Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2023 DIGILAW 710 (RAJ)

Maya Devi v. Vishweshwar Dayal

2023-03-22

GANESH RAM MEENA

body2023
JUDGMENT 1. These batch of writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners/non-applicants under section 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the orders passed under section 9 of 'The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizen Act, 2007' (for short 'the Act of 2007') by the Maintenance Tribunal constituted under Section 7 of the Act of 2007 on an application for maintenance filed under section 5 of the Act of 2007. 2. S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos.17596/2018 and 14495/2020 have been filed by the petitioners against the orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal constituted under Section 15 of the Act of 2007 on filing of appeals under section 16 of the Act of 2007, whereby the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeals being not maintainable. 3. For ready reference, the facts of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.11941/2021, Maya Devi Vs. Vishweshwar Dayal & Anr., are being taken into consideration. In this case, the respondents/ applicants namely; Vishweshwar Dayal and Sampat Devi filed an application under the provisions of the Act of 2007 before the Maintenance Tribunal with the prayer to dispossess the petitioner/non-applicant Maya Devi from their residential house. It was stated by the respondents/applicants in the application that respondent/applicant No.l- Vishweshwar Dayal is a retired Army person and after his retirement, they constructed a house for their own residence at Village Bhamarwasi (Mohanpura). It was alleged in the application that on 06.02.2021 the petitioner/ non-applicant Maya Devi came with her brother and gave beating to them for which an FIR No.40/2021 was registered at Police Station Baggad, wherein charge-sheet was submitted against the accused persons. However, both the parties entered into a compromise. Thereafter, petitioner/non-applicant Maya Devi lodged an FIR No.25/2021 at Police Station Mahila Thana, Jhunjhunu, against the respondents/ applicants. In such circumstances, the petitioner/non-applicant prayed to dispossess the respondents/applicants from the house, to hand over the possession of the house to her and also prayed to restrain the respondents/ applicants from entering in her house. The Maintenance Tribunal issued notices to the petitioner/ non-applicant, who appeared before the Tribunal and submitted an application for dismissing the application for maintenance filed by the respondents/ applicants stating that the respondents/applicants do not come in the definition of Senior Citizens as their age is below 59 years. The Maintenance Tribunal issued notices to the petitioner/ non-applicant, who appeared before the Tribunal and submitted an application for dismissing the application for maintenance filed by the respondents/ applicants stating that the respondents/applicants do not come in the definition of Senior Citizens as their age is below 59 years. The Maintenance Tribunal after examining the material available on the record, allowed the application filed by the respondents/applicants vide its order dated 22.09.2021 and ordered to dispossess the petitioner/ applicant from their house and directed the SHO, Police Station Baggad, District Jhunjhunu to get vacated the said plot and hand over the possession of the plot to the respondents/applicants. Aggrieved by the order of the Maintenance Tribunal, the petitioner/non-applicant has preferred instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. In other writ petitions also i.e. S.B. Civil Writ Petitions No.17596/2018 and 14495/2020, challenge has been made to the orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal in appeal either by the children or the relatives against the order of the Maintenance Tribunal. 5. On 14.03.2023 while these batch of writ petitions came up before the Court for arguments, an issue was raised from the respondents side that the writ petition against the order of Maintenance Tribunal under the provisions of the Act of 2007 is not maintainable for the reason that a statutory remedy of appeal under section 16 of the Act of 2007 is available to the aggrieved person/s including the children and the relatives. 6. Counsels appearing for the petitioners submitted that the provision of section 16 of the Act of 2007 only permits any senior citizen or a parent to file an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal against the order passed by the Maintenance Tribunal. Therefore, they have filed these writ petitions challenging the orders of the Maintenance Tribunal. 7. Vide order dated 27.02.2023, this Court directed the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court to serve a copy of this order along-with the copy of SBCWP No.11941/2021, Maya Devi Vs. Vishweshwar Dayal & Anr., in the office of Mr. R.D. Rastogi, Additional Solicitor General so that he may appear before the Court and may make submissions in regard to the availability of remedy of appeal to the children or other relatives, in case they are aggrieved by the order of the Maintenance Tribunal because the Act of 2007 is a Central Legislation. 