JUDGMENT : The plaintiff in O.S.No.197 of 2013 before the Sub Court, Kozhikode is the appellant. She filed the suit for declaration, injunction; both mandatory and prohibitory and damages for use and occupation. The suit was decreed as per the judgment dated 24.09.2014, except in regard to the claim for damages. The 1st defendant preferred A.S.No.166 of 2014 before the District Court, Kozhikode. The plaintiff preferred a cross objection. The appeal and the cross objection were disposed of as per a common judgment dated 22.03.2016. The appeal was allowed and the cross objection was dismissed. Resultantly, the original suit stands dismissed. Aggrieved thereby the plaintiff filed this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 2. The appeal was admitted on 01.09.2016 on the following substantial questions of law: i) Whether the lower appellate court is justified in acting on Ext.A4 document as genuine when it is attested by a notary unaccompanied by a certificate and attestation of the same by another notary unaccompanied by certificate and when it is not an act contemplated under the Notaries Act? ii. Whether the lower appellate court was justified in dismissing the petition to admit additional evidence invoking Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure to examine notary who had allegedly attested the copy-Ext.A4 which does not qualify for a presumption? An additional substantial question of law is framed, namely, iii. Is the finding of fact by the lower appellate court that the original of Ext. B2 power of attorney is a valid deed so irrational attracting the blame of being perverse? 3. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents. 4. The parties are referred to in accordance with their ranks in the suit. 5. The trial court, after trial, decreed the suit in part as follows: “1. Declaring that sale deed bearing No.262/2007 of S.R.O. Kozhikode (Ext.A7) and document No.263/2007 of S.R.O. Kozhikode (Ext.A8) are invalid and void; 2. Restraining the defendants and their men from trespassing into the plaint A schedule property and committing acts of waste therein and interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaint A schedule property by the plaintiff by a permanent prohibitory injunction; 3. Restraining the defendants and their men from trespassing into the plaint A schedule property and committing acts of waste therein and interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaint A schedule property by the plaintiff by a permanent prohibitory injunction; 3. Directing the 1st defendant to vacate and surrender vacant possession of the house bearing No.37/1101 situates in the property described as item No.1 in the plaint A schedule to the plaintiff within two months from today by a mandatory injunction.” 6. The plaintiff was aggrieved by the observations in the judgment that she had executed Exts.B6 and B7 receipts, acknowledging receipt of a sum of Rs.11 lakhs and hence she filed the cross objection assailing the said finding. The lower appellate court, after hearing both sides, held that Exts.A7 and A8 documents were executed by the 1st defendant in the exercise of valid authority given to him by the plaintiff in terms of the original of Ext.B2 power of attorney. Thereby, the lower appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court that Exts.A7 and A8 sale deeds were invalid. The finding of the trial court that the said power of attorney is a fabricated one was also reversed by the first Appellate Court. The reasons for the said findings are given by the first Appellate Court in paragraph No.13 of the said judgment which reads thus: “13. The contention of the 1st appellant is that a power of attorney was got executed by the 1st respondent from Mumbai and the same was attested by one Notary Public by name Davood N Prasada of Greater Mumbai and the same was sent to him authorising him to sell the plaint schedule properties. According to the 1st appellant by using the power of attorney so executed he sold the property to the 2nd appellant and 2nd respondent who are his brothers-in-law. The further case of the 1st appellant is that for the purpose of executing sale deed in the name of the 2nd appellant and the 2nd respondent with respect to plaint schedule properties the power of attorney was produced before the Sub Registrar, Kozhikode. The registered document along with power of attorney was received back from the Registrar's office by DW2, an attesting witness to the document. The registered document along with power of attorney was received back from the Registrar's office by DW2, an attesting witness to the document. Exts.A7 and A8 are the certified copies of the assignment deed executed by the 1st appellant in the name of the 2nd appellant and the 2nd respondent. According to the 1st appellant, though the originals of Exts.A7 and A8 were handed over to him by DW2 Murali, the power of attorney was handed over to the 1st respondent. So the original power of attorney is not available with him at present. To prove the power of attorney, the 1st appellant therefore produced Ext.B2 photocopy of the power of attorney attested by Advocate Chithra of Kozhikode. The 1st respondent would dispute the genuineness of Ext.B2 copy. The case of the 1st respondent is that