JUDGMENT : 1. The instant writ petition has been filed on behalf of the petitioner wherein the petitioner has called in question the advertisement notice dated 05.07.2012, with a direction to the respondents to allow the petitioner to continue on the post of Vocational Instructor till such time the post is filled on substantive basis. Besides, the petitioner is seeking direction against the respondents to release salary and other benefits in favour of the petitioner. 2. With a view to appreciate the controversy involved in the instant petition, it would be appropriate to give factual background of the instant case. 3. That, in terms of the advertisement notice dated 03.10.2011, applications were invited from the eligible candidates for the academic arrangements in different Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs) of Kashmir Division for the academic session 2011-12 with fixed honorarium of Rs.4000/- per month. Besides other posts, the applications in terms of the aforesaid advertisement notice, the post of Vocational Instructor (COPA) was also invited. 4. The petitioner applied for selection and was appointed to the post of Vocational Instructor and accordingly, in terms of the order dated 05.11.2012, the petitioner came to be engaged in the academic arrangement to run the COPA Trade at ITI Sopore. Thereafter, on 05.07.2012 the respondents issued advertisement notice where under they again invited applications from eligible candidates for temporary engagement in academic arrangement in the ITI’s of Kashimir Division for conducting training activities including trade of COPA for the academic session 2012-23 or till the regular arrangement is made in accordance with the rules on the recommendations of the J&K Services Selection Board which is earlier. 5. The petitioner has challenged the advertisement notice dated 05.07.2012 on the following grounds: a) That it is true that in terms of the advertisement notice dated 03.10.2011, the respondents had invited application from eligible candidates for academic arrangements in different ITIs of Kashmir Division for the academic session 2011-2012 with a fixed honorarium of Rs.4000/-PM. It was however stated in the advertisement notice that in the event of regular appointment made under rules, the contract arrangement will cease at once it is respectfully submitted that the respondents have not made any regular appointment against the post held by the petitioner. It was however stated in the advertisement notice that in the event of regular appointment made under rules, the contract arrangement will cease at once it is respectfully submitted that the respondents have not made any regular appointment against the post held by the petitioner. In that view of the matter, they have no jurisdiction to issue advertisement notice dated 05.07.2012 for filling the posts of COPA instructor, Stenography Instructors and Plumber Instructor for the academic session 2012-13 or till regular arrangements are made. In accordance with rules on the recommendations of the Service Selection Board, whichever is earlier, in that view of the matter, the advertisement notice dated 05.07.2012 deserve to be set aside. (b) That it not in the advertisement notice dated 03.10.2011, but in the advertisement notice 05.07.2012, the respondents have clearly stated that the academic arrangement for the academic session 2012.13 shall hold good till regular arrangements are made in accordance with rules, on the recommendations of the Service Selection Board. It is thus clear that any one appointed in terms of the advertisement notice dated 03.10.2011 will have to continue on the post till such time, regular arrangement is made by the respondents on the recommendations of the service selection Board. The petitioner respectfully submit that in her case also, the respondents have to follow the same yardstick and they have to allow the petitioner to continue on the post till such time regular arrangement is made on the basis of the recommendations of the Service Selection Board. Since by issuing the advertisement notice dated 05.07.2012, the respondents are going to displace the petitioner from the post held by her in an illegal, improper and unconstitutional manner, therefore, the advertisement notice dated 05.07.2012 is liable to be set aside. (c) That it is well settled proposition of law that one substitute cannot be replaced by another. There are judgments which suggest that once an adhoc contractual or temporary arrangement is made, it has to continue till such time, the post is filled on substantive basis by the authorities concerned on the recommendations of the Recruitment Board. (c) That it is well settled proposition of law that one substitute cannot be replaced by another. There are judgments which suggest that once an adhoc contractual or temporary arrangement is made, it has to continue till such time, the post is filled on substantive basis by the authorities concerned on the recommendations of the Recruitment Board. Since in terms of the advertisement notice dated 05.07.2012, the respondents have again invited applications for filling the posts of COPA Instructor, Stenography Instructor and plumber Instructor for the session 2012.13, which means that on the selection of the candidates against these posts, the petitioner will be displaced by them, therefore, also the impugned advertisement notice dated 05.07.2012 is legal bad and is liable to be set aside. (d) That the Hon’ble court has in a number of cases of