8. Mr. R.D. Rastogi, Addl. R.D. Rastogi, Additional Solicitor General so that he may appear before the Court and may make submissions in regard to the availability of remedy of appeal to the children or other relatives, in case they are aggrieved by the order of the Maintenance Tribunal because the Act of 2007 is a Central Legislation. 8. Mr. R.D. Rastogi, Addl. Solicitor General and the other counsels appearing on behalf of respondents submitted that the children and the relatives can also file an appeal under section 16 of the Act of 2007 on being aggrieved by the order of the Maintenance Tribunal as like the remedy of appeal to parents and senior citizens. They also submitted that these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed as the petitioners have alternative efficacious remedy of appeal under section 16 of the Act of 2007. In support of their submissions, Mr. R.D. Rastogi, Addl. Solicitor General and other counsels appearing on behalf of the respondents have placed reliance upon the following judgments:- 1. D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.16743/2018, Smt. Rekha Agarwal Vs. Union of India & Ors., decided by the Division Bench of this Court on 03.08.2021; 2. Paramjit Kumar Saroya Vs. The Union of India & Anr., reported in AIR 2014, Punjab & Haryana 121, decided by Hon 'ble the Apex Court; 3. Writ- C No. 11295 of 2019, Akhiiesh Kumar & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., decided by the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court; 4. Writ Petition No.147056/2020 (GM-RES), Smt. M. Sunitha (Vidyasri Vs. Smt. Shashikala Mugadura & Anr., decided on 20.07.2021 by Single Bench of High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench; and 5. Nivedita Sharma Vs. Cellular Operators Association of India & Others, reported in (2011) 14 SCC 337, decided by the Hon 'ble Apex Court. 9. Considered the arguments advanced by the counsels appearing for the respective parties in regard to the maintainability of the writ petitions and availability of remedy of appeal to the parents and relatives undere section 16 of the Act of 2007. 10. For adjudication of the issue of availability of remedy of appeal under section 16 of the Act of 2017 to the parents and the relatives and also maintainability of the writ petition, certain provisions of the Act of 2007, which are relevant, are reproduced as under:- "2. 10. For adjudication of the issue of availability of remedy of appeal under section 16 of the Act of 2017 to the parents and the relatives and also maintainability of the writ petition, certain provisions of the Act of 2007, which are relevant, are reproduced as under:- "2. Definitions- (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise req u ires, - (a) '' '' (b) "maintenance" includes provision for food, clothing, residence and medical attendance and treatment; (c) " '' (d) "parent" means father or mother whether biological, adoptive or step father or step mother, as the case may be, whether or not the father or the mother is a senior citizen. (e) '' '' (f) '' '' (g) "re " means any legal heir of the children senior citizen who is not a minor and is in possession of or would inherit his property after his death; (h) " (i) ' '' (j) "Tribunal" means the Maintenance Tribunal constituted under Sec. 7." 4. Maintenance of Parents and Senior Citizens. A senior citizen including parent who is unable to maintain himself from his own earning or property owned by him, shall be entitled to make an application under section 5 in case of - i. parent or grand-parent, against one or more of his children not being a minor; ii. a childless senior citizen, against such of his relative referred to in clause (g) of section 2. (2) The obligation of the children or relative, as the case may be, to maintain a senior citizen extends to the needs of such citizen so that senior citizen may lead a normal life. (3) The obligation of the children to maintain his or her parent extends to the needs of such parent either father or mother or both, as the case may be, so that such parent may lead a normal life. (4) Any person being a relative of a senior citizen and having sufficient means shall maintain such senior citizen provided he is in possession of the property of such senior citizen or he would inherit the property of such senior citizen: Provided that where more than one relatives are entitled to inherit the property of a senior citizen, the maintenance shall be payable by such relative in the proportion in which they would inherit his property. 5. 