clause (d) in Ext.B2 has been illegally incorporated by the 1st appellant without the concurrence and if the original power of attorney is produced it would be revealed. In my view the evidence of DW1 and DW2 would show that the original power of attorney is not with the 1st appellant. Further in the cross-examination PW1 would admit that she had seen the original power of attorney in the office of her lawyer. In my view this admission made by PW1 in the cross-examination would go a long way to accept the case of the 1st appellant that the original power of attorney is with the 1st respondent and she is withholding the same. Further there is a categoric admission made by the 1st respondent in Ext.A5 notice sent by her to the 1st appellant regarding the due execution of a power of attorney. Ext.A5 notice has been issued by the 1st respondent through her lawyer informing the 1st appellant cancelling the power of attorney executed by her. The stand taken by the 1st respondent during trial is that she did not execute a power of attorney and instead she put the signature in a power of attorney without getting the same attested by any authorising person and sent the same to the 1st appellant. The admission in Ext.A5 speak very much against the case of the 1st respondent. If she had not executed a power of attorney, there was no need for her to cancel the same. The admission in Ext.A5 speak very much against the case of the 1st respondent. If she had not executed a power of attorney, there was no need for her to cancel the same. So the contention raised by the st respondent that she did not execute the power of attorney in the name of the 1st appellant cannot be accepted. Further when specific question was put to PW1 in cross-examination she would say that the power of attorney allegedly executed by her is seen attested by Notary Public Davood N Prasada, a resident of Greater Mumbai. Though she is a resident of Mumbai did not conduct any enquiry about the whereabouts of the Notary Public. So the only inference that can be drawn is that the 1st respondent did not conduct any enquiry regarding Notary Public as she was very much aware that the power of attorney was attested by Davood N Prasada of Greater Mumbai.” 7. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/appellant would submit that the findings of the lower Appellate Court in the aforesaid paragraph are against the pleadings and evidence. It is submitted that the trial court rendered the findings after a proper appreciation of the evidence, but the lower appellate court reversed such findings stating incorrect facts and stating totally untenable reasons, obligating this Court to consider the correctness of the said findings. 8. In Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh [ (1992) 1 SCC 647 ] the Apex Court held that there is no prohibition on entertaining a second appeal even on a question of fact, provided the court is satisfied that the findings of fact recorded by the courts below stood vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by showing an erroneous approach to the matter i.e. the findings of fact are found to be perverse. It is, however, explained that the High Court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of fact in a routine and casual manner by substituting its subjective satisfaction in place of that of the lower courts. This principle was reiterated in Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali [ (2010) 12 SCC 740 ] and Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab State Electricity Board and others [ (2010) 13 SCC 216 ]. 9. The Apex Court in Illoth Valappil Ambunhi (D) By LRs. This principle was reiterated in Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali [ (2010) 12 SCC 740 ] and Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab State Electricity Board and others [ (2010) 13 SCC 216 ]. 9. The Apex Court in Illoth Valappil Ambunhi (D) By LRs. v. Kunhambu Karanavan [ (2020) 18 SCC 317 ] held that it is now well settled that perversity in arriving at a factual finding gives rise to a substantial question of law, attracting intervention of the High Court under Section 100 of the Code. In Narayan Sitaramji Badwaik (Dead) through LRs. v. Bisaram and others [ AIR 2021 SC 2438 ] the Apex Court considered the extent of the jurisdiction of High Courts to appreciate factual issues under Section 103 of the Code. It was held that the High Court may decide an issue of fact, provided there is sufficient evidence on record before it, in two circumstances. First, when an issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal has not been determined by the lower Appellate Court or by both the Courts below. And the second, when an issue of fact has been wrongly determined by the Court below by virtue of the decision on the question of law under Section 100 of the Code. The said principle was reiterated by the Apex Court in Azgar Barid (D) by LRs. and others v. Mazambi @ Pyaremabi and others [ (2022) 5 SCC 334 ]. 