitioner was arrested on 8.2.2022 and he was released on bail on 03.03.2022. Even going by the version of the respondents, for the first time, the Station House Officer has given the report dated 01.07.2022 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police concerned and thereafter, the Deputy Superintendent of Police had given a report to the District Police Chief, who, in turn, had given the report to the 3rd respondent-District Inspector General of Police only on 21.07.2022. The above said conduct of the authorities would show that they did not really have the sense of urgency, so as to justify the externment measure, as envisaged under Section 15(1) of the Act. The delay, as above, even as between 03.03.2022 (the date of release on bail) up to 21.07.2022, the date of submission of the report by the Deputy Inspector General of Police cannot be said to be reasonable and properly explained in the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay, as above, even as between 03.03.2022 (the date of release on bail) up to 21.07.2022, the date of submission of the report by the Deputy Inspector General of Police cannot be said to be reasonable and properly explained in the facts and circumstances of the case. 18. The plea of delay in a similar externment case was considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the judgment in Asker Ali v. State of Kerala and others [2022 (6) KLT OnLine 1083 : W.P.(Crl.) No.873 of 2022]. As per the judgment rendered in the said case, the bail was granted to the accused on 10.01.2022 and the date of submission of the report was on 21.03.2022. In that case, the delay that occurred in between the date of bail and the submission of the report by the authority was not reasonably and properly explained and it was held that the externment order vitiates the entire proceedings (See paragraphs 17 and 18 thereof). Moreover, the time required for expeditious and effective early action has been reiterated in the decision-making process in preventive detention laws, including in the case of Sushantakumar Banik v. State of Tripura and others [2022 (5) KLT OnLine 1155 (SC) : (2022) SCC Online 1333]. In that decision, a Three Bench of the Apex Court, after placing reliance on various other case laws as in S.K. Nizamuddin v. State of West Bengal [1974 KLT OnLine 991 (SC) : (1975) 3 SCC 395 ], Suresh Mahato v. The District Magistrate, Burdwan [1974 KLT OnLine 995 (SC) = (1975) 3 SCC 554 ], Serajul v. State of West Bengal [1974 KLT OnLine 970 (SC) : (1975) 2 SCC 78 ] and Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamilnadu [1979 KLT OnLine 1089 (SC) : (1979)1 SCC 465 ], has reiterated the legal imperativeness for ensuring that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purposes of the measure should not be snapped and the live and proximate link should be maintained and unexplained and inordinate delay, as between initial stage of detention order or in executing the detention order etc. would invite the invalidation of the proceedings. 19. In the light of the above aspects, we are of the view that the petitioner is entitled to succeed in the above second contention, as the delay has not been properly explained. In other words, the delay is inordinate. would invite the invalidation of the proceedings. 19. In the light of the above aspects, we are of the view that the petitioner is entitled to succeed in the above second contention, as the delay has not been properly explained. In other words, the delay is inordinate. Hence, the link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of externment has been likely snapped, as also the live link and proximate link has been snapped which invites the interdiction of this Court in judicial review.” 19. The learned counsel would also rely on the judgment of the Division Bench in Asker Ali v. State of Kerala and others [2022:KER:69271], wherein it was held that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and purposes of the externment order has been snapped since the delay is unexplained and is inordinate. Further, the necessity and imperativeness of the externment order, as contended by the respondents, was not really made out in the impugned order. Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the said decision read thus; “18. A reading of the abovesaid paragraphs of the impugned Ext.P1 order would indicate that none of these factual aspects, justifying the delay and establishing as to why it is properly explained, etc., have not, in any manner, been explained or adverted to in Ext.P1 order. Further, we see that, even if the time upto the release of the petitioner on bail in the third case, i.e., 10.02.2022, is excluded, the Sponsoring Agency has chosen to give its report in the matter only on 21.03.2022. There is five weeks’ delay on the part of the Sponsoring Authority to give that report. The said delay is unexplained and is inordinate. That apart, even if we assume that the further time taken by the 2nd respondent from 21.03.2022 onwards is explained as above, and is treated as reasonable for complying with the statutory formalities for issuance of show cause notice etc., it has to been seen that none of these factual aspects have been canvassed or adverted to in the impugned order. It is only blandly stated that the delay is justified. 19. It is only blandly stated that the delay is justified. 