identical nature directed the respondents not to substitute the petitioner of those writ petitions by contractual employees, but to maintain status quo. Two such orders passed on 30.08.2011 and 15.09.2011 in SWP No. 1891/2011 are annexed herewith as annexure(s) P-D and P-E. That the petitioner also annex herewith a circular issued by the respondents on 19.10.2011 which also shows that candidates working on academic arrangements in various ITI’s of Kashmir Division have been allowed to continue pursuant to the orders passed by the Hon’ble Court in different writ petitions, seeking continuation on the existing arrangement. The petitioner is also entitled to continue on the post to which she was appointed in terms of order dated 05.11.2011, but as the respondents have issued the advertisement notice dated 05.07.2012, which is aimed at to dislodge the petitioner from her respective post, therefore, the impugned advertisement notice dated 05.07.2012 deserve to be quashed. 6. It is specific case of the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the petitioner has been engaged by the respondents against clear vacancy, though in an academic arrangement, but she is entitled to continue till such time, the post is filled on substantive basis by the respondents. It is submitted that the petitioner cannot be displaced by the respondents by engaging candidates for academic session in her place on contractual or other basis. It is submitted that the petitioner cannot be displaced by the respondents by engaging candidates for academic session in her place on contractual or other basis. Since, the respondents have issued the advertisement notice dated 05.07.2012, which has the effect of dislodging the petitioner from her present place of posting, therefore, the impugned advertisement deserves to be quashed and the respondents be directed to allow the petitioner to continue on the post of Vocational Instructor till such time, the post is filled on substantive basis on the recommendations of the Service Selection Board. 7. It is further case of the petitioner that she has requested the respondents to allow her to continue on the post held by her and to withdraw the impugned advertisement, but they have refused to do so, as such, the petitioner is constrained to seek the indulgence of this Court. 8. The specific case, which has been advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the petitioner is entitled to continue on the post to which she has been appointed in terms of the order mentioned hereinabove for the academic session 2011-12. However, the respondents in gross violation of the rights and interests of the petitioner have issued another advertisement notice dated 05.07.2012, where-under, the respondents have again invited the applications from eligible candidates for temporary engagement in academic arrangement in the ITIs of Kashmir Division for conducting training activities including the Trade of COPA, Stenography and Plumber @ Rs.6000/-per month for Degree holders and Rs.5500/- for Diploma holders for the academic session 2012-13 or till the regular arrangements are made in accordance with the rules on the recommendations of J&K Service Selection Board, whichever is earlier. 9. Per contra, reply has been filed on behalf of the respondents in which specific stand has been taken by the respondents that the petitioner was engaged on academic arrangement vide Dy. Director Technical Education Order No. 59 of 2011 dated 05.11.2011 for the academic session 2011-2012, only. Respondents further states that the order clearly mentions that the engagement is just for one academic session and since the academic session is over, the engagement automatically has ceased. 10. Director Technical Education Order No. 59 of 2011 dated 05.11.2011 for the academic session 2011-2012, only. Respondents further states that the order clearly mentions that the engagement is just for one academic session and since the academic session is over, the engagement automatically has ceased. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently argued that the petitioner was well aware of the fact that the assignment was purely temporary and was only for academic session and has no right to continue in any capacity beyond the period of her particular assignment. He further submits that the petitioner has already submitted the bond in this regard, whereby, the petitioner has specifically admitted that she would not claim any continuation beyond academic session. 11. The stand taken by the respondents further reveals that the terms and conditions of the engagement of the petitioner clearly indicate the intendment of the employer that the engagement of the petitioner was purely for academic arrangement and not otherwise. Respondents have submitted that the engagement of the Instructors in academic Institutions on academic session basis has become imperative for the respondents for various reasons and the Government while taking the policy decision for such kind of engagements had taken into account various factors which include the requirement of Institution given to the number of students at the given point of time or the requirement of Instructor in a particular stream/trade. 