ORDER : 1. The petitioner has preferred the present writ petition praying for the following reliefs: (1) That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to produce the entire record leading to issuance of the impugned order dated 02.03.2009 Annexure P-1 for kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court. (2) That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 2.3.2009 Annexure P-1 passed by the respondent no. 4; (3) That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to impose heavy cost upon the respondents. (4) Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper may also be passed in favour of the petitioner. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner while rendering his services on the post of Senior Branch Manager was attached with Head Office, Bilaspur. On 15.4.2006 Lakhan Lal Kaushik and Baldau Prasad made a written complaint to the respondent no. 3 alleging that though at any point of time they have not taken any agricultural loan in their name from the respondent bank Ratanpur Branch, but they have been served with demand notice for repayment of agricultural loan, upon which preliminary enquiry was conducted and Shri K.K. Dubey, Senior Branch Manager, Masturi was appointed as Enquiry Officer, who vide its letter dated 18.04.2006 directed the petitioner and Shri R.S. Kaushik, Senior Supervisor (attach) with Head Officer, Bilaspur to submit their explanation. The Enquiry Officer recorded the statements of Laxmi Prasad Yadav and Vijendra Singh Thakur, as there were direct allegations of fraud and cheating against the said Laxmi Prasad and Vijendra Singh Thakur. The Enquiry Officer recorded the finding that the petitioner has committed grave error in discharging its duties in relation to the bogus loan proceedings. It was also alleged that the bank officials were involved with the outsiders in the sanction and distribution of bogus loan and forwarded its Preliminary Enquiry Report dated 4.5.2006 to the respondent No. 4. The respondent no. It was also alleged that the bank officials were involved with the outsiders in the sanction and distribution of bogus loan and forwarded its Preliminary Enquiry Report dated 4.5.2006 to the respondent No. 4. The respondent no. 4 in the light of enquiry report firstly placed the petitioner under suspension vide order dated 8.5.2006 and subsequently on 19.6.2006 issued a charge sheet framing the charge against the petitioner that he has committed gross negligence in discharging his duty with respect to the sanction of the loan to the fake borrowers, therefore recovery of the bank has severely been affected and due to the conduct of the petitioner, the institution suffered with gross financial loss, therefore, why the same may not be recovered from the petitioner. The aforesaid conduct of the petitioner is punishable under section 57 (1) of Bank Service Rules. The respondent no. 4 proposed the punishment for the aforesaid charges as termination from service. Thereafter Petitioner was directed to submit his reply within 7 days from the date of receipt of the charge sheet failing which ex-parte proceedings will be drawn for termination of petitioner's service. The petitioner on 19.8.2006 replied to the charges framed against him. Thereafter the respondent no. 3 vide its order dated 20.9.2006 appointed the respondent no. 4 as Enquiry Officer who vide memo dated 5.10.2006 directed the petitioner to remain present before him on 10.10.2006 at 1.00 for Departmental Enquiry, in reply thereto petitioner vide application dated 10.10.2006 brought into the kind notice of the Enquiry Officer that as per the rules and regulations the competent authority should have appointed the Enquiry Officer by name and designation and also to appoint the Presenting Officer and such appointment order should have been sent to all the concerned persons and he has not received any such order issued as per the provisions contained in the Service Rules. Thereafter the respondent no. 3 rectified its mistake and vide order dated 18.10.2006 appointed Shri D.R. Thakur, Chief Executive Officer as Enquiry Officer and Shri U.R. Yadav, Incharge of Establishment Section as Presenting Officer. The petitioner on attaining the age of superannuation service on 31.10.2006 retired from service. Thereafter the respondent no. 3 rectified its mistake and vide order dated 18.10.2006 appointed Shri D.R. Thakur, Chief Executive Officer as Enquiry Officer and Shri U.R. Yadav, Incharge of Establishment Section as Presenting Officer. The petitioner on attaining the age of superannuation service on 31.10.2006 retired from service. The Enquiry Officer vide its letters dated 23.2.2007, 16.3.2007, 29.3.2007 and 17.4.2007 fixed the date, time and place of hearing of the Departmental enquiry, however all these notices were delivered to the petitioner too late, therefore the petitioner could not appear in the departmental enquiry proceedings. The respondent no. 3 vide its order dated 11.8.2007 appointed Shri K.K. Jain, C.E.O. as Enquiry Officer instead of Shri D.R. Thakur and likewise Shri K.K. Dubey, Establishment Section Incharge appointed as Presenting Officer instead of U.R. Yadav. The Enquiry Officer vide its letter dated 29.1.2008 fixed the date, time and place for hearing on 18.2.2008 Monday at 12.30 p.m. at Head Office Bilaspur. The petitioner immediately after receipt of the aforesaid letter, vide Annexure P-14 application dated 14.2.2008 brought into the kind notice of the respondent no. 4/Enquiry Officer that he has not received any order as cited in the letter regarding appointing of Enquiry Officer, therefore he is unable to appear before him. The