ORDER : 1. The appellants have challenged the order dated 14th August 2019 passed in WP (S) No. 1515 of 2013 by which their prayer for appointment of the appellant No. 2 on compassionate ground has been declined by the writ Court. 2. The appellant No. 1 is mother of the appellant No. 2 for whose appointment the appellant No. 1 submitted an application in the year 2002, after the death of her elder son in harness on 10th November 2001. 3. The writ Court has held that the scheme of National Coal Wages Agreement (in short ‘NCWA’) does not envisage appointment on compassionate ground to the members of the family, one after another. The writ Court has also observed that the order dated 16th February 2005 by which the application for compassionate appointment of the appellant No. 2 was rejected was not challenged in the writ proceeding. 4. The writ Court held as under: “6. On the discussions made above, this Court finds that the compassionate appointment made for to meet the sudden jerk in the family, N.C.W.A. scheme does not provide that one after another family members will be accommodated in the C.C.L. Moreover, the rejection order dated 16.02.2005 is not challenged by the petitioners, accordingly the writ petition is dismissed.” 5. M/s Central Coalfields Limited (in short ‘CCL’) has taken a ground that the elder brother of the appellant No. 2 who died on 10th November 2001 was not a regular employee rather a Trainee Mining Sirdar, who had just completed 2nd phase of training. 6. Mrs. M.M. Pal, the learned senior counsel for the appellants, has submitted that the appellant No. 1 applied for appointment of her elder son, namely, Jaspal Singh under the Special Female VRS Scheme and while so the stand taken by the CCL that the application for compassionate appointment to the appellant No. 2 was a kind of hereditary employment, one after another, is unfounded. It is further submitted that in course of employment of elder brother of the appellant No. 2 his service book was opened which duly recorded all necessary information about him and, moreover, the appointment on compassionate ground cannot be ad hoc or temporary, rather it must always be permanent in nature. 7. It is further submitted that in course of employment of elder brother of the appellant No. 2 his service book was opened which duly recorded all necessary information about him and, moreover, the appointment on compassionate ground cannot be ad hoc or temporary, rather it must always be permanent in nature. 7. Briefly stated, the appellant No. 1 was appointed on compassionate ground in the year 1992 and five years after that she took voluntary retirement under the Special Female VRS Scheme, exercising the option for appointment of a dependent in her place. Accordingly, Jaspal Singh who was her elder son was appointed on 18th January 1999 as a trainee Mining Sirdar on stipend of Rs. 2500/- per month. The said Jaspal Singh was placed for undergoing mines training at Ray u/g Mines of Bachra Project for a period of six months from 10th April 2001 to 9th October 2001. The appellants have pleaded that on account of his illness he remained absent from duty and died on 10th November 2001. However, the CCL has projected that Jaspal Singh was a habitual absentee who before could complete his training died in harness. 8. In the counter-affidavit dated 15th July 2022, the CCL has pleaded that Jaspal Singh attended the duty of twelve days each in May 2001 and June 2001 and, thereafter, remained absent from training without any intimation and permission to leave. Mr. D.K. Chakraverty, the learned counsel for the CCL, states that as per the records maintained by the CCL, Jaspal Singh attended duty just one day in April 2001 and he remained absent from 20th June 2001 till his death was reported by producing a death certificate issued by Brindavan Hospital and Research Centre, Ranchi Road, Hazaribagh. 9. The aforesaid facts clearly bring out that there were several applications for appointment on compassionate grounds from the family of the appellant No. 1, who herself was offered appointment on death of her husband. The scheme for compassionate appointment is formulated by the employer to provide sustenance to the family in distress and no dependent has a vested right to claim appointment on compassionate ground. The scheme for compassionate appointment itself is in teeth of the constitutional mandate under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, any offer for compassionate ground must be within the four corners of the scheme itself. 10. The scheme for compassionate appointment itself is in teeth of the constitutional mandate under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, any offer for compassionate ground must be within the four corners of the scheme itself. 10. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal vs. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “2...........The whole object of granting compassionate employment is thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member of such family a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. What is further, mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood. The Government or the public authority concerned has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased, and it is only if it is satisfied, that but for the provision of employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. The posts in Classes III and IV are the lowest posts in non-manual and manual categories and hence they alone can be offered on compassionate grounds, the object being to relieve the family, of the financial destitution and to help it get over the emergency. The provision of employment in such lowest posts by making an exception to the rule is justifiable and valid since it is not discriminatory. The favourable treatment given to such dependant of the deceased employee in such posts has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, viz., relief against destitution. No other posts are expected or required to be given by the public authorities for the purpose. It must be remembered in this connection that as against the destitute family of the deceased there are millions of other families which are equally, if not more destitute. The exception to the rule made in favour of the family of the deceased employee is in consideration of the services rendered by him and the legitimate expectations, and the change in the status and affairs, of the family engendered by the erstwhile employment which are suddenly upturned.” 