Anoop Kumar Singh v. State Of U. P. Thru Prin. Secy. Commercial Tax And Reg. Dept.
2023-01-09
JASPREET SINGH, RAMESH SINHA
body2023
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 22.10.2020 passed by the State Public Services Tribunal, Indira Bhawan, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) in Claim Petition No. 1886 of 2019 : Anoop Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. and another, by which the said claim petition preferred by the petitioner against the punishment order dated 04.09.2019 was dismissed, instant writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner. 2. The facts leading to the instant appeal, in a nutshell, are as under : Initially, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Commercial Tax Officer in the year 2002. Later on, his post was designated as Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax and while working as such, the petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 22.10.2018 on the ground of alleged irregularities committed by him while passing tax assessment order in regard to M/s Shashi Sales, Lucknow for the assessment year 2014-15. A charge-sheet dated 22.10.2018 was served upon the petitioner, levelling seven charges against him. The Joint Commissioner, Commercial Tax Officer’s Training Institute, Lucknow was appointed as Enquiry Officer, who, after completion of enquiry, submitted its report dated 22.01.2009, wherein it has been stated that charge nos. 5 and 6 levelled against the petitioner was not proved, whereas charge nos. 1, 2, 4 and 7 were proved and charge no.3 was partly proved. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority had issued a show cause notice dated 12.02.2019 to the petitioner along with the copy of the enquiry report dated 22.01.2019, to which the petitioner had submitted his reply. After that the Disciplinary Authority had passed the punishment order dated 04.09.2019, withholding three increments with cumulative effect and a censure entry. 3. Against the aforesaid punishment order dated 04.09.2019, the petitioner has preferred claim petition No. 1886 of 2019 before the Tribunal, which was dismissed by the Tribunal vide judgment and order dated 22.10.2020. Feeling aggrieved, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 4. Heard Shri Rishi Raj, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri Abhiyudya Mishra, learned Standing Counsel for the State/respondents and perused the impugned judgment passed by the Tribunal as well as material brought on record. 5.
Feeling aggrieved, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 4. Heard Shri Rishi Raj, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri Abhiyudya Mishra, learned Standing Counsel for the State/respondents and perused the impugned judgment passed by the Tribunal as well as material brought on record. 5. Challenging the impugned judgment and order dated 22.10.2020 passed by the Tribunal, learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that on the basis of any tax assessment order, the concerned tax assessment officer cannot be punished as he performed the quasi judicial function. He further argued that if there is any objection against the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer, the appeal can be filed before the appellate authority against that said assessment order. He further argued that against the order of assessment dated 20.09.2018 passed by the petitioner, the trader had filed first appeal before the appellate authority, which was allowed by the appellate authority and quashed the assessment order dated 20.09.2018 and remanded the matter to the assessing officer for re-assessment of the tax liability vide order dated 05.10.2018, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure No.12 to the writ petition. 6. Elaborating his submission, learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that on the basis of passing any tax assessment order, the concerned officer cannot be punished as he performed the quasi judicial function while passing the assessment order and if any negligence is being committed, he shall not be inflicted with the major punishment in the manner as the petitioner has been subjected to. His submission is that the Tribunal, without considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter, erred in dismissing the claim petition preferred by the petitioner. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has next argued that the departmental proceedings have been concluded against the petitioner in violation of principles of natural justice and without providing the evidence against him inasmuch as the Inquiry Officer has not associated the trader against which the assessment order was passed by the petitioner. The request of the petitioner for producing evidence in his support was not entertained by the Inquiry Officer. The Disciplinary Authority, before passing the punishment order, has failed to consider the fact that the petitioner has performed a quasi judicial function for which he could not be held guilty and punished.