12. It has been further contended by the respondents that the decision to make engagement of Instructor on academic arrangements is sometimes made in absence of a post only to cater the need of a particular Institution in a particular situation. He further contended that the said engagements are generally made to tide over the immediate need of the Institutions i.e., exigencies of administration. Learned counsel further argued that in such like situation, the intendment of the respondents in making such engagements is only for a particular academic session and not otherwise. He further argued that it was never the intendment of the respondents to make the arrangement to last till the vacancy is filled through regular selection process and thus, the claim of the petitioner that he has unfettered claim of continuation of her engagement beyond academic session for which arrangement has been made, is without any basis and contrary to the terms and conditions of the advertisement notice and the engagement order. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the claim of the petitioner is not sustainable under law, as such, is liable to be set aside. 13. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record which reveals that vide order dated 18.07.2012, this Court granted status quo with respect to the position of the petitioner as it existed on that date and the said order continues to be in operation as on today. 14. There is no dispute to the fact that the engagement of the petitioner on the post of vocational Instructor was purely contractual in nature for a period of one year i.e for the academic session 2011-2012 with a fixed honorarium of Rs 4000/- per month. The appointment of the petitioner was not on contract, ad-hoc or consolidated basis to a specific post or a clear vacancy and there is marked difference in so far as appointment on academic arrangement for a fixed term, concerned. It is a purely temporary arrangement for specific department and that is need based. 15. An academic arrangement is for an academic session/year, it gets terminated at the end of such session/year, and is renewed again at the commencement of successive session/year and again terminated at the end of such successive session/year so on and so forth. The decision to make engagement on academic arrangement is sometimes made in absence of a post, only to cater the need of a particular institution in a particular situation. The said engagement is generally made to tide over the immediate need/requirement of the institutions i.e. precisely exigencies of administration. 16. It is to be noted that Legislature has clearly indicated that only three categories, namely, appointments on ad-hoc, contractual and consolidated pay basis, are eligible to be considered for regularization subject to their satisfying the requirements of the statutory provisions. It does not apply to the case of appointment on academic arrangement. It is a separate and an independent method or manner by which appointment is made in a Government Department and the Government in its wisdom has excluded the category of appointment made on academic arrangement basis for fixed term. 17. It is to be noted that regularization will apply in respect of posts in the Government for which appointments are made on ad-hoc, contractual or consolidated pay. 17. It is to be noted that regularization will apply in respect of posts in the Government for which appointments are made on ad-hoc, contractual or consolidated pay. The appointment of the petitioner in the present case has been made on academic arrangement basis, so it cannot be equated on same terms. The petitioner, therefore, is not right in claiming continuation in her arrangement beyond academic sessions for which her engagement had been made. 18. From a plain reading of the terms and conditions provided in the Engagement order no.59 of 2011 dated 5-11-2011, whereby, the petitioner was engaged as Vocational Instructor, a period of one year i.e for the academic session 2011-2012, it is crystal clear that the petitioner has no right to claim for continuation in the academic arrangement beyond the stipulated period. For facility, the relevant portion of the said order is reproduced below: “Before the candidates are allowed to join the concerned Heads of the Institutes will check their testimonials in original and obtain an undertaking from them duly attested by the Judicial Magistrate binding them to the effect, that they shall have no claim for continuation in tire academic arrangement beyond the stipulated period even if the department shall have to make the academic arrangement again for the next session in the event regular arrangement is not made within the time frame.” 19. From a bare reading of the engagement order, it becomes abundantly clear that the appointment of the petitioner was purely on academic arrangement basis for a period of one year. Thus, the petitioner was well aware of the fact that her engagement was purely temporary and was only for academic session and has no unfettered right to continue in any capacity beyond the period of her particular assignment. Besides, the terms and conditions of the order of her engagement/assignment clearly indicate the intendment of the employer that her engagement is purely for academic arrangements and no further. The said assignment of the petitioner came to an end by afflux of tenure and the petitioner cannot be allowed to turn around now, contrary to the term of her assignment. Thus, the petitioner has no legal right to continue in her engagement. The said assignment of the petitioner came to an end by afflux of tenure and the petitioner cannot be allowed to turn around now, contrary to the term of her assignment. Thus, the petitioner has no legal right to continue in her engagement. Merely because she has rendered services on contract for academic session with reference to limited purpose, does not vest her with any indefeasible right of claiming continuation on the post of Vocational Instructor till such time, the post is filled on substantive basis seeking policy for regularization, as projected by the petitioner. 