5. Application for maintenance- (1) An application for maintenance under section 4, may be made - (a) by a senior citizen or a parent, as the case may be; or (b) if he is incapable, by any other person or organisation authorised by him; or (c) the Tribunal may take cognizance suo motu. Exp : For the purposes of this section "organisation" means any voluntary association registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, or any other law for the time being in force. (2) The Tribunal may, during the pendency of the proceeding regarding monthly allowance for the maintenance under this section, order such children or relative to make a monthly allowance for the interim maintenance of such senior citizen including parent and to pay the same to such senior citizen including parent as the Tribunal may from time to time direct. (3) On receipt of an application for maintenance under sub-section(l), after giving notice of the application to the children or relative and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry for determining the amount of maintenance. (4) An application filed under sub-section (2) for the monthly allowance for the maintenance and expenses for proceeding shall be disposed of within ninety days from the date of the service of notice of the application to such person: Provided that the Tribunal may extend the said period, once for a maximum period of thirty days in exceptional circumstances for reasons to be recorded in writing. (5) An application for maintenance under subsection (1) may be filed against one or more persons: Provided that such children or relative may implead the other person liable to maintain parent in the application for maintenance. (6) Where a maintenance order was made against more than one person, the death of one of them does not affect the liability of others to continue paying maintenance. (7) Any such allowance for the maintenance and expenses for proceeding shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance or expenses of proceeding, as the case may be. (7) Any such allowance for the maintenance and expenses for proceeding shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance or expenses of proceeding, as the case may be. (8) If, children or relative so ordered fail, without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Tribunal may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person for the whole, or any part of each month's allowance for the maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made whichever is earlier: Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Tribunal to levy such amount within a period of three months from the date on which it became due." 9. Order for maintenance-(l) If children or relatives, as the case may be, neglect or refuse to maintain a senior citizen being unable to maintain himself, the Tribunal may, on being satisfied of such neglect or refusal, order such children or relatives to make a monthly allowance at such monthly rate for the maintenance of such senior citizen, as the Tribunal may deem fit and to pay the same to such senior citizen as the Tribunal may, from time to time, direct. (2) The maximum maintenance allowance which may be ordered by such Tribunal shall be such as may be prescribed by the State Government which shall not exceed ten thousand rupees per month. 15. Constitution of Appel Tribunal- (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one Appellate Tribunal for each district to hear the appeal against the order of the Tribunal. (2) The Appellate Tribunal shall be presided over by an officer not below the rank of District Magistrate. 16. 15. Constitution of Appel Tribunal- (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one Appellate Tribunal for each district to hear the appeal against the order of the Tribunal. (2) The Appellate Tribunal shall be presided over by an officer not below the rank of District Magistrate. 16. Appeals- (1) Any senior citizen or a parent, as the case may be, aggrieved by an order of a Tribunal may, within sixty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal: Provided that on appeal, the children or relative who is required to pay any amount in terms of such maintenance order shall continue to pay to such parent the amount so ordered, in the manner directed by the Appellate Tribunal: Provided further that the Appellate Tribunal may, entertain the appeal alter the expiry of the said period of sixty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. (2) On receipt of an appeal, the Appellate Tribunal shall, cause a notice to be served upon the respondent. (3) The Appellate Tribunal may call for the record of proceedings from the Tribunal against whose order the appeal is preferred. (4) The Appellate Tribunal may, after examining the appeal) and the records called for either allow or reject the appeal. (5) The Appellate Tribunal shall, adjudicate and decide upon the appeal Hied against the order of the Tribunal and the order of the Appellate Tribunal shall be final: Provided that no appeal shall be rejected unless an opportunity has been given to both the parties of being heard in person or through a duly authorised representative. (6) The Appellate Tribunal shall make an endeavour to pronounce its order in writing within one month of the receipt of an appeal. (7) A copy of every order made under sub-section (3) shall be sent to both the parties free of cost." 11. In the matter of Paramjit Kumar Saroya (supra), the Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court held that the provision of Section 16(1) of the Act of 2007 is valid however- must be read to provide for the right of appeal. In paragraphs 31 and 32, it has been held as under:- "31. In the matter of Paramjit Kumar Saroya (supra), the Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court held that the provision of Section 16(1) of the Act of 2007 is valid however- must be read to provide for the right of appeal. In paragraphs 31 and 32, it has been held as under:- "31. Now coming to the conspectus of the