JUDGMENT : The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order as contained in memo no. 2532 dated 05.05.2022 passed by the respondent no. 4 – the Engineer-in-Chief, Water Resources Department, Government of Jharkhand, whereby the petitioner has been debarred from participating in future tenders for a period of two years and ten months. 2. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the petitioner was awarded residual work of construction relating to three reservoirs schemes i.e., Bhairwa Reservoir Scheme at Gola in Hazaribagh district vide Agreement No. 01F2/2005-06 dated 02.07.2005, Ramrekha Reservoir Scheme at Dobhaye in Simdega district vide Agreement No. 06F2/2005-06 dated 12.12.2005 and Keso Reservoir Scheme at Jainagar in Koderma district vide Agreement No. 15F2/2006-07 dated 23.03.2007 on ‘Turn Key Basis’. A show cause notice dated 19.05.2017 was issued to the petitioner by the respondent no. 3 – the Deputy Secretary (Eng.), Water Resources Department, Government of Jharkhand alleging that all the aforesaid three works were to be completed in 30 months from their respective date of commencement, however, even after lapse of 10 years, the said work could not be completed as yet and thereby asking the petitioner to explain the reason within one month as to why it may not be debarred from participating in other forthcoming tenders of Water Resources Department for the alleged negligence committed by it in proper execution of the said works. The petitioner replied the said show cause notice on 16.06.2017 reiterating the reasons for delay in completion of the said projects such as, non-completion of the process of timely acquisition of land, non-payment of compensation to the landowners, public protest for committing delay in rehabilitation of the displaced persons as well as development of the place of rehabilitation due to shortage of fund and stoppage of work owing to regular violence by the anti-social elements. However, the respondent no. 3 passed an order as contained in letter no. 402 dated 23.08.2017 debarring the petitioner from participating in future tenders/contracts to be floated by the Water Resources Department till further order. However, the respondent no. 3 passed an order as contained in letter no. 402 dated 23.08.2017 debarring the petitioner from participating in future tenders/contracts to be floated by the Water Resources Department till further order. The petitioner preferred a writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 5230 of 2017 challenging the order dated 23.08.2017 and the said writ petition was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 26.09.2018, whereby the said order of debarment was quashed and set aside holding that the debarment can never be permanent, rather the term of debarment depends upon the nature and gravity of the offence committed by the erring contractor. Pursuant to the said order of this Court, the Joint Secretary, Water Resources Department, Government of Jharkhand vide memo no. 5911 dated 23.10.2019, cancelled the order of debarment of the petitioner with immediate effect. However, a show cause notice was again issued to the petitioner by the Joint Secretary, Water Resources Department, Government of Jharkhand on 14.11.2019 asking it to reply within one month as to why the work with respect to agreements dated 02.07.2005, 12.12.2005 and 23.03.2007 executed for Bhairwa Reservoir Scheme, Ramrekha Reservoir Scheme and Keso Reservoir Scheme respectively were not completed and why the petitioner should not be debarred from participating in future tenders/contracts for a period of five years for committing negligence in performing the aforesaid three works. The petitioner replied the said show cause notice on 14.12.2019 primarily stating that the issue raised in the show cause notice dated 14.11.2019 is sub-judice before the Arbitrator appointed by this Court. However, the respondent no. 4 vide impugned order as contained in memo no. 2532 dated 05.05.2022 debarred the petitioner from participating in future tenders/contracts for a period of two years and ten months in purported exercise of power conferred under Clause 11.1.4 of Jharkhand Water Resources Contractor Registration Rules, 2018 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules, 2018”) notified on 29.10.2018 observing that after examining the petitioner’s reply and analysing the report submitted by the respondent no. 5, it was found that construction of residual works related to Bhairwa Reservoir Scheme and Keso Reservoir Scheme were not fully executed by it. 3. 5, it was found that construction of residual works related to Bhairwa Reservoir Scheme and Keso Reservoir Scheme were not fully executed by it. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that three arbitration applications being A.A No. 32 of 2017 concerned with the dispute of Bhairwa Reservoir Scheme, A.A No. 38 of 2017 concerned with the dispute of Keso Reservoir Scheme and A.A No. 15 of 2018 concerned with Ramrekha Reservoir Scheme were filed by the petitioner under Section 11(6)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 1996”) for appointment of Arbitrator in order to adjudicate the dispute between the parties, wherein vide orders dated 22.11.2018, 10.01.2019 and 03.05.2019 respectively, Justice Permod Kohli (Retd.) was appointed as sole Arbitrator. The main issue pending before learned Arbitrator is with respect to construction of residual works allotted to the petitioner vide Agreement Nos. 01F2/2005-06 dated 02.07.2005, 06F2/2005-06 dated 12.12.2005 and 15F2/2006-07 dated 23.03.2007 for which the petitioner has been debarred vide impugned order dated 05.05.2022 alleging delay in execution of the said works. It is further submitted that the question as to who is responsible for delay in completion of the said works is otherwise required to be adjudicated by an independent body i.e., learned Arbitrator. Unless the alleged breach of contract by the petitioner is decided by the adjudicatory arbitral tribunal, the respondent no. 4 by invoking Clause 11.1.4 of the Rules, 2018 cannot unilaterally hold that the petitioner has committed breach of the terms and conditions of the said agreements and consequently, debar the petitioner from participating in all future contracts and projects for a period of 2 years and ten months. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the said contention, puts reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “J.G Engineers Private Limited Vs. Union of India” reported in 2011 (5) SCC 758 . It is further submitted that no convincing reason has been assigned in the impugned order for debarring the petitioner which is otherwise in violation of the principles of natural justice and thus, the same is liable to be set-aside. The delay caused in completion of the works is beyond the control of the petitioner which can be remedied only by the respondents. The said fact has been mentioned by the respondent no. The delay caused in completion of the works is beyond the control of the petitioner which can be remedied only by the respondents. The said fact has been mentioned by the respondent no. 6 – the Superintending Engineer, Waterways Circle, Water Resources Department, Hazaribagh in his letters dated 05.05.2008 and 27.01.2009. The issuance of impugned order dated 05.05.2022 has infringed the fundamental right of the petitioner as guaranteed under Article (19)(1)(g) of the Constitution of India by debarring it from participating in any future tender of the respondents. 5. It is also submitted that the order of debarment has inflicted serious stigma on the petitioner as it carries great repute in its field of business. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the reason assigned for blacklisting the petitioner in the impugned order is a rubber stamp reason or a pretence of reason which cannot be equated with a valid decision making procedure as has been elaborated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan” reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496. It is also submitted that earlier an order of blacklisting the petitioner was passed for an indefinite period and the same was quashed by this Court vide order dated 26.09.2018 passed in W.P.C No. 5230 of 2017 without remanding the matter or granting liberty to the respondents to re-examine/re-open the issue. However, the respondent no. 4 arbitrarily reopened the issue and passed the impugned order which is in clear violation of the order dated 26.09.2018 earlier passed by this Court. 6. It is further submitted that the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner by the Joint Secretary, Water Resources Department, Government of Jharkhand, whereas the order of blacklisting has been passed by the respondent no. 4 which is also against the principle of fairness. 7. In support of the said contention, learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Gullapalli Nageswara Rao Vs. A.P. State Road Transport Corpn.” reported in 1959 Supp (1) SCR 319 : AIR 1959 SC 308 , wherein it has been held as under: 31. 7. In support of the said contention, learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Gullapalli Nageswara Rao Vs. A.P. State Road Transport Corpn.” reported in 1959 Supp (1) SCR 319 : AIR 1959 SC 308 , wherein it has been held as under: 31. The second objection is that while the Act and the Rules framed thereunder impose a duty on the State Government to give a personal hearing, the procedure prescribed by the Rules impose a duty on the Secretary to hear and the Chief Minister to decide. This divided responsibility is destructive of the concept of judicial hearing. Such a procedure defeats the object of personal hearing. Personal hearing enables the authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the witnesses and clear up his doubts during the course of the arguments, and the party appearing to persuade the authority by reasoned argument to accept his point of view. If one person hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality. We therefore hold that the said procedure followed in this case also offends another basic principle of judicial procedure. 8. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the present writ petition is not maintainable as the same involves purely a contractual dispute. Learned counsel puts reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Bharat Coking Coal Limited & Anr. Vs. AMR Dev Prabha & Ors.” reported (2020) 16 SCC 759 and submits that it is a well settled principle of law that writ petition is not maintainable where the issue is solely of violation of contractual right or duty. A person seeking relief under writ jurisdiction must also actively satisfy the Court that remedy being sought is in the domain of public law, and is not merely contractual. Moreover, a balance is required to be maintained between the need for commercial freedom and possibility of collusion, illegality and squandering of public resources. 9. It is further submitted that the order of debarment has been passed after careful examination of the explanation submitted by the petitioner and thus it cannot be said that the order of blacklisting has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. 