10. Indisputably, the plaintiff was the owner of plaint A schedule properties. She obtained plaint A schedule item No.1, which includes two properties, by virtue of Ext.A1 sale deed from her brother Sri.Mohandas. She obtained plaint A schedule item No.2 by virtue of Ext.A2, which is a partition deed. Her definite case is that having been in Mumbai along with her family, she entrusted the properties with her brother, the 1st defendant, for management as a caretaker. She is said to have executed a power of attorney for that purpose alone in his favour. She would contend that the 1st defendant prepared and sent a power of attorney along with a covering letter, which are Exts.A3 and A3(a), but it contained a clause enabling him to alienate the properties, which she did not want and therefore she had executed a power of attorney avoiding such a clause. Ext.A4 is said to be a copy of that power of attorney. Ext.A4 is said to be a copy of that power of attorney. The plaintiff would allege that the 1st defendant interpolated Ext.A4 by inserting a few words in clauses (d), (e) and (f) in it. And, using such a fabricated power of attorney; Ext.B2 is said to be a copy of it, the 1st defendant on 15.03.2007 executed Ext.A7 alienating plaint A schedule item No.1 in favour the 2nd defendant and Ext.A8 alienating plaint A schedule item No.2 in favour of the 3rd defendant. Defendants No.2 and 3 are admittedly the brothers-in-law of the 1st defendant. 11. The 1st defendant stoutly denies that the original of Ext.B2 was anyway manipulated. He thus claims that in the exercise of the powers given to him by Ext.B2 he validly had executed Exts.A7 and A8. The 1st defendant set forth another plea that Ext.A1 sale deed was taken in the name of the plaintiff for namesake only and it was he who purchased that property. The 1st defendant relying on Ext.B1, which is a sale agreement executed between himself and Sri.Mohandas in regard to plaint A schedule item No.1 properties, claimed that it was he who purchased the property, and for the reason of her advancing him Rs.4 lakhs, the document was taken in her name. 12. Ext. A1 does not contain any recital indicating that the sale took place at the instance of the 1st defendant or that he is the real purchaser. On a perusal, it is obvious that the transaction mentioned in Ext.B1 does not have any relation with the transaction in Ext. A1. His claim is thus based only on his oral testimony. The claim that he was the ostensible owner is absolutely untenable in the light of the registered document (Ext.A1) conferring title of that property to the plaintiff. Such a plea is hit by Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 13. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant-plaintiff contended that the manipulation and embellishment in Ext.B2 are obvious on the face of it as well as from the circumstances obtained in this case, and no amount of evidence could save Exts.A7 and A8 from being invalidated. 13. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant-plaintiff contended that the manipulation and embellishment in Ext.B2 are obvious on the face of it as well as from the circumstances obtained in this case, and no amount of evidence could save Exts.A7 and A8 from being invalidated. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants-respondents, per contra, would submit that Exts.A7 and A8 being duly registered documents, their genuineness can well be inferred in view of the provisions of Section 60 of the Registration Act and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned Senior Counsel would submit that once the process of registration is duly gone through, the genuineness of the power of attorney, based on which such deeds are executed and presented for registration, is not germane for consideration. 14. The Apex Court in Bhagat Ram and another v. Suresh and others [ AIR 2004 SC 436 ] held that while a document is registered and particulars as required by Sections 52 and 58 of the Registration Act are endorsed on it as provided in Section 60, a presumption by reference to Section 114 [Illustration (e)] of the Evidence Act regarding its genuineness arises. The said principle was reiterated in Jamila Begum (dead) through LRs v. Shami Mohommed (dead) through LRs and another [ AIR 2019 SC 72 ], wherein it was held that a registered document carries with it a presumption that it was validly executed. In such a case, it is for the party challenging the genuineness of the transaction to show that the document is not valid in law. The onus of proof in that matter is on the person who challenges the transaction. 15. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff would submit that in the absence of production of original of Ext.B2 power of attorney itself, Exts.A7 and A8 have to be held invalid documents. It is contended that despite disputing genuineness of the power of attorney and filing a petition specifically asking the defendants to produce, they did not produce the original of Ext.B2. Further, the pleading of the defendants and the evidence they let in regard to the original of Ext.B2, being too contradictory to be acted upon, the only possible finding is that the document was tampered by the 1st defendant. Further, the pleading of the defendants and the evidence they let in regard to the original of Ext.B2, being too contradictory to be acted upon, the only possible finding is that the document was tampered by the 1st defendant. A contention that the original of Ext.B2 was not duly attested or registered as per the provisions of the