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2023 DIGILAW 701 (GAU)

Dharnad Brahmaputra Fishery Co-Op Society Ltd. , Represented By Its Secretary Sri Bimal Das, Son Of Brojen Das v. State Of Assam, Represented By The Additional Chief Secretary To The Government Of Assam, Fishery Department

2023-06-16

ACHINTYA MALLA BUJOR BARUA, NELSON SAILO

body2023
JUDGMENT : (A.M. Bujor Barua, J.) Heard Mr. KN Choudhury, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S Khound, learned counsel for the appellants in WA No.186/2023 and WA No.216/2023 namely M/s. Dharnad Brahmaputra Fishery Co-op Society Ltd., (for short, Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS) and Mr. NC Das, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. M Devi, learned counsel for the appellants in WA No.218/2023 namely M/s. Kachudola Fishery Co. Operative Society Ltd (for short, Kachudola FCS). Also heard Mr. YS Mannan, learned counsel for the respondent M/s. Dhir Beel Fishery Co.Operative Society Ltd. (for short, Dhir Beel FCS) as well as Mr. RK Bora, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate for the respondents in the Fisheries Department, Government of Assam and the Deputy Commissioner, Dhubri. 2. A notice inviting tender (for short, NIT) dated 17.12.2018 was issued by the Deputy Commissioner Dhubri inviting tendered bids, for settlement of Group No.1 Dhar Brahmaputra Fishery. Some of the relevant terms and conditions of the tender notice are as extracted: “………2. Cooperative Societies or non-governmental organisations or self help groups comprising of 100% actual fishermen from the scheduled caste community or Maimal community of the Barak Valley or actual fishermen from the scheduled caste community or Maimal community of the Barak Valley shall be eligible to submit the tender. The tenderer has to be from the concerned district and neighbourhood of the fishery concerned. 4(Kha). Bakijai clearance certificate from the office of Deputy Commissioner (the certificate should be from the appropriate official in the office of the Deputy Commissioner clearly stating the name of the self help group or the society). 4(Unga) Security money amounting to 15% of the minimum Government value of the fishery shall be deposited in the form of call deposit clearly stating it to be in the name of the Deputy Commissioner/Sub-Divisional Officer along with stating the name of the Cooperative Society/Self Help Group. 4(Jhha) Annual audited balance sheet of three financial years from the current year, of the cooperative society/group shall be required to be submitted (balance sheet shall have to be approved by the concerned official).” 3. 4(Jhha) Annual audited balance sheet of three financial years from the current year, of the cooperative society/group shall be required to be submitted (balance sheet shall have to be approved by the concerned official).” 3. The Government of Assam in the Fishery Department had also issued a Notification dated 18.01.2018 bearing No.FISH-19/65/2017-FISHERY/1(eCF No.50022) wherein it is provided, amongst others, as extracted: “(1) Documents to be submitted to the DC/SDO(C) along with tender documents by the tenderers:- (i) 100% Actual Fishermen Certificate: Submission of 100% Actual Fishermen certificate of Fishermen Cooperative Society, SHGs, NGOs issued by the ARCS indicating that all the members of the Fishermen Cooperative Society, SHGs, NGOs, are actual fishermen belonging to Schedule Caste Community or Maimal Community of erstwhile Cachar district of Assam. (iii) Fishermen experience certificate: Experience certificate of Fishermen Cooperative Society, SHGs, NGOs is to be issued by the DFDOs indicating that all the Members of Fishermen Cooperative Society, SHGS, NGOs have ample experience in fishing and related activities and they are fully involved in such activities. (iv) Bakijai Clearance Certificate: Bakijai Clearance Certificate is to be furnished by the Bakijai authority under the concerned Deputy Commissioner where the Society/NGO is registered which should invariably be in the name of the Society/NGO/SHG and not in the name of the office bearers of the Society/NGO/SHG. (v) Security Deposit: The security amount to be deposited in the form of Call deposit clearly pledging the same in favour of concerned DC/SDO (Civil) with name of the Bidder Society in case of 60% Govt. Fishery which shall not be less that one - tenth of the revenue of the fishery for first year of the full term of settlement. (ix) Balance Sheet and profit loss account: Balance sheet and profit loss account for consecutive preceding three years shall be submitted duly verified by Competent Authority of Cooperation Department in respect of Coop. Societies and by Chartered Accountants in respect of NGOs/SHGs.” 4. In the bidding process, the respondent Dhir Beel FCS had submitted a tendered bid amounting to Rs.3,13,43,949/-whereas, the writ appellant Kochudhola FCS submitted a bid of Rs.1,74,78,313/- and the writ appellant Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS submitted a bid value of Rs.1,22,50,000/-. 5. Societies and by Chartered Accountants in respect of NGOs/SHGs.” 4. In the bidding process, the respondent Dhir Beel FCS had submitted a tendered bid amounting to Rs.3,13,43,949/-whereas, the writ appellant Kochudhola FCS submitted a bid of Rs.1,74,78,313/- and the writ appellant Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS submitted a bid value of Rs.1,22,50,000/-. 5. By the order dated 24.03.2022 of the Joint Secretary to the Government of Assam in the Fisheries Department, a settlement had been made in favour of Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS at their tendered value of Rs.1,22,50,000/- for 7 years. The order dated 24.03.2022 of the Joint Secretary itself contains the reason as to why the bids of the other bidders were rejected and the bid of Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS was accepted. 6. The reasoning provided in the order dated 24.03.2022 in respect of respondent Dhir Beel FCS is as extracted: 1. M/S Dhir Beel FCS Ltd has offered the 1 st highest bid of Rs. 3,13,43,949.00 for 7 years. i) Registration Certificate: The Society has not submitted the Registration Certificate with the tender. But it has submitted a certificate issued by ARCS, Dhubri dated 20.06.2018 to the effect that society is registered with it vide No. D-3/74-75 dtd. 14.02.1975. Further, the society has submitted an application dtd, 27.02.2019 stating that the original Registration certificate has been damaged in the devastating floods of 1988 & they have applied for issue of duplicate but ARCS has not issued it. The Certificate issued by ARCS, Dhubri dated 20.6.18 in lieu of the Original Registration Certificate is accepted as grounds cited for non production of the same has been found to be authentic with relaxation of condition as laid down in Clause4(Sa) of NIT may be relaxed. ii) PAN CARD: The society has submitted PAN in the name of Secretary of the society. But also submitted an acknowledgement receipt for applying for PAN in the name of society. iii) Bakijai Certificate: The Bakijai certificate submitted with the tender was issued by the Certificate Officer, Bakijai, SDO(C) office, BLP dtd. 26.06.2018 without mentioning the validity period of the certificate. It is pointed out here that as per procedure laid down for issue of Bakijai Certificate in the light of provisions of ARTPS Act, 2012, validity of such certificate is for 90 days from the date of issue. 26.06.2018 without mentioning the validity period of the certificate. It is pointed out here that as per procedure laid down for issue of Bakijai Certificate in the light of provisions of ARTPS Act, 2012, validity of such certificate is for 90 days from the date of issue. In the instant case, the validity of the Bakijai Certificate dated 26.6.18 on the last date of submission of tender on 2.1.19 was more than 90 days old and hence not valid. iv) Call Deposit: The Call deposit submitted with the tender is issued in the individual name of the Secretary of the Society. But as per Clause 4(Unga) of NIT, such Call Deposit should be in the name of the Society/NGO. v) Audited Accounts: The Audited Accounts is to be submitted for preceding 3 years up to current year as per Clause 4(Jha) of NIT. But the society has submitted audited Accounts for 2012-13, 2015-16 & 2017-18 instead of for the years 2015-16, 2016-17 & 2017-18. vi) All other documents found in order in terms of NIT. vii) From the perusal of the reports of C.O on neighborhood issue, it is seen that 3 villages resided by members of the society are located at a minimum distance of 1.5 KM & maximum distance of 2.5 KM from the fishery. As regards the view of the Tender Committee that the society has been brought under consideration as the highest bidder despite having invalid documents as per own observation of the Committee in the meeting held on 6.8.19, Govt took into consideration the observation of the Tender Committee as legally not tenable as submissions of highest bid without valid documents in terms of NIT is not the highest valid bid and thus rejected taking into consideration view of the Hon’ble High Court quoted above.” 