JUDGMENT : (Manish Mathur, J.) Heard Mr. Mohammad Tariq Saeed, learned counsel for revisionist, Mr. Sunil Sharma and Mr. Ruved Kamal Kidwai, learned counsel for opposite party No. 2 and Mr. Syed Aftab Ahmad, learned counsel for opposite party No. 8. 2. In view of order being proposed to be passed, notices to opposite parties No. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 stand dispensed with. 3. Learned counsel for opposite parties submit that since a question of law is involved, the revision may be decided without objections being filed by the answering opposite parties. 4. Revision under Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act 1995 has been filed against order dated 17.11.2022 passed in Case No. 38 of 2020 whereby revisionist-plaintiff has been directed to pay ad valorem Court fees on the relief sought in plaint. 5. Learned counsel for revisionist submits that the aforesaid case had been filed by revisionist seeking a relief of permanent injunction against the defendants and their agents from interfering in peaceful possession over suit property. Further relief for a decree of declaration for properties entered in Waqf deed dated 3.12.1924 as Waqf Properties were also sought. It is submitted that for the purposes of payment of Court fees, it was indicated in the plaint that Waqf Property not having marketable value, only for the purposes of payment of Court fee, suit was being valued tentatively at Rs. 1000/- and since prayer for permanent injunction had been sought, the maximum prescribed Court fee of Rs. 500/- was being paid and on the point of declaration, Rs. 200/- was being paid. 6. It is submitted that objection against the valuation and Court fee was filed by defendants whereafter by means of impugned order dated 17.11.2022, the Waqf Tribunal held that in view of relief sought in the suit, ad valorem Court fee was payable which was required to be paid within a period of two weeks. 7. Learned counsel for revisionist submits that while passing impugned order, Tribunal has ignored specific provisions of Section 7 of Court fee Act 1870 inasmuch as, with regard to relief sought, Court fee was payable only in terms of Section 7(iv)(a) excluding the provisions of Section 7(iv)(A) of the aforesaid Act and as such only the fixed Court fees was required to be paid as indicated in plaint and not ad valorem Court fee. 8. 8. Learned counsel has placed reliance on judgment rendered by Division Bench of this Court in the case of Basant Kumar Mata Nehliya v. Chowdhary Ujjair, (2011)89 ALR 551, to buttress his submission. 9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite parties on the other hand submits that in view of consequential relief being sought by the revisionist-plaintiff, Tribunal has rightly considered the provisions of Section 7 of the Act and has rightly adjudged ad valorem Court fee being payable by plaintiff in view of relief that has been sought in plaint. 10. He has placed reliance on judgment of Coordinate Bench rendered by this Court in the case of Dr. Sushil Suri v. Harish Suri and others, 2023(2) ADJ 552 (LB). 11. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties, the question of law requiring adjudication is whether in a suit for declaration with consequential relief for permanent injunction, ad valorem Court fee or fixed Court fee is payable in terms of Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act, 1870. 12. For the aforesaid purpose, it is relevant to indicate that in the suit filed by revisionist, a decree for declaration of suit properties as Waqf Properties in terms of Waqf deed dated 3.12.1924 was sought alongwith consequential relief of permanent injunction to restrain defendants from interfering in the peaceful possession of plaintiff over the suit property. It is noticeable that no prayer for consequential relief of possession has been sought by the plaintiff. 13. It is noticeable that no prayer for consequential relief of possession has been sought by the plaintiff. 13. Section 7 of Court Fees Act, 1870, which is relevant for the purposes is as follows: ''Computation of fees payable in certain suits for money.-The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suit next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows: For money-(i) In suits for money (including suits for damages or compensation, or arrears of maintenance, or annuities, or of other sums payable periodically)-according to the amount claimed; For maintenance and annuities-(ii-a) In suits for maintenance and annuities or other sums payable periodically, according to the value of the subject-matter of the suit and such value shall be deemed to be ten times the amount claimed to be payable for one year: Provided that in suits for personal maintenance by females and minors, such value shall be deemed to be the amount claimed to be payable for one year; For reduction or enhancement of maintenance and annuities-(ii-b) In suits for reduction or enhancement of maintenance and annuities or the sums payable periodically according to the value of the subject-matter of the suit and such value shall be deemed to be ten times the amount sought to be reduced or enhanced for one year, For other movable property having a market value-(iii) In suits for movable property other than money, where the subject-matter has a market value-according to such value at the date of presenting the plaint; For declaratory decree with consequential relief (iv) In suits-(a) to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief other than reliefs specified in sub-section (iv-A) is prayed; and For accounts.-(b) For accounts according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal: Provided that in suits falling under Clause (a), where the relief sought is with reference to any immovable property, such amount shall be the value of the consequential relief and if such relief is incapable of valuation, then the value of the immovable property computed in accordance with sub-section (v), (v-A) or (v-B) of this section as the case may be: [Provided further that in all suits falling under Clause (a), such amount shall in no case be less than Rs. 300]: [Provided (also), that in suits falling under Clause (b) such amount shall be the approximate sum due to the plaintiff and the said sum shall form the basis for calculating (or determining) the valuation of an appeal from a preliminary decree passed in the suit. For cancellation or adjudging void instruments and decrees.