Registration Act is also set forth as a reason to find it an invalid one. 16. The learned counsel appearing on either side referred to the decision in Manik Majumder and others v. Dipak Kumar Saha (dead) through LRs and others [ AIR 2023 SC 506 ] concerning the said aspect. In that decision, the question was regarding validity of a sale deed executed by the 2nd plaintiff as the power of attorney of the original owner of the property in his own name and another sale deed he subsequently executed in favour of the 1st plaintiff, who is none other than his wife. Validity of the sale deeds was questioned by the defendants by disputing genuineness of the power of attorney. The power of attorney was not produced before the court. The principal, who said to have executed that the power of attorney, was not a party to the suit, and therefore, there was no occasion for him to dispute the genuineness of the power of attorney. In such a factual scenario the Honourable Judges composing the Division Bench rendered conflicting judgments. One view taken was that there was non-compliance of the provisions of Section 32 read with Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act insofar as the production of power of attorney for the purpose of registration of the sale deed was concerned and hence no presumption could be drawn. The other view was that since the power of attorney holder had executed and presented the sale deed for registration and as the original owner of the property, did not initiate any proceedings to dispute execution of the power of attorney, it could only be said that the sale deed executed by the 2nd plaintiff as the power holder of the owner was a valid document. In view of the said conflicting views and as a final judgment in that case was not rendered, the ratio of the said decision is not able to be deduced. 17. In view of the said conflicting views and as a final judgment in that case was not rendered, the ratio of the said decision is not able to be deduced. 17. A situation where a sale deed executed by the power of attorney and presented for registration cropped up for consideration in Amar Nath v. Gian Chand and another [ (2022) 11 SCC 460 ]. The questions whether the registering authority has an obligation to enquire into and decide regarding genuineness or not of the power of attorney before allowing registration of the document executed and presented by the attorney, was considered in detail. The import of the provisions of Sections 32, 33 and 34 of the Registration Act was considered and the principle of law emanates therefrom was laid down by the Apex Court in the following words,- “33. The argument of the plaintiff that for a proper and legal presentation of a document, the first defendant was obliged to produce the original power of attorney, does not appear to be sound. In fact, the matter itself is not res integra. This Court in Rajni Tandon v. Dulal Ranjan Ghosh Dastidar [(2019) 14 SCC 784 : (2009) 5 SCC (civ) 520], held, inter alia, as follows: “19. In view of the aforesaid situation, the issue that falls for our consideration is whether a person who executes a document under the terms of the power of attorney, is, insofar as the registration office is concerned, the actual executant of the document and is entitled under Section 32(a) to present it for registration and get it registered. xxx xxx xxx 21. Section 32 deals with persons who are eligible to present documents for registration before the proper registration office. Section 32 specifies three categories of persons who can present documents for registration. The use of the word “or” between the clauses of Section 32 demonstrates that the legislature intended the said clauses to be read disjunctively and not conjunctively. It is settled law that the use of the word “or” is used to signify the disjunctive nature of a provision. In this regard reference may be made to the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. State of A.P. [ (2006) 9 SCC 591 ] 22. It is settled law that the use of the word “or” is used to signify the disjunctive nature of a provision. In this regard reference may be made to the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. State of A.P. [ (2006) 9 SCC 591 ] 22. Clause (a) of Section 32 specifies that a document can be presented for registration by: (i) by the person executing the document; (ii) any person claiming under the document presented for registration; and (iii) in the case the said document is a copy of a decree or order, any person claiming under the decree or order. Clauses (b) and (c) deal with cases where the document is presented not by any person mentioned in (i), (ii) and (iii) above but by their agent, representative or assign. This is so because the use of the words “such person” in clauses (b) and (c) can be understood to mean only persons as referred to in (i), (ii) and (iii) above. 23. It may also be mentioned herein that the scope of clauses (b) and (c) in Section 32 may to an extent overlap one another. However, we do not propose to deal with the same as it is not relevant for determination of the issue before us. It is suffice to say that insofar as clause (c) of Section 32 is concerned the agents, representatives or assigns of the persons referred to in (i), (ii) and (iii) above can present the said document for registration only if they are duly authorised by the power of attorney executed and authenticated in the manner hereinafter mentioned. 