ORDER : Petitioner is before this Court calling in question an order dated 19.12.2022 passed by the Appellate Authority who is the Chairman and Commissioner of the Health and Family Welfare Department, Bengaluru. 2. Sans details, facts in brief are as follows: Petitioner claims to be a Hi-tech Multi-Speciality Hospital. Alleging that the hospital has been in the habit of collecting money beyond what is prescribed for the treatment of COVID19 to its patients in the hospital, the representative of the people of the constituency, a Minister then addressed a communication to the Competent Authority to initiate proceedings for cancellation of licence against the petitioner. The communication from the Minister leads the 2nd respondent/District Health and Family Welfare Officer to issue a show cause notice on 08.08.2022. Petitioner submits a detailed reply to the show cause notice so issued on 08.08.2022, appending plethora of documents justifying that they have not collected excess charges and the allegations made in the show cause notice are absolutely baseless. 3. The Deputy Commissioner acting as an original Authority passes an order on 20.08.2022 cancelling the licence of the petitioner on the contents of the show cause notice and claiming to be considering the reply submitted by the petitioner. The petitioner then knocks at the doors of this Court in W.P.No.18556 of 2022 which comes to be disposed by an order dated 21.09.2022 by directing the petitioner to approach the Appellate Authority by way of an appeal against the order referred supra. The petitioner then files an appeal before the Chairman and Commissioner, for Health and Family Welfare Services, which comes to be rejected by the impugned order dated 19.12.2022 affirming the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner (supra). It is this order that drives the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition, yet again. 4. Heard, Sri Manu Prabhakar Kulkarni along with Smt. Shristi Widge, Sri. Sharan Balakrishna and Sri. Manoj J Raikar, learned counsel appearing for petitioner, and Sri Mahesh Shetty, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 to 3 and Sri.H. Pavan Chandra Shetty, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4. 5. The learned counsel appearing for petitioner Sri.Manu.P.Kulkarni would submit that original order passed by the Deputy Commissioner is one without jurisdiction as it is not the Committee that can consider the grievances of any person. 5. The learned counsel appearing for petitioner Sri.Manu.P.Kulkarni would submit that original order passed by the Deputy Commissioner is one without jurisdiction as it is not the Committee that can consider the grievances of any person. It is the Committee which is constituted under the Chairmanship of the Commissioner, BBMP, that ought to have taken note of the grievances and not the one that has taken note of, as the hospital comes within the jurisdiction of the BBMP. Therefore, the learned counsel would submit that if the original order is without jurisdiction, the petitioner filing an appeal before the Appellate Authority will not cure the jurisdiction that the original Authority did not have while passing the order. 6. Learned counsel Sri Pavan Chandra Shetty representing the respondent No.4 would vehemently refute the submission to contend that the petitioner has chosen to file an appeal before the Appellate Authority, and cannot now come before the Court and contend that the Authority before whom he had filed an appeal did not have a jurisdiction to do so, he would seek dismissal of the petition. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for respective parties and have perused the material on record. 8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The issue in the lis lies in a narrow compass. What necessitates consideration is, as to who, is the Competent Committee to consider the grievances so made and institute proceedings qua the facts in the case at hand. It is not in dispute that the parties to the lis are governed by the Karnataka Private Medical Establishments Act, 2007 (“Act” for short). The Act puts in place grievance redressal mechanism. Section 4 of the Act deals with Registration and Grievance Redressal Authority. Section 4 runs as follows: “[4. It is not in dispute that the parties to the lis are governed by the Karnataka Private Medical Establishments Act, 2007 (“Act” for short). The Act puts in place grievance redressal mechanism. Section 4 of the Act deals with Registration and Grievance Redressal Authority. Section 4 runs as follows: “[4. Registration and Grievance Redressal Authority:-There shall be a Registration and Grievance Redressal Authority in each district consisting of the following members nominated in such manner with such qualification as may be prescribed, namely: (a) The Deputy Commissioner of the District Chairman (b) District Health and Family Welfare Officer Member Secretary (c) District AYUSH Officer Member (d) One member each from Indian Medical Association and one more association Members (e) One women representative when the Authority is dealing with a grievance redressal Member.] (Emphasis supplied) On the onset of COVID-19, the State Government amends Section 4 by insertion of a proviso to Section 4 by constituting a different Committee for the medical establishments coming within the precincts of the BBMP. The proviso runs as follows: [Provided that, in respect of the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike area, the Registration and Grievance Redressal Authority shall consist of the following, namely:- (a) The Commissioner, BBMP Chairman (b) The Chief Health Officer (Public Health) Member (c) The President or Secretary of Indian Medical association, State Head quarters Member (d) The Joint Director, AYUSH Member (e) One woman representative when the authority deals with grievance redressal Member Provided further that, on and from the date of commencement of the Karnataka Private Medical Establishments (Amendment) Act, 2020 all applications pertaining to Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike area, pending before the Registration and Grievance Redressal Authority specified in Section 4, shall be transferred to the Registration and Grievance Redressal Authority specified in the first proviso and it shall dispose of them as if they were filed before it.]” (Emphasis supplied) Section 4 has twin Committees, one in the section; the other in the proviso and have twin jurisdiction clearly demarcated. The Committee under Section 4 has its jurisdiction on every medical establishment in the State except the BBMP; the proviso renders jurisdiction to the Committee created in the proviso to the establishments coming within the precincts of the BBMP and nothing about the State. 