20. It is pertinent to mention here that the services on academic arrangement basis is domain of the Government and the conditions of regulating such arrangement is further power of the Government, which cannot be by any stretch of imagination supplemented by the Courts and as such the Court cannot supplement the terms and conditions of hiring of services against the academic arrangement. 21. Furthermore, the said engagement of the petitioner being an academic arrangement, fixed for the term of one year, was need based and as such, she cannot seek to restrain the respondents from engaging others on academic arrangement as she herself is the beneficiary of such procedure. 22. The relief with reference to continuation of petitioners having worked for academic arrangement is already settled by the Division Bench of this Court in case titled “State of J&K and Ors. vs. Afshan Majid and Ors., reported in 2008 (2) JKJ 550 [HC]”. The Division Bench while disposing of the Letters Patent Appeal, filed by the State has held that contractual Lecturers engaged for a period not exceeding ten months on academic arrangement and at the end of the term the engagement comes to an end and for the next year/session every candidate is obliged to make fresh applications for selection and such arrangement evolved by the State Government cannot be held to be arbitrary, unreasonable or unjustified. 23. Further, this court in case titled “Gurjeet Singh And Ors. vs . State And Ors. SWP No. 847/2019 decided on 19.04.2019” has observed as under: “As per settled position of law, hiring of services on academic arrangement basis is domain of the Government and the conditions of regulating such arrangement is further power of the Government, which cannot be by any stretch of imagination supplemented by the Courts. vs . State And Ors. SWP No. 847/2019 decided on 19.04.2019” has observed as under: “As per settled position of law, hiring of services on academic arrangement basis is domain of the Government and the conditions of regulating such arrangement is further power of the Government, which cannot be by any stretch of imagination supplemented by the Courts. It is for the petitioners whether to compete the process of selection as per the terms and conditions or not. Court cannot supplement the terms and conditions of hiring of services against the academic arrangement and under the garb of such challenge cannot allow the petitioners to continue in the arrangement till they are absorbed.” 24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Uma Devi and others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 ” has considered the entire issue of the appointments on daily wage, ad-hoc or contractual basis followed by their regularization into permanent appointment, at length and the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 43, 45, 47 are apt to be taken note of and are, therefore, set out below:- "43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, which we have described as 'litigious employment' in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates. ................... 45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent, courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. ................... 45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent, courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain -- not at arms length -- since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. ................................................................ 47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post." 25. Further, this Court in a similar case of academic arrangement titled “Rajani Kumari and Ors. Vs. State and Ors, reported in 2017 (1) JKJ (HC) 310” has held as under: "7. It is a separate and an independent method or manner by which appointment is made in a Government Department. Further, this Court in a similar case of academic arrangement titled “Rajani Kumari and Ors. Vs. State and Ors, reported in 2017 (1) JKJ (HC) 310” has held as under: "7. It is a separate and an independent method or manner by which appointment is made in a Government Department. Government in its wisdom has excluded the category of appointment made on academic arrangement basis for fixed term. The petitioners have no locus to challenge the wisdom of the Government in enacting such a provision. The language of Section 3 clearly provides that regularization will apply in respect of posts in the Government for which appointments are made on adhoc of contractual or consolidated pay. Therefore, it is referable to a particular post of a clear vacancy, whereas in these cases, petitioners have been appointed in Higher Education Department on fixed term on an academic arrangement basis. So, both cannot be equated on same terms. There is no arbitrariness in that as alleged. In any event, he implored upon the Court not to accept the interpretation as propounded by the petitioners. Mr. Sharma relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled Union of India and Another Vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal reported in AIR 1992 SC 96 , which was relied upon in a subsequent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled Satheedevi Vs Prasanna and Anr., reported in AIR 2010 SC 2777 .” Their Lordships while dealing with the controversy in Deoki Nandan Aggarwal's case (supra), held in para Para 14 as under: "We are at a loss to understand the reasoning of the learned Judges in reading down the provisions in paragraph 2 in force prior to November 1. 