19. Hence, we have no hesitation to hold that the time taken by the Sponsoring Agency to give the report only on 21.03.2022, even though the petitioner was released on bail on 10.02.2022, is rather inordinate and unexplained and would show that the necessity and imperativeness of the impugned externment order, as contended by the respondents, is not really made out. In other words, the live link between the last prejudicial activity and purposes of the externment order has been snapped in this case. Hence, we are of the view that the impugned Ext.P1 order is liable to be interdicted on this sole ground.” 20. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader would rely on the judgment of the Division Bench in Stalin v. State of Kerala and others [ 2011 (1) KHC 852 ] and Harikrishnan v. State of Kerala and others [2023:KER:35595]. 21. In Stalin [ 2011 (1) KHC 852 ] a Division Bench of this Court noticed that unlike an order of detention under Section 3 of the Act, in the case of an order of restriction under Section 15, it is mandatory that the principles of natural justice be observed. In other words, it is necessary that the officer must issue a show cause notice and afford an opportunity of being heard. Necessarily, this consumes time. Therefore, the nature of the proceedings under Section 3 and Section 15 are inherently different. In Section 15, the authority can act in a matter where ‘known goonda’ or ‘known rowdy’ is indulging or about to indulge or is likely to indulge in anti-social activities and it is to prevent the concerned person from so acting in any place within his jurisdiction that an order could be passed. In the case of Section 3(1) of the Act, there is an indication that the legislature intended a sense of immediacy and, therefore, a proximate nexus between the act or acts and the order of detention is inevitable. Section 15, apart from allowing the officer to delve into the past, permits him to hypothesise about what ‘known goonda’ or ‘known rowdy’, is likely to do in the immediate future, having regard to the use of the words ‘about to indulge’. It also permits the officer to glean out the likelihood of such a person indulging in anti-social activities. Section 15, apart from allowing the officer to delve into the past, permits him to hypothesise about what ‘known goonda’ or ‘known rowdy’, is likely to do in the immediate future, having regard to the use of the words ‘about to indulge’. It also permits the officer to glean out the likelihood of such a person indulging in anti-social activities. In comparison to the order of detention, an order of externment under Section 15, is lighter in its impact on the personal liberty of the person concerned. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the said decision read thus; ‘12. The next question which we must consider is the effect of the last crime which was considered by the Officer being allegedly committed on 23.03.2010, but the order of restriction under Section 15 being passed on 25.09.2010. We must, first of all, remind ourselves that we are not dealing with an order of detention. An order of detention under Section 3 is a grave deprivation of the personal liberty of the person detained. An order under Section 15 also visits the person concerned with an incursion into his personal liberty within the meaning of Article 21. This is for the reason that every citizen has a right to travel in any part of India, subject to any law which may provide otherwise. In fact, as held in Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another [ AIR 1978 SC 597 ], the right to travel abroad itself was treated as part of Article 21 of the Constitution. Proceeding on the basis, therefore, that the order under Section 15 of the Act also visits the person with the lesser deprivation of liberty in comparison with Section 3, we must consider whether the principle of delay in passing an order of detention in relation to the last crime allegedly committed results in snapping of the link is as such applicable in the case of an order of restriction under Section 15 and also whether, in the facts, much store can be laid by the petitioner based on the said principle. 13. As far as the facts are concerned, we notice that in the Counter Affidavit it is stated as follows: “The averment of the petitioner in para 4 of the Writ Petition that there is no proximate nexus between the last prejudicial act and the date of the restriction order is not correct. 13. As far as the facts are concerned, we notice that in the Counter Affidavit it is stated as follows: “The averment of the petitioner in para 4 of the Writ Petition that there is no proximate nexus between the last prejudicial act and the date of the restriction order is not correct. The last prejudicial act that led to the registration of Crime No.507/10 was on 23.03.2010 and investigation was completed and charge sheet was prepared and filed on 31.03.2010, thereafter the preliminary report was prepared on 26.06.2010 by the Circle Inspector of Police, Palluruthy and forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner of Police. The Deputy Commissioner after due application of mind and after being satisfied that there is need for passing an order for restriction against the petitioner, forwarded the report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police