ORDER : Reportable 1. In all these writ petitions, challenge has been made to the impugned suspension order dated 20.06.2022, on similar grounds and controversy involved therein is identical in nature, therefore, with consent of learned counsel for both parties, all writ petitions have been heard together and would stand decided by this common Order. Facts of SB Civil Writ Petition No.9220/2022, are being taken as main case. 2. Learned counsel for petitioners submits that petitioners were placed under suspension vide order dated 20.06.2022 (Ann.1) issued by the Director (Traffic), Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur (hereinafter for short “the RSRTC”) and the suspension order is not accompanied with charge sheet, giving out reasons of suspension, therefore, the same is not sustainable in law being in violation of Clause 35(vi) of the Standing Orders of 1965. Petitioners submit that in the impugned suspension order itself, it is contained that charge sheet shall be issued within a period of 7 days and the suspension order without accompanying with the charge sheet has been issued, taking resort of the office order dated 01.06.2022, whereby and whereunder Clause 35(i) of the Standing Orders of 1965, was amended. Learned counsel for petitioners submits that passing suspension order, by taking resort to office order dated 01.06.2022 is arbitrary and illegal as the office order dated 01.06.2022 has been challenged by the Rajasthan State Roadways Employees Union (hereinafter for short “the Trade Union”) by way of filing an appeal on 14.06.2022 before the Labour Court No.1, Jaipur, and therefore, by virtue of Section 7 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (hereinafter for short “the Act of 1946”), the amendment, carried out in Clause 35(i) of the Standing Orders of 1965 vide order dated 01.06.2022, cannot remain in operation on the date of issuance of the impugned suspension order. 3. Learned counsel for petitioners submits that the impugned suspension order dated 20.06.2022 is liable to be quashed and set aside merely being not accompanied with the charge sheet and such issue is covered by the order dated 11.01.2016, passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in SB Civil Writ Petition No.7599/2015 titled Yogendra Kumar Meena Vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, which has also been followed later in case of Karan Singh Dhayal Vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation in SBCWP No.23744/2018 vide order dated 14.03.2019. 4. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, which has also been followed later in case of Karan Singh Dhayal Vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation in SBCWP No.23744/2018 vide order dated 14.03.2019. 4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for and on behalf of respondents-RSRTC submitted two folds of arguments; (A) Charge sheet to petitioners was also issued on the same date of issuance of the impugned suspension order i.e. on 20.06.2022, but due to avoiding service of charge sheet by petitioners, the same could be served upon them by way of Chaspadagi on the next date i.e. on 21.06.2022. In addition, it has been submitted by way of additional affidavit dated 23.01.2023 that charge sheet was also sent through post on 20.06.2022 itself. (B) By virtue of order dated 01.06.2022, the Clause 35(i) of the Standing Orders of 1965, has been substituted in the manner that a competent authority may suspend a workman for any act or omission or misconduct, by an order in writing and a charge sheet shall be served within 15 days containing specific charges. Therefore, due to such amendment, even if the charge sheet was not accompanied with the impugned suspension order, the same remains valid by virtue of office order dated 01.06.2022. According to learned counsel for respondents, office order dated 01.06.2022 has come in operation w.e.f. 02.06.2022 in view of Clause 5(3) of the Act of 1946. 5. Learned counsel for respondents has further pointed out that the appeal preferred by the Trade Union assailing the office order dated 01.06.2022 before the Labour Court is though pending, but the stay application filed with the appeal has been dismissed by the Labour Court vide order dated 08.07.2022. 6. Heard learned counsel for both parties and perused the material on accord with their assistance. 7. The factual matrix, for issuance of impugned suspension order against petitioners is common, and as per record, it has transpired that petitioners along with few other workmen, entered in the Office of Chief Manager, Sikar Depot on 17.06.2022, raised slogans and tried to create pressure on the Chief Manager, to accept demands of workmen. As per record, despite repeated requests by the Chief Manager, they did not leave her chamber and continued with their protest for about an hour. Such behavior and conduct of petitioners were taken as misconduct by the Chief Manager, under Order No.34 of the Standing Orders of 1965. As per record, despite repeated requests by the Chief Manager, they did not leave her chamber and continued with their protest for about an hour. Such behavior and conduct of petitioners were taken as misconduct by the Chief Manager, under Order No.34 of the Standing Orders of 1965. As per record, it also transpires that in respect of the incident occurred on 17.06.2022, the Chief Manager, Sikar Depot, Smt. Mukesh lodged an FIR No.451/2022 at Police Station Udhyog Nagar, Sikar on 18.06.2022. Thereafter, an approval from the Head Office via E-mail was sought on 20.06.2022 and petitioners have been placed under suspension by issuing impugned suspension order. It appears from the record that the concerned Chief Manager of Sikar Depot also issued a separate charge sheet to each petitioner on 20.06.2022 itself leveling such allegations of portraying protest in her chamber in illegal manner. The charge sheet dated 20.06.2022 has also been placed on record. It may be noted that petitioners have not accepted such allegations and have depicted the incident in another manner. However, this Court is not required to enter in such factual controversy as the same is subject matter of the disciplinary proceedings. The factual matrix have been narrated only to take a gist of facts, under which impugned suspension order came to be issued. 8. During course of arguments, it has been stated by the learned counsel for respondents that suspension orders of petitioners have been revoked vide order dated 13.12.2022, albeit disciplinary proceedings pursuant to charge sheets dated 20.06.2022 against petitioners, are pending. 9. Having heard learned counsel for parties and on appreciation of the aforesaid contentions, this Court is of the opinion that the issue involved in instant writ petitions revolves around two legal issues; (I) as to whether the impugned suspension order, issued without accompanying with charge sheet is sustainable as per Clause 35(vi) of the Standing Orders 1965? (II) Whether the impugned suspension order passed, after placing reliance on the office order dated 01.06.2022 and treating the amendment in Clause 35(i) of the Standing Orders of 1965 operative be held as valid? 10. (II) Whether