ORDER : (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) : Since both the appeals arise out of the same case, being Special (NIA) Case No. 02 of 2020, corresponding to R.C. No. 25 of 2020/NIA/DLI arising out of Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158 of 2019, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, they are taken up together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 356 of 2023 is preferred under Section 21 of the National Investigating Agency Act, 2008 against order dated 16.02.2023 passed in Special (NIA) Case No. 02 of 2020 corresponding to R.C. No. 25 of 2020/NIA/DLI arising out of Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158 of 2019 registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 452, 302, 353 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code; Section 27 of the Arms Act, Section 17(i) and 17(ii) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act and Sections 10, 13, 17 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, whereby and whereunder the application filed under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for discharge being Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 128 of 2023 has been rejected. 3. Whereas Criminal Appeal No. 666 of 2023 has been filed against order dated 11.04.2023 in Special (NIA) Case No. 02 of 2020 by which charges have been framed against the appellant under Section 120B read with Sections 121, 121A of the Indian Penal Code; under Section 10, 13, 17, 18, 39 and 40 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 4. The factual matrix leading to filing of instant case, as per the pleadings available on record, in brief, is that on 22.11.2019 at about 20:00 hours a patrolling party stopped at Lukuiya More, Chandwa (Latehar), where the members of CPI (Maoist), a banned terrorist organization, fired indiscriminately on the police patrolling party and killed four police personnel and looted government issued arms and ammunitions i.e., 01 pistol, ten rounds of 9 mm ammunition, three 0.303 rifle with 150 round bullet from the police persons and shouted slogans “Maowadi Zindabad” and thereafter escaped from the place of occurrence. One Home Guard, namely, Dinesh Ram, who escaped unhurt, went to Chandwa Police Station and lodged complaint against 18 named accused persons and some unknown persons, which was registered as Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158 of 2019 dated 23.11.2019. One Home Guard, namely, Dinesh Ram, who escaped unhurt, went to Chandwa Police Station and lodged complaint against 18 named accused persons and some unknown persons, which was registered as Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158 of 2019 dated 23.11.2019. After investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet against six accused persons, namely, Baijnath Ganjhu, Sunil Ganjhu @ Mangra, Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu, Sanjay Ganjhu, Naresh Ganjhu and Faguna Ganjhu. The Central Government, taking into consideration the gravity of the offence, in exercise of power conferred under Sub-section (5) of Section 6 read with Section 8 of the National Investigating Agency Act, 2008 directed the ‘National Investigating Agency’ (in short ‘NIA’) to take up the investigation of the case and accordingly, Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158 of 2019 was re-registered as R.C. No. 25 of 2020/NIA/DLI dated 24.06.2020 under Sections under Sections 147, 148, 149, 452, 302, 353 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 27 of the Arms Act, Section 17(i) and 17(ii) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act and Sections 10, 13, 17 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The ‘National Investigating Agency’, after investigation, submitted first supplementary charge-sheet on 30.04.2021 against 34 accused persons including the appellant herein under Sections 120B, 121, 121A, 122, 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 353, 395, 396 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code; under Section 10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 38, 39 and 40 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and also under Section 25(1-b)a, 26, 27 and 35 of the Arms Act. So far present appellant is concerned, he was arrested on 03.02.2021 and taken in police remand from 04.02.2021 to 09.02.2021 and was arrayed as Accused No. 8 (A-8) in the first supplementary charge-sheet dated 30.04.2021. The role and activities alleged to have been established against the appellant at paragraph 17.24 (8) of the first supplementary charge-sheet dated 30.04.2021 is as under: “Investigation has established that A-8 is a local contractor and used to provide financial support to CPI (Maoist) proscribed terrorist organization. A-8 was regularly in touch with A-14 and on 20.11.2019, he received a letter from A-14 through Shivnath Yadav and Abul Ansari. On 21.11.2019, a day before the incident, he along with Shivnath Yadav, Abul Ansari and Ravi Ranjan @Pintu Singh went to Beerjangha Forest and met A-14 who demanded levy to the tune of Rs.20,00,000/- from A-8. A-8 was regularly in touch with A-14 and on 20.11.2019, he received a letter from A-14 through Shivnath Yadav and Abul Ansari. On 21.11.2019, a day before the incident, he along with Shivnath Yadav, Abul Ansari and Ravi Ranjan @Pintu Singh went to Beerjangha Forest and met A-14 who demanded levy to the tune of Rs.20,00,000/- from A-8. A-8 finally agreed to pay Rs.12,00,000/- and assured A-14 helping his wife in getting bail. Thereafter, A-8 paid Rs.2,00,000/- to A-14 and returned back. Thereafter, as per the averments made in pre-para, it is established that A-8 provided financial assistance to A-14, RCM of CPI (Maoist) a prescribed terrorist organization. A-8 paid levy to CPI (Maoist) which helped in strengthening the organization for waging war against Government of India and threatening national securities." Thereafter, the petitioner-appellant filed an application before Special Judge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for discharge from facing trial, which was registered as Misc. Criminal Application No. 128 of 2023. The learned Special Judge, after hearing learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of documents available on record, rejected the application filed by the appellant stating that there is prima facie material available against the petitioner-appellant for framing of charge under Sections 120B read with Section 121, 121A of the Indian Penal Code; under Section 10, 13, 17, 18, 39 and 40 of the UA(P) Act, 1967, against which, the appellant has approached this Court by filing Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 356 of 2023. During pendency of the Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 356 of 2023, the learned Special Judge framed the charge against the appellant vide order dated 11.04.2023, against which, the appellant filed Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 666 of 2023. 5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that while rejecting the discharge application and subsequently framing the charges under Section 120B read with Sections 121, 121A of the Indian Penal Code; under Section 10, 13, 17, 18, 39 and 40 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention Act, 1967, the learned Special Judge has not appreciated the fact about non-availability of ingredient of offence alleged to have been committed under Sections 120B read with Section 121, 121A of the Indian Penal Code; under Section 10, 13, 17,18, 39 and 40 of the UA(P) Act, 1967, under which the cognizance of the offence has been taken. It has been submitted by referring to various paragraphs of the counter affidavit which has been filed by the respondent-NIA that no ingredient is said to be available against the appellant making out a case under Sections120B read with Section 121, 121A of the Indian Penal Code due to the reason that the only allegation is that the amount of levy, as demanded by the proscribed group i.e., MCC (Maoist) has been given by the appellant. There is no allegation of conspiring for giving result to the occurrence in which the four police personnel has died. Further submission has been made that even there is no ingredient of Section 10, 13, 17, 18, 39 and 40 of the UA (P) Act, 1967. It has been submitted that Section 10 of UA (P) Act, 1967 speaks about penalty for being member of an unlawful association, etc., but as would appear from the material gathered and referred in the counter affidavit that there is no such allegation that appellant was a member of such unlawful association. So far as Section 13 of the Act, 1967 is concerned, submission has been made that it speaks about punishment for unlawful activities for whoever takes part in or commits or advocates, abets, advises or incites the commission of any unlawful activity, but from the materials available against him, it appears that nothing has come against the appellant that he was involved in such activity at any point of time. Further, there is no ingredient of Section 17 of the Act, 1967 also as the appellant did not ever raise funds for terrorist activity, directly or indirectly, rather, the NIA, after investigation, has come to conclusion at paragraph 17.11.9 of the first supplementary charge-sheet that funding for the Maoist comes from abductions, extortion and by setting up unofficial administrations to collect taxes in rural areas and Maoist are extorting vast amount of money from local branches of mining companies, contractors and other business persons. The investigation further establishes that the appellant is a partner of M/s Santosh Construction and when the appellant took the work of road construction from Mcluskinganj to Chandwa in 2021 the cadres of CPI (Maoist) demanded levy amount from the appellant for which the appellant had to pay the levy to protect his life, which itself clarifies that the appellant was not in any way was involved in raising funds rather on compulsion he has paid the amount by way of levy. Hence, Section 17 of the Act, 1967 is not any way attracted against the appellant. Further submission has been made that there is no ingredient of Section 18 also since no evidence has come in course of investigation that the appellant ever conspired or attempted to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act. Submission has been made that ingredient of Section 39 and 40 of the Act, 1967 are also not attracted as the aforesaid provision stipulate about the offence relating to support given to a terrorist organization and offence of raising fund for a terrorist organization respectively, but, after taking into consideration the material available in the first supplementary charge-sheet basis upon which the counter affidavit has been filed, it appears that the appellant has given the amount by way of levy and once it is established by the Investigating agency-NIA that the amount has been paid by way of levy, it cannot be construed to be the fund to support the terrorist organization with an intention to support the activity of a terrorist organization. It has further been submitted that applicability of Section 17 of the Act, 1967 will only come into play if raising of funds with mens rea but nothing has come in course of investigation that the appellant was helping in any way to the proscribed terrorist group with an intention to support rather he was subjected to coercion for collecting levy from him. Learned counsel for the appellant in order to strengthen his argument that ingredient of Section 17 will come into play if there will be any mens rea has relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pulin Das Alias Panna Koch Vs. Learned counsel for the appellant in order to strengthen his argument that ingredient of Section 17 will come into play if there will be any mens rea has relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pulin Das Alias Panna Koch Vs. State of Assam [ (2008) 5 SCC 89 ]; People's Union for Civil Liberties & Another Vs. Union of India [ (2004) 9 SCC 580 ; as also the judgment passed by Bombay High Court in the case of Mohammad Gausuddin Vs. State of Maharashtra [(2003) SCC Online Bom 270]. Learned counsel for the appellant on the basis of aforesaid argument coupled with case laws, as referred above, has submitted that since the learned Special Judge without appreciating the aforesaid fact has rejected the discharge application vide order dated 16.02.2023 framed the charges against the appellant, vide order dated 11.04.2023, therefore, it requires interference by this Court. 6. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the respondent-NIA has submitted that ample material has been surfaced against the appellant, as would appear from the reference to that effect made in various paragraphs of the counter affidavit. Referring to the different paragraphs of the counter affidavit, it has been submitted that: (I).The appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8) is a key partner of construction firm, namely, M/s Santosh Construction, Chandwa, Latehar, who was arrested in this case on 03.02.2021. The respondent-NIA, after a thorough investigation, collected sufficient prosecutable evidence and submitted supplementary charge-sheet on 30.04.2021 against the appellant and other 33 persons. (II).During investigation, the appellant was found close to accused Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), who is Regional Commander of CPI (Maoist), and used to provide logistics support to him quite often besides providing funds, which were used by top Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) for carrying out terrorist activities. (III).Further, in the year 2012, the appellant gave rupees four lakhs to Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) through third person, which was collected by Kunwar Ganjhu, brother of Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) on behalf of CPI-Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14). (IV).In the year 2014, the appellant gave rupees one lakh to banned terrorist organization CPI (Maoist) through a third person and also sent Rs. 50,000/- to Maoist- Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) through another person. (IV).In the year 2014, the appellant gave rupees one lakh to banned terrorist organization CPI (Maoist) through a third person and also sent Rs. 50,000/- to Maoist- Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) through another person. In the year 2014 itself, on the direction of accused-Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) clothes and shoes to the football players were provided by accused-Mrityunjay Kumar Singh @ Sonu Singh. (V).On 21.11.2019, i.e., one day prior to the unfortunate incident, on receipt of letter from Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), the appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar Singh @ Sonu Singh (A-8) along with his three associates went to Beerjangha forest where he met Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), who was camping there along with his armed cadres for execution of the instant terror attack against the police and on being asked by Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) to pay Rs. 20,00,000- (twenty lakhs), with mutual understanding, the appellant/accused-Mrityunjay Kumar Singh @ Sony Singh agreed to pay Rs. 12,00,000/- [Twelve Lakhs] for the road construction work taken by him and Rs. 5,00,000/- (Five Lakhs) for the road construction of Belanga to Run Road of another contractor who was his friend. Further, on that day, the appellant/accused Mrityunjay Kumar Singh @ Sonu Singh (A-8) paid Rs. 2,00,000/- to Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) which was directly used by the CPI (Maoist) in commission of the instant terrorist activity i.e., for arranging logistics for commission of heinous act. Even, on being asked by accused, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) for engagement of good lawyer to get his wife-Lalita Devi released, the appellant gave affirmative reply. (VI).On 31.12.2019, accused Baijnath Ganjhu (A-1) went to the house of appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar Singh @ Sony Singh (A-8) and showed him letter of accused Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14). Both exchanged their mobile numbers on that day. Later on, on 02.01.2020, the appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8) made a call to Baijnath Ganjhu (A-1) and asked him to collect money for accused Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), whereupon accused accused Baijnath Ganjhu (A-1) and Rajesh Ganjhu (A-3) came to the house of house of appellant and collected Rs. 5,00,000/- for handing it over to Regional Commander of CPI (Maoist)-Ravindra Ganjhu. Again on 05.01.2020, accused persons-Baijnath Ganjhu (A-1), Rajesh Ganjhu (A-3) and Kunwar Ganjhu (elder brother of Ravindra Ganjhu) came to the house of appellant, where the appellant gave Rs. 5,00,000/- and one pair of new clothes of Nike Company for handing it over to Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14). 5,00,000/- for handing it over to Regional Commander of CPI (Maoist)-Ravindra Ganjhu. Again on 05.01.2020, accused persons-Baijnath Ganjhu (A-1), Rajesh Ganjhu (A-3) and Kunwar Ganjhu (elder brother of Ravindra Ganjhu) came to the house of appellant, where the appellant gave Rs. 5,00,000/- and one pair of new clothes of Nike Company for handing it over to Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14). (VII).It has been averred in the counter affidavit that investigation revealed that the amounts were withdrawn from the bank account of M/s Santosh Construction through his employees on 02.11.2019 and 04.11.2019 respectively, which itself shows his previous and subsequent conduct and establishes his guilt in committing grave offence. It further also established his mens rea that the appellant knowingly and willfully supported illegal activities by providing funds and logistics support to CPI (Maoist) on regular basis. (VIII).During examination, accused Baijnath Ganjhu (A-1), Rajesh Ganjhu (A-3) and Kunwar Ganjhu (elder brother of Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14)] disclosed that while they were returning from the house of appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8) with cash of Rs. 5,00,000/- (five lakhs) and new clothes for handing it over to Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), they were apprehended by the police and in their disclosure statement they have clearly stated that the amount and clothes have been given by accused Mrityunjay Kumar Singh @ Sonu Singh (A-8) to be handed over to accused, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), for which, a case was registered in Chandwa Police Station being F.I.R. No. 4 of 2020, in which, the appellant was also arrayed as accused. However, later on investigation in this case was taken up by NIA and accordingly Chandwa Police Station being F.I.R. No. 4 of 2020 was re-registered as RC-38/2020/NIA/DLI dated 03.11.2020. (IX).In the counter affidavit, it has further been stated that during investigation, it has surfaced that the accused, Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh was charge-sheeted and was sent to custody for the period from 20.09.2014 to 03.12.2015 i.e, for one year two months and 14 days in two other cases in Chandwa P.S i.e. Crime No. 99 of 2014 dated 19.09.2014 under Sections 364, 302, 201 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Crime No. 108 of 2015 dated 15.06.2015 under Sections 279, 337 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, which reveals that the appellant has close links with many gangsters/criminals apart from top Cadres of CPI (Maoist), a proscribed terrorist organization. (X).There are substantial evidence on record to show that the appellant was in collusion with the proscribed terrorist organization as such he cannot claim himself to be the victim of the act of terrorist as at no point of time, the appellant made complaint before local police about extortion or levy during the period 2014 to 2021 i.e., till his arrest that he was subjected to extortion by CPI (Maoist). However, the appellant filed complaints against other splinter/rival groups like JJMP, SJMM and JPC, which are said to be anti-CPI (Maoist) organization. Contrarily, the petitioner made false information, again and again before the learned trial Court, before this Court as well as before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that he and his firm filed complaints against CPI (Maoist) and its cadres but the actual fact is that he filed complaint against the rivalry of CPI (Maoist), which shows its collusion with the proscribed terrorist group-CPI (Maoist). (XI).The investigation further reveals that the firm of appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8), M/s Santosh Construction made construction of bridges/road/culverts in various Maoist infested areas but was never stopped to do his work for a single day or no harm was caused to his workers or materials on the site whereas the Maoist cadres burned many vehicles/machineries/materials of other contractors in such naxal infested area and beaten up the workers at various construction sites and also threatened the contractors and their workers for dire consequences, which also establishes the fact that due to mutual understanding between the appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8) and the CPI (Maoists). (XII).During investigation of the instant case, search was conducted on 10.10.2020 in the house and office premise of appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh(A-8) where unaccounted cash of Rs. 2,64,42,000/- [two crores sixty four lakhs and forty two thousand] and some incriminating materials were recovered. On being asked, the father of the appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh(A-8), namely, Santosh Kumar Singh gave a hand-written slip wherein he claimed that he earned an amount of Rs.80 lakhs from bus, truck and crusher and about Rs. 2,64,42,000/- [two crores sixty four lakhs and forty two thousand] and some incriminating materials were recovered. On being asked, the father of the appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh(A-8), namely, Santosh Kumar Singh gave a hand-written slip wherein he claimed that he earned an amount of Rs.80 lakhs from bus, truck and crusher and about Rs. 60 lakhs was borrowed by him and his son, Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh from their relatives and other persons i.e., in total he only disclosed about 1,40,00,000/- [one crore forty lakhs] and for the rest of the amount he failed to produce any documentary proof, which casts doubt upon the source of income of the appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh(A-8). Even some of the lenders, on enquiry denied having lending any amount to Santosh Kumar Singh (father of the appellant) or the appellant and remaining persons in the lender list were the close relative of the appellant but they also failed to explain why they had given amount in cash and not through the bank. Therefore, the investigating agency came to the conclusion that the statement made by genuineness of the said money is false and fabricated. (XIII).The three partners of the firm, M/s Santosh Construction, namely Akhilesh Kumar Singh, Amresh Kumar Singh and Lal Bipin Nath Sahadeo, who infused Rs. 3.32 Crore in AY 2018-19 and Rs. 1.15 Crore in AY 2019-20 in the capital of the firm have failed to explain the source of their income regarding the amount infused in the capital amount of the firm. On analysis of the expenses of M/s Santosh Construction it has surfaced that a huge amount of Rs. 6.47 Crore was paid during Assessment Years 2015-16 to 2019-20 as expenses to sub-contractors-Sh. Bachaspati Sharma, Smt. Vijay Laxmi Devi, Sh. Bijendra Yadav, Sh. Thakur Jaswant Singh, Anil Construction and Sh Anag Sinha but on examination Sh Bachaspati Sharma had denied that he and his wife Vijay Laxmi Devi had done any work as sub-contractor for M/s Santosh Construction and similarly Sh. Bijendra Yadav had also denied. (XIV).During investigation, it also surfaced that the firm in question also fabricated unaudited balance-sheet with an intention to mop up the unaccounted amount. The tax audit of the books of accounts was not done for the last two financial years i.e., FY 2020-21 and 2021-22 but the ITRs have been filed without audit report. Bijendra Yadav had also denied. (XIV).During investigation, it also surfaced that the firm in question also fabricated unaudited balance-sheet with an intention to mop up the unaccounted amount. The tax audit of the books of accounts was not done for the last two financial years i.e., FY 2020-21 and 2021-22 but the ITRs have been filed without audit report. The appellant- Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8) though resigned from the firm on 09.01.2021 i.e., post seizure of cash of Rs. 2,64,42,200/- whereas reconstitution of the firm deed was made on 05.06.2021 which was effected from 01.04.2021 while he was in jail from 03.02.2021 to 31.01.2023 but has been found that remuneration of Rs.13,50,000/- and 13,08,000/- has been paid to him in FY 2021-22 and FY 2020-21 respectively. (XV).It has been averred that since the investigation revealed that the seized cash of Rs. 2,64,42,000/- falls within the ambit of “Proceeds of Terrorist” as defined under Section 2(1)(g) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the said cash was seized/attached under Section 25(5) of the UA(P) Act on 25.04.2022, against which, the firm submitted a representation before the Designated Authority, MHA, New Delhi for releasing the seized amount but the said authority rejected his representation on merit confirming the order of seizure vide order dated 23.06.2022, which was challenged by filing Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 2022 before the learned NIA Special Judge, Ranchi. The learned Special Judge, after hearing the parties and on perusal of material available on record, dismissed the said appeal vide order dated 06.01.2023, against which, the appellant filed appeal before this Court by filing Cri. Appeal (DB) No. 154 of 2023, which also stands dismissed vide order dated 02.03.2023. (XVI). During investigation, many accounts of the firm M/s Santosh Construction and its partner was frozen on different dates by the NIA, against which, the appellant moved this Court filing writ petition being W.P.(Cr.) No. 205 of 2021, which was dismissed vide order 02.08.2022. Against the order of dismissal, the appellant moved Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petition (Cr.) No. 09998 of 2022, which was dismissed vide order dated 03.01.2023 directing the respondent-NIA to complete the investigation within two months from the date of order and thereafter may take appropriate steps. Against the order of dismissal, the appellant moved Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petition (Cr.) No. 09998 of 2022, which was dismissed vide order dated 03.01.2023 directing the respondent-NIA to complete the investigation within two months from the date of order and thereafter may take appropriate steps. (XVII).During investigation, the investigating agency asked for books of accounts, labour payment details, staff salaries payment, materials purchased from the unregistered GST suppliers, sub-contractor payment details etc., but the same was not provided by the partner of the firm and their accountant and Chartered Accountants, which shows that they did not maintain any digital records intentionally and used to maintain some hand written temporary ledgers, few rough notes of expenses regarding material purchased from unregistered GST suppliers. The total income of the firm M/s Santosh Construction and its active partner during FY 2013-14 and 2021-22 was approx 19.79 crores only whereas the assets worth of approx. Rs. 30.90 crores were acquired during the said period which is highly disproportionate to the income. (XVIII).It has been averred that several witnesses but not limited to protected witness, ‘C’, ‘E’, ‘K’, ‘L’, ‘X’ and ‘Y’; PWs 34, 40, 57, 58, 60 and 123 have deposed that the appellant- Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh(A-8) used to provide funds to the cadres of proscribed terrorist organization CPI (Maoist) and also documentary evidence which were sufficient to prove the offence against the appellant and make out a prima facie case against the appellant- Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh(A-8). Learned counsel for the respondent-NIA has submitted that the entire materials were produced before the learned trial Court, who on being satisfied with the sufficiency of evidence available against him, has been pleased to reject the application for discharge and thereafter charges have been framed on 11.04.2023 against the present appellant- Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh(A-8), which requires no interference by this Court as there is prima facie material available against the appellant for trial. 7. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the respondent-NIA relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State Vs. 7. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the respondent-NIA relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State Vs. Selve [ AIR 2018 SC 81 ] wherein it has been held that at the time of framing of charge, probative value of material on record has to be gone into, which proceeds on presumption that the material produced by prosecution is true but court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that material produced does not warrant conviction. Further relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in State through CBI Vs. Dr. Anup Kumar Srivastava [ (2017) 15 SCC 560 ] wherein the Hon’ble Court has determined that at the stage of framing of charge the trial court is not to examine and assess in detail the material produced by prosecution or to consider sufficiency of material to establish offence alleged. Learned counsel for the respondent-NIA further referred to the judgment rendered in Asim Shariff Vs. National Investigation Agency [ (2019) 7 SCC 148 ], in particular 16 to 19. In the backdrop of these facts and judicial pronouncements, learned counsel for the respondents-NIA has submitted that the appellant/accused Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8) is not entitled to any relief. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the contents of the counter affidavit. 9. Although the charges have already been framed against the appellant but this Court at this juncture thinks fit to discuss the principle of discharge as contained under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 10. There are two important components in Section 227 Cr.P.C - (a). after hearing the submissions of the accused and (b). not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court while hearing the issue of ‘hearing the submissions of the accused’ has dealt with the same in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi [ AIR 2005 SC 359 : (2005) 1 SCC 568 ], wherein at paragraph 18 it has been held as under: “18. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention. The reliance on Articles 14 and 21 is misplaced. The scheme of the Code and object with which Section 227 was incorporated and Sections 207 and 207-A omitted have already been noticed. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention. The reliance on Articles 14 and 21 is misplaced. The scheme of the Code and object with which Section 227 was incorporated and Sections 207 and 207-A omitted have already been noticed. Further, at the stage of framing of charge roving and fishing inquiry is impermissible. If the contention of the accused is accepted, there would be a mini-trial at the stage of framing of charge. That would defeat the object of the Code. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge the defence of the accused cannot be put forth. The acceptance of the contention of the learned counsel for the accused would mean permitting the accused to adduce his defence at the stage of framing of charge and for examination thereof at that stage which is against the criminal jurisprudence. By way of illustration, it may be noted that the plea of alibi taken by the accused may have to be examined at the stage of framing of charge if the contention of the accused is accepted despite the well-settled proposition that it is for the accused to lead evidence at the trial to sustain such a plea. The accused would be entitled to produce materials and documents in proof of such a plea at the stage of framing of the charge, in case we accept the contention put forth on behalf of the accused. That has never been the intention of the law well settled for over one hundred years now. It is in this light that the provision about hearing the submissions of the accused as postulated by Section 227 is to be understood. It only means hearing the submissions of the accused on the record of the case as filed by the prosecution and documents submitted therewith and nothing more. The expression “hearing the submissions of the accused” cannot mean opportunity to file material to be granted to the accused and thereby changing the settled law. At the stage of framing of charge hearing the submissions of the accused has to be confined to the material produced by the police.” [Emphasis supplied] The second component i.e., ‘not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’, has been dealt with by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr. At the stage of framing of charge hearing the submissions of the accused has to be confined to the material produced by the police.” [Emphasis supplied] The second component i.e., ‘not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’, has been dealt with by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr. [ (1979) 3 SCC 4 ], wherein at paragraphs 7 it has been held as under: “7. Section 227 of the Code runs thus: “If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.” The words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.” The Hon’ble Apex Court has further dealt with the proper basis for framing of charge in the case of Onkar Nath Mishra & Ors Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr. [ (2008) 2 SCC 561 ] wherein at paragraphs 11,12 and 14 it has been held as under: “11. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr. [ (2008) 2 SCC 561 ] wherein at paragraphs 11,12 and 14 it has been held as under: “11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. 12. In State of Karnataka v. L.Muniswamy [ (1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404], a three-Judge Bench of this Court had observed that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As framing of charge affects a person's liberty substantially, need for proper consideration of material warranting such order was emphasised. 14. In a later decision in State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [ (2000) 6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] this Court, referring to several previous decisions held that: (SCC p. 342, para 7) “7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijayan Vs. State of Kerela & Anr. [(2010) SCC 398 SC] and in Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr. [ (1979) 3 SCC 4 ] has formulated guidelines. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sajjan Kumar Vs. State of Kerela & Anr. [(2010) SCC 398 SC] and in Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr. [ (1979) 3 SCC 4 ] has formulated guidelines. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sajjan Kumar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation [ (2010) 9 SCC 368 ] at paragraph 21 has also formulated such guidelines, which reads as under: 21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu represented by Inspector of Police Vigilance and Anti-corruption Vs. N. Suresh Rajan and others [ (2014) 11 SCC 709 , it has been held that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the Court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. In the case of State of Karnataka Lokayukta, Police Station, Bengaluru Vs. M.R. Hiremath (2019) 7 SCC 515 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the Court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat & Ors Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat & Ors Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. [ (2013) 11 SCC 476 ], has held that at the time of framing of charge the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record to decide whether there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence. There is no need to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence to convict the accused. Materials brought on record by the prosecution can be believed to be true, but their probative value cannot be decided at that stage. The accused is entitled to urge his contentions while entertaining the discharge application only on the material submitted by the prosecution, but he is not entitled to produce any material at that stage and the Court is not required to consider any such material. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial judge is empowered to discharge the accused, irrespective of the result of the trial. 12. Before examining the legality and reasonability of the order dated 11.04.2023 whereby charges have been framed against the appellant, it will be purposeful to discuss the scope and applicability of section 228 of Criminal Procedure Code. For ready reference the section 228 of Cr.P.C. is being quoted herein under: “(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which- (a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, and thereupon the Chief Judicial Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant- cases instituted on a police report; (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub- section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.” From perusal of the aforesaid provision it is evident that the question of framing charge arises only when the court finds that the accused is not entitled to discharge in Sessions Cases and the provisions relating to discharge of the accused are very important and the Judge must consider first whether there are any sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Palwinder Singh Vs. Balvinder Singh & others (2009) 3 SCC(Cri) 850 has been pleased to hold that charges can also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshaling and appreciation of the evidence is not in the domain of the court at that point of time. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sajjan Kumar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation [ (2010) 9 SCC 368 ] has been pleased to hold that at the stage of framing of charge under Section 228 Cr.P.C. it is not for the judge concerned to analyze all materials including pros and cons, reliability and acceptability etc.; the evidentiary value and its credibility and veracity has to be considered at the stage of trial. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. S. Selvi & Another, reported in (2018) 13 SCC 455 has categorically held that at the stage of Sections 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State through CBI Vs. Dr. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State through CBI Vs. Dr. Anup Kumar Srivastava (supra) has emphatically held that the legal position is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge the trial Court is not to examine and assess in detail the materials placed on record by the prosecution nor is it for the Court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the offence alleged against the accused persons. At the stage of charge the Court is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied that a prima facie case of commission of offence alleged has been made out against the accused persons. It is further held by the Hon’ble Apex Court framing of charge is the first major step in a criminal trial where the Court is expected to apply its mind to the entire record and documents placed therewith before the court. Taking cognizance of an offence has been stated to necessitate an application of mind by the court but framing of charge is a major event where the court considers the possibility of discharging the accused of the offence with which he is charged or requiring the accused to face trial. The Hon’ble Apex Court delineating the scope of Court?s powers in respect of framing of charges in a criminal cases one of those being Dipakbhai Jagdishchndra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547 , wherein the law relating to the framing of charge and discharge is discussed elaborately in paragraphs 15 and 23 and same are reproduced as under : “15. We may profitably, in this regard, refer to the judgment of this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh [State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 ] wherein this Court has laid down the principles relating to framing of charge and discharge as follows: (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4) “4. We may profitably, in this regard, refer to the judgment of this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh [State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 ] wherein this Court has laid down the principles relating to framing of charge and discharge as follows: (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4) “4. … Reading Sections 227 and 228 together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. … If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.” 23. At the stage of framing the charge in accordance with the principles which have been laid down by this Court, what the court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post office. The court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the sense that the court dons the mantle of the trial Judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after a full-fledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has made out the case for the conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the court must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. The material must be such as can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that the accused has committed the offence. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. The material must be such as can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that the accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must be the suspicion which is premised on some material which commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that the accused has committed the offence.” Recently the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohd. Maqbool Magrey, (2022) 12 SCC 657 has elaborately discussed the issue of framing of charge and has held in paragraph 27 which reads as under: “27. Thus from the aforesaid, it is evident that the trial court is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the time of framing of charge and should not act as a mere post office. The endorsement on the charge-sheet presented by the police as it is without applying its mind and without recording brief reasons in support of its opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the material which is required to be evaluated by the court at the time of framing charge should be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous as would render the exercise a mini trial to find out the guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required at this stage is that the court must be satisfied that the evidence collected by the prosecution is sufficient to presume that the accused has committed an offence. Even a strong suspicion would suffice. Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is placed before the court by the prosecution in the shape of final report in terms of Section 173CrPC, the court may also rely upon any other evidence or material which is of sterling quality and has direct bearing on the charge laid before it by the prosecution.” 