on 29.08.2010. Thereafter this respondent after due application of mind and after examining all the records arrived at the objective satisfaction that the petitioner is a known rowdy and further at the subjective satisfaction that with a view to prevent him from further committing anti-social activities, that there was a need to pass an order under Section 15(1) of KAAPA restraining the petitioner from entering the jurisdiction of Kochi City Police.” Therefore, the proceedings commenced in June, 2010 itself. Unlike an order of detention under Section 3, in the case of an order of restriction under Section 15, it is mandatory that the principles of natural justice be observed. In other words, it is necessary that the Officer must issue a show cause notice and afford an opportunity of being heard. Necessarily, this consumes time. Therefore, the nature of the proceedings under Section 3 and Section 15 are inherently different. Still, further more, we must also remind ourselves that in Section 15, as pointed out by the learned Senior Government Pleader, the Authority can act in a matter where the known goonda or known rowdy is indulging or about to indulge or is likely to indulge in anti-social activities and it is to prevent the concerned person from so acting in any place within his jurisdiction that an order could be passed. This language is to be contrasted with the phraseology in Section 3 where it is provided as follows: “3. This language is to be contrasted with the phraseology in Section 3 where it is provided as follows: “3. Power to make orders for detaining Known Goondas and Known Rowdies.- (1) The Government or an Officer authorised under sub-section (2), may, if satisfied on information received from a Police Officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police with regard to the activities of any Known Goonda or Known Rowdy, that with a view to prevent such person from committing any anti-social activity within the State of Kerala in any manner, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.” Thus, in the case of Section 3(1) of the Act, there is an indication that the legislature intended a sense of immediacy and, therefore, a proximate nexus between the act or acts and the order of detention is inevitable. We must reiterate that Section 15, apart from allowing the Officer to delve into the past, permits him to hypothesise about what the known goonda or known rowdy, is likely to do in the immediate future, having regard to the use of the words “about to indulge”. What is more, it also permits the Officer to glean out the likelihood of such a person indulging in anti-social activities. We must also immediately remind ourselves that certainly in comparison to the order of detention, an order of restriction under Section 15, is lighter in its impact on the personal liberty of the person concerned. In fact, the learned Senior Government Pleader would point out that it is almost like the conditions attached to bail granted by the Courts. We are not, for a moment, saying that if the act/acts which are complained of have completely lost their relevance by the passage of time, giving rise to a total absence of any nexus, still an order of restriction can be passed under Section 15. But, we do not think, in the facts of this case, that it is a case of the said nature. Accordingly, we repel the said contention.’ 22. In Harikrishnan [2023:KER:35595] the Division Bench followed the law laid down in Stalin [ 2011 (1) KHC 852 ]. Paragraph 10 of that judgment reads thus; ‘10. But, we do not think, in the facts of this case, that it is a case of the said nature. Accordingly, we repel the said contention.’ 22. In Harikrishnan [2023:KER:35595] the Division Bench followed the law laid down in Stalin [ 2011 (1) KHC 852 ]. Paragraph 10 of that judgment reads thus; ‘10. Before delving into the question aforesaid, we find it appropriate to refer to the decision in Stalin C.V. v. State of Kerala and others [ 2011 (1) KHC 852 ], wherein a Division Bench of this court had occasion to consider the delay on the part of the competent authority in initiating proceedings under Section 15 of the Act and its impact on the live link required for the purpose of initiating action, in comparison with the delay in initiating proceedings for detention under Section 3 of the Act. Paragraph 12, and the relevant portion of paragraph 13 of the judgment read thus: “12. The next question which we must consider is the effect of the last crime which was considered by the Officer being allegedly committed on 23.03.2010, but the order of restriction under Section 15 being passed on 25.09.2010. We must, first of all, remind ourselves that we are not dealing with an order of detention. An order of detention under Section 3 is a grave deprivation of the personal liberty of the person detained. An order under Section 15 also visits the person concerned with an incursion into his personal liberty within the meaning of Article 21. This is for the reason that every citizen has a right to travel in any part of India, subject to any law which may provide otherwise. In fact, as held in Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another [1978 KHC 477 : AIR 1978 SC 597 : 1978 (1) SCC 248 : 1978 (2) SCR 621 ], the right to travel abroad itself was treated as part of Article 21 of the Constitution. In fact, as held in Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another [1978 KHC 477 : AIR 1978 SC 597 : 1978 (1) SCC 248 : 1978 (2) SCR 621 ], the right to travel abroad itself was treated as part of Article 21 of the Constitution. Proceeding on the basis, therefore, that the order under Section 15 of the Act also visits the person with the lesser deprivation of liberty in comparison with Section 3, we must consider whether the principle of delay in passing an order of detention in relation to the last crime allegedly committed results in snapping of the link is as such applicable in the case of an order of restriction under Section 15 and also whether, in the facts, much store can be laid by the petitioner based on the said principle. 