7. The reasoning provided in the order dated 24.03.2022 in respect of the writ appellant Kachudola FCS is again as extracted: 2. “M/S Kachudola FCS Ltd., Abhaypuri, Dist Bongaigaon has offered the 2 nd highest bid of Rs1,74,78,317.00 for 7 years i) The Experience Certificate issued by DFDO, Bongaigaon is in the name of Secretary of the society and does not cover all the members of the Society in terms of Clause 4(Ka) of NIT. “M/S Kachudola FCS Ltd., Abhaypuri, Dist Bongaigaon has offered the 2 nd highest bid of Rs1,74,78,317.00 for 7 years i) The Experience Certificate issued by DFDO, Bongaigaon is in the name of Secretary of the society and does not cover all the members of the Society in terms of Clause 4(Ka) of NIT. ii) The Society has submitted a Demand Draft as Security which has been purchased by Jairam Das who is not an authorized person of the society as per Resolution of the society which is in violation of terms & condition of NIT vide Clause 4(Unga). iii) All other documents found in order in terms of NIT. iv) The Society belongs to Bongaigaon dist and hence not eligible to participate in terms of Clause 2 of NIT. The Tender Committee took into consideration the observation of the Hon’ble High Court dated 31.7.2009 in WP(C) No 1566/2008 vide Para 18 & 22, and reaffirmed by the Hon’ble Court in common judgment/order dated 21.03.2013 vide Para 37 in WP(C) No 34/2012 & WP(C) No 687/2013 that the societies which are not the resident of the origination district of the fishery are not entitled to get consideration. v) The neighborhood issue is not discussed as the tender itself is invalid. The tender is found to be not valid reasons cited above which corroborates with the findings of the tender Committee.” 8. The reasoning provided in the order dated 24.03.2022 for accepting the bid of the writ appellant Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS is as extracted: 3. “M/S Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS Ltd., Dist Dhubri has offered the 3 rd highest bid of Rs.1,22,50,222.00 for 7 years. i) All the documents submitted by the society with the tender are found to be in order which corroborates with the findings of the Tender Committee. ii) From the perusal of the reports of C.O.s on neighborhood issue, it is seen that 6 villages inhabited by members of the society are located within a minimum distance of 8 KM & maximum distance of 13 KM.” 9. Dhir Beel FCS instituted WP(C)No.4450/2022 assailing the order of settlement dated 24.03.2022, whereas Kachudola FCS instituted WP(C)No.3736/2022 also assailing the same order. By the judgment and order dated 22.05.2023, the order of settlement dated 24.03.2022 made in favour of the appellant Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS was interfered and set aside. Dhir Beel FCS instituted WP(C)No.4450/2022 assailing the order of settlement dated 24.03.2022, whereas Kachudola FCS instituted WP(C)No.3736/2022 also assailing the same order. By the judgment and order dated 22.05.2023, the order of settlement dated 24.03.2022 made in favour of the appellant Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS was interfered and set aside. Being aggrieved, writ appeal No.186/2023 has been instituted by the appellant Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS against the judgment and order dated 22.05.2023 passed in respect of WP(C)No.4450/2022 and writ appeal No.216/2023 has been instituted against the same judgment and order in respect of WP(C)No.3736/2022. On the other hand, the appellant Kachudola FCS had also assailed the common judgment and order dated 22.05.2023 in the two writ petitions on a limited ground that by the said judgment it has been held in favour of the respondents Dhir Beel FCS. 10. In WA No.186/2023, the core contention raised is that while dealing with the reasoning of the settling authority in the order of 24.03.2022, as regards the Bakijai certificate submitted by respondent Dhir Beel FCS, the learned Single Judge in its judgment and order dated 22.05.2023 had firstly interfered, as provided in paragraph 12 of the judgment, that the Notification dated 18.01.2018 which had also been relied upon by the settling authority to arrive at a conclusion in respect of the Bakijai clearance certificate of Dhir Beel FCS by relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in GJ Fernandez Vs. State of Mysore, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1753 , would be unacceptable. 11. The other contention raised in writ appeal No.186/2023 is as regards the rejection of the call deposit of Dhir Beel FCS that it was issued in the individual name of the secretary of the society and not the society itself as required under Clause 4(unga) of the NIT. The learned Single Judge in the judgment and order dated 22.05.2023 held in paragraph 37 that it is merely a trivial ground which cannot have any impact on the decision making process. By following the proposition of law laid down in M/s. Gauripur Cooperative Fishery Society Ltd. Vs. The learned Single Judge in the judgment and order dated 22.05.2023 held in paragraph 37 that it is merely a trivial ground which cannot have any impact on the decision making process. By following the proposition of law laid down in M/s. Gauripur Cooperative Fishery Society Ltd. Vs. State of Assam in WP(C)No.6885/2022 by the order dated 11.11.2022, it was submitted that it would be unacceptable under the law that the said defect cannot be a curable defect and further the requirement of call deposit to be issued in the name of the society itself has its own purpose which cannot be achieved if issued in the name of the secretary of the society. 12. The further contention raised in writ appeal No.186/2023 is as regards the reasons of the settling authority regarding non-furnishing of the audited accounts by Dhir Beel FCS, where the tenderer had submitted the audited accounts for the years 2012-13, 2015-16, 2016-17 instead of the preceding three years i.e., 2015-16, 2016-17 and 2017-18. The conclusion of the learned Single Judge in paragraph 37 that the explanation for the given year 2017-18 that it was subsequently submitted although not submitted at the time of submission of the bid, was factually erroneous and, therefore, the reasoning of the settling authority to reject the bid of Dhir Beel FCS for the reason of not having submitted the audit report in the required manner was a right reasoning for rejection of the tendered bid. 13. In WA No.216/2023, the core contention raised is that while dealing with the reasoning of the settling authority in the order dated 24.03.2022 as regards the experience certificate issued by the DFDO Bongaigaon in respect of Kachudhola was in the name of the secretary of the society and therefore, does not cover all the members of the society, the learned Single Judge in its judgment and order dated 22.05.2023 had dealt with by the learned Single Judge in paragraph 40 of its judgment, wherein a conclusion was arrived that the said reason is ex-facie erroneous as the experience certificate although in the name of the secretary, but indeed it covers all the members, which according to the appellant is an incorrect conclusion of the learned Single Judge. 14. 