1986 as — more than five years " and as —more than four years in the same paragraph for the period subsequent to November 1. 1986. It is not the duty of the Court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. The Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the courts. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. The Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the courts. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature the Court could not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. Courts shall decide what the law is and not what it should be. The Court of course adopts a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but could not legislate itself. But to invoke judicial activism to set at naught legislative judgment is subversive of the constitutional harmony and comits of instrumentalities. Vide P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries, (1990)/SCR 482 at p. 488: ( AIR 1990 SC 933 at p.936). Mangilal v. Sugamchand Rathi (1965) 5 SCR 239 : ( AIR 1965 SC 101 ), Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay 1959 Supp. (1) SCR 489 : ( AIR 1959 SC 459 ). Smt Hira Devi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur 1952 SCR 1122 at p.1131 : ( AIR 1952 SC 362 at p.365). Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar ( 1953 SCR 533 at p.545): ( AIR 1953 SC 148 at p. 152), Gujarat Streel Tubes Ltd. V. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha (1980) 2 SCR 146 : ( AIR 1980 SC 1896 ), W. Naravanaswami v. G. Punnerselvam (1973) / SCR 172 at p. 182 : ( AIR 1972 SC 2284 at p. 2289), N. S. Vardachari v. G. Vasantha Pai (1973) / SCR 886) : ( AIR 1973 SC 38 ). Union of India v. Sankal Chand Himatlal Sheth (1978) 1 SCR 423 : ( AIR 1977 SC 2328 ) and Commr: of Sales Tax. U.P. v. Auriaya Chamber of Commerce, Allahabad (1986) 2 SCR 430 at p. 4.38: ( AIR 1986 SC 1556 at pp. 1559-60). Modifying and altering the scheme and applying it to others who are not otherwise entitled to under the scheme will not also come under the principle of affirmative action adopted by courts sometimes in order to avoid discrimination. If we may say so, what the High Court has done in this case is a clear and naked usurpation of legislative power”. If we may say so, what the High Court has done in this case is a clear and naked usurpation of legislative power”. (Emphasis supplied) Further in para 10 of Satheedevi's case (supra) their Lordships observed thus: "Before proceeding further. we may notice two well recognized rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise - Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, 1958 SCR 30 360 : AIR 1957 SC 907 ). The other important rule of interpretation is that the Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation because it has no power to do so. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words which are not therein. Even if there is a defect or an omission in the statute, the Court cannot correct the defect or supply the omission. Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323: ( AIR 1992 SC 96 ) : 1991 AIR SCW 2754), Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corporation (1966) 3 SCR 466 : ( AIR 1966 SC 1678 ). On this premise, it is pleaded that the prayer to declare Section 3(b) as ultra vires should be dismissed. 26. The contention of the petitioner projected in the instant petition that “ one substitute cannot be replaced by another”, has been dealt in Rajani Kumari Judgment mentioned supra. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced below: “14. The next relief Sr. No.(D) to prohibit the respondents from replacing/ substituting the petitioners by another set of contractual appointee or by transferring regularly recruited Lecturers from one institution to another till their cases for confirmation/regularization against the post of Lecturers are considered by the Empowered Committee constituted under Section 10 of the Act. The next relief Sr. No.(D) to prohibit the respondents from replacing/ substituting the petitioners by another set of contractual appointee or by transferring regularly recruited Lecturers from one institution to another till their cases for confirmation/regularization against the post of Lecturers are considered by the Empowered Committee constituted under Section 10 of the Act. This prayer has three aspects. One is the confirmation and second is the regularization. Ist two parts of the prayer are inapplicable in the case of these petitioners as their appointments were made on academic arrangement basis. The third aspect is replacing contract employees by another set of contract employees. 15. This Court has taken a view in case titled Vidhu Puri & Ors. Vs. State th. Higher & Tech. Edu. Dept. & Ors. and batch of cases (SWP No.209/ 2003 and connected matters) decided on 04-07-2016 on the basis of decisions considered and declined in Division Bench case titled State of J&K Vs. Afshan Majid, reported as 2008 (2) J.K.J. 550 , which decision was again followed by the Single Judge, to be more specific in the case titled Suman Sharma Vs. State of J&K, reported as 2009 (2) J.K.J. 173 . The same was followed in subsequent decisions. This Court also followed in its earlier decision in batch of writ petitions, lead case as SWP No.209/2003. Vidhu Puri & Ors. Vs. State thr. Higher & Tech. Edu. Dept. & Ors., decided on 14-07-2016. 