respondent no. 4 instead to make available the concerned order of appointment of E.O. and Presenting Officer, forfeited the opportunity of submitting reply and initiated ex- parte proceedings against the petitioner. The petitioner in response to letter Annexure P-16 dated 12.3.2008 wrote an application to the respondent no. 4 stating therein that there is no provision with regard to contemplating the Departmental Enquiry against the retired employee, therefore the directives/guidelines issued by the Registrar, Societies, according to which fundamental rules of Government employees will be applicable and it is compulsory for obtaining prior permission from the competent authority for initiation of D.E. against the retired employee, are required to be followed and therefore departmental enquiry conducted against him is not in accordance with rules and also not justified. The Staff Sub Committee without due appreciation and marshaling of the material/evidence available on record to its true perspective manner and also without looking into the fact that the D.E. was conducted ex-parte against the petitioner and no opportunity was afforded to adduce evidence as well as to cross examine the witnesses and also without appreciating the fact that there was no intimation to the petitioner about appointment of the E.O. and P.O. vide its resolution no. 1 taken a decision that the whole recovery of the bogus distribution of loan shall be recovered from the retrial dues of the petitioner and even thereafter if any recovery still remains, he may be noticed to deposit the same within a period of one month failing which legal proceedings will be drawn for recovery of the remaining sum, which is illegal and arbitrary, against which the present writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned order (Annexure P-1) suffers with illegalities and material irregularities, therefore the same deserves to be set aside. The impugned decision of Staff Sub Committee of recovery of the entire bogus loan with penal interest from the retrial dues of the petitioner is not only harsh but also punitive in nature. The entire ex-parte proceedings of Departmental Enquiry is illegal, arbitrary and bad in eye of law as well as without jurisdiction. As per fundamental rules, before initiation of Departmental Enquiry against the retired employee, prior permission has to be taken from the competent authority and in absence of such permission, the whole D.E. proceedings are illegal and deserves to be declared as null and void. The entire Preliminary Enquiry as well as the Departmental Enquiry as conducted by the Enquiry Officer is not in accordance with the provision of Service Rules as well as the rules applicable thereto. The respondent no. The entire Preliminary Enquiry as well as the Departmental Enquiry as conducted by the Enquiry Officer is not in accordance with the provision of Service Rules as well as the rules applicable thereto. The respondent no. 3 firstly vide order dated 20.6.06 Annexure P-6 appointed Chief Executive Officer as Enquiry Officer and vide order dated 18.10.2006 Annexure P-8 appointed Shri D.R. Thakur, CEO as Enquiry Officer, Shri U.R. Yadav as Presenting Officer and vide order Annexure P-13 dated 11.8.2007 appointed Shri K.K. Jain, CEO as E.O. and Shri K.K. Dubey as Presenting Officer and vide order dated 28.12.2007 appointed Shri D.R. Thakur as E.O. and Shri K.K. Dubey as Presenting Officer which has not been communicated to the petitioner, as such whole proceedings is vitiated. The respondent no. 3 with malafide intention to harass and humiliate the honest employee of the bank and to cause injustice spent one and half year period in appointing the Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer, as such inordinate delay caused in conducting the departmental enquiry which is also against the rules of natural justice. The respondents have failed to appreciate that the fake borrowers along with their loan application form submitted the original revenue documents relating to agriculture land, but a fake person who produced the original revenue documents and remain present in the entire valuation proceedings and the villagers present at the time of spot inspection etc with him shown him to be a genuine person, therefore question does not arise to suspect the borrower as fake borrower. There is a provision in the Bank Adhiniyam that even if unfortunately a fake person succeeded in getting bogus loan, the entire bogus loan ought to have been recovered from him on the basis of affidavit sworn by him therefore even if by mistake the bogus loan sanctioned and distributed by the bank, there will be no financial harm to the bank as the recovery of the loan could be recovered from the fake person. The respondent no. 3 in the instant fake loan also charge sheeted Shri R.S. Kaushik, Supervisor and imposed the punishment of termination of service and also recovery of the entire bogus loan with penal interest from his dues, as such the respondent no. 3 is recovering the bogus loan just more than double rather than the actual loan disbursed to the fake borrowers leaving the fake borrowers free from the recovery. 