14. In WA 216/2008 with regard to the reasoning in respect of Kachudhola FCS that the bank draft submitted as security deposit was purchased by another person namely Jairam Sharma (sic Das) who is not an authorized person, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge that the same is not a relevant issue and even if it is held to be a defect the same is a curable one, was erroneous according to the appellant, inasmuch as, the purpose and purport of a security deposit is that it is the bidder who is required to make the security deposit, but in the instant case, it was done by somebody else. 15. In WA 216/2008 with regard to the reasoning of the settling authority in the order dated 24.03.2022 that the bidder Kachudola FCS belongs to the Bongaigaon district, whereas the settlement was initiated by the Dhubri district and, therefore, they are not eligible to participate in the tender process as per clause 2 of the NIT, the said aspect had not been gone into by the learned Single Judge in the judgment impugned. Whereas, on the other hand, according to the appellant the said reasoning is a valid reason to reject the tender process inasmuch as, it violates the expressed conditions of the NIT itself. 16. Mr. KN Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the appellant in WA No.186/2023 and WA No.216/2023 also assails the impugned judgment and order dated 22.05.2023 of the learned Single Judge as regards the view taken that the Notification dated 18.01.2018 is not a law passed by the legislature of the State, but an executive instruction and, therefore, such notification shall not be enforceable under the law on the ground that the conclusion is incorrect and irrelevant for the purpose of the present case. On the issue of Bakijai Certificate of M/s Dhir Beel FCS: 17. On the issue that the Bakijai certificate of Dhir Beel FCS was more than 90 days old at the time of consideration of the tendered bids and therefore not valid, Mr. KN Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the appellant Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS refers to clause-4 (Kha) of the NIT and submits that the certificates are ordinarily issued with a prescribed duration for which it would remain valid, which itself is an indication that the period for which such certificate is issued is also a relevant consideration. KN Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the appellant Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS refers to clause-4 (Kha) of the NIT and submits that the certificates are ordinarily issued with a prescribed duration for which it would remain valid, which itself is an indication that the period for which such certificate is issued is also a relevant consideration. Accordingly, it is submitted that in the certificate issued in respect of the respondent Dhir Beel FCS, it did not contain any period for which it was issued and it merely provides that there is no Bakijai case that has been instituted against the President of Dhir Beel FCS and that the said certificate is dated 26.06.2018. 18. Mr. KN Choudhury, learned senior counsel also refers to clause-4 of the Notification dated 18.01.2018, which provides that the Bakijai clearance certificate is to be furnished by the Bakijai authority in the concerned Deputy Commissioner, where the society or the NGO is registered and should invariably be in the name of the society, NGO or Self Help Group (SHG), as the case may be and not in the name of the office bearer of the society. 19. Mr. YS Mannan, learned counsel for the respondent Dhir Beel FCS on the other hand, by referring to clause 4 (Kha) of the NIT and clause-4 of the Notification dated 18.01.2018, submits that the said provision did not anywhere indicate that the Bakijai certificate should not be prior to 90 days of the date of consideration of the tender. Mr. YS Mannan, learned counsel, on the other hand, by referring to the reasoning provided by the settling authority in the order of 24.03.2022 submits that even the ARTPS Act, 2012 does not contain any such provision which requires that the validity of the certificate should be 90 days from the date of issue. 20. To substantiate his submission, Mr. YS Mannan, learned counsel also refers to the judgment rendered by the Division Bench in Pub Goalpara Fishery co operative Society Vs. 20. To substantiate his submission, Mr. YS Mannan, learned counsel also refers to the judgment rendered by the Division Bench in Pub Goalpara Fishery co operative Society Vs. State of Assam and others, reported in 2022 SCC onLine Gau 731, wherein in paragraph 14, the rejection of a Bakijai certificate by the settling authority on the ground that the same was issued by an authority other than the Deputy Commissioner was rejected, where further it was provided that it was open for the official respondents to make necessary enquiries to find out if there are any dues payable to the Government by the tenderer concerned, and therefore, it was an aberration in form and not in respect of the content of the certificate. Accordingly, by relying on the said proposition, it is submitted that in the instant case also, the settling authority could have made an enquiry as regards the Bakijai dues of the society, rather than rejecting the Bakijai certificate merely on the ground that it was more than 90 days from the date of consideration. 21. Further by referring to the judgment of the division bench rendered in Abu Talib Vs. the Assam Fisheries Development Corporation Ltd and others delivered on 29.09.2011 in WA 294/2011, wherein it had been provided that the requirement of submitting a Bakijai clearance certificate cannot be taken as a rigid requirement, it is submitted that rejecting the Bakijai certificate of Dhir Beel FCS on the ground that it was more than 90 days old from the date of consideration was incorrect. 22. Reference is also made to the pronouncement of this Court in M/s Gauripur Co operative Fishery Society Vs. State of Assam and others, wherein by the judgment dated 11.11.2022 in WP(C) No. 6885/2022 in paragraph 7, it was held that an incorrect certificate which was submitted earlier is a curable defect which is an acceptable proposition of law in a tender process. Accordingly, a submission is made that in the instant case also, the Bakijai certificate of Dhir Beel FCS being more than 90 days old from the date of consideration is also a curable defect. 23. The relevance of a Bakijai certificate in a tender process is that the bidder concerned does not have any dues payable to the Government authorities from any prior proceeding. 23. The relevance of a Bakijai certificate in a tender process is that the bidder concerned does not have any dues payable to the Government authorities from any prior proceeding. This view had also been accepted by the Division Bench in paragraph 14 of its judgment rendered in Pub Goalpara Fishery Co operative Society (supra) wherein it was provided that a Bakijai clearance certificate is required to ensure that there are no dues payable by an applicant/bidder in respect of any revenue to the Government and in short, the Bakijai clearance certificate can be termed to be a ‘no dues certificate issued by the competent authorities’. If a Bakijai certificate is for the purpose of ensuring that there are no dues payable by the bidder to the Government authorities, the reasoning adopted by the settling authorities that the Bakijai certificate of Dhir Beel FCS is more than 90 days old from the date of consideration cannot be said to be either arbitrary or unreasonable or illogical in any manner. An old certificate can depict that the bidder has no dues to the Government for any period prior to the period immediately preceding the date of consideration of the tender, which does not give the answer as to whether for the period immediately preceding the date of consideration there is any Bakijai dues by the bidder. What had been provided in paragraph 14 of the judgment in Pub Goalpara Fishery Co operative society (supra) was in the context that in the said matter, the Bakijai certificate was issued by an authority which was other than the Deputy Commissioner, but otherwise the certificate was a valid certificate as regards the period for which the certificate was issued. In the said context, the Division Bench provided that if the content of the certificate is otherwise correct, but the aberration was that it was issued by an authority other than the Deputy Commissioner when actually it was the Deputy Commissioner who ought to have issued the certificate, the same is a defect in form and not in respect of the content. 24. 