discussion aforesaid, we have no doubt in our mind that we would be faced with the serious consequences of quashing such a provision which deprives the right of one party to the appeal remedy, while conferring it on the other especially in the context of the other provisions of the same Section as well as of the said Act. l/l/e have to avoid this. The only way to avoid it is to press into service both the principles of purposive interpretation and casus omissus. The Parliamentary discussions on the other provisions of the said Act do not convey any intent by which there is any intent of the Parliament to create such a differentiation. There is no point in repeating what we have said, but suffice to say that if nothing else, at least to give a meaning to the first proviso of Section 16(1) of the said Act, the only interpretation can be that the right of appeal is conferred on both the sides. It is a case of an accidental omission and not of conscious exclusion. Thus, in order to give a complete effective meaning to the statutory provision, we have to read the words into it, the course of action even suggested in N. Kannadasan's case (supra) in para 55. How can otherwise the proviso to sub section (1) be reconciled with sub section itself. In fact, there would be no need of the proviso which would be made otiose and redundant. It is salutary role of construction of the statute that no provision should be made superfluous. There is no negative provision in the Act denying the right of appeal to the other parties. The other provisions of the Act and various sub sections discussed aforesaid would show that on the contrary an appeal from both sides is envisaged. It is salutary role of construction of the statute that no provision should be made superfluous. There is no negative provision in the Act denying the right of appeal to the other parties. The other provisions of the Act and various sub sections discussed aforesaid would show that on the contrary an appeal from both sides is envisaged. Only exception to this course of action is the initial words of sub section (1) of Section 16 of the said Act which need to be supplanted to give a meaning to the intent of the Act, other provisions of the said Act as also other sub sections of the same Section of the said Act. In fact, in Board of Muslim Wakfs Rajasthan's case (supra), even while cautioning supply of casus omissus, it has been stressed in para 29 that the construction which tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective must always be avoided and the construction which advances the remedy intended by the statute should be accepted. This is the only way we can have a consistent enactment in the form of whole statute. 32. We are thus of the view that Section 16(1) of the said Act is valid, but must be read to provide for the right of appeal to any of the affected parties." In the matter of Akhilesh Kumar & Anr. (supra), the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court also agreed the view taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Paramjit Kumar Saroya (Anr.) and observed that if right of an appeal is denied to the aggrieved party, namely, child or children or relatives the appeal clause under the Act, 2007 would be frustrated and tantamount to denying them the similar right of appeal as provided to another party who is the senior citizens or parents. Paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of this judgment are relevant, which are reproduced as under:- "8. In a similar controversy the Madras High Court in Balamurugan vs. Rukmani (C.R.P.(PD) (MD)No. 437 of 2015 & M.P.(MD)Nos. Paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of this judgment are relevant, which are reproduced as under:- "8. In a similar controversy the Madras High Court in Balamurugan vs. Rukmani (C.R.P.(PD) (MD)No. 437 of 2015 & M.P.(MD)Nos. 1 & 2 of 2015 decided on, 29 April 2015) in agreement with the view taken in Paramjit Kumar Saroya (supra) has held that an appeal under section 16 of the Act, 2007 would be maintainable at the behest of both the parties, i.e. at the instance of the aggrieved party for the reason that where the Tribunal decides a case in favour of the senior citizens or parents, the children or dependent or relatives against whom the order is passed and against whom it can be enforced under section 11 of the Act, 2007 would be the aggrieved person and have a right to file an appeal. 9. l/l/e find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Paramjit Kumar Saroya (supra) and Balamurugan (supra) because if the right of appeal is denied to the aggrieved party, namely, child or children or relatives the appeal clause under the Act, 2007 would be frustrated and tantamount to denying them the similar right of appeal as provided to another party who is the senior citizens or parents. 