13. xxxx Therefore, the proceedings was commenced in June, 2010 itself. Unlike an order of detention under Section 3, in the case of an order of restriction under Section 15, it is mandatory that the principles of natural justice be observed. In other words, it is necessary that the Officer must issue a show cause notice and afford an opportunity of being heard. Necessarily, this consumes time. Therefore, the nature of the proceedings under Section 3 and Section 15 are inherently different. Still, furthermore, we must also remind ourselves that in Section 15, as pointed out by the learned Senior Government Pleader, the Authority can act in a matter where the known goonda or known rowdy is indulging or about to indulge or is likely to indulge in antisocial activities and it is to prevent the concerned person from so acting in any place within his jurisdiction that an order could be passed. This language is to be contrasted with the phraseology in Section 3 where it is provided as follows: “3. This language is to be contrasted with the phraseology in Section 3 where it is provided as follows: “3. Power to make orders for detaining Known Goondas and Known Rowdies.- (1) The Government or an Officer authorised under sub-section (2), may, if satisfied on information received from a Police Officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police with regard to the activities of any Known Goonda or Known Rowdy, that with a view to prevent such person from committing any anti-social activity within the State of Kerala in any manner, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.” Thus, in the case of Section 3(1) of the Act, there is an indication that the legislature intended a sense of immediacy and, therefore, a proximate nexus between the act or acts and the order of detention is inevitable. We must reiterate that Section 15, apart from allowing the Officer to delve into the past, it permits him to hypothesise about what the known goonda or known rowdy, is likely to do in the immediate future, having regard to the use of the words “about to indulge”. What is more, it also permits the Officer to glean out the likelihood of such a person indulging in anti-social activities. We must also immediately remind ourselves that certainly in comparison to the order of detention, an order of restriction under Section 15, is lighter in its impact on the personal liberty of the person concerned. In fact, the learned Senior Government Pleader would point out that it is almost like the conditions attached to bail granted by the Courts. We are not, for a moment, saying that if the act/acts which are complained of have completely lost their relevance by the passage of time, giving rise to a total absence of any nexus, still an order of restriction can be passed under Section 15. But, we do not think, in the facts of this case, that it is a case of the said nature. But, we do not think, in the facts of this case, that it is a case of the said nature. Accordingly, we repel the said contention.” As evident from the extracted passages of the judgment, the question considered by this Court in the said case was whether the principle of delay snapping the live link with reference to the involvement of the person concerned in the last prejudicial activity, for passing the order of detention, would apply as such in the case of an order of restriction under Section 15 of the Act. Although this Court observed that an order of restriction cannot be passed under Section 15 of the Act if the act/acts which are complained of have completely lost their relevance by the passage of time, giving rise to a total absence of any nexus, it was held that an order of restriction under Section 15 is lighter in its impact on the personal liberty of the person concerned and that its effect is only in the nature of a condition attached to a bail order. When we examine the facts of the case on hand, in the light of the ratio in Stalin C.V., (supra), we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order on the ground of delay, for the passage of time in the case on hand does not give rise to total absence of any nexus. The conduct on the part of the petitioner in getting himself involved in another prejudicial activity immediately after serving the impugned order fortifies the subjective satisfaction rendered by the competent authority in this regard.’ 