24. The words “executed and authenticated in manner hereinafter mentioned” in Section 32(c) would mean the procedure specified in Section 33. This is clear from the opening words of Section 33 which reads “for the purposes of Section 32, the following power of attorney shall alone be recognised”. Section 32 refers to documents presented for registration by a holder of “power of attorney” in clause (c) and it therefore follows that the procedure specified under Section 33 would be attracted where a document is presented by a person holding “powers of attorney” of the persons mentioned in clause (a) of Section 32. 25. Section 32 refers to documents presented for registration by a holder of “power of attorney” in clause (c) and it therefore follows that the procedure specified under Section 33 would be attracted where a document is presented by a person holding “powers of attorney” of the persons mentioned in clause (a) of Section 32. 25. The aforesaid position makes it explicitly clear that Section 32 of the Act requires the documents sought to be registered, to be presented, inter alia by the person executing it. In other words, the said expression requires presence of the actual person executing the document. The basic principle underlying this provision of the Act is to get before the Sub-Registrar the actual executant who, in fact, executes the document in question. In fact, the ratio of the decision in Ram Gopal [AIR 1960 Punj 226] has laid down a similar proposition on the conjoint reading of Section 32 and Section 33 of the Act and after referring to all the judgments noted hereinbefore. Same view has been expressed earlier by the Bombay High Court in Ratilal Nathubhai v. Rasiklal Maganlal [ AIR 1950 Bom 326 ]. 26. It is important to bear in mind that one of the categories of persons who are eligible to present documents before the registration office in terms of Section 32 of the Act is the “person executing” the document. The expression “person executing” used in Section 32 of the Act, can only refer to the person who actually signs or marks the document in token of execution, whether for himself or on behalf of some other person. Thus, “person executing” as used in Section 32(a) of the Act signifies the person actually executing the document and includes a principal who executes by means of an agent. Where a person holds a power of attorney which authorises him to execute a document as agent for someone else, and he executes a document under the terms of the power of attorney, he is, so far as the registration office is concerned, the actual executant of the document and is entitled under Section 32(a) to present it for registration and get it registered. xxx xxx xxx 28. xxx xxx xxx 28. In the facts of the present case, it is quite clear that Indra Kumar Halani, was given the full authority by Nandlal Tantia under the power of attorney to transfer the suit property and to execute the necessary document. It is an accepted position that the said document had been executed by Indra Kumar Halani in the name and on behalf of Nandlal Tantia thereof. Therefore, for the purposes of registration office under Section 32(a) of the Act Indra Kumar Halani is clearly the “person executing” the document. Therefore, it follows that the said sale deed which was executed and authenticated by Indra Kumar Halani could be presented for registration by him. We are of the considered view that Indra Kumar Halani acted in the aforesaid manner mandated under Section 32(a) of the Act. 29. The object of registration is designed to guard against fraud by obtaining a contemporaneous publication and an unimpeachable record of each document. The instant case is one where no allegation of fraud has been raised. In view thereof the duty cast on the registering officer under Section 32 of the Act was only to satisfy himself that the document was executed by the person by whom it purports to have been signed. The Registrar upon being so satisfied and upon being presented with a document to be registered had to proceed with the registration of the same.” xxx xxx 37. Section 34 provides for the inquiry to be done by the Registering Office before he orders registration. It declares that no document shall be registered under the Act unless the persons executing such document or their representatives, assigns or agents authorised as aforesaid, appear before the Registering Authority before the time, allowed for presentation under Sections 23, 24, 25 and 26. This is, however, subject to Sections 41, 43, 45, 69, 75, 77, 83 and 89. Appearances under Section 34(1) may be simultaneous or at different times. Section 34(3)(a) enjoins upon the Registering Officer to enquire whether or not such document was executed by the persons by whom it purports to have been executed. Section 34(3)(b) further makes it his duty to satisfy himself as to the identity of a person’s appearing before him and alleging that they have executed the document. It must be understood and read along with Section 32(a). Section 34(3)(b) further makes it his duty to satisfy himself as to the identity of a