The request of the petitioner for producing evidence in his support was not entertained by the Inquiry Officer. The Disciplinary Authority, before passing the punishment order, has failed to consider the fact that the petitioner has performed a quasi judicial function for which he could not be held guilty and punished. His submission is that the Tribunal has not considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter while passing the impugned order. 8. Lastly, learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that on 25.06.2020, the Departmental Promotion Committee for the purpose of promotion to the post of Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Tax was held and the similarly situated Trade Tax Officers of 2002 batch have been promoted on the post of Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department but the petitioner is still stagnant on the post of Assistant Commissioner due to the impugned action of the respondents. 9. To strengthen his submission, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and others Vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha : (2010) 2 SCC 772 , wherein in para-28, the Apex Court observed that an enquiry officer acting in a quasi judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/ disciplinary authority/ Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents. 10. Learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, has submitted that while posted as Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Lucknow, the petitioner was kept under suspension vide order dated 22.10.2018 for irregularity committed by him in disposal of Tax Assessment Order for the year 2014-15 with respect to the firm namely, Shashi Sales Lucknow and disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner, levelling seven charges against him. On receipt of the charge-sheet, the petitioner has submitted the reply to the charge-sheet on 10.12.2018.
On receipt of the charge-sheet, the petitioner has submitted the reply to the charge-sheet on 10.12.2018. The Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry by fixing the date, time and place and the petitioner was given full opportunity of hearing in the enquiry proceedings. The Inquiry Officer after conclusion of the inquiry submitted the inquiry report dated 22.01.2019 to the disciplinary authority. The said inquiry report dated 22.1.2019 was supplied to the petitioner through the letter dated 12.02.2019 keeping in view sub-rule 4 of Rule 9 of the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, seeking his reply on the inquiry report. In response thereof, the petitioner submitted his reply to the show cause notice dated 12.02.2019 through his letter dated 26.02.2019. After receipt of the reply of the petitioner through letter dated 26.02.2019, the U.P. Public Service Commission was consulted and after the advice of the U.P. Public Service Commission dated 19.08.2019, the punishment order dated 04.09.2019 was passed against the petitioner, withholding his three increments with cumulative effect as well as censure entry was also given, keeping in view the fact of not adhering to the departmental procedures, violating the Government Orders and also for violating Rule 3 of the U.P. Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1956. Against the aforesaid punishment order dated 04.09.2019, the petitioner submitted his representation to His Excellency, the Governor of U.P. on 01.10.2019 which was rejected by means of the order dated 02.03.2020. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred the claim petition before the Tribunal, which was dismissed by means of the impugned order. His submission is that there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned order and the instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 11. We have examined the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the impugned judgment and material brought on record. 12. Before proceeding further, it would be apt to mention here that in S. Govinda Menon Vs. Union of India : AIR 1967 SC 1274 , the Apex Court has held as under:- " ..... It is not necessary that a member of the service should have committed the alleged act or omission in the course of discharge of his duty as a servant of the Government in order that it may form the subject matter of disciplinary proceedings.
It is not necessary that a member of the service should have committed the alleged act or omission in the course of discharge of his duty as a servant of the Government in order that it may form the subject matter of disciplinary proceedings. In other words, if the act or omission is such as to reflect the reputation of the officer for his integrity or good faith or devotion to duty, there is no reason why disciplinary proceedings should not be taken against him for that act or omission.... The test is whether the act or omission has some reasonable occasion with nature and condition of his service or where the act or omission has caused any reflection upon the reputation of the member of the service for integrity or devotion of duty as a public servant.... The proposition put forward was that quasi-judicial orders, unless vacated under the provisions of the Act, are final and binding and cannot be questioned by the executive government through disciplinary proceedings..... The charge is, therefore, one of misconduct and recklessness disclosed by the utter disregard of the relevant provisions....... But in the present proceedings what is sought to be challenged is not the correctness or the legality of the decision of the Commissioner but the conduct of the appellant in the discharge of his duty as Commissioner. The appellant was proceeded against because in the discharge of his function, he acted in utter disregard of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. It is the manner in which he discharges his function that brought up in these proceedings.....It is manifest, therefore, that though the propriety and legality of the sanction to the leases may be question in appeal or revision under the Act the Government is not precluded from taking disciplinary act if there is proof that the has acted in gross recklessness in the discharge of his duties or that he failed to act honestly or in good faith or that he omitted to observe the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory power." 13. Thus, the aforesaid judgment is an authority that disciplinary proceedings can be initiated against an employee in respect of the action, even if it pertains to exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers. 14. In S. Govinda Menon (supra), the Apex Court had relied upon the judgment in Pearce Vs.