13. Thus from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely infer that as per mandate of Section 227 Cr. Thus from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely infer that as per mandate of Section 227 Cr. P.C., if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so. Further as per Section 228 Cr. P.C. only thereafter and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge. Therefore, the stage of discharge under Section 227 Cr. P.C. is a stage prior to framing of the charge (under Section 228 Cr. P.C.) and once the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed for framing of charge under Section 228 Cr. P.C. At the stage of Section 227, the judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame the charge against him and after that if the judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 Cr.P.C, if not, he will discharge the accused. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. It is our considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the Court was only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not because at the stage of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible. 14. In the backdrop of aforesaid case laws and judicial deduction, this Court is now proceeding to examine the fact so as to come to the conclusion as to whether the evidence which has been collected in course of investigation and has been brought on record, as would be available in the impugned order as also in the counter affidavit, prima facie case is made out or not? 15. It appears from the pleadings made by the parties and the counter affidavit filed by the respondents-NIA on the basis of investigation done in this case that: (i). As per paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit, the appellant is one of the partners of M/s Santosh Construction, Latehar who came closer to Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), a Regional Commander of CPI (Maoist), and used to provide logistics support to him quite often besides providing funds, which were used by top Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) for carrying out terrorist activities. (ii). At paragraph 11, it has been stated that in the year 2012, the appellant gave rupees four lakhs to Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) through third person, which was collected by Kunwar Ganjhu, brother of Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) on behalf of Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14). In the year 2014, the appellant gave rupees one lakh to banned terrorist organization CPI (Maoist) through a third person and also sent Rs. 50,000/- to Maoist- Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) through another person. In the year 2014 itself, on the direction of accused- Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) clothes and shoes to the football players were provided by the appellant. In the year 2014, the appellant gave rupees one lakh to banned terrorist organization CPI (Maoist) through a third person and also sent Rs. 50,000/- to Maoist- Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) through another person. In the year 2014 itself, on the direction of accused- Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) clothes and shoes to the football players were provided by the appellant. It is alleged that on 21.11.2019, one day prior to the incident of terror attack in which four police personnel has died and their arms and ammunitions were looted, on receipt of letter from Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), the appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8) along with his three associates went to Beerjangha forest met Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), who was camping there along with his armed cadres for execution of the instant terror attack against the police and on being asked by Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), to pay Rs. 20,00,000- (twenty lakhs), with mutual understanding, the appellant/accused-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sony Singh agreed to pay Rs. 12,00,000/- [Twelve Lakhs] for the road construction work taken by him and Rs. 5,00,000/- (Five Lakhs) for the road construction of Belanga to Run Road of another contractor who was his friend. Further, on that day, the appellant/accused Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8) paid Rs. 2,00,00/- to Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) which was directly used by the CPI (Maoist) in commission of the instant terrorist activity i.e., for arranging logistics for commission of heinous act. (iii).At paragraph 12, it has been stated that on 31.12.2019, accused Baijnath Ganjhu (A-1) went to the house of appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sony Singh (A-8) and showed him letter of accused Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14). On 02.01.2020, the appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8) made a call to Baijnath Ganjhu (A-1) and asked him to collect money for accused Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), whereupon accused accused Baijnath Ganjhu (A-1) and Rajesh Ganjhu (A-3) came to the house of house of appellant and collected Rs. 5,00,000/- for handing it over to Regional Commander of CPI (Maoist)-Ravindra Ganjhu. Again on 05.01.2020, accused persons-Baijnath Ganjhu (A-1), along with other associates came to the house of appellant, where the appellant gave Rs. 5,00,000/- and one pair of new clothes of Nike Company for handing it over to Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14). 5,00,000/- for handing it over to Regional Commander of CPI (Maoist)-Ravindra Ganjhu. Again on 05.01.2020, accused persons-Baijnath Ganjhu (A-1), along with other associates came to the house of appellant, where the appellant gave Rs. 5,00,000/- and one pair of new clothes of Nike Company for handing it over to Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14). It has been averred that the amounts were withdrawn from the bank account of M/s Santosh Construction through his employees on 02.11.2019 and 04.11.2019 respectively, which itself shows his previous and subsequent conduct and establishes his guilt in committing grave offence. (iv).At paragraph 13 of the counter affidavit, it has been stated that during examination, accused Baijnath Ganjhu (A-1), Rajesh Ganjhu (A-3) and Kunwar Ganjhu (elder brother of Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14)] disclosed that while they were returning from the house of appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8) with cash of Rs. 5,00,000/- (five lakhs) and new clothes for handing it over to Maoist, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), they were apprehended by the police and in their disclosure statement they have clearly stated that the amount and clothes have been given by accused Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8) to be handed over to accused, Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), for which, a case was registered in Chandwa Police Station being F.I.R. No. 4 of 2020, in which, the appellant was also arrayed as accused. However, later on investigation in this case also was taken up by NIA and accordingly Chandwa Police Station being F.I.R. No. 4 of 2020 was re-registered as RC-38/2020/NIA/DLI dated 03.11.2020. (v).In the counter affidavit at paragraph 14, it has further been stated that during investigation, it has surfaced that the accused, Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh was charge-sheeted and was sent to custody for the period from 20.09.2014 to 03.12.2015 i.e, for one year and two months and 14 days in two other cases in Chandwa P.S i.e. Crime No. 99 of 2014 dated 19.09.2014 under Sections 364, 302, 201 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Crime No. 108 of 2015 dated 15.06.2015 under Sections 279, 337 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, which reveals that the appellant has close links with many gangsters/criminals apart from top Cadres of CPI (Maoist), a proscribed terrorist organization. (vi).At paragraph 16, it has been stated that there are substantial evidence on record to show that the appellant in collusion with the proscribed terrorist organization therefore he cannot claim herself to be the victim of the act of terrorist as at no point of time, the appellant made complaint before local police about extortion or levy that he was subjected to extortion by CPI (Maoist) but filed complaints against other splinter/rival groups like JJMP, SJMM and JPC, which are said to be anti-CPI (Maoist) organization, rather, the petitioner made false information, again and again before the learned trial Court, before this Court as well as before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that he and his firm filed complaints against CPI (Maoist) and its cadres but as a matter of fact he filed complaint against the rivalry of CPI (Maoist), which shows its collusion with the proscribed terrorist group-CPI (Maoist). (vii).At paragraph 17, it has been stated that the investigation further reveals that the firm of appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8), M/s Santosh Construction made construction of bridges/road/culverts in various Maoist infested areas but was never stopped to do his work for a single day or no harm was caused to his workers or materials on the site whereas the Moaist cadres burned many vehicles/machineries/materials of other contractors in such naxal infested area and beaten up the workers at various construction sites and also threatened the contractors and their workers for dire consequences, which also establishes the fact that due to mutual understanding between the appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8) and the CPI (Maoists). (viii).At paragraph 19, 20 and 21 of the counter affidavit, it has been stated that during investigation of the instant case, search was conducted on 10.10.2020 in the house and office premise of appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8), unaccounted cash of Rs. 2,64,42,000/- [two crores sixty four lakhs and forty two thousand] and some incriminating materials were recovered. On being asked, the father of the appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh(A-8), namely, Santosh Kumar Signh gave a hand-written slip wherein he claimed that he earned an amount of Rs.80 lakhs from bus, truck and crusher and about Rs. 2,64,42,000/- [two crores sixty four lakhs and forty two thousand] and some incriminating materials were recovered. On being asked, the father of the appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh(A-8), namely, Santosh Kumar Signh gave a hand-written slip wherein he claimed that he earned an amount of Rs.80 lakhs from bus, truck and crusher and about Rs. 60 lakhs was borrowed by him and his son, Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh form their relatives and other persons i.e., in total he only disclosed about 1,40,00,000/- [one crore forty lakhs] and for the rest of the amount he failed to produce any documentary proof, which casts doubt upon the source of income of the appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh(A-8). Even some of the lenders, on enquiry denied having lending any amount to Santosh Kumar Singh (father of the appellant) or the appellant and remaining persons in the lender list were the close relative of the appellant, however, they also failed to explain why