person’s appearing before him and alleging that they have executed the document. It must be understood and read along with Section 32(a). Section 32(a) mandates presentation of the document for registration by some person executing or claiming under the same, inter alia. In respect of a person who presents the document, who claims to have executed the document, not only is he entitled to present the document for registration, in the inquiry under Section 34(3)(a) and 3(b), the duty of the Registering Officer extends only to enquire and find that such person is the person who has executed the document he has presented and further be satisfied about the identity of the person. When it comes to Section 34(3)(c), the Registering Officer is duty-bound in respect of any person appearing as a representative, assign or agent to satisfy himself of a right of such a person to so appear. Section 34(3)(c) is relatable to persons covered by Section 32(b) and 32(c) of the Act. We have already found that the word ‘agent’ is to be understood as a person who is authorised to present the document for registration. Such an agent would fall under Section 32(c). Thus, in regard to persons falling in Section 34(3)(c), it would, indeed, be incumbent on the agent, inter alia, to produce the power of attorney as such.” (underlines supplied) The Apex Court accordingly held that there is no need for production of the original deed of power of attorney when the document is presented for registration by the person who executed the document on the strength of a power of attorney. It was explained that the enquiry contemplated under the Registration Act cannot extend to the question as to whether the person who executed the document in his capacity of the power holder of the principal was a validly constituted power of attorney or not. Here, the 1st defendant executed Exts.A7 and A8 in his capacity of power of attorney holder of the plaintiff. When he himself presented the documents for registration, it is in terms of the provisions of Section 32(a) of the Registration Act and therefore production of the power of attorney before the registering authority was not required. Here, the 1st defendant executed Exts.A7 and A8 in his capacity of power of attorney holder of the plaintiff. When he himself presented the documents for registration, it is in terms of the provisions of Section 32(a) of the Registration Act and therefore production of the power of attorney before the registering authority was not required. Of course, the 1st defendant has a definite case that he produced the power of attorney before the registering authority. That, however, does not alter the requirement of law or affect legality of the registration and execution of a sale deed. Hence, I hold that whether or not Ext.B2 was produced before the registering authority, that does not have a bearing on the decision regarding validity of Exts.A7 and A8. 18. In Umadevi Nambiar v. Thamarasseri Roman Catholic Diocese [ (2022) 7 SCC 90 ] it was held that possession of a property of an agent under a deed of power of attorney is also the possession of the principal and that any unauthorised sale made by the agent will not tantamount to the principal parting with its possession. In Ramathal and others v. K.Rajamani (dead) through LRs and another [2023 ICO 1172] the said principle was reiterated by holding that once the power of attorney is found to be invalid any further action taken pursuant to it cannot also be held to be valid. Therefore, the sale by the 1st defendant by virtue of Exts.A7 and A8 can confer title to the property in favour of defendant Nos.2 and 3 only if the 1st defendant had valid authority to alienate under Ext.B2 power of attorney. Hence, the moot question is whether the original of Ext.B2 was duly and validly executed by the plaintiff. 19. PW1 is the plaintiff. She deposed denying execution of a power of attorney like Ext.B2. She deposed that when Ext.A3, a draft power of attorney was sent by the 1st defendant, she did not accept it since it contained a provision for alienating the properties. It is her further version that she sent the original of Ext.A4 constituting the 1st defendant as her power of attorney for the purpose of managing the property alone and not giving any power for alienation. She also deposed that she signed in the last page of Ext.A4 alone and it was not attested. 20. It is her further version that she sent the original of Ext.A4 constituting the 1st defendant as her power of attorney for the purpose of managing the property alone and not giving any power for alienation. She also deposed that she signed in the last page of Ext.A4 alone and it was not attested. 