10. The Supreme Court in Surjit Singh Ka Ira vs. Union of India (1991) 2 SCC 87 ) in paragraph no. 19 has held as under: "19. True it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there, but "where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meanings, it is permissible to supply the words" (Craies Statute Law, 7th Edition, p. 109). Similar are the observations in Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, [ 1988] 2 SCC 513 at 524-25 where it was observed that the court construing a provision should not easily read into it words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. (See: Sirajul Haq Khan & Ors. v. The Sunni Central Board of Waqf, [ 1959] SCR. 1287 at 1299)" In the matter of Smt. M. Sunitha (Vidyasri), the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench, relying upon the view taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the matter of Paramjit Kumar Saroya (supra), observed that the right of appeal under Section 16(1) of the said Act is conferred on both side. Para 12 is relevant, which is reproduced as under:- "12. In view of the above discussion, the only interpretation can be the right of appeal under Section 16 (1) of the said Act is conferred on both side. It is case of an accidental omission and not of conscious exclusion. Therefore, the impugned order passed under Section 7 of the Act is an appeal under Section 16 of the Act. Since the petitioner has an alternative remedy of appeal under Section 16 of the Act, the above writ petition is disposed of reserving liberty to the petitioner to file an appeal before the appellate authority under Section 16 of the Act. If such an appeal is filed within four weeks from today, the interim order granted by this Court will be continued till the disposal of the appeal before the appellate authority. The Appellate Authority is directed to dispose of the appeal not late than three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. The Revenue Secretary, Government of Karnataka is directed to communicate this order to all the Maintenance Tribunals and Appellate Tribunals. Accordingly, writ petition is disposed of. " The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nivedita Sharma (supra) has observed that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Para 11, 21, 26 and 27 of this judgment are relevant, which are reproduced as under:- "11. We have considered the respective arguments/submissions. Para 11, 21, 26 and 27 of this judgment are relevant, which are reproduced as under:- "11. We have considered the respective arguments/submissions. There cannot be any dispute that the power of the High Courts to issue directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition under Article 226 of the Constitution is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by parliamentary legislation- L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 . However, it is one thing to say that in exercise of the power vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can entertain a writ petition against any order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its agency/instrumentality or any public authority or order passed by a quasi-judicial body/authority, and it is an altogether different thing to say that each and every petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution must be entertained by the High Court as a matter of course ignoring the fact that the aggrieved person has an effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is settled law that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. 21. In Charan Singh v. Healing Touch Hospital (2000) 7 SCC 668 , this Court observed (SCC p.673, paras 11-12): "11. The Consumer Protection Act is one of the benevolent pieces of legislation intended to protect a large body of consumers from exploitation. The Act provides for an alternative system of consumer justice by summary trial. The authorities under the Act exercise quasi-judicial powers for redressal of consumer disputes and it is one of the postulates of such a body that it should arrive at a conclusion based on reason. The necessity to provide reasons, howsoever, brief in support of its conclusion by such a forum, is too obvious to be reiterated and needs no emphasising. Obligation to give reasons not only introduces clarity but it also excludes, or at any rate minimizes, the chances of arbitrariness and the higher forum can test the correctness of those reasons. Unfortunately we have not been able to find from the impugned order any reasons in support of the conclusion that the claim of the Appellant is 'unrealistic' or 'exaggerated' or 'excessive'. Unfortunately we have not been able to find from the impugned order any reasons in support of the conclusion that the claim of the Appellant is 'unrealistic' or 'exaggerated' or 'excessive'. Loss of salary is not the sole factor which was required to be taken into consideration. 12. While quantifying damages, consumer forums are required to make an attempt to serve ends of justice so that compensation is awarded, in an established case, which not only serves the purpose of recompensing the individual, but which also at the same time, aims to bring about a qualitative change in the attitude of the service provider. Indeed, calculation of damages depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down for universal application. While awarding compensation, a Consumer Forum has to take into account all relevant factors and assess compensation on the basis of accepted legal principles, on moderation. It is for the Consumer Forum to grant compensation to the extent it finds it reasonable, fair and proper in the facts and circumstances of a given case according to established judicial standards where the claimant is able to establish his charge." 