they had given amount in cash and not through the bank. Therefore, the investigating agency came to the conclusion that the statement made by genuineness of the said money is false and fabricated. It has been stated that three partners of the firm, M/s Santosh Construction have failed to explain the source of their income regarding the amount infused in the capital amount of the firm. (ix).At paragraph 22, it has been stated that on analysis of the expenses of M/s Santosh Construction it has surfaced that a huge amount of Rs. 6.47 Crore was paid during Assessment Years 2015-16 to 2019-20 as expenses to sub-contractors but on examination the sub-contractor Sh Bachaspati Sharma had denied that he and his wife Vijay Laxmi Devi had done any work as sub-contractor for M/s Santosh Construction and similarly the other sub-contractor, Sh. Bijendra Yadav denied. (x).At paragraph 23 it has been stated that during investigation, it also surfaced that the firm in question also fabricated unaudited balance-sheet with an intention to mop up the unaccounted amount. The tax audit of the books of accounts was not done for the last two financial years i.e., FY 2020-21 and 2021-22 but the ITRs have been filed without audit report. (xi).At paragraph 24, it has clearly been stated that the investigation revealed that the seized cash of Rs. The tax audit of the books of accounts was not done for the last two financial years i.e., FY 2020-21 and 2021-22 but the ITRs have been filed without audit report. (xi).At paragraph 24, it has clearly been stated that the investigation revealed that the seized cash of Rs. 2,64,42,000/- falls within the ambit of “Proceeds of Terrorist” as defined under Section 2(1)(g) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The said cash was seized/attached under Section 25(5) of the UA(P) Act on 25.04.2022, against which the firm submitted a representation before the Designated Authority, MHA, New Delhi for releasing the seized amount which was rejected vide order dated 23.06.2022 and order of rejection was affirmed up-to Hon’ble Supreme Court. (xii). At paragraph 25 and 26, it has been stated that during investigation, many accounts of the firm M/s Santosh Construction and its partner was frozen on different dates by the NIA, against which, the appellant moved this Court filing writ petition being W.P.(Cr) No. 205 of 2021, which was dismissed vide order 02.08.2022, which was affirmed by Hon’ble Supreme Court. During investigation, the investigating agency asked for books of accounts, labour payment details, staff salaries payment, materials purchased from the unregistered GST suppliers, sub-contractor payment details etc., but the same was not provided by the partner of the firm and their accountant and Chartered Accountants, which shows that they did not maintain any digital records intentionally and used to maintain some hand written temporary ledgers, few rough notes of expenses regarding material purchased from unregistered GST suppliers. (xiii). At paragraph 33, it has been averred that several witnesses but not limited to protected witness, ‘C’, ‘E’, ‘K’, ‘L’, ‘X’ and ‘Y’; PWs 34, 40, 57, 58, 60 and 123 have deposed that the appellant- Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh(A-8) used to provide funds to the cadres of proscribed terrorist organization CPI (Maoist) and also documentary evidence which were sufficient to prove the offence against the appellant and make out a prima facie case against the appellant- Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh(A-8). (xiv). At paragraph 35, in unequivocal terms it has been stated that the appellant/accused-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8) had a long association with the Maoist Cadres as he was utilizing them to eliminate/reduce competition in his contract work. (xiv). At paragraph 35, in unequivocal terms it has been stated that the appellant/accused-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8) had a long association with the Maoist Cadres as he was utilizing them to eliminate/reduce competition in his contract work. Investigation further reveals that he used to threaten other civil contractors against participating in the government bidding process with the help and assistance of these armed Maoist cadre. Investigation further reveals that he and his father also used to create hurdles, directly and indirectly for other contractors in execution of the awarded civil works in Latehar district. 16. This Court in the light of aforesaid material fact available on record against the appellant is now proceeding to examine the contention raised on behalf of appellant regarding non-availability of various Sections under which the charges have been framed. 17. Charge has been framed under Section 120B read with Section 121, 121A of the Indian Penal Code; under Section 10, 13, 17, 18, 39 and 40 of the UA(P) Act, 1967, this Court, therefore, on the threadbare of ingredients of these Sections is examining as to whether there is ingredient of the Sections, above referred, so as to prove prima facie case against the appellant. 18. For ready reference, Section 120 B, 121 and 121A of the Indian Penal Code is reproduced hereunder as: 120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.— (1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, [imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence. (2)Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.] 121. Waging, or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against the Government of India.—Whoever wages war against the [Government of India], or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death, or [imprisonment for life] [and shall also be liable to fine]. [Illustration] 5***A joins an insurrection against the [Government of India]. A has committed the offence defined in this section. [Illustration] 5***A joins an insurrection against the [Government of India]. A has committed the offence defined in this section. 6* * * * * 7 [121A. Conspiracy to commit offences punishable by section 121.—Whoever within or without [India] conspires to commit any of the offences punishable by section 121, or conspires to overawe, by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force, [the Central Government or any [State] Government ], shall be punished with [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description which may extend to ten years, [and shall also be liable to fine]. Explanation.—To constitute a conspiracy under this section, it is not necessary that any act or illegal omission shall take place in pursuance thereof.] It is evident from Section 120 B that the same speak about a criminal conspiracy whereas Section 121 speaks about waging or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against the Government of India. Further Section 121A says about conspiracy to commit offences punishable by section. 19. Further Section 121A says about conspiracy to commit offences punishable by section. 19. Further, charge has been framed under Section under Section 10, 13, 17, 18, 39 and 40 of the UA(P) Act, 1967, which are quoted as under: [10.Penalty for being member of an unlawful association, etc.—Where an association is declared unlawful by a notification issued under section 3 which has become effective under sub-section (3) of that section,— (a) a person, who— (i) is and continues to be a member of such association; or (ii) takes part in meetings of such association; or (iii) contributes to, or receives or solicits any contribution for the purpose of, such association; or (iv) in any way assists the operations of such association, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine; and (b) a person, who is or continues to be a member of such association, or voluntarily does an act aiding or promoting in any manner the objects of such association and in either case is in possession of any unlicensed firearms, ammunition, explosive or other instrument or substance capable of causing mass destruction and commits any act resulting in loss of human life or grievous injury to any person or causes significant damage to any property,— (i) and if such act has resulted in the death of any person, shall be punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine; (ii) in any other case, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.] 13. Punishment for unlawful activities.—(1) Whoever— (a) takes part in or commits, or (b) advocates, abets, advises or incites the commission of, any unlawful activity, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. (2) Whoever, in any way, assists any unlawful activity of any association, declared unlawful under section 3, after the notification by which it has been so declared has become effective under sub-section (3) of that section, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both. (2) Whoever, in any way, assists any unlawful activity of any association, declared unlawful under section 3, after the notification by which it has been so declared has become effective under sub-section (3) of that section, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both. (3) Nothing in this section shall apply to any treaty, agreement or convention entered into between the Government of India and the Government of any other country or to any negotiations therefor carried on by any person authorised in this behalf by the Government of India. [17. Punishment for raising funds for terrorist act.—Whoever, in India or in a foreign country, directly or indirectly, raises or provides funds or collects funds, whether from a legitimate or illegitimate source, from any person or persons or attempts to provide to, or raises or collects funds for any person or persons, knowing that such funds are likely to be used, in full or in part by such person or persons or by a terrorist organisation or by a terrorist gang or by an individual terrorist to commit a terrorist act, notwithstanding whether such funds were actually used or not for commission of such act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purpose of this section,— (a) participating, organising or directing in any of the acts stated therein shall constitute an offence; (b) raising funds shall include raising or collecting or providing funds through production or smuggling or circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian currency; and (c) raising or collecting or providing funds, in any manner for the benefit of, or, to an individual terrorist, terrorist gang or terrorist organisation for the purpose not specifically covered under section 15 shall also be construed as an offence.] 18. Punishment for conspiracy, etc.—Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or [incites, directly or knowingly facilitates] the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 39. 39. Offence relating to support given to a terrorist organisation.