20. When confronted, PW1 stated that the clauses conferring power of alienation were inserted in paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) in Ext.B2. The 1st defendant, as DW1, deposed that Ext.B2 is the true copy of the deed of power of attorney sent by the plaintiff. Ext.B2 is attested to be a true copy by one Notary Public, Advocate Chitra A. Non-examination of Smt.Chitra is pointed out as a reason to discard Ext.B2. Further, it is contended that a Notary Public is not authorised to certify true copies. What is relevant to the trial in this case is whether such a document was executed by the plaintiff or whether document actually executed by her is the original of Ext.A4. Therefore, can Ext.B2 be received in evidence as a secondary evidence does not require consideration in this case. In other words, the question requires consideration is only whether the plea concerning the contents of Ext.B2 power of attorney raised by the plaintiff or the 1st defendant is true. 21. The trial court found that there are insertion of words in clauses (d), (e) and (f). Those insertions are, precisely, the difference between Ext.A4 and Ext.B2. If we read clauses (d), (e) and (f), it is gatherable that the words providing for sale are added lastly to each of the said clauses. The words providing for sale have no cohesion with the former part of such clauses. For easy understanding clauses (d), (e) and (f) in both the documents are extracted below: Clauses in Ext.A4 “d) To demand and receive money and articles due to me granting receipts on my behalf. e) To accept service of summons and notices registered communications, money orders and cheques etc. f) AND GENERALLY to do and execute all acts and deeds which you, my brother in your absolute discretion deems necessary and proper. Clauses in Ext.B2 “d) To demand and receive money and articles due to me granting receipts on my behalf for the sale of the above properties. f) AND GENERALLY to do and execute all acts and deeds which you, my brother in your absolute discretion deems necessary and proper. Clauses in Ext.B2 “d) To demand and receive money and articles due to me granting receipts on my behalf for the sale of the above properties. e) To accept service of summons and notices registered communications, money orders and cheques etc., relating to the above sale. f) AND GENERALLY to do and execute all acts and deeds which you, my brother in your absolute discretion deems necessary and proper, for the sale, release or exchange and to receive money on my behalf and represent me before the Registering Authority.” If we compare the words occurring in the said clauses providing sale, which are underlined, it is quite evident that the spacing between the letters in the so-called added words is noticeably different from the spacing between the letters in the rest of the words in those clauses and elsewhere in Ext.B2. The spacing between letters in the disputed words is monospace and, in the other words, it is proportional. In the said context, the remaining oral evidence need be considered. 22. As pointed out above, the original of Ext.B2 was not produced by the defendants, who were supposed to be in possession of it. The 1st defendant being the power holder and defendant Nos.2 and 3 being the purchasers of the property from the 1st defendant in his capacity of a power of attorney, they must be in possession of the original power of attorney. Despite calling upon them to produce the original by filing a petition by the plaintiff, the original was not produced. In the written statement, they feigned ignorance about the original of Ext.B2. During cross-examination of PW1 also, there was no suggestion from the defendants as to where was the original. Later, DW2, who is a witness for the defendants, stated in court that it was he who obtained the original of Ext.B2 from the registration office. He further stated that the said original was entrusted with the husband of the plaintiff. In regard to that version, the evidence is so inconsistent. DW2 stated that after 20 days of the date of registration of Exts.A7 and A8, he got back the power of attorney as well as original of Exts.A7 and A8. He further stated that the said original was entrusted with the husband of the plaintiff. In regard to that version, the evidence is so inconsistent. DW2 stated that after 20 days of the date of registration of Exts.A7 and A8, he got back the power of attorney as well as original of Exts.A7 and A8. He further stated that the husband of the plaintiff approached him demanding the deed of power of attorney and then after contacting PW1 over phone, he gave it to the husband of the plaintiff. DW1, on the other hand, stated initially that he did not know how and when DW2 gave that original. But he subsequently stated that in his presence, DW1 handed over the original to the husband of the plaintiff. Those inconsistencies are not reconcilable. The fact that on 20.04.2007 the plaintiff sent Ext.A5 notice to the 1st defendant cancelling the power of attorney describing specifically that it was one giving power to manage the property alone, makes the plea of the defendants totally improbable. Hence, their case that the original of Ext.B2 was given to the husband of the plaintiff cannot be true. 23. The version of DW1 in regard to Ext.A3 also is contradictory. There is a candid admission in the written statement that Ext.A3, which is a draft power of attorney, was sent by him to the plaintiff along with a covering letter. As a matter of fact, it was during his cross-examination the covering letter was marked as Ext.A3(a). But, later at page 11 of his cross-examination, he denied having sent Ext.A3 to the plaintiff. Thus, DW1 is turned out to be a person contradicting his own statements. When such a person claims that the original of Ext.B2 was duly executed by the plaintiff, it is difficult to attach credence to that version, especially in the light of the aforesaid inconsistencies in the evidence and the incongruity in the document itself. 