10. 9. It is further submitted that the order of debarment has been passed after careful examination of the explanation submitted by the petitioner and thus it cannot be said that the order of blacklisting has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents puts further reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “State of U.P Vs. Sudhir Kumar Singh & Ors.” reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 847, wherein it has been held as under: 39. An analysis of the aforesaid judgments thus reveals: (1) Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused. (2) Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in public interest. (3) No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice. (4) In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person. (5) The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice. 11. (5) The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents also puts reliance on a judgment of this Court rendered in the case of “Prabhat Kumar Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors.” [W.P.(C) No. 336 of 2020], wherein this Court has held that the principles of natural justice cannot be applied in a straitjacket formula. There is no legal duty to provide an opportunity of hearing, where it will not change the ultimate conclusion to be reached by the decision-maker. A breach of procedure cannot give rise to a remedy in courts unless there is some crucial substance behind it which has been lost by such failure. The Court has to determine as to whether observance of the principles of natural justice was necessary for a just decision in the facts of a particular case. There may be cases where on admitted and undisputed facts, only one conclusion is possible and in such an eventuality, application of the principles of natural justice would be a futile exercise and an empty formality. 12. It is also submitted that the petitioner was allotted residual works of construction under Bhairava Reservoir Scheme, Keso Reservoir Scheme and Ramrekha Reservoir Scheme and the completion period for the said works was 30 months from the respective dates of commencement, but in spite of sincere departmental assistance, the works were not completed even after more than 10 years of execution of agreements which severely affected the proposed creation of irrigation benefit for deprived people mostly belonging to tribal communities and backward castes. The delay in completion of works has not only hampered the interest of beneficiaries for whom those were sanctioned, but has also put burden of additional expenditure on the State exchequer due to price rise of materials and manpower. It is further submitted that a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner vide letter no. 247 dated 19.05.2017 under the signature of the respondent no. It is further submitted that a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner vide letter no. 247 dated 19.05.2017 under the signature of the respondent no. 3 – the Deputy Secretary (Eng.), Water Resources Department, Government of Jharkhand for non-completion of Bhairwa Reservoir Scheme, Ramrekha Reservoir Scheme and Keso Reservoir Scheme even after more than ten years which was replied by the petitioner on 16.06.2017. On examination of the said reply at the department level, it was found that the petitioner failed to furnish satisfactory answer to the show cause notice, rather took excuses of land acquisition, law and order problem, price escalation, non-cooperation of the department. So far as escalation of price in completion of the works is concerned, it was duly mentioned in the Clauses 26.5 and 26.6 of the bid documents that the agreements executed on ‘turn-key basis’ did not contain the provision of rate revision or price escalation. The petitioner also failed to explain the excess expenditure of Rs.25.85 crores made by it under the Keso Reservoir Scheme. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents further contends that on approval of competent authority, the matter of fraudulent payment made with respect to Keso Reservoir Scheme was referred to the Department of Cabinet Vigilance, Government of Jharkhand for enquiry by Technical Vigilance Cell wherein it was prima facie found that there was huge fraudulent payment in the said scheme. The report also mentioned the names of 13 tainted officials of the Department of Water Resources, Government of Jharkhand, who were involved with the petitioner in the said fraudulent payment. The entire matter was placed before the Government for appropriate decision and consequently, it was ordered to lodge an FIR against the tainted officials as well as the petitioner. The respondent no. 2 vide letter no. 5256 dated 11.12.2017 requested the Director General of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Jharkhand, Ranchi to take action against 13 erring engineers as well as the petitioner (the contractor) in accordance with law by lodging FIR against them and to inform the action taken in this regard. The Office of the Principal Accountant General (Audit), Jharkhand also found excess payment made to the petitioner and as such, an FIR was lodged against the petitioner by the Executive Engineer, Waterways Division, Barhi (Hazaribagh) being ACB P.S Case No. 04 of 2018 after approval of the competent authority. 14. The Office of the Principal Accountant General (Audit), Jharkhand also found excess payment made to the petitioner and as such, an FIR was lodged against the petitioner by the Executive Engineer, Waterways Division, Barhi (Hazaribagh) being ACB P.S Case No. 04 of 2018 after approval of the competent authority. 