3 is recovering the bogus loan just more than double rather than the actual loan disbursed to the fake borrowers leaving the fake borrowers free from the recovery. The respondent bank attached the tractor and trolley from the possession of the fake borrowers in connection bogus loan. The respondent no. 3 nowhere disclosed the actual recovery of the fake loan though it ought to have specifically disclosed. He further submits that ?? opportunity to cross-examines the witnesses has been afforded to the petitioner. Th proper notice was not served upon the petitioner for hearing of the department enquiry and without giving final show cause notice and opportunity of hearing, the order is illegal, arbitrary and an abuse of the process of law. The principle of natural justice has been followed in the Preliminary, Departmental Enquiry as well as in passing the impugned order. Reliance has been placed on the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bhagirathi Jena vs. Board of Directors, OSFC and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 666 , Punjab State Power Corporation Limited, Patiala and Others vs. Atma Singh Grewal, (2014) 13 SCC 666 and this Court's order dated 25.07.2019 passed in W.P. (S) No. 4149/2009, parties being R.S. Kaushik vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 opposes the submission made by the petitioner's counsel and submits that from a bare perusal of the reliefs having sought for by the petitioner, it is clear that the petitioner has no grievance against the respondent State and he has not prayed for any relief against them. The petitioner has preferred the instant petition for being aggrieved against the order passed by the respondent No. 4 by which the order of recovery from the petitioner in respect of fake loan case has been made by the respondent Bank I.e. Zila Sahakari Krishi Aur Gramin Vikas Bank Maryadit, Bilaspur vide order dated 02/03/2009. Referring to the said order it is submitted that a proper Enquiry was conducted against the petitioner and the petitioner was given proper opportunity of hearing as well. The petitioner instead of making proper clarification did not prefer to appear in the enquiry and therefore was proceeded ex parte. However, the petitioner made a written explanation to the charges which was not found satisfactory. The petitioner instead of making proper clarification did not prefer to appear in the enquiry and therefore was proceeded ex parte. However, the petitioner made a written explanation to the charges which was not found satisfactory. The competent authority while passing the impugned order herein took every relevant aspect into consideration and reached at the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty on the basis of material on record. Even otherwise the present petition is not maintainable for the reason that the petitioner is having an effective and efficacious alternative remedy of preferring an application under section 55 (2) of the Chhattisgarh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 before the Registrar, Co-operative Societies. In other words, the petitioner should have preferred the statutory remedy available under the law and thereafter in case of sustaining with his grievance only should have approached this Hon'ble Court. Therefore, the instant petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 & 4 submits that the petitioner has challenged the legality, validity and propriety of the decision of the Staff Sub Committee dated 02.03.2009 filed as Annexure P-1 for recovery of the entire bogus loan issued to the fake borrowers with penal interest from the dues of the petitioner. The decision of the Staff Sub Committee dated 02.03.2009 can not be challenged before this Court in writ petition being discretionary relief as alternative remedy is available to the petitioner under the C.G. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, therefore the petition is outrightly liable to be dismissed. The respondent No. 3 and 4 have been impleaded as party in the petition, which is not in accordance with law as they are not the legal personality and therefore, the petition does not lie against them and requires to be dismissed on this count also. It is further submitted that vide order dated 20.09.2006 contained in Annexure P-6, the Inquiry Officer was appointed. Subsequently, Shri D. R. Thakur was appointed as Inquiry Officer and Shri U. R. Yadav was appointed as Presenting Officer because of the fact that earlier Inquiry Officer has been transferred. The petitioner was revoked on 30.10.2006 and thereafter he was retired on 31.10.2006 from services of the Bank. Subsequently, Shri D. R. Thakur was appointed as Inquiry Officer and Shri U. R. Yadav was appointed as Presenting Officer because of the fact that earlier Inquiry Officer has been transferred. The petitioner was revoked on 30.10.2006 and thereafter he was retired on 31.10.2006 from services of the Bank. The Inquiry Officer had been issuing the notice to the petitioner for appearing before him and several notices have been sent to him but the petitioner had been successful in managing such notices by obtaining the due date through the postal agency, which can be inferred by the documents filed by the petitioner. Apart from the above notices, the Inquiry Officer issued the notices dated 08.01.2007, 05.02.2007, 16.01.2008. In all these notices the same tactics have been adopted by the petitioner and the notice dated 29.01.2008 sent through the registered post was served to the petitioner on 05.02.2008, in which he had to appear for hearing on 18.02.2008 but he did not appear, therefore he was proceeded ex-parte and the intimation was sent to him through the notice dated 27-29/02/2008, thereafter the final show cause notice alongwith the enquiry report was sent to the petitioner and when he did not appear then the next date of hearing was fixed for 09.02.2009 and was published in the Newspaper, but on the said date also the petitioner remained absent, therefore on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the case as was available on perusal of the documents and enquiry report, the order in