16. It is the case of respondents that they are not resorting to such a procedure of replacing contract teachers/lecturers by another set of contract teachers/ lecturers. The engagement is need based. In any event, the lecturers on contract or engaged on academic arrangement cannot seek to restrain the government from engaging lecturers on contract engagement or academic arrangement as they themselves are beneficiary of such procedure. This issue becomes academic because petitioners are appointed on academic arrangement. 17. On this issue also, Courts have taken a view to safeguard ousting of contract engagements only for the purpose of accommodating new incumbents on contract basis. In this regard, it will be useful to refer judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled State of Haryana Vs. Piara Singh and Others reported as AIR 1991 SC 223 referring to the following observations: “..... In State of Haryana Versus Piara Singh. 1992 (4) SC 118 of 152. In this regard, it will be useful to refer judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled State of Haryana Vs. Piara Singh and Others reported as AIR 1991 SC 223 referring to the following observations: “..... In State of Haryana Versus Piara Singh. 1992 (4) SC 118 of 152. this Court had held that the normal rule is recruitment through the prescribed agency but due to administrative exigencies, an adhoc or temporary appointments may be made in such situation, this Court held that efforts should always be made to replace such adhoc or temporary employee by regularly selected employees, as early as possible. Temporary employees also would get liberty to compete along with others for regular selection but if he does not get selected, he must give way to the regularly selected candidates. Appointment of the regularly selected candidates cannot be withheld or kept in abeyance for the sake of such an adhoc or temporary employee. Adhoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another adhoe or temporary employee. He must be replaced only by regularly selected employee.” 18. The said ratio will apply to the petitioners only if they are sought to be replaced by another set of teachers/lecturers on academic arrangement. 19. The relief of prohibiting the respondents from replacing/substituting the petitioners by transferring regularly recruited Lecturers from one institution to another till their cases for confirmation/regularization against the post of Lecturers are considered, has been dealt with by Hon 'ble Supreme Court in case titled Dr. Kishore Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported as 1997 (1) 107: 1997 (3) SCC 209 , wherein their Lordships observed as under: "It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since vacancies are existing the appointment of Dr. Solanki by transfer could not be used as a means to terminate the service of the petitioner. We fail to appreciate the contention. It is fairly agreed by the learned counsel that the petitioner has no right to the post and as soon as a duly selected candidate is posted in his place. he has to give place to the duly selected candidate. But his contention is that since Dr. Solanki was selected earlier to the order passed by the Tribunal and had been appointed on his transfer, it cannot be used as a means to terminate the services of the petitioner. His contention absolutely has no force. he has to give place to the duly selected candidate. But his contention is that since Dr. Solanki was selected earlier to the order passed by the Tribunal and had been appointed on his transfer, it cannot be used as a means to terminate the services of the petitioner. His contention absolutely has no force. As soon as the duly selected candidate is posted. whether directly or by transfer, necessarily the petitioner has to give place to such a candidate. The petitions. Therefore, do not merit interference. Therefore, the said plea has no legal basis. 20. This Court hastens to hold that academic arrangement teachers/lecturers cannot seek to hold on to their post for ever. If they are found not to be up to the mark or efficient then their continuation will be a question mark. It is for the authorities to decide the best course of action in a non-arbitrary manner. If academic arrangement teachers/lecturers seek extension then they have to make a representation for considering the extension of service, which can be considered on its own merits. 21. In this regard, it will be useful to refer to the decision of this Court where a plea of retention when employed on contractual basis, Division Bench of this Court considered and declined the claim in case titled State of J&K Vs. Afshan Majid, reported as 2008 (2) J.K.J. 550 . which decision was followed by the Single Judge, to be more specific in the case titled Suman Sharma Vs. State of J&K. reported as 2009 (2) J.K.J. 173 . 