24. Exts.A7 and A8 were executed on 15.03.2007. DW1 deposed that during the time of marriage of her daughter in 2011 also, he was residing in the building in plaint A schedule item No.1 property meaning thereby he continued to be in possession of the property despite execution of Exts.A7 and A8 on 15.03.2007 in favour of defendants No.2 and 3. 25. Defendant Nos.2 and 3 are the brothers-in-laws of the 1st defendant. 25. Defendant Nos.2 and 3 are the brothers-in-laws of the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant claims that Rs.11 lakhs was paid to the plaintiff towards the price of plaint A schedule properties, for which he places reliance on Exts.B6 and B7 receipts dated 20.12.2006 and 23.04.2007. The plaintiff denies issuance of such receipts. The 1st defendant has a contention that at the time of purchase of plaint A schedule item No.1 in the name of plaintiff from Sri.Mohandas, only Rs.4 lakhs, out of the total sale price of Rs.7 lakhs, was paid by the plaintiff and the balance was paid by him. If so, deducting that amount, the balance alone need to be paid to the plaintiff. Another circumstance telling upon the credibility of the 1st defendant is that the sale price shown in Ext.A7 is Rs.5.5 lakhs and in Ext.A8 is Rs.2,80,000/-. When the 1st defendant thereby received only Rs.8.3 lakhs, he claimed to have paid Rs.11 lakhs to the plaintiff, over and above Rs.3 lakhs he claimed to have expended at the time of execution of Ext.A1. From the above facts and circumstances, the probability is certainly that Ext.B2 was not a duly executed power of attorney by the plaintiff. 26. It can be seen that in Ext.A3 an independent clause enabling sale was included as clause (b), which reads,-“b) To execute and register deeds of sale, mortgage, agreement, release or any other deeds and receive the consideration for such transactions and also borrow money pledging all or any of the properties.” It is usual also if a power of attorney enabling the power holder to sell a property is executed, the prominence in the deed of power of attorney shall be to that clause. Whereas, in Ext.B2, the clauses that enable sale are added to totally distinct clauses, which is quite unusual. That further improbabilises the case of the 1st defendant. PW1 never stated that she saw the original of Ext.B2. She only deposed that she happened to see a copy of Ext.B2 in the office of her counsel. The further observation by the lower appellate court that the plaintiff admitted in Ext.A5 execution of the power of attorney and that rendered support to the case of the 1st defendant. PW1 never stated that she saw the original of Ext.B2. She only deposed that she happened to see a copy of Ext.B2 in the office of her counsel. The further observation by the lower appellate court that the plaintiff admitted in Ext.A5 execution of the power of attorney and that rendered support to the case of the 1st defendant. What is stated in Ext.A5 notice and in the plaint is that she executed a power of attorney authorising the 1st defendant to manage the property alone as a caretaker. There is absolutely nothing in Ext.A5 notice, in the plaint or in her deposition, enabling even remotely to infer that she admitted to have given a power of attorney empowering sale of the property. Again, it was observed by the lower appellate court that solely because such a power of attorney was executed, the plaintiff resorted to cancel it and that also supported the case of the 1st defendant. On a reading of Ext.A5, it is clear that the 1st defendant was trying to misuse the power of attorney, and therefore, she cancelled it. There is no indication in it that the power of attorney she issued was one enabling the 1st defendant to sell the property. 27. When the above is the evidence came on record, what the lower appellate court observed in paragraph No.13 of its judgment, which is extracted above, are totally and explicitly against facts. The resultant conclusion that the original of Ext.B2 was duly executed by the plaintiff is on totally incorrect premises and the same amounted to perversity. I have no hesitation to hold that the said findings and conclusion are totally against the evidence and facts, and the consequent reversal of the judgment and decree of the trial court is unsustainable in law. In the wake of that finding the questions raised as regards validity of attestation of Ext.B2 as a true copy by a Notary Public, rejection by the lower appellate court the request for permission to adduce additional evidence and genuineness of Exts.B6 and B7 receipts become insignificant and I leave them off. The findings above follow that the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court reversing the decree of the trial court is liable to be set aside. This appeal is accordingly allowed. The findings above follow that the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court reversing the decree of the trial court is liable to be set aside. This appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree dated 24.09.2014 in O.S.No.197 of 2013 on the file of the III Additional Sub Court, Kozhikode are restored.