question was passed against the petitioner, which is in accordance with law and the same can not be challenged in the writ petition. It is further submitted that the departmental proceeding was commenced after the retirement of the petitioner. On 19.06.2006, the show cause notice alongwith the charge sheet was served to the petitioner in which he filed his reply on 19.08.2006 and thus the enquiry commenced of which the notices were issued through the postal registration and the Inquiry Officer/Chief Executive Officer was appointed which was informed to the petitioner vide letter dated 05.10.2006, which was received by the petitioner on 07.10.2006. The departmental proceeding was made as per the provisions of law and it did not cause any prejudice to him. The departmental proceeding was made as per the provisions of law and it did not cause any prejudice to him. The petitioner was granted ample opportunity of hearing, which is apparent vide order sheet dated 03.06.2006 written and signed by him regarding obtaining the copies and perusing the record filed. The order passed vide Annexure P-1 is reasoned order, based on cogent evidence on record and the same has been served to him against which the petitioner did challenge in the proper forum of dispute provided under Section 59 of the C.G. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, therefore such order has become final and conclusive and the same can not be challenged in the writ jurisdiction. It is also submitted that the criminal case has also been registered against the petitioner before the Criminal Court, the copy of which is filed as Annexure R-3-4/10. Therefore, the writ petition may kindly be dismissed. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 7. It is an admitted position in this case that the petitioner was working in the respondent bank and the enquiry was initiated against the petitioner regarding issuance of loan to the fake borrowers. It is also admitted fact that the petitioner retired on 31.10.2006, whereas the impugned order was passed on 02.03.2009 (Annexure-P/1) i.e. after more than 2 years of his retirement. 8. The petitioner has placed his reliance on the order passed by this Court in WPS No. 4149/2009 preferred by R.S. Kaushik, who is also the deliquent employee in the same incident at the same time. This Court has observed in Paras 17, 18, 19, 20 & 21 as under: “17. Right from the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others, 1995 (6) SCC 749 up till now it has been repeatedly reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the High Court in exercise is its power of judicial review under Article 226 can interfere with a punishment, when on perusal of facts it would shock the conscious of the Court or for that matter shocks the conscious of any prudent man. The power of judicial review under service jurisprudence, particularly in disciplinary matters is permitted to the extent of examining whether there was any error in the decision making process and whether all relevant factors were considered before the disciplinary authority taking a final decision. It is also expected that the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority would take into consideration the nature of misconduct, the role played by the delinquent and the findings of the enquiry officer. When an administrative order is put to test before the court of law, it has to be examined whether the administrative officer is “rational” or “reasonable” and it should also be subjected to test of Wednesbury principle. The courts would be required to examine whether the administrative body at the first instance while taking the stand i.e. whether he has acted illegally and illogically. It also examines whether he has omitted any relevant factors from consideration and at the same time taken in to consideration the irrelevant factors which under normal circumstances would not be taken by a normal prudent man or a reasonable person. 18. The above principle of law has been settled by the decision of law right from the landmark judgment of Supreme Court in case of B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others, 1995 (6) SCC 749 wherein in paragraph 18, the Supreme Court held as under: “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact- finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” “19. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” “19. The said principle was further reiterated by the Supreme Court in case of Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and Others vs. P.C. Kakkar, 2003 (4) SCC 364 , wherein in paragraphs 11 and 12 it has been held as under: “11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesbury's case (supra) the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. 12. To put difference unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to certain litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.” 