-(iv-A) In suits for or involving cancellation of or adjudging void or voidable a decree for money or other property having a market value, or an instrument securing money or other property having such value: (1) where the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-title was a party to the decree or the instrument, according to the value of the subject-matter, and (2) where he or his predecessor-in-title was not a party to the decree or instrument, according to one-fifth of the value of the subject-matter, and such value shall be deemed to be- if the while decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the amount for which or value of the property in respect of which the decree was passed or the instrument executed, and if only a part of the decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the amount or value of the property to which such part relates. Explanation.-'The value of the property' for the purposes of this sub-section, shall be the market-value, which in the case of immovable property shall be deemed to be the value as computed in accordance with sub-section (v), (v-A) or (v-B) as the case may be. For easement.-(iv-B) In suits-(a) for a right to some benefit (not herein otherwise provided for) to arise out of land; For an injunction-(b) to obtain an injunction; To establish an adoption-(c) to establish an adoption or to obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is valid; To set aside an adoption-(d) to set aside an adoption or to obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption in invalid or never, in fact, took place; To set aside an award other than awards mentioned in Section 8- (e) to set aside an award not being an award mentioned in Section 8; according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint; [Provided that such amount shall not be less than one-fifth of the market value of the property involved in or effected by the relief sought or Rs. 200 whichever is greater: Provided further that in the case of suits falling under Clauses (a) and (b) the amount of Court fee leviable shall in no case exceed Rs. 500] Explanation 1.-When the relief sought is with reference to any immovable property the market-value of such property shall be deemed to be the value computed in accordance with sub-section (v) and (v-A) or (v-B) of this section, as the case may be. Explanation 2.-In the case of suits- (i) falling under Clauses (a) and (b), the property which is affected by the relief sought, and where properties of both the plaintiff and defendant are affect, the property of the plaintiff so affected; (ii) falling under Clauses (c) and (d), the property to which title by succession or otherwise may be delivered or affected by the alleged adoption; and (iii) falling under Clause (e), the property which forms the subject-matter of the award; shall be be deemed to be the property involved in or affected by the relief sought within the meaning of the proviso to this sub-section.'' 14. From a perusal of aforesaid provision, it is evident that computation of Court fee payable in certain suits particularly with regard to declaratory decree with consequential relief is indicated in Section 7(iv)(a) whereunder provisions of sub-section(iv-A) is an exception. The proviso to aforesaid provisions indicates that in cases of suits falling under Clause (a) where relief sought is with reference to any immoveable property, such amount shall be the value of consequential relief and if such relief is incapable of valuation, then the value of immoveable property is to be computed in accordance with Sub-Section (v-A) or (v-B) of the Section. 15. The provisions regarding cancellation or adjudging void instruments and decrees has been indicated in Section 7(iv-A) of the Act, which has been exempted for consideration for purposes of Court fees pertaining to Section 7(iv)(a). 16. Proviso to Section 7(iv-B)(e) provides that in cases of suits following under clauses (a) and (b), the amount of Court fee leviable shall in no case exceed Rs. 500/-. Section 7 (iv-B) provides also that with regard to consequential relief of injunction, the amount of Court fee leviable in no case shall exceed Rs. 300/-. 17. 16. Proviso to Section 7(iv-B)(e) provides that in cases of suits following under clauses (a) and (b), the amount of Court fee leviable shall in no case exceed Rs. 500/-. Section 7 (iv-B) provides also that with regard to consequential relief of injunction, the amount of Court fee leviable in no case shall exceed Rs. 300/-. 17. The aspect of matter with regard to Court fees payable for the purposes of relief sought in a plaint for declaration with consequential relief of permanent injunction has been considered by Division Bench of this Court in the case of Basant Kumar Mata Nehliya (supra) in the following manner : ''6. A plain reading of relevant portion reproduced (supra) shows that so far as the injunction is concerned, Court fee shall not exceed Rs. 500/-. Similarly, in case a suit is filed to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief other than the relief specified in sub-section (iv-A) is prayed, then for the occupant of the property, the Court fee shall be paid to the amount on which relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. However, in case, the suit is filed for cancellation or adjudging void instrument and decrees, then Court fee shall be assessed on the face of market value of the property keeping in view the explanation given in the section. 7. It is settled law that it is for the plaintiff to pay Court fees in terms of the relief sought in the plaint and ordinarily such valuation for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction ordinarily has to be accepted vide S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar [ AIR 1958 SC 245 ], Tara Devi v. Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj through Sebaits Chandeshwar Prasad and Meshwar Prasad [ (1987) 4 SCC 69 .]. 10. In the present case, the consequential relief is of injunction for which the proviso to Section (iv-B) provides that the amount of Court fee leviable shall in no case exceed Rs. 300/-. To put in other words, in case the plaintiff is in possession of the property and files declaratory suit with prayer for injunction, then the Court fee leviable shall not exceed Rs. 500/-. 