22. In that in paragraph 18, it has been held as follows: "18. For the reasons mentioned above and in view of the afore-quote observations made by the Division of this Court in cases referred to above, these petitions are disposed of with the following directions:- i/ That the petitioners are not entitled to regularization of their services against the posts they have been engaged on contract/temporary basis as the said engagement has been done without following any procedure as provided for filling up the post belong to State-Cadre: ii/ That the petitioners shall be allowed to continue till the posts are filled up by a regular selection process. The State respondent, however, shall be free to continue this engagement of the petitioners only if there is requirement to engage them keeping in view the interest of students who are studying in particular colleges; In the light of the above, petitioners appointed on academic arrangement have no legal right to seek regularization dehors the Act. 26. This is a very peculair case where the petitioner who was engaged as vocational Instructor way back on 5.11.2012 by way of an academic arrangement is a beneficiary of interim order granted by this court which continued for 11 years, when the order of engagement was only for one academic year i.e 2011-2012 and the petitioner has also filed an undertaking that she will not claim any continuation in the academic arrangement beyond the stipulated period even if the Department shall have to make the academic arrangement again for next session in the event regular arrangement is not made within the timeframe. 27. The prayer of the petitioner and the foundation laid down in the instant petition is contrary to the undertaking given by the petitioner and also the terms and conditions governing her engagement. It is a peculiar case where the petitioner have enjoyed the fruit of interim order for eleven years contrary to the spirit and mandate of terms and conditions of her engagement order and undertaking filed and yet petitioner is clamouring for her continuance ever after eleven years. 28. The continuation of the petitioner on the said post in terms of interim court order dated 18.07.2012, does not create any right or interest in her favour. The petitioner cannot hold on to her post forever on the strength of the interim order and the continuation pursuant to the said orders issued from time to time would not change the nature of her appointment. Merely, because the petitioner has rendered services on contract for academic session with reference to limited purpose, does not vest her with any indefeasible right of claiming continuation on the post of Vocational Instructor till such time the post is filled on substantive basis. The petitioner cannot hold on to her post forever on the strength of the interim court order and the continuation pursuant to the said order would not change the nature of her appointment. 23. The petitioner cannot hold on to her post forever on the strength of the interim court order and the continuation pursuant to the said order would not change the nature of her appointment. 23. I am fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in “State of UP v. Raj Karan Singh (1998) 8 SCC 529 ”. It is apt to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment hereunder. “....Besides, merely because a person continues under the interim orders of the Court, such continuance on the post cannot and, in this case, does not confer on him any right for continuance, it does not enhance his case for regularization. It is only an interim arrangement pending decision by the Court and cannot disturb the position in law or equities, as on the date of the petition." 24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “State of Rajasthan and Others vs Daya Lal and Others, reported in (2011) 2 SCC 429 ” has observed as under: “Mere continuation of service by a temporary or ad hoc or daily-wage employee, under cover of some interim orders of the court, would not confer upon him any right to be absorbed into service, as such service would be "litigious employment". Even temporary, ad hoc or daily-wage service for a long number of years, let alone service for one or two years, will not entitle such employee to claim regularization, if he is not working against a sanctioned post. Sympathy and sentiment cannot be grounds for passing any order of regularization in the absence of a legal right”. 25. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in a case titled “Nagesh Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Ors”., reported as 2010 LIC 3245: 2010 ILR (Allahabad) 547: 2010 (4) All. LJ 638: 2010 (6) ADJ 235 , has also observed in para 18 as under: "18.Keeping in view the facts and circumstances stated hereinabove the reply to the said question would be in negative. As the appointment of the appellant being for a fixed term, he has no right to continue beyond the period of indicated in his appointment letter which is a time bound for a fix period. Extension of appointment by judicial order is not permissible under law as a fixed term appointment would come to an end automatically by efflux of time. Extension of appointment by judicial order is not permissible under law as a fixed term appointment would come to an end automatically by efflux of time. In case, the contention of the appellant is accepted, it would be amount to rewriting the appointment letter allowing the appellant to continue without their being letter of appointment issued by the competent authority for a period after the term of his term/tenure of engagement is over.” Conclusion 26. Keeping in view the above discussion and the settled legal position, I find no merit in the present petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed alongwith all connected applications. 27. The interim direction, if any, shall stand vacated.