11. The exception to the rule made in favour of the family of the deceased employee is in consideration of the services rendered by him and the legitimate expectations, and the change in the status and affairs, of the family engendered by the erstwhile employment which are suddenly upturned.” 11. In the present case, the appellant No. 1 opted for voluntary retirement in the year 1997 and her elder son was appointed in the year 1999, who died at the end of the year 2001.Whatever may be the reason and whether the so-called order of rejection dated 16th February 2005 was communicated to the appellants or not, after two decades no direction to the CCL for appointment of the appellant No. 2 on compassionate ground could have been issued by the writ Court. 12. In this regard, we may notice the following observations by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Central Coalfields Limited vs. Parden Oraon, 2021 SCC Online SC 299: “8. The whole object of granting compassionate appointment is to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis which arises due to the death of the sole breadwinner. The mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood. The authority concerned has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased, and it is only if it is satisfied that but for the provision of employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis that the job is offered to the eligible member of the family. It was further asseverated in the said judgment that compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of reasonable period as the consideration of such employment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in the future. It was further held that the object of compassionate appointment is to enable the family to get over the financial crisis that it faces at the time of the death of sole breadwinner, compassionate appointment cannot be claimed or offered after a significant lapse of time and after the crisis is over.” 13. Mrs. M.M. Pal, the learned senior counsel for the appellants, has drawn our attention to the appointment of Smt. Sabita Devi whose husband late Nand Lal Kahar was also a trainee and not a regular appointee. Mrs. M.M. Pal, the learned senior counsel for the appellants, has drawn our attention to the appointment of Smt. Sabita Devi whose husband late Nand Lal Kahar was also a trainee and not a regular appointee. This plea has been taken on behalf of the appellants to demonstrate discrimination by the CCL in the matter of compassionate appointment under NCWA. 14. Mrs. M.M. Pal, the learned senior counsel for the appellants, has submitted that the CCL accepts that appointment to Smt. Sabita Devi was offered but no plausible reason has been disclosed by the CCL for rejecting the claim for appointment of the appellant No. 2. In this connection, our attention has been drawn to the order dated 11th August 2022 passed in the present proceeding by which a direction was issued to the CCL to give a categorical statement on this issue. 15. In its supplementary counter-affidavit dated 17th October 2022, the CCL has pleaded that in compliance of the order dated 4th December 2007 passed in WP (S) No. 2205 of 2007 the appointment of Smt. Sabita Devi was approved. The CCL has also referred to the order dated 22nd October 2018 passed in WP (S) No. 4252 of 2017 and the order dated 22nd November 2017 passed in LPA No. 393 of 2017 with analogous cases to submit that compassionate appointment cannot be transformed into a kind of hereditary appointment. 16. Mrs. M.M. Pal, the learned senior counsel for the appellants has relied on the decisions in Chadra Tirkey vs. State of Jharkhand and Others, 2010 (3) JLJR 192 and Food Corporation of India and Others vs. Ram Kesh Yadav and Others, (2007) 9 SCC 531 to submit that once the application of the appellant No. 1 under the Special Female VRS Scheme was accepted by the CCL it was under an obligation to fulfill the other conditions, such as, appointment to the appellant No. 2 on compassionate ground. 17. We are unable to accept the submissions made on behalf of the appellants particularly for the reason that appointment on compassionate ground to the appellant No. 2 must depend on his fulfilling the conditions as envisaged under the scheme - the ex-employee who died in harness must be a regular employee. 17. We are unable to accept the submissions made on behalf of the appellants particularly for the reason that appointment on compassionate ground to the appellant No. 2 must depend on his fulfilling the conditions as envisaged under the scheme - the ex-employee who died in harness must be a regular employee. The plea taken by the appellants that late Jaspal Singh must be held to be in regular appointment cannot be accepted de hors the offer of appointment including the letters for training. Similarly, opening of the service book is not an evidence under any of the service rules as a proof of the employee being on regular service. Rather, as a matter of practice the service book of an employee shall contain the date of his confirmation which has not been recorded in the service book of late Jaspal Singh. 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in a series of judgments that compassionate appointment cannot be granted after a long lapse of time. Still, in a matter in which 20 years since death of the son of the appellant No. 1 have passed, the appellants have been insisting on a direction to the CCL for compassionate appointment. We are of the opinion that in a matter of this nature the counsels should also act responsibly and the Court’s precious time should not be wasted like this. 19. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances in the case, we find no ground to interfere with the writ Court’s order and, accordingly, LPA No. 656 of 2019 is dismissed.