300/-. To put in other words, in case the plaintiff is in possession of the property and files declaratory suit with prayer for injunction, then the Court fee leviable shall not exceed Rs. 500/-. 12.The aforesaid proposition also revealed that from the combined reading of Section 7 (iv-A) or Section 7 (iv-B), the legislature to their wisdom while making provision for valuation of declaratory decree with consequential relief under the proviso of Section 7 (iv-a) has consciously excluded Section 7 (iv-A) which provides imposition of Court fee with regard to the suit for cancellation or adjudging void instrument or decree for money or other property having market value, where the Court fee shall be assessed on the basis of market value of such property. In the present case, so far as relief is concerned, plaintiff has not made any prayer for cancellation or setting aside of any document, deed or revenue record or sought the delivery of possession. The proviso of Section 7 (iv-B) has not been dealt with in the cases referred relied upon by the parties Counsel.'' 18. Paragraph 6 of the aforesaid judgment clearly indicates the fact that in a suit filed to obtain declaratory decree or order where consequential relief other than relief specified in sub-section (iv-A) is prayed for with relief for permanent injunction, then the Court fees is to be assessed as per the valuation indicated in the plaint. As such, the Division Bench has come to a conclusion that in such cases that possession of property is not sought as a consequential relief, the declaratory suit filed with prayer for injunction, Court fee leviable shall not exceed Rs. 500/-. 19. The Division Bench in terms has placed reliance on Full Bench of this Court in the case of Chief Inspector of Stamps v. Laxmi Narain, AIR 1958 SC 245 , in the following manner: ''11. The Full Bench has been relied upon by both sides in Chief Inspector of Stamps v. Laxmi Narain [1970 AIR All 488], in which identical situation has been dealt with. The Full Bench has been relied upon by both sides in Chief Inspector of Stamps v. Laxmi Narain [1970 AIR All 488], in which identical situation has been dealt with. Para 22 of the judgment is reproduced as under: ''In suit No. 12 of 1960, the reliefs prayed for were a declaration that the first plaintiff was the Mahant of the Math and the Sarbarakar of the deity and the properties of the Math and an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the first plaintiff over the properties as Mahant and Sarbarakar. The relief of injunction flowed directly from the right which the plaintiff desired to be declared and is a consequential relief. This suit is also, therefore, covered by sub-section (iv)(a).'' 20. The aforesaid aspect has also been considered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Suhrid Singh v. Randhir Singh and others, (2010)12 SCC 112 , in the following terms: ''7.Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to A and B, two brothers. A executes a sale-deed in favour of C. Subsequently A wants to avoid the sale. A has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if B, who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by A is invalid/void and non est/illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and Court fee is also different. If A, the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad valorem Court fee on the consideration stated in the sale-deed. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and Court fee is also different. If A, the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad valorem Court fee on the consideration stated in the sale-deed. If B, who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed Court fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17(iii) of the Second Schedule of the Act. But if B, a non-executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale-deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad valorem Court fee as provided under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act. 8. Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the Court fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of Section 7.'' 21. Upon applicability of aforesaid judgments in the present facts and circumstances of the case, it is evident that suit for declaratory decree has been filed with consequential relief of only permanent injunction and not for possession. In such circumstances, Court fees would be payable in terms of Section 7(iv-a) of the Act and not in terms of Section 7(iv-A) of the Act and therefore only a fixed Court fee of Rs. 500/- was payable by the revisionist. The Tribunal has clearly erred in holding ad valorem Court fee being payable by the revisionist. It is also a relevant factor that it cannot be assumed that a relief of possession is to be sought for by the plaintiff particularly when no such express relief has been sought in the plaint. The aforesaid judgments clearly indicate that Court fee is payable only as per relief sought in a plaint and not for what it ought to have prayed for. 22. The aforesaid judgments clearly indicate that Court fee is payable only as per relief sought in a plaint and not for what it ought to have prayed for. 22. Learned counsel for opposite parties has placed reliance on judgment rendered in the case of Dr. Sushil Suri (supra) but upon a perusal of same, it is evident that nothing contrary has been laid down in the aforesaid judgment, which in itself is based on judgment rendered by Supreme Court in the case of Suhrid Singh (supra) whereby also it has been held that ad valorem Court fees in such matter is not paid. 23. Considering aforesaid facts and the aforesaid judgments, it is apparent that the impugned order dated 17.11.2022 passed by the Waqf Tribunal in case No. 38 of 2020; Ansar Nawaz Khan v. Tashkeel Ahmad and others is against the propositions of law and is therefore set aside. 24. Consequently, revision succeeds and is allowed. Parties to bear their own costs. 25. Learned counsel for answering opposite parties submits that even otherwise the suit was not maintainable in view of the fact that the plaintiff has not disclosed his locus standi as a Mutwali to maintain the suit and the value of property has not been disclosed. 26. With regard to aforesaid submissions, it is apparent that issue with regard to maintainability of suit is not the subject-matter of the present proceedings and for which purpose opposite party as defendant have a right to file objections before the Tribunal concerned.