14. It is lastly submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that after receiving the reply from the petitioner, response of the Chief Engineer, Hazaribagh was also taken and after considering the same as well as on going through the petitioner’s reply and the document available on record, the respondent no. 4 passed the impugned order of blacklisting the petitioner. 15. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The petitioner is aggrieved with the order of the respondent no. 4, whereby it has been debarred from participating in future tenders for a period of two years and ten months. 16. The thrust of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the recourse of Clause 11.1.4 of the Rules, 2018 cannot be taken by the respondent no. 4 while passing the impugned order as the dispute with respect to non-completion of the works in question is pending before the Arbitrator appointed by this Court under Section 11(6)(c) of the Act, 1996. The respondents cannot be the judges of their own cause. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “J.G. Engineers (P) Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Anr.” reported in (2011) 5 SCC 758 , wherein it has been held that the question as to whether the other party committed breach cannot be decided by the party alleging such breach. A contract cannot provide that one party will be the arbitrator to decide whether he or the other party has committed the breach. The said question can only be decided by an adjudicatory forum i.e., a court or an Arbitral Tribunal. 17. In support of the said contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has invited attention of this Court towards paragraph nos. 50 and 52 of the Arbitration Application No. 32 of 2017, which is quoted hereinbelow for ready reference: “50. The time for completion of the contract was 30 months. 17. In support of the said contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has invited attention of this Court towards paragraph nos. 50 and 52 of the Arbitration Application No. 32 of 2017, which is quoted hereinbelow for ready reference: “50. The time for completion of the contract was 30 months. However, due to breaches committed by the respondent, the claimant was prevented from performing the same even within the reasonable time. The claimant had duly mobilized its men and machinery and the same were lying idle. The claimant could not undertaken any other projects and its men and machinery remained idle. The claimant, thus by reason of the prolongation of the contract beyond the stipulated period, has incurred huge expenditure and suffered loss and damage under various heads. 52. Thus, the claimant is entitled to the following claims:- (a) The claimant has executed various works for which the payment has not been made and the same remains pending till now. The claimant thus claims an amount of Rs.20,00,000.00 for the work already executed for which the payment has not been made, the same can also be verified by the competent authority of the respondents. The amount may further increase as the claimant has not stopped working and still continues to execute the work wherever it is possible. (b) Due to prolongation of the contractual period and failure on part of the respondent to grant extension of time a retention money amounting to Rs.15,73,799/- has been deducted from the R.A Bills at the rate of 10% from the running account bills. The claimant is thus entitled to the aforesaid amount and accordingly prays for the same. (c) During the execution of the contract security deposit was deducted from running account bills at the rate of 5% from each R.A bill as a result of which a total of Rs. 2,37,92,565/- was deducted from R.A bills out of which Rs.1,65,00,000/- has been released by the respondents on request of the claimant and therefore a total amount of Rs.72,92,565/- is still lying with the respondents towards security deposit. The work was to be executed within a span of 30 months and the security deposit was to be released after one year of defect liability period from the date of completion of the contract. The work was to be executed within a span of 30 months and the security deposit was to be released after one year of defect liability period from the date of completion of the contract. However, due to latches and lapses on the part of the respondents the contract could not be completed within the contractual period and the same is still subsisting. Therefore, the claimant suffered huge loss and damage due to blockage of this fund for more than 13 years, the claimant thus prays for release of the balance security deposit lying with respondents amounting to Rs.72,92,565/-.