23. In Golam Hussain @ Gama v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta [ (1974) 4 SCC 530 ] the Apex Court noticed that the branch of jurisprudence bearing on prohibitory detention has been crystallised and it is no longer a valid contention that because the accused has been discharged in a criminal case the ground of charge cannot be relied upon by the appropriate authority for passing an order of detention. The former relates to the punitive branch of criminal law and relates to the past commission, the latter to the preventive branch of social defence and protects the community from future injury. The former relates to the punitive branch of criminal law and relates to the past commission, the latter to the preventive branch of social defence and protects the community from future injury. This branch of jurisprudence, as interpreted by the Court, has made it futile for a detenu to urge that because the grounds of detention have been the subject-matter of criminal cases which have ended in discharge, therefore the order of detention is mala fide. The basic imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not apply to the ‘subjective satisfaction’ component of imprisonment for reasons of internal security. To quarrel with such a proposition is to challenge the wisdom of Parliament. 24. In Golam Hussain @ Gama [ (1974) 4 SCC 530 ] one of the contentions raised by the detenu was that there has been a long interval of nine months between the criminal incidents of October and November, 1972, and the detention order of July, 1973. The learned counsel for the detenu relied on the decisions in Lakshman Khatik v. State of West Bengal [ (1974) 4 SCC 1 ], Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan [ AIR 1964 SC 334 ]. After considering the rival contentions, the Apex Court held that it is true that there must be a live link between the grounds of criminal activity alleged by the detaining authority and the purpose of detention, namely, inhibition of prejudicial activity of the species specified in the statute. This credible chain is snapped if there is too long and unexplained an interval between the offending acts and the order of detention. Such is the ratio of proximity in Lakshman Khatik [ (1974) 4 SCC 1 ]. No authority, acting rationally, can be satisfied, subjectively or otherwise, of future mischief merely because long ago the detenu had done something evil. To rule otherwise is to sanction a simulacrum of a statutory requirement. But no mechanical test by counting the months of the interval is sound. It all depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long, on the reason for the delay in taking preventive action, like information of participation being available only in the course of an investigation. The Court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case. The Court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case. If the detaining authority takes the chance of conviction and, when the court verdict goes against it, falls back on its detention power to punish one whom the court would not convict, it is an abuse and virtual nullification of the judicial process. But if honestly finding a dangerous person getting away with it by overawing witnesses or concealing the commission cleverly, an authority thinks on the material before him that there is a likelihood of and need to interdict public disorder at his instance, he may validly direct detention. The distinction is fine but real. It is one thing to say that a mere subjective satisfaction is sufficient to deprive a person of fundamental freedom; it is another to reject that satisfaction as specious and non-existent. Parliament makes the law and is responsible for it; the court only applies it, as it must. 25. Viewed in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Golam Hussain @ Gama [ (1974) 4 SCC 530 ] and that laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Stalin [ 2011 (1) KHC 852 ], we find no merits in the challenge made by the petitioner against the order of externment dated 13.03.2023 of the 2nd respondent Deputy Inspector General of Police, issued in exercise of the powers under Section 15(1)(a) of KAAPA. There is no unexplained and inordinate delay, as contended by the petitioner. The live link for passing an order of externment was never snatched, in case the explanation offered in paragraph 13 of the order of externment is read along with the facts and circumstances pointed out in paragraphs 2 to 12 of that order. The acts alleged against the petitioner are grave and serious in nature. The power under Section 15 of KAAPA can be exercised by the authority where a ‘known goonda’ or ‘known rowdy’ is indulging or about to indulge or is likely to indulge in anti-social activities and it is to prevent the concerned person from so acting in any place within his jurisdiction. The power under Section 15 of KAAPA can be exercised by the authority where a ‘known goonda’ or ‘known rowdy’ is indulging or about to indulge or is likely to indulge in anti-social activities and it is to prevent the concerned person from so acting in any place within his jurisdiction. Section 15, apart from allowing the authority to delve into the past, permits him to hypothesise about what ‘known goonda’ or ‘known rowdy’, is likely to do in the immediate future, having regard to the use of the words ‘about to indulge’. Section 15 also permits the authority to glean out the likelihood of such a person indulging in anti-social activities. In the result, this Writ Petition (Criminal) fails and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.