9. Likewise, Section 16 of the Act also undergoes an amendment at the time when the proviso was inserted to Section 4. 9. Likewise, Section 16 of the Act also undergoes an amendment at the time when the proviso was inserted to Section 4. The amended Section 16 created an Appellate Authority for considering appeals filed against orders passed by the Committee created in the proviso. Section 16 insofar as it is germane, runs as follows: “…. ….… (a) The Additional Chief Secretary or Principal Secretary or Secretary to Government, Health and Family Welfare Department Chairman (b) The Director, Health and Family Welfare Services Member (c) The Director, AYUSH Member (d) The Director of Medical Education Member (e) One Clinician with post graduation in General Medicine nominate by the State Government Member” Therefore, the Original Authority and the Appellate Authority are clearly depicted under the statute, they are as afore-quoted. 10. The case at hand requires consideration on the bedrock of the aforesaid mandate of the statute. The genesis of the problem is a tippani from the 4th respondent, the then Minister. The tippani is in the form of a direction to cancel the licence of the petitioner. The tippani reads as follows: The Minister, in the aforesaid tippani, quotes that there have been grievances by the general public that the petitioner has been charging exorbitant rates for treatment of patients without giving appropriate treatment and therefore, he directs cancellation of the licence and initiation of proceedings. The tippani leads to issuance of a show cause notice dated 08.08.2022. The show cause notice so issued, reads as follows: The illegality springs from the issuance of the show cause notice itself as it is issued by the 2nd respondent/District Health and Family Welfare Officer who is not the one who had to even consider the grievance or the direction of the Minister (supra). The petitioner does not question the jurisdiction of the officer who had issued the show cause notice, but submits a reply refuting all that was alleged in the notice. The reply leads to passage of an order by the Committee as found in Section 4 of the Act (supra) and not the Committee under the proviso. The Committee and its members as obtaining in the order dated 20.08.2022 reads as follows: The order that is passed by the Committee is one of cancellation of the licence of the petitioner. The reply leads to passage of an order by the Committee as found in Section 4 of the Act (supra) and not the Committee under the proviso. The Committee and its members as obtaining in the order dated 20.08.2022 reads as follows: The order that is passed by the Committee is one of cancellation of the licence of the petitioner. The order reads as follows: On the passage of the order, the petitioner knocks at the doors of this Court calling the aforesaid order in question. This Court, by an order dated 21.9.2022 disposes the petition, by the following order: “4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the petition papers, this Court is not inclined to grant a full indulgence in the matter but is of the considered opinion that the petitioner should be permitted to avail the remedy of appeal and that till that remedy is availed, the hospital should work as before for a reasonable period of time. Such grant of interim relief is recognized by the Apex Court in the decision of Director Defence R & D Laboratories vs. C. Panda, AIR 1977 AP 7 . In the above circumstances, this Writ Petition is disposed off; petitioner is directed to file the appeal within a period of thirty days to be computed from this date and till such time, he files the appeal or, till the expiry of thirty days whichever is earlier. It is made clear that till such time the hospital services of the petitioner shall not be disturbed.” (Emphasis supplied) This Court directs the petitioner to file an appeal before the Appellate Authority/Competent Authority within 30 days. The petitioner then files an appeal before the Chairman, Appellate Authority and Commissioner of the Health and Family Welfare Services, which was the Appropriate Authority constituted under Section 16 of the Act (supra). The Appellate Authority rejects the appeal. It is this order that is called in question in the subject petition. 11. If the order that is passed by the Committee i.e., the original order is considered qua the proviso to Section 4 supra, it would unmistakably indicate that it is an order passed by the Committee which had no jurisdiction to do so. Therefore, the order that is passed by the Committee is coram non-judice. 11. If the order that is passed by the Committee i.e., the original order is considered qua the proviso to Section 4 supra, it would unmistakably indicate that it is an order passed by the Committee which had no jurisdiction to do so. Therefore, the order that is passed by the Committee is coram non-judice. Therefore, an original order which was without jurisdiction is appealed by the petitioner before an Appellate Authority who had jurisdiction to consider the said appeal. The Appellate Authority considers the appeal on its merits and rejects it. The issue now would be, whether the defect of jurisdiction of the original Authority can be cured by the Appellate Authority who had jurisdiction to consider the appeal? The answer is, an unequivocal and an emphatic “no”. 12. Merely because the petitioner files an appeal to the appropriate Authority against an order of the original Authority which was without jurisdiction and the Appellate Authority considering the appeal on its merit would not cure the want of jurisdiction of the original Authority. If the foundation is faulty, the super-structure of any amount of strength cannot cure the defect. If the original Authority is corum non-judice, the competent Appellate Authority, by considering the appeal cannot breath life into such original order and make it corum judice. It is by now an hackneyed principle of law that if a statute prescribes performance of duties upon certain Authorities, those duties shall be performed only by those Authorities and none else, as error or jurisdiction always cuts at the root of the matter. 13. Though the challenge is only to the order passed by the Appellate Authority, since the Appellate Authority has considered the appeal on its merits, the original order has merged with the appellate order and since the original order was without jurisdiction, for the reasons indicated hereinabove, the appellate order is rendered unsustainable. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) Writ Petition is allowed. (ii) The impugned order passed by the 1st respondent/Appellate Authority dated 19.12.2022 stands quashed. (iii) The quashment of the order would not tie the hands of the 1st respondent i.e., Appellate Authority to initiate proceedings, in accordance with law; if available in law; if necessary.