—(1) A person commits the offence relating to support given to a terrorist organisation,— (a) who, with intention to further the activity of a terrorist organisation,— (i) invites support for the terrorist organization; and (ii) the support is not or is not restricted to provide money or other property within the meaning of section 40; or (b) who, with intention to further the activity of a terrorist organisation, arranges, manages or assists in arranging or managing a meeting which he knows is— (i) to support the terrorist organization; or (ii) to further the activity of the terrorist organization; or (iii) to be addressed by a person who associates or professes to be associated with the terrorist organisation; or (c) who, with intention to further the activity of a terrorist organisation, addresses a meeting for the purpose of encouraging support for the terrorist organisation or to further its activity. (2) A person, who commits the offence relating to support given to a terrorist organisation under sub-section (1) shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or with fine, or with both. 40.Offence of raising fund for a terrorist organisation.—(1) A person commits the offence of raising fund for a terrorist organisation, who, with intention to further the activity of a terrorist organisation,— (a) invites another person to provide money or other property, and intends that it should be used, or has reasonable cause to suspect that it might be used, for the purposes of terrorism; or (b) receives money or other property, and intends that it should be used, or has reasonable cause to suspect that it might be used, for the purposes of terrorism; or (c) provides money or other property, and knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect, that it would or might be used for the purposes of terrorism. 1 [Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, a reference to provide money or other property includes— (a) of its being given, lent or otherwise made available, whether or not for consideration; or (b) raising, collecting or providing funds through production or smuggling or circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian currency.] (2) A person, who commits the offence of raising fund for a terrorist organisation under sub-section (1), shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years, or with fine, or with both. Section 10 speaks about the penalty for being member of an unlawful association, etc. A person, who is and continues to be a member of such association; or takes part in meetings of such association; or contributes to, or receives or solicits any contribution for the purpose of, such association; or in any way assists the operations of such association, shall be punished under the provision of this Act. Section 13 speaks about the punishment for unlawful activities i.e., whoever takes part in or commits, or advocates, abets, advises or incites the commission of, any unlawful activity; and whoever, in any way, assists any unlawful activity of any association, declared unlawful under section 3, after the notification by which it has been so declared has become effective under sub-section (3) of that section, shall be punished under the provisions of this Act. Section 17 says about the punishment for raising funds for terrorist act whoever, directly or indirectly, raises or provides funds or collects funds, whether from a legitimate or illegitimate source, from any person or persons or attempts to provide to, or raises or collects funds for any person or persons, knowing that such funds are likely to be used, in full or in part by such person or persons or by a terrorist organization or by a terrorist gang or by an individual terrorist to commit a terrorist act, notwithstanding whether such funds were actually used or not for commission of such act. Section 18 speaks about the punishment for conspiracy, etc. whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or [incites, directly or knowingly facilitates] the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act. Section 18 speaks about the punishment for conspiracy, etc. whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or [incites, directly or knowingly facilitates] the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act. Section 39 speaks about the offence relating to support given to a terrorist organisation and say that a person commits the offence relating to support given to a terrorist organisation who, with intention to further the activity of a terrorist organization, invites support for the terrorist organization; and the support is not or is not restricted to provide money or other property within the meaning of section 40; or who, with intention to further the activity of a terrorist organisation, arranges, manages or assists in arranging or managing a meeting which he knows is to support the terrorist organization; or to further the activity of the terrorist organization; or to be addressed by a person who associates or professes to be associated with the terrorist organisation; or who, with intention to further the activity of a terrorist organisation, addresses a meeting for the purpose of encouraging support for the terrorist organisation or to further its activity. Section 40 says about the offence of raising fund for a terrorist organization. A person commits the offence of raising fund for a terrorist organisation, who, with intention to further the activity of a terrorist organisation, invites another person to provide money or other property, and intends that it should be used, or has reasonable cause to suspect that it might be used, for the purposes of terrorism; or receives money or other property, and intends that it should be used, or has reasonable cause to suspect that it might be used, for the purposes of terrorism; or provides money or other property, and knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect, that it would or might be used for the purposes of terrorism. 20. The argument has advanced that no ingredient neither of Section 120B read with Sections 121, 121A of the Indian Penal Code nor Section 10, 13, 17, 18, 39 and 40 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention Act, 1967 are attracted against the appellant. 21. 20. The argument has advanced that no ingredient neither of Section 120B read with Sections 121, 121A of the Indian Penal Code nor Section 10, 13, 17, 18, 39 and 40 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention Act, 1967 are attracted against the appellant. 21. This Court is not in agreement with such submission reason being that if Section 120B read with Section 121 and 121A of the Indian Penal Code will be taken into consideration it speaks about criminal conspiracy and in the counter affidavit, in particular, at paragraph 10, 11 and 12 it has been stated that the appellant used to give logistic support to proscribed organization (MCC Maoist) besides extending financial aid, which were used by top Maoist Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) for carrying out terrorist activities. At paragraph 35 of the counter affidavit, in clear terms it has been stated that the appellant/accused-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8) had a long association with the Maoist Cadres as he was utilizing it to eliminate/reduce competition in his contract work and used to threaten other civil contractors against participating in the government bidding process with the help and assistance of these armed Maoist cadre, a proscribed terrorist organization, which has been declared to be a proscribed organization who used to wage war against the government by killing the police personnel looting their arms and ammunitions. Further material which has been collected in course of investigation by the investigating agencyagainst the appellant also suggests his association with the proscribed organization, as has been discussed above and as such in that view of the matter the argument which has been advanced that there is no ingredient of Section 120B, 121 and 121A of the Indian Penal Code, according to our considered view, is fit to be rejected and accordingly rejected. 22. Thus, the ingredients of Section 120 B read with Section 121 and 121 A of the Indian Panel Code is prima facie attracted so as to proceed with the trial. 23. The ingredient for attracting Section 10 of the UA(P) Act, 1967 are that the person who continues to be a member of such association; or takes part in meetings of such association; or contributes to, or receives or solicits any contribution for the purpose of, such association; or in any way assists the operations of such association. 23. The ingredient for attracting Section 10 of the UA(P) Act, 1967 are that the person who continues to be a member of such association; or takes part in meetings of such association; or contributes to, or receives or solicits any contribution for the purpose of, such association; or in any way assists the operations of such association. So far availability of ingredient of Section 10 of U.A.(P) Act, 1967 is concerned, it has surfaced during investigation that to eliminate competition in his contract work, he made association with top Maoist Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), Regional Commander of proscribed organization (MCC Maoist) which continued for a long period of time. Further, material has been collected against the appellant of his active association with the proscribed terrorist organization and during investigation material has also surfaced which prima facie indicates about complicity of the appellant in assisting operation of such association by transmitting the amount so collected and kept with him as would appear from paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of counter affidavit. Hence, in that view of the matter, we are of the prima facie view that the ingredient of Section 10 is prima facie attracted. So far ingredient of Section 13 of Act, 1967 is concerned, it stipulates that whoever takes part in or commits or in any way, assists any unlawful activity of any association, declared unlawful shall be liable to be punished under the provision of this Act. The petitioner since has given logistic support to the proscribed Maoist group, besides giving monetary assistance and assurance of arranging legal aid for the wife of accused-Rabindra Ganjhu (A-14), as such ingredient of Section 13 of U.A.(P) Act, 1967 is attracted in this case. As per averments made in the counter affidavit, it transpires that the petitioner directly or indirectly supported the terrorist organization, who used the logistics support and funds as provided by the appellant for spreading terror. Further, when search was conducted on 10.10.2020 in the house and office premise of appellant-Mrityunjay Kumar @ Sonu Singh (A-8), unaccounted cash of Rs. 2,64,42,000/- [two crores sixty four lakhs and forty two thousand] and some incriminating materials were recovered. The associates of accused-Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), Regional Commander of CPI (Maoist) often comes to collect the amount so asked by him from the appellant. 2,64,42,000/- [two crores sixty four lakhs and forty two thousand] and some incriminating materials were recovered. The associates of accused-Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), Regional Commander of CPI (Maoist) often comes to collect the amount so asked by him from the appellant. Therefore, this Court is of the view, based upon the material surfaced during investigation, prima facie suggests the ingredient of Section 17, 18, 39 and 40 are not attracted against the appellant for framing of charge/facing the trial. 