24. In the instant case, it is noticed that when the requirement of submitting a Bakijai certificate has not been achieved inasmuch as, it is not certified as to whether for the period immediately preceding the date of consideration any dues were there to be paid by the bidder, it has to be understood that the said defect would be more of a defect of content rather than a defect in form. 25. From such point of view, the reasoning depicted by the settling authority in the order dated 24.03.2022 cannot be said to be either arbitrary or unreasonable or illogical in the context of the submission. 26. As regards the reliance placed by Mr. YS Mannan, learned counsel for the respondent Dhir Beel FCS upon the proposition laid down in Abu Talib (supra) that the requirement of submitting a Bakijai clearance certificate could not be taken as a rigid requirement and neither it was a case where level playing field was denied, nor a case where loss has been caused to the public relevance, the same would have to be understood to be a proposition in the context of the factual matrix of that matter where this observation was made. In the matter before the Division Bench in Abu Talib (supra), the bidder therein had not submitted the Bakijai certificate along with the tendered bid, but was subsequently allowed by the settling authority to submit the Bakijai certificate which was accepted and the act of the authorities allowing the Bakijai certificate to be submitted subsequently was assailed. In the said context, it was the submission of the bidder who was allowed to submit the Bakijai certificate that the initial non submission of the Bakijai certificate was a curable defect and it is in that context that the observation was made that the submission of Bakijai certificate could not be taken as a rigid requirement. 27. The concept of curable defect is an acceptable proposition in the law of tendering process. A document that may be required to be submitted in a tendering process may be of two types. The first type being the document itself creates the existence of a fact, whereas the second type would be that the document depicts the existence of an existing fact. A document that may be required to be submitted in a tendering process may be of two types. The first type being the document itself creates the existence of a fact, whereas the second type would be that the document depicts the existence of an existing fact. If the relevant document itself creates the existence of a fact and such document was not produced while submitting the bids, a later submission of the document cannot be held to be a curable defect inasmuch as, at the time of non submission of the document, the required fact did not exist and it was made to exist only when subsequently the document was procured and submitted. But on the other hand, if the required document is of the second type that it merely depicts the existence of a fact which is already existing, a non submission of the document at the time of submitting the bid will not render the fact which existed to be a non-existent fact. In such circumstance, when the document is procured and submitted subsequently, it still depicts the same fact which even earlier existed. Such document which depicts an existing fact and does not create the existence of a fact, if not submitted at the time of submission of the bid, but had been allowed to be submitted at a later point of time would have to be construed to be a curable defect. 28. From such point of view, we will have to agree with the submission of Mr. YS Mannan, learned counsel for the respondent Dhir Beel FCS that in the instant case also, the non submission of the Bakijai certificate for the period immediately preceding the date of consideration of the tenders, provided that there were no dues payable by the bidder during the period immediately preceding the consideration may be a curable defect and the authorities could have granted the said bidder an opportunity to submit a more corrected version of the Bakijai certificate. The said defect would be a curable defect if the existing fact would be that there were no dues payable, but only the bakijai certificate thereof was not obtained. The said defect would be a curable defect if the existing fact would be that there were no dues payable, but only the bakijai certificate thereof was not obtained. But for the purpose, we have noticed that the records reveal that there was no such request by the Dhir Beel FCS to allow them to submit a more corrected version of the Bakijai certificate when it was noticed that the earlier certificate did not serve the purpose for which it was submitted. 29. For the purpose, we even verified the records and from the records, there appears one application by Dhir Beel FCS, but the said application also does not contain any request to the authorities to allow them to submit a more corrected version of the Bakijai certificate. 30. A curable defect can be allowed to be cured when it is sought to be cured. But when the bidder does not sought the defect to be cured, we see no inherent responsibility being bestowed on the settling authorities to go out of turn and on their own point it out to the bidder giving the opportunity to submit a more corrected certificate and take that into consideration. In fact, if that is done, it would be an adoption of a discriminatory procedure in favour of one of the bidders, which may again entail a possible violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. From such point of view, we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. YS Mannan, learned counsel that as the non submission of Bakijai certificate itself is curable defect, therefore, the settling authorities ought to have given an opportunity to the respondent Dhir Beel FCS to subsequently produce the corrected form of the Bakijai clearance certicate. 31. As regards the proposition of the Division Bench in Abu Talib (supra) that the requirement of submitting the Bakijai certificate could not be taken as a rigid requirement, it is noticed that the said observation was made when it was not a lis before the Court as to whether the requirement of submitting a Bakijai certificate is a rigid requirement or not. 32. 32. As already indicated above, the core issue in the matter in Abu Talib (supra) was whether allowing the bidder to submit a Bakijai certificate at a later point of time after submission of the tendered bid was arbitrary or not, where the stand taken was that it was a curable defect. As it was not an issue before the Court, such observation would have to be understood to be an obiter dicta, rather than a ratio decidendi to make it binding. If the purpose of a Bakijai certificate is to ensure that it is a certificate of no dues to the Government as indicated in paragraph 14 of the judgment of the Division Bench in Pub Goalpara Fishery Co operative society (supra), where there is a requirement of a bidder being free of any dues to the Government, immediately preceding the date of consideration of the tender, we have to understand that a Bakijai certificate would also be an essential requirement in a tender process. 33. Accordingly, the proposition of Abu Talib (supra) regarding the Bakijai certificate being not a rigid requirement is clarified. 34. In view of the above, we see no reason to interfere with the reasoning of the settling authority in the order dated 24.03.2022 as regards the unacceptability of the Bakijai clearance certificate of the respondent Dhir Bheel FCS. On the issue of Call Deposit of M/s Dhir Beel FCS: 35. On the issue of call deposit in respect of Ms. Dhir Beel FCS being issued in the individual name of the Secretary of the Society, Mr. KN Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the appellant Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS has referred to clause-4 (Unga) of the NIT, wherein it is specifically provided that 15% of the minimum Government value of the fishery would have to be deposited in the form of a call deposit, wherein it should be clearly stated that it is in favour of the Deputy Commissioner or the Sub Divisional Officer, as the case may be, by mentioning the name of the co operative society or the self help group, who may submit such call deposit. As there is a specific provision that the certificate should mention that it is the co operative society or the self help group who had submitted the same, Mr. As there is a specific provision that the certificate should mention that it is the co operative society or the self help group who had submitted the same, Mr. KN Choudhury, learned senior counsel submits that in the instant case as the call deposit has been submitted in the name of the secretary of the society, therefore, there is an aberration of clause 4 (Unga) and as such, the call deposit had been rightly rejected by the settling authority in the order dated 24.03.2022. 