20. Again in case of Kailash Nath Gupta vs. Enquiry Officer (R.K. Rai), Allahabad Bank and Others, 2003 (9) SCC 480 , the Supreme Court in paragraph 11 held as under: “11. In the background of what has been stated above, one thing is clear that the power of interference with the quantum of punishment is extremely limited. But when relevant factors are not taken note of, which have some bearing on the quantum of punishment, certainly the Court can direct re-reconsideration or in an appropriate case to shorten litigation, indicate the punishment to be awarded. But when relevant factors are not taken note of, which have some bearing on the quantum of punishment, certainly the Court can direct re-reconsideration or in an appropriate case to shorten litigation, indicate the punishment to be awarded. It is stated that there was no occasion in the long past service indicating either irregularity or misconduct of the appellant except the charges which were the subject matter of his removal from service. The stand of the appellant as indicated above is that though small advances may have become irrecoverable, there is nothing to indicate that the appellant had misappropriated any money or had committed any act of fraud. If any loss has been caused to the bank (which he quantifies at about Rs.46,000/-) that can be recovered from the appellant. As the reading of the various articles of charges go to show, at the most there is some procedural irregularity which cannot be termed to be negligence to warrant the extreme punishment of dismissal from service.” 21. In case of Mohd. Yunus Khan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, 2010 (10) SCC 539 , the Supreme Court again emphasized the fact that the decision of the disciplinary authority must be following the rule of law and the authority cannot be permitted to act whimsically or arbitrarily. Their actions should be guided by the principles of reasonableness and fairness.” 9. The petitioner has filed letter dated 02.02.2005 passed by the Registrar Cooperative Societies Raipur, which is as under: 10. It is clear from Annexure-P/3 that preliminary enquiry was conducted by K.K. Dubey and in departmental enquiry (Annexure-P/4), his name appeared as witness No. 2. The petitioner filed reply Annexure-P/5 and as per Annexure-P/8, enquiry officer was appointed against the petitioner on 18.10.2006. 11. It is not disputed in this case that the petitioner retired from service on 31.10.2006, whereas his suspension was revoked on 30.10.2006 and despite that the enquiry was continued and enquiry report was submitted and impugned order was passed on 02.03.2009, but the respondent authorities did not file any rules or regulations showing that as to how the departmental enquiry was continued against the late petitioner even after his retirement. 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Dev Prakash Tewari vs. Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Institutional Service Board, Lucknow and Others, (2014) 7 SCC 260 , held in Paras 8 & 9 as under: “8. 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Dev Prakash Tewari vs. Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Institutional Service Board, Lucknow and Others, (2014) 7 SCC 260 , held in Paras 8 & 9 as under: “8. Once the appellant had retired from service on 31.3.2009, there was no authority vested with the respondents for continuing the disciplinary proceeding even for the purpose of imposing any reduction in the retiral benefits payable to the appellant. In the absence of such an authority it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the appellant was entitled to get full retiral benefits. 9. The question has also been raised in the appeal with regard to arrears of salary and allowances payable to the appellant during the period of his dismissal and upto the date of reinstatement. Inasmuch as the inquiry had lapsed, it is, in our opinion, obvious that the appellant would have to get the balance of the emoluments payable to him.” 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bhagirathi Jena (supra) held in Para 6 & 7 as under: “6. It will be noticed from the abovesaid regulations that no specific provision was made for deducting any amount from the provident fund consequent to any misconduct determined in the departmental enquiry nor was any provision made for continuance of departmental enquiry after superannuation. 7. In view of the absence of such provision in the abovesaid regulations, it must be held that the Corporation had no legal authority to make any reduction in the retiral benefits of the appellant. There is also no provision for conducting a disciplinary enquiry after retirement of the appellant and nor any provision stating that in case misconduct is established, a deduction could be made from retiral benefits. Once the appellant had retired from service on 30.6.95. there was no authority vested in the Corporation or continuing the departmental enquiry even for the purpose of imposing any reduction in the retiral benefits payable to the appellant. In the absence of such authority, it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the appellant was entitled to full retiral benefits on retirement.” 14. there was no authority vested in the Corporation or continuing the departmental enquiry even for the purpose of imposing any reduction in the retiral benefits payable to the appellant. In the absence of such authority, it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the appellant was entitled to full retiral benefits on retirement.” 14. In this case also, in absence of any rules or regulations, the Corporation had no legal authority to make any reduction in retiral benefits of the late petitioner or any recovery from his retiral dues, as such considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the aforesaid guidelines of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 02.03.2009 (Annexure-P/1) is hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to pay all retiral dues and pensionary benefits to the legal heirs of the petitioner in accordance with the rules and regulations. Let this exercise be completed within 4 months from the date of submission of receipt of copy of this order and if the entire payment is not made within the stipulated period, the same shall carry interest 6% per annum till its actual realization. 15. The writ petition stands allowed.