26. We also find that the High Court has taken cognizance of the statement made on behalf of the counsel for the Petitioners that their clients would challenge Clause (Hi) of para 38 of the State Commission's order by filing an appeal under Section 19 of the Act and the fact that one of the aggrieved parties, namely, American Express Bank Limited has already filed an appeal questioning paragraph 38(iii) of the order of the State Commission. After having noticed that some of the Petitioners were inclined to avail the remedy of appeal against the particular portion of the order passed by the State Commission, the High Court should not have entertained the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and the miscellaneous petitions filed under Article 227 of the Constitution and directed them to avail remedy of appeal under Section 19 of the 1986 Act. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the impugned order is set aside. 27. However, liberty is given to Respondent No. 1 and Ors. to challenge the order of the State Commission by availing alternative remedy of appeal under Section 19 of the 1986 Act. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the impugned order is set aside. 27. However, liberty is given to Respondent No. 1 and Ors. to challenge the order of the State Commission by availing alternative remedy of appeal under Section 19 of the 1986 Act. We also direct that if the Respondents or any one of them file(s) an appeal within a period of 60 days from today, then the same shall be entertained by the National Commission and decided on merits. We also give liberty to American Express Bank Limited to amend the memo of appeal for the purpose of challenging the order of the State Commission on other grounds. It will also be open to Respondent No. 1 and Ors. to apply for stay of the order of the State Commission. If any such application is filed, the National Commission shall decide the same on its own merits without being influenced by the observations contained in the impugned order." The Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Rekha Agarwal (supra), agreed to the observations made by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Pa ram jit Kumar Saroya (supra), and held that the petitioner would be at liberty to file an appeal under Section 16 of the Act and the writ petition was disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to file an appeal under section 16 of the Act of 2007 before the Appellate Tribunal. 12. On consideration of the provisions of the Act of 2007, this Court also finds that in case the children and relative are precluded from filing an appeal as per the wordings of provision of Section 16 of the Act of 2007, whether the children who are above the age of 60 years and are senior citizens as per definition clause 2(h), can also be deprived of filing an appeal. If the persons other than parents being aggrieved with the order passed by the Maintenance Tribunal are not allowed remedy of appeal under section 16 of the Act of 2007, but the children and the relatives being senior citizens could file an appeal, then why i.e. children and the relatives who are below 60 years of age be deprived of remedy of appeal. Such bifurcation in the eyes of this Court would tantamount to discrimination. 13. Such bifurcation in the eyes of this Court would tantamount to discrimination. 13. Proviso to Section 16 of the Act of 2007 speaks that on appeal, the children or relative who is required to pay any amount in terms of such maintenance order shall continue to pay to such parent the amount so ordered in the manner directed by the Appellate Tribunal. The wordings of this proviso clause clearly show the intention of the legislation that the children and the relatives are also provided the remedy of appeal but because of some omissions, the words 'children and relatives' have been left out. 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, reported in (1991) 2 SCC 87 has held as under:- "19. True it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there, but "where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meanings, it is permissible to supply the words" (Craies Statute Law, 7th Edition, p. 109). Similar are the observations in Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, [ 1988] 2 SCC 513 at 524-25 where it was observed that the court construing a provision should not easily read into it words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. (See: Sirajul Haq Khan & Ors. v. The Sunni Central Board of Waqf, [ 1959] SCR. 1287 at 1299)" 15. If we go by wording of the Statute, that only the senior citizens or the parents could file an appeal under section 16 of the Act of 2007 before the Appellate Tribunal, then in a case where a senior citizen or parent is also partly aggrieved by the order of the Maintenance Tribunal, he/she will have to file an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal and the children or the relative would invoke the writ jurisdiction. This cannot be the intention of the legislation that an order of the Maintenance Tribunal should be examined under two legal remedies. To avoid such complications also the right of an appeal is required to be conferred upon all the parties aggrieved by the order of the Maintenance Tribunal. 