36. Mr. YS Mannan, learned counsel for the respondent Dhir Beel FCS on the other hand by referring to the proposition laid down in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment of the Division Bench rendered in Gajen Choudhury Vs. the State of Assam and others, in WA 284/2011, wherein in the order dated 27.09.2011, it had been provided that as the form of the bank draft upon being accepted could have been encashable and deposited in the corporation account and, therefore, to be construed that such condition in the NIT that the name of the society or the self help group should be specifically mentioned is merely an ancillary or subsidiary requirement, submits that the call deposit submitted by Dhir Beel FCS being in the name of the secretary being an ancillary requirement would not vitiate the tender of the society. 37. The requirement of submitting call deposits as per Clause 4 (Unga) is for the purpose of submitting the earnest money by a bidder while participating in the tender process. The purpose of earnest money is to ensure that the bidder shows some earnestness and seriousness in submitting the tender meaning thereby that it is the bidder who has to deposit such amount with the tendering authorities. 38. True, it can be said that if the call deposit had been made in the name of secretary of the society it cannot be wholly rejected because the secretary himself is a part of the society and therefore, it has to be understood that the deposit was made on behalf of the society itself. The said aspect also requires a further consideration. 39. The said aspect also requires a further consideration. 39. If the call deposit had been made in the name of the secretary of the society, the settling authority can always require the secretary to produce relevant materials to show as to what was the source of the money that was used for making the call deposits. If the source of the money can be sourced to the society itself, it cannot be said that the call deposit made in the name of the society would be unacceptable. But on the other hand, if the secretary is unable to show that the source of money is from the society itself it would again mean that the money paid in the call deposit is from some other source and not the bidder society which again will not show any earnestness and seriousness on the part of the bidder to submit the earnest money. We leave it to the settling authority in future to deal with such matters as it may arise. But in the instant case as there is no such material that the source of the money resulting in the call deposit in the name of the secretary of Dhir Beel is not being sourced from the society itself, we are of the view that a mere rejection by the settling authority without any further enquiry and only for the reason that it was in the name of the secretary and not the society would not make the call deposit unacceptable, more so, where it had already been provided by the Division Bench in WA 284/2011 that such conditions are more of ancillary and subsidiary in nature. On the issue of Call Deposit of Kochudhola FCS: 40. On the issue of call deposit in respect of the appellant Kochudhola FCS, we have perused the copy of the demand draft produced before the Court, from which it is discernible that the demand draft was purchased by Jairam Sharma and it was drawn in favour of the Deputy Commissioner A/C Kachudhola Fishery Co-operative Society Ltd No.1 Dhar Brahmaputra. The call deposits are required to be made as an earnest money for participating in the tender process, which again, is a requirement to show the earnestness and seriousness of the bidder to participate in the bidding. The call deposits are required to be made as an earnest money for participating in the tender process, which again, is a requirement to show the earnestness and seriousness of the bidder to participate in the bidding. From such point of view, it would be a relevant aspect as to who had purchased the call deposit for submitting as an earnest money. Again clause 4(unga) of the terms and conditions of the NIT requires that the earnest money ought to be 15% of the minimum Government value which should be in favour of the Deputy Commissioner/Sub Divisional Officer, but clearly stating the name of the society or the self help group who had made the deposit. The terms of the NIT is explicit enough that the call deposits are required to be made by the cooperative society or the self help group who intends to participate in the tender process. 41. Further Rule 12 of the Assam Fisheries Rules 1953 provides that all registered fisheries shall be settled under tender system of sale, where the Government shall settle 60% category fisheries with special category of cooperative societies, non-governmental organisations, and self help groups consisting of 100% actual fishermen in the neighbourhood of the fishery concerned by tender system. Explanation 1 to Rule 12 provides that ‘special category’ means and includes the cooperative societies, self help groups, and non-governmental organisations comprising of 100% actual fishermen of the scheduled caste community or maimal community of the erstwhile Cachar district who cannot participate in the competitive bidding because of poor financial condition due to famine, flood, drought, epidemic or any other circumstance beyond their control. Explanation 2 to Rule 12 provides that a ‘60% category fishery’ means 60% of the registered fisheries available in a civil sub-division eligible for settlement in a particular year. Rule 12 is quoted hereinbelow: “[12. Explanation 2 to Rule 12 provides that a ‘60% category fishery’ means 60% of the registered fisheries available in a civil sub-division eligible for settlement in a particular year. Rule 12 is quoted hereinbelow: “[12. Except those referred to in sub- rule No.8(b) above, all registered Fisheries shall be settled under tender system of sale in place of sale auction:] [Provided that the Government shall settle a 60% category fishery with special category of co-operative Societies, Non-Government Organisations and Self Help Groups consisting of 100% actual fishermen in the neighbourhood of the fishery concerned by the Tender System.] Explanation 1:- For the purpose of this rule, the words “special category” means and includes the Co-operative Societies, Self-Help Groups, Non-Governmental Organisations comprising of 100% actual fishermen of the Scheduled Caste Community or Maimal community of erstwhile Cachar district. Who can not participate in competitive bidding because of poor financial condition due to famine, flood, draught, epidemic of any other circumstances which are beyond control of the society, non-Governmental Organisation or Self Help Groups as the case may be; Explanation 2:- For the purpose of this rule “a 60% category fishery” means 60% of registered fisheries available in a Civil Sub-Division eligible for settlement in a particular year.]" 42. A reading of Explanation 2 to Rule 12 makes it discernible that amongst the available registered fisheries in a civil sub-division eligible for settlement in a given year, 60% of such available fisheries shall be identified and earmarked for settlement under the proviso to Rule 12 i.e., by tender system from amongst the cooperative societies, non-governmental organisations and self help groups comprising of 100% actual fishermen of the scheduled caste community or the maimal community of the erstwhile Cachar district, who cannot participate in the competitive bidding because of poor financial condition. 43. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the Group No.1 Dhar Brahmaputra Fishery was earmarked as a 60% fishery within the meaning of Explanation 2 to Rule 12. The Group No.1 Dhar Brahmaputra Fishery being earmarked as a 60% fishery, the eligibility to participate in the tender process would be limited to a cooperative society, non-governmental organisations or self help groups comprising of 100% actual fishermen belonging to the scheduled caste community or the maimal community of the Cachar district. The Group No.1 Dhar Brahmaputra Fishery being earmarked as a 60% fishery, the eligibility to participate in the tender process would be limited to a cooperative society, non-governmental organisations or self help groups comprising of 100% actual fishermen belonging to the scheduled caste community or the maimal community of the Cachar district. As a corollary, if any of the bidders, although may be a cooperative society, non-governmental organisations or self help groups, comprises of less than 100% actual fishermen belonging to the scheduled caste community or the maimal community of the Cachar district, a reading of Rule 12 along with its proviso and explanation 1 and 2 would make it discernible that such cooperative societies, non-governmental organisations or self help groups comprising of less than 100% actual fishermen belonging to the scheduled caste community or the maimal community of the erstwhile Cachar district would be ineligible to participate in the tender process for the 60% earmarked fisheries. 44. From such point of view, it would be a relevant factor as to who had paid the earnest money in the form of a call deposit for participating in the tender process. Even if the call deposit had been purchased by the secretary or the president of a cooperative society, but if the money from which such call deposit had been purchased had not been sourced from within the internal funds of the society itself, it cannot be said that the purchase of the call deposit had been made by the society itself. 45. But on the other hand, if the call deposit had been purchased by a person in his individual capacity, who may or may not be a member of the cooperative society, but not from the internal funds of the society itself, such call deposits that may be submitted as earnest money would require further scrutiny. If the person who purchases the call deposit is neither the office bearer nor a member of the society and the source of the fund to purchase such call deposit is his own individual source, a question would definitely arise as to whether it is a call deposit being made by a cooperative society, non-governmental organisations or self help groups, comprising of 100% actual fishermen belonging to the scheduled caste community or the maimal community of the erstwhile Cachar district or by some other entity. 46. 46. If the aforesaid situation of the call deposit being made by another entity is examined in the context of the provisions of Rule 12 of the Assam Fishery Rules 1953, where in respect of the 60% category only the co operative societies or non-governmental organisation or self help groups comprising of 100% actual fishermen of the scheduled caste community or the maimal community of the erstwhile Cachar district can participate, it can be understood that the purchase of the call deposit being sourced from another entity unconnected with the co operative societies or non-governmental organisation or self help groups, would result in an aberration of Rule 12 where through an indirect manner an entity unconnected with co operative societies or non-governmental organisation or self help groups would also be allowed to participate in the tender process. 47. In the instant case, as noted above, the demand draft in lieu of the call deposit on behalf of the appellant Kochudhola FCS was purchased by Jairam Sharma. No explanation is forthcoming as to whether the purchaser Jairam Sharma is a member of the Kochudhola FCS or he is a stranger. If he is a member of the Kochudhola FCS, a question may arise as to whether Jairam Sharma is an actual fishermen belonging to the scheduled caste community or else there may be a situation where the Kochudhola FCS may not be a society comprising of 100% actual fishermen belonging to the scheduled caste community. On the other hand, if Jairam Sharma is not a member of the Kochudhola FCS, the purchase of the call deposit/bank draft would have to be construed to have been made not by the Kochudhola FCS. 48. In other words, it would have to be construed that an entry to participate in the tender process has been meted to an entity which would not be a cooperative society, non-governmental organisations or self help groups comprising of 100% actual fishermen belonging to the scheduled caste community or the maimal community of the erstwhile Cachar district. In other words, an ineligible entity would also participate in the tendering process where the fishery concerned is open for participation only amongst the cooperative societies, non-governmental organisations or self help groups comprising of 100% actual fishermen belonging to the scheduled caste community or the maimal community of the erstwhile Cachar district. 49. In other words, an ineligible entity would also participate in the tendering process where the fishery concerned is open for participation only amongst the cooperative societies, non-governmental organisations or self help groups comprising of 100% actual fishermen belonging to the scheduled caste community or the maimal community of the erstwhile Cachar district. 49. In the circumstance, and in the absence of any material on record that the purchaser of the demand draft Jairam Sharma is an actual fishermen belonging to the scheduled caste community, the demand draft purchased by him for being used as the call deposit for earnest money on behalf of Kochudhola FCS would have to be unacceptable and cannot be used for the purpose of earnest money in the form of call deposit for participating in the tender process in respect of a fishery which is earmarked as 60% fishery under Rule 12. 50. From such point of view, we do not notice any infirmity in the settlement order dated 24.03.2022 pertaining to the rejection of the demand draft submitted by M/s. Kochudhola FCS. On the issue of audited balance sheet of Ms. Dhir Beel FCS: 51. On the issue as regards the rejection of the bid of Dhir Beel FCS for having not submitted the audited accounts for the years 2015-16, 2016-17 and 2017-18, Mr. KN Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the appellant Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS refers to the provisions of Clause 4(Jhha) of the NIT which provides that the balance sheet of the cooperative society or self help groups for the previous three financial years are to be provided which provision is also available in clause (9) of the Notification dated 18.01.2018 and accordingly submits that the audited balance sheets having not been submitted for the previous three financial years, the bid of Dhir Beel FCS would be an incomplete bid which was rightly rejected in the settlement order dated 24.03.2022. 52. Mr. 52. Mr. YS Mannan, learned counsel for the respondent Dhir Beel FCS on the other hand, submitted that the audited balance sheet for the year 2017-18 was subsequently obtained and non-submission of the audited account at the relevant time can also be construed to be a curable defect and hence instead of rejecting the bid of respondent Dhir Beel FCS on the ground of non-submission of the audited balance sheet for the year 2017-18, the public interest would have been better served had the said respondent been given an opportunity to produce the audited balance sheet for the year 2017-18 and take a decision on the settlement after duly considering the same. Mr. YS Mannan, learned counsel submits that the bid value of Dhir Beel FCS was Rs.3,13,43,949/-, whereas the next highest bid of Kochudhola was Rs.1,74,78,313/- whereas the appellant Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS had been settled at their bid value of Rs.1,22,50,000/- and in such circumstance, had an opportunity been given to Dhir Beel FCS to rectify the curable defect of not having earlier submitted the audited balance sheet of the year 2017-18, the public interest of higher revenue being earned by the Government would have been satisfied. 