25. The attachment of amount of Rs. 2,64,42,000/- [two crores sixty four lakhs and forty two thousand] has been questioned by one of the partner of the M/s Santosh Construction by filing Cr. A (DB) No. 154 of 2023, but the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 16.03.2023 has affirmed the order passed by the Special Judge, whereby and whereunder the order of attachment passed under Section 25 (3) of the Act has been refused to be interfered with. The aforesaid fact of seizure of amount of Rs.2,64,42,000/- [two crores sixty four lakhs and forty two thousand] the fact about handing over the money in favour of A-4, as per the detailed discussion made hereinabove amassing the huge source of money without the known source of income since the amount which has been recovered could not be substantiated in the ITR or from the known source of document rather even after opportunity being given to appellant to explain the source of income he failed to substantiate the same, all constitutes to attract the ingredient of 39 and 40 of UA(P) Act, 1967. 26. The argument has been advanced on behalf of appellant that the amount so given to the accused-Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) was the levy but even accepting the fact about recovery of money or handing over the huge amount in favour of member of proscribed group to be a levy amount, it cannot be termed as a levy amount reason being that the levy amount mean by putting pressure upon the person by the proscribed group but in the material collected in course of investigation by the NIA wherein it has come that the amount so collected was used to be kept with the appellant in his house and whenever the amount was desired by Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) the appellant used to hand over the money to A-14 through his man. Since the appellant used to keep the money with him then it cannot be said that it was only subjected to levy. Otherwise, there was no occasion for the appellant to keep the money so collected in his possession and whenever it was demanded, the same was being handed over to accused-Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14). 27. Similar plea has been taken before Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in another case being Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 71 of 2020 wherein the appellant of the said case has taken plea that the appellant was subjected to extortion/levy for smooth running of his business and he was having no option but to give money (levy) to the terrorist group (TPC). The argument in the aforesaid pretext was raised that when the appellant was subjected to extortion then the ingredient of Section 17 of the UA (P) Act will not be applicable. The Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court has dealt with the aforesaid argument and has rejected the aforesaid plea, as would appear from paragraph 22 of the aforesaid judgment, relevant portion of which reads as under: “22. ………… The issue of extortion has also been raised by the appellants by raising the point that they were the victims of extortion and as such, they cannot be held criminally liable even if any money has been paid. According to the appellants, the funding has been done to the TPC in order to run the business smoothly. On the other hand, learned senior counsel appearing for the NIA has submitted that even the issue of extortion cannot be adjudged at this stage as the same depends upon the factual aspect and can be decided upon appreciation of the evidence led by the parties. This Court has found substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the NIA as the issue of extortion or mensrea or vicarious liability are the factual aspects and the same can only be assessed by appreciating the evidence either documentary or oral and therefore, we are of the view that at this stage the issue of mensrea, vicarious liability or victim of extortion will not be proper to be looked into in absence of relevant documents. At this juncture, learned senior counsel for the appellants, Mr. At this juncture, learned senior counsel for the appellants, Mr. Cheema, referring to Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, has submitted that the appellate court has the power to deal with the issue both on law and facts and according to him, the fact denotes the appreciation of fact for consideration of issue of mensrea, vicarious liability or issue of extortion. However, we are not impressed by such submission because appreciation of fact at this stage will not be proper to be considered and cannot be considered save and except which is available on record i.e., either in the charge-sheet or in the order taking cognizance and we, on the basis of the fact as has been brought on record by way of second supplementary chargesheet, are of the view that the investigating agency has found prima facie allegation against the appellants treating it to be sufficient for framing of charges. It further requires to mention herein that the aforesaid judgment (Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 71 of 2020) has been challenged before the Hon’ble Apex Court by filing Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 779/2022 but the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to refuse to interfere with the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court. 28. Herein also, argument has been advanced that the amount, which is said to be amount collected by way of demand of levy is also cannot be considered to attract the ingredient of Section 17 of the UPA Act but the said plea is fit to be rejected, reason being that there is sufficient ingredient so as to attract 17 of the UA(P) Act, 1967 as such there is no reason to take different view since the Co-ordinate Division Bench has already taken the view that the appellant cannot be allowed to take the plea that he has been subjected to compulsion for making payment of the amount in favour of terrorist group. 29. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Bombay High Court in the case of Mohammad Gausuddin Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) but we after going through the order passed by the Bombay High Court has found that the factual aspects pertains to grant of bail but herein we are dealing with the appeal against rejection of application for discharge and framing of charge. 30. State of Maharashtra (supra) but we after going through the order passed by the Bombay High Court has found that the factual aspects pertains to grant of bail but herein we are dealing with the appeal against rejection of application for discharge and framing of charge. 30. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment rendered in the case of People's Union for Civil Liberties & Another (supra) in order to demonstrate the issue of mens rea wherein Section 20, 21 and 22 of the TADA Act was the subject matter. According to learned counsel for the appellant Section 20, 21 and 22 is pari materia to the provision of raising funds as is available under the UAP Act and in absence of any mens rea the allegation cannot be said to be established. But we are not impressed with such argument after going through the material surfaced in course of investigation by the investigating agency against the appellant wherein intention has been shown to be explicit since the appellant was in direct touch with the Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), the Regional Commander of proscribed group-MCC (Maoist) and he was in money transaction also and used to keep money in his house as has been referred in the preceding paragraphs. 31. Further the stage of Section 227 the learned judge is merely to evaluate the evidence in order to find out whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, in other words the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie discloses that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him and after that if the learned trial judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame charge under Section 228 Cr.P.C. and if it is found that there is no sufficient ground, the learned trial judge will discharge the accused. However, since the stage of discharge under Section 227 Cr. P.C. is a stage prior to framing of charge (under Section 228 Cr. P.C.), as such if the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed to framing of charge under Section 228 Cr. However, since the stage of discharge under Section 227 Cr. P.C. is a stage prior to framing of charge (under Section 228 Cr. P.C.), as such if the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed to framing of charge under Section 228 Cr. P.C. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or go into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. It is, thus, evident that at the stage of discharge or framing of charge the Court is only required to consider whether there is prima facie case is made out or not. 32. This Court on the basis of discussion made herein above and coming back to the position of law for showing interference against the order of framing of charge as per the judgment rendered herein above wherein the requirement is that at the stage of discharge/framing of charge the Court is required to evaluate materials and documents on record to decide whether facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offence. Here, in the instant case, we are of the view that after going through the material collected as referred in the counter affidavit and considering it on its face value which according to considered value discloses the presence of ingredients to constitute the offence. 33. In consequence thereof and based upon the discussion made hereinabove, we are of the considered view that the ground so agitated for interfering with the order passed by the learned trial Court refusing to discharge the appellant is having no substance and accordingly the same is hereby dismissed. We are further of the view based upon the discussions made hereinabove that the charges which has been framed by the learned trial Court under different Sections prima facie suggests the ingredients are attracted against the aforesaid offence and hence we are also not inclined to interfere with the same. 34. Resultantly, both the appeals stand dismissed. 35. In consequence of dismissal of these appeals, pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. 36. 34. Resultantly, both the appeals stand dismissed. 35. In consequence of dismissal of these appeals, pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. 36. Before parting with the order, it is made clear that the findings so recorded at by this Court are restricted only for the purpose of dealing with the matter of discharge/framing of charges and as such the trial Court will not be prejudiced by any of the findings so recorded by this Court or observations made by this Court, during trial of the instant case.