16. In the wake of the observations made by Hon'ble the Apex Court, the High Courts and in view of the above discussion, the only interpretation can be that there is a right of appeal under section 16(1) of the Act of 2007 conferred on both side i.e. senior citizens, parents and children or relatives. It is a case of an accidental omission and not of conscious exclusion. It is, therefore, held that the appeal is maintainable under section 16(1) of the Act of 2007 by the children or the relatives also against the order passed by the Maintenance Tribunal. 17. Since the petitioners have alternative remedy of an appeal under section 16 of the Act of 2007, all the writ petitions are disposed of with liberty to the petitioners to file an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under section 16 of the Act of 2007. If any such appeal is filed before the Appellate Tribunal under section 16 of the Act of 2007 within four weeks from today, the same shall be considered by the Appellate Tribunal on its merits. It is also observed that if any such appeal is filed within four weeks from today, the interim orders, if any, granted by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction in favour of the petitioners will continue till filing of the appeals before the Appellate Tribunal or for four weeks from today whichever is earlier. 18. The Appellate Tribunal is directed to dispose of the appeal/s, if so filed expeditiously but not later than three months from the date of filing of the appeal/s. 19. 18. The Appellate Tribunal is directed to dispose of the appeal/s, if so filed expeditiously but not later than three months from the date of filing of the appeal/s. 19. Counsel appearing for the petitioners also submitted that a reference has been made by the Court vide order dated 12.09.2019 on the following legal questions:- "(a) Whether The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 empowers the Maintenance Tribunal constituted under Section 7 of the Maintenance Act, 2007 to pass an order of eviction of a person who is in possession of the property of such senior citizen by birth or marriage by interpreting Section 23 of the Maintenance Act, 2007 to include possession as transfer with a condition? (b) Whether the word 'transfer' used in Section 23 of the Maintenance Act, 2007 would include the possession held by birth or marriage and declaration of transfer as void would include eviction also?" 20. It is further submitted by the counsels appearing for the petitioners that the said reference is pending before the Division Bench for adjudication. The petitioners may raise all the issues which have been taken by them in the writ petition and during the oral arguments including the issue of pendency of reference before the Appellate Tribunal, who shall take into consideration the same while deciding the applications. 21. In the writ petitions challenging the orders of the Appellate Tribunal whereby the appeals either filed by the children or the relatives have been dismissed as being not maintainable, the orders of dismissal of appeals (in SBCWP No. 17596/2018, Nemi Chand Vs. Hukum Kaur & Anr.- the order dated 19.06.2018 passed in Appeal No.12/57/2017 and in SBCWP No. 14495/2020, Smt. Minali Sharma Vs. Shyam Narayan Sharma- the order dated 12.11.2020 passed by the Court of the District Collector, Tonk, in Appeal No.39/2020) are set aside with the direction to the Appellate Tribunal to decide the appeals afresh on merits after providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners/appellants. 22. Since the writ petitions have been disposed of, the stay applications and pending application/s, if any, also stand disposed of. 23. 22. Since the writ petitions have been disposed of, the stay applications and pending application/s, if any, also stand disposed of. 23. Before parting this order, this Court would like to add that since by various pronouncements by various Hon'ble Courts it has been held that the remedy of an appeal under section 16(1) of the Act of 2007 is available to all the aggrieved persons including the children and relatives. The Addl. Solicitor General of India Mr. R.D. Rastogi, Senior Advocate also stated before the Court that the remedy of an appeal under section 16(1) of the Act of 2007 is available to all the aggrieved persons including the children and relatives but because of non-mentioning in Section 16 of the Act of 2007 that the children and the relatives could also file an appeal, the confusion remains in legal fraternity and the general public which leads them to invoke the writ jurisdiction against the orders of the Maintenance Tribunal. 24. In view of the observations of the Hon'ble Courts and the statement made by learned Addl. Solicitor General of India, this Court expects from the Union of India to take necessary steps for issuing orders, circulars or amendments in consonance with the observations, findings of the Hon'ble Courts and the statement of Addl. Solicitor General of India in regard to the remedy of filing of an appeal to the children and relatives under the provision of Section 16(1) of the Act of 2007. 23. Registry is directed to place a copy of this order in other connected case files.