-----” 18. I have also perused the show cause notice dated 14.11.2019, wherein it was alleged against the petitioner that in all aforesaid three works, 30 months’ time form the date of commencement of the said works was fixed for completion, however, even after lapse of more than 10 years, the works were not completed. The petitioner specifically replied that earlier, it had filed a writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 5230 of 2017, which was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 26.09.2018 quashing and setting aside the impugned letter of debarment and giving liberty to it to take recourse of alternative resolution mechanism as provided in the concerned agreements for other reliefs sought by it. Pursuant to the said direction, the petitioner filed three arbitration applications before this Court being A.A No. 32 of 2017, A.A No. 38 of 2017 and A.A No. 15 of 2018 for appointment of Arbitrator in order to adjudicate the dispute between the parties, wherein Justice Permod Kohli (Retd.) has been appointed as Arbitrator. It was further stated that there were numerous admission by deputed engineers and office bearers of the respondents that the delay was caused mostly due to non-availability of encumbrance free work site. The respondent no. 4, in the impugned order of blacklisting, has not discussed the grounds taken by the petitioner in its reply to the show cause notice and has merely observed that on consideration of the report submitted by the petitioner (the contractor) and after verifying the facts submitted by the Chief Engineer, it was evident that the petitioner did not complete the residual works of Bhairwa Reservoir Scheme, Ramrekha Reservoir Scheme and Keso Reservoir Scheme as per the conditions of the agreements. 19. 19. In the case of “Kranti Associates (P) Ltd.” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37].) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)], wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”. 20. I am of the view that since as per the petitioner’s explanation, the delay so caused in execution of the works was due to default of the respondents, it was the bounden duty of the respondent no. 4 to discuss the said explanation submitted by the petitioner while passing the order of blacklisting. In the case of “Cantonment Board, Meerut & Another Vs. Afzal” reported in (2019) 6 SCC 150 , as has been relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, the High Court had quashed the show cause notice observing that the reply filed by the original petitioners was not considered and no reason was assigned while rejecting the objection. The order of the High Court was affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court holding that the notice was issued mechanically and in a causal manner. 21. The order of the High Court was affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court holding that the notice was issued mechanically and in a causal manner. 21. Moreover, on perusal of the assertion made in the Arbitration Applications quoted hereinabove, it would be apparent that the question of fixing responsibility on the erring party for causing delay in completing the works in question is also the subject matter of arbitration and as such, passing of the order of blacklisting during the pendency of the arbitral proceeding is arbitrary and unreasonable. The respondent no. 4, who has passed the impugned order of blacklisting the petitioner was also a party respondent in the said arbitration applications filed by the petitioner and, therefore, the impugned action is in violation of the underlying principle of the maxim Nemo Judex In Causa Sua which literally means no person can be a judge in his own cause. 22. One of the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner is that in the counter affidavit, the allegation of misappropriation has also levelled against the petitioner in order to somehow justify the order of blacklisting, however, the same was not made the ground of blacklisting either in the show cause notice or in the impugned order and thus as per the proposition laid down in the case of “Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. Vs. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors.” reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 , the said ground is non est in the eye of law. It has been held in the aforesaid case that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. If that is permitted, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. I find substance in the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner since in the show cause notice as well as the impugned order, alleged delay on the part of the petitioner in completion of works are the only ground for blacklisting. Hence, the other grounds mentioned in the counter affidavit justifying the blacklisting cannot be accepted. 23. I find substance in the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner since in the show cause notice as well as the impugned order, alleged delay on the part of the petitioner in completion of works are the only ground for blacklisting. Hence, the other grounds mentioned in the counter affidavit justifying the blacklisting cannot be accepted. 23. I have also perused Clause 11.1.4 of the Rules, 2018 as has been relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents, which provides that if the work is not completed within specific time without any reasonable ground, then the contractor may be suspended. In the present case, the specific contention of the petitioner is that due to inaction on the part of the respondents the delay was caused in completion of the works and the claim and counter claim of the parties on the said issue is yet to be decided by learned Arbitrator, who is presently in seisin of the matter. Thus, I am of the view that taking recourse of Clause 11.1.4 of the Rules, 2018 by the respondents based on unilateral factual assertion is also an arbitrary exercise of power. 24. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstance, the impugned order as contained in memo no. 2532 dated 05.05.2022 passed by the respondent no. 4 blacklisting the petitioner cannot be sustained in law and thus, the same is quashed and set-aside. 25. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. I.A. No. 7032 of 2022 also stands disposed of.