Thus, the aforesaid judgment is an authority that disciplinary proceedings can be initiated against an employee in respect of the action, even if it pertains to exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers. 14. In S. Govinda Menon (supra), the Apex Court had relied upon the judgment in Pearce Vs. Foster, (1966) 17 QBD 536, wherein it had been held as under:- "If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duty in the service, it is misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal." 15. The Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. K.K. Dhawan, AIR 1993 SC 1478 , relied upon its earlier judgment in S. Govinda Menon (supra) and observed that the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers, acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person, is not acting as a Judge, and in the disciplinary proceedings, it is the conduct of the officer in discharge of his official duties and not the correctness or legality of his decisions or judgments which are to be examined, as the legality of the orders can be questioned on appellate or revisional forum. In such a case the Government cannot be precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. The Apex Court summarised some circumstances in which disciplinary action can be taken, which are as under:- "(i) Where the Officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion of duty; (ii) if there is, prima facie, material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty; (iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Government servant; (iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers; (v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party; (vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however, small the bribe may be, because Lord Coke said long ago "though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great." 16. The Apex Court further observed that the said instances were not exhaustive. However, it was further observed by the Apex Court that each case would depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case, and no absolute rule can be postulated. 17.
The Apex Court further observed that the said instances were not exhaustive. However, it was further observed by the Apex Court that each case would depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case, and no absolute rule can be postulated. 17. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the assessment so made by the petitioner for the assessment year 2014-15 vide order dated 20.09.2018 upon which he was subjected to inquiry was challenged by the trader, namely, Shashi Sales, in the Court of Additional Commissioner Grade-2 (Appeal), Lucknow in Appeal No. 410 of 2018 and the Appellate Authority, vide order dated 05.10.2018, allowed the appeal and quashed the order of assessment dated 20.09.2018 and remitted the matter to the assessing officer for re-assessment of tax. A copy of the appellate order dated 05.10.2018 has been annexed with the instant writ petition. Thus, it appears that no revenue loss has incurred to the government. 18. That once it is noticed that the departmental enquiry can proceed against a delinquent employee relating to the discharge of its duty in service and not confining to the correctness of the order, hence in the aforesaid circumstances, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that he was not given a due and proper opportunity of hearing is to be examined. It has been specifically urged by the Counsel for the petitioner that no date, time and place of the enquiry was fixed. 19. From perusal of the impugned order passed by the Tribunal also indicates that the issue was raised before it but it came to a contrary finding by holding that since the enquiry was based on the basis of quasi-judicial order passed by the petitioner, hence there was no requirement to hold a full-fledged enquiry. This aspect could not be disputed by the learned Standing Counsel nor it could be demonstrated that the petitioner was granted due opportunity. Where the charge-sheet has been served on the petitioner and major punishment is proposed, which has been awarded to the petitioner, in such circumstances, a proper enquiry ought to have been held and it cannot be skirted by saying that there was no need for holding the same as it was based on documents.
Where the charge-sheet has been served on the petitioner and major punishment is proposed, which has been awarded to the petitioner, in such circumstances, a proper enquiry ought to have been held and it cannot be skirted by saying that there was no need for holding the same as it was based on documents. Even if, at all, the said enquiry was based on documents, the least that could have been done, was to prove the said documents inasmuch as it has been noticed that it was not the legality of the order which was in issue rather it was the manner in which the order was passed, upon which the charge-sheet was issued and was the subject matter of the enquiry against the petitioner. This aspect of the matter has been completely lost sight off by the enquiry officer as well as disciplinary authority and has also been noted appropriately noticed by the Tribunal. 20. Taking note of principles laid down by the Apex Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. K.K. Dhawan (Supra) and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer are totally vitiated for want of any legally acceptable or relevant evidence to support the charges of misconduct and in absence of any evidence, the conclusion reached by the inquiry officer affirmed by the disciplinary authority also stand vitiated. 21. In view of the aforesaid, the instant writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 22.10.2020 passed by the Tribunal, punishment order dated 04.09.2019 and the order dated 02.03.2020 are hereby quashed. The matter shall stand remitted to the enquiry officer, who, shall after giving due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, providing all the documents and considering the legally admissible evidence, shall proceed with the enquiry and endeavour be made that the same is taken to its logical conclusion within six months from the date a copy of this order is produced before the authority concerned. It is also directed that the petitioner shall not seek any unnecessary adjournments and if he does not co-operate in the early conclusion of the enquiry, the enquiry officer shall be well within his rights to proceed in the matter in accordance with law.