53. The provisions of clause 4(unga) of the NIT and clause 9 of the Notification dated 18.01.2018 would have to be understood to have their own relevance, as the audited balance sheet of the immediate preceding years of the settlement would show the exact financial status of the bidder and, therefore, it cannot be said that it is only an ancillary requirement. But at the same time, as the audited balance sheet reflects the existing financial situation of the bidder, any late submission of the balance sheet can also be construed to be otherwise a curable defect. From such point of view, we see sufficient force in the submission of Mr.YS Mannan learned counsel for the respondent Dhir Beel FCS. But as the bid of Dhir Beel FCS is also found to be defective for having not submitted the Bakijai Clearance Certificate which again is also a relevant document determining the eligibility of a bidder, it would be futile to direct the settling authorities to consider the audited balance sheet of Dhir Beel FCS for the year 2017-18 at this stage. 54. 54. As regards the contention of Mr.YS Mannan learned counsel that public interest would be served if the bid of M/s. Dhir Beel FCS is directed to be reconsidered by taking note of the audited balance sheet of the year 2017-18, it is noticed that the claim for public interest is on the basis that the said society had quoted the rate of Rs.3,13,43,949/-whereas the next highest bidder had quoted the rate of Rs.1,74,78,313/- and therefore, if the settlement is made in favour of Dhir Beel FCS, the total revenue earned by the settling authorities would be much higher. It is true, and we are also not oblivious of the aspect that public interest can also be determined on the basis of the higher revenue that may be earned. But at the same time, to maximize the revenue also may not be the only basis to determine the public interest, if the higher bid would be a recklessly high bid. A reckless higher bid would also require the bidder to satisfy the settling authorities about the economic viability of such recklessly high bid. The other consequence would be that to sustain the recklessly high bid in the event of a settlement being made, the prices of the fish may be increased unreasonably which again will affect the public in general who may consume such fishes, or else some other unscrupulous means may be adopted in operating the fishery to maximize the returns from the settlement. 55. Therefore, on the claim made by M/s. Dhir Beel FCS on the issue of public interest as because their bid is much more higher than the next highest bidder, to gauge the public interest it is also an inherent duty of the settling authorities to balance the benefit of earning higher revenue through a recklessly high bid vis-à-vis the interest of the public in general who may have to bear the brunt of any such resultant adverse situation. On the issue of experience certificate of M/s Kochudhola FCS: 56. On the issue of the experience certificate of Kochudhola FCS, Mr. On the issue of experience certificate of M/s Kochudhola FCS: 56. On the issue of the experience certificate of Kochudhola FCS, Mr. KN Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the appellant Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS by referring to clause 3 of the Notification dated 18.01.2018 submits that the experience certificate of the fishermen cooperative societies, non-governmental organisations and self help groups should be issued by the District Fishery Developmental Officer indicating that all the members thereof have ample experience in fishing and related activities and that they are fully involved in such activities. It is submitted that the certificate of experience submitted by Kochudhola FCS is in the name of the secretary of the society and not the society itself and, therefore, it does not satisfy the requirement of clause 3 of the Notification dated 18.01.2018. 57. We have perused the experience certificate submitted by Kochudhola FCS as available in the records. A reading of the certificate which is available on record, makes it discernible that the certificate had been issued by the District Fishery Development Officer Bongaigaon bearing issue No.1082 dated 19.08.2009 which certifies that all the members of the society have the experience in fishing and related activities and are fully involved in such activities and they belong to Malo and Namasudra community which are recognized as scheduled castes. The contents of the experience certificate are extracted as below: “This is to certify that the Kachudola Fishery Co-Operative Society Ltd., Village-Kachudola, P.O.Kheluapara, District- Bongaigaon is a registered Co-operative Society bearing Regd. No. G-III/75-76 dt. 5.5.75. The members of the Society are from 7(seven) nos. villages, out of which 3 (three) nos. namely Kachudola, Kabaitary and Chalantapara villages falls under the district of Bongaigaon. These are neighbouring villages. The members of the Society from the above mentioned 3 (three) nos. of villages are from Malo and Namasudra Community which are recognised as Scheduled Caste. They are active and experienced fishermen. Fishing is their traditional trade and only occupation of their livelihood. All the members of the society from the above mentioned 3 (three) nos. of villages from S.C. community (100%). The above mentioned villages are near 1 No. Dharnad Brahmaputra River. Issue No. 1082 Dt.19/8/09 Sd/- District Fishery Dev. Officer, Bongaigaon.” 58. They are active and experienced fishermen. Fishing is their traditional trade and only occupation of their livelihood. All the members of the society from the above mentioned 3 (three) nos. of villages from S.C. community (100%). The above mentioned villages are near 1 No. Dharnad Brahmaputra River. Issue No. 1082 Dt.19/8/09 Sd/- District Fishery Dev. Officer, Bongaigaon.” 58. Considering the contents of the certificate, we do not notice any infirmity in the experience certificate submitted by Kochudhola FCS as the contents thereof conforms to the requirement of clause 3 of the Notification dated 18.01.2018. On the issue that Kochudhola FCS is from the Bongaigaon district: 59. As regards the issue that Kochudhola FCS belongs to the Bongaigaon district and therefore not eligible to participate in the tender process, Mr. KN Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the appellant Dhar Brahmaputra FCS refers to clause 2 of the NIT which provides that the tenderer ought to belong to the concerned district and of the neighbourhood of the fishery. By referring to clause 2, it is the submission of Mr. KN Choudhury, learned senior counsel that Kochudhola FCS is disentitled to participate in the tender process which is issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Dhubri district, inasmuch as, Kochudhola FCS is a registered society in the Bongaigaon district. 60. Mr. NC Das, learned senior counsel for the appellant Kochudhola FCS refers to a communication dated 10.02.2006 of the Deputy Commissioner Dhubri made to the Commissioner and Secretary to the Government of Assam in the Fisheries Department, which provides that 76.30% of the Group No.1 Dhar Brahmaputra Fishery is in the Goalpara district, 17.66% in the Dhubri district and 6.04% in the Bongaigaon district. By referring to the said report, it is the submission of Mr. NC Das, learned senior counsel that although the registration of Kochudhola FCS is in the Bongaigaon district, but the requirement of clause 2 of the NIT that the bidder must be of the concerned district and of the neighbourhood of the fishery had been fulfilled by Kachudhola FCS. By referring to the said report, it is the submission of Mr. NC Das, learned senior counsel that although the registration of Kochudhola FCS is in the Bongaigaon district, but the requirement of clause 2 of the NIT that the bidder must be of the concerned district and of the neighbourhood of the fishery had been fulfilled by Kachudhola FCS. As a part of the fishery is admittedly also within the Bongaigaon district, as such, the requirement of the fishery being in the concerned district had been fulfilled and the Kochudhola FCS being within the neighbourhood of the part of the Group No.1 Dhar Brahmaputra Fishery which is located in the Bongaigaon district, they do fulfill both the requirements of clause 2 of the NIT dated 19.12.2018. 61. Upon considering the communication dated 10.02.2006, which provides that a part of the Group No.1 Dhar Brahmaputra Fishery is also located in the Bongaigaon district, we see no reason to disagree with the submission of Mr. NC Das, learned senior counsel that in respect of Group No.1 Dhar Brahmaputra Fishery the expression ‘concerned district’ in clause 2 of the NIT dated 19.12.2018 would also include the Bongaigaon district. It is more so, inasmuch as, the requirement of clause 2 is that the tendering cooperative society ought to be of the district concerned and in the neighbourhood of the fishery. The said provision in clause 2 of the NIT dated 19.12.2018 also makes it apparent that the expression ‘concerned district’ would also mean the district where the fishery or a part of the fishery would be located and not merely the district from which the tender process would be initiated. As the fishery is located over three districts, initiating the tender process by one of the districts, would be more of a matter of convenience, rather than giving a meaning to the expression ‘concerned district’ so as to limit the participation to the fishery cooperative societies of that district alone. The said view also finds support to the provision of clause 2 of the NIT that the tenderer must be of the concerned district and of the neighbourhood of the fishery concerned where the expression neighbourhood of the fishery can only be related to the location of the fishery and not the district which initiates the tender process. 62. The said view also finds support to the provision of clause 2 of the NIT that the tenderer must be of the concerned district and of the neighbourhood of the fishery concerned where the expression neighbourhood of the fishery can only be related to the location of the fishery and not the district which initiates the tender process. 62. In view of the above, the reasoning of the settling authority in the order dated 24.03.2022 declaring Kochudhola FCS to be ineligible to participate in the tender process as because their location is from Bongaigaon district and not Dhubri district, would be unacceptable. 63. Another aspect raised by the appellant Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS is that in paragraph 12 of the impugned judgment dated 22.05.2023, the gazette notification dated 18.01.2018 was assailed by the writ petitioners Dhir Beel FCS and Kochudhola FCS on the ground that gazette notification cannot be given precedence over the statute holding the field. For the purpose reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in GJ Fernandez (supra) that Article 162 of the Constitution of India does not confer any authority on the State Government to issue statutory rules and it only provides for the extent and scope of the executive power of the State Government which coincides with the legislative power of the State Legislature and that the State Government can take executive action in all matters in which the Legislature of the State can pass law, but the said article itself does not confer any rule making power on the State. In paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment it has been recorded by relying upon the judgment in Her Majesty the Queen Vs. Burah reported in 1878 (5) Ind App.178 that there was a submission that when the Assam Fishery Rules 1953 does not permit the enlargement of the statutory rules by a notification, the Notification dated 18.01.2018 will not have any force of law. Accordingly, in paragraph 42 of the impugned judgment, it was held that the Notification dated 18.01.2018 is not a law passed by the Legislature of the State, but an executive instruction and, therefore, as the statute itself did not have any provision for issuing a notification, such notification shall not be enforceable in law. 64. Mr. Accordingly, in paragraph 42 of the impugned judgment, it was held that the Notification dated 18.01.2018 is not a law passed by the Legislature of the State, but an executive instruction and, therefore, as the statute itself did not have any provision for issuing a notification, such notification shall not be enforceable in law. 64. Mr. KN Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the appellant Dharnad Brahmaputra FCS submits that the Notification dated 18.01.2018 is not a delegated legislation, but a subordinate legislation. It is also submitted that if the statutory provision itself is inadequate to provide for a complete procedure of performing an act, the procedures to be followed can always be supplemented by a notification or an executive instruction and for such notification or executive instruction no empowerment under the statute would be required. The only restriction would be that the notification or the executive instruction cannot supplant the statutory provisions nor can it be contrary to it. 65. In the instant case, it is noticed that the Notification dated 18.01.2018, even if it is referred as an executive instruction, provides for certain procedural requirements in carrying forward the tender process for settlement of a fishery under the Assam Fishery Rules 1953, in a situation where a more detailed and necessary procedures have not been provided in the Rules. On a reading of the provisions of the Assam Fishery Rules 1953 and the Notification dated 18.01.2018 in a conjoint manner, it is discernible that the Notification dated 18.01.2018 is supplementary in nature providing for some more detailed and necessary procedures in carrying forward the tender process, rather it being an attempt to supplant the Assam Fishery Rules, 1953 or to provide anything in conflict with the provisions of the Rules. 66. From such point of view, the proposition put forth by the respondent Dhir Beel FCS that the provisions of the Notification dated 18.01.2018 would be inapplicable, nor it can be relied upon for carrying forward the tender process would be unacceptable and hence rejected. It is an accepted proposition in administrative law that the provisions of the statutory law can always be supplemented, though not supplanted, so as to provide for a more detailed, clear and unambiguous procedure for carrying forward a particular act. 67. It is an accepted proposition in administrative law that the provisions of the statutory law can always be supplemented, though not supplanted, so as to provide for a more detailed, clear and unambiguous procedure for carrying forward a particular act. 67. The further provisions in paragraph 42 of the impugned judgment that the provisions of the Notification dated 18.01.2018 shall not be enforceable in law, would also have to be clarified that although the provisions of a notification or an executive instruction may not be enforceable, but at the same time, it has a binding effect on the authorities to follow the provisions thereof while carrying forward the particular act for which such notification or executive instruction may have been put in place. 68. In the instant case, the settling authorities in the order dated 24.03.2022 had followed the provisions of the Notification dated 18.01.2018 and it is not that the society which was bestowed upon the benefits of the said order seeks to enforce the provisions thereof. Under the aforesaid principle what would be impermissible is that if the authorities are not following the provisions of the notification, it would not be open for the renderers to seek for an enforcement of the provisions, but the reverse would not be applicable that if the tendering authorities are following the provisions, the same warrants an interference on the principle of the provisions of a notification being not enforceable. 69. In such view of the matter, we do not see any acceptable reasoning that the settling authority in the settlement order dated 24.03.2022 having followed the provisions of the Notification dated 18.01.2018, an interference would be justified on the principle that the notification is merely in the nature of an executive instruction and that it being not framed under any statutory provision, the provisions thereof cannot be relied upon by the settling authority. 70. 70. In view of the conclusions arrived that the Bakijai clearance certificate of Dhir Beel FCS having not been submitted for the relevant period which would result in an essential requirement not being fulfilled and that the call deposit submitted by Kochudhola FCS being unacceptable, which again would result in an essential requirement not being fulfilled, we uphold the order of settlement dated 24.03.2022, although in respect of the other reasonings contained in the said order in respect of Dhir Beel FCS and Kochudhola FCS, as indicated above, would be unacceptable. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order 22.05.2023 in WP(C)No.4450/2022 and WP(C)No.3736/2022 passed by the learned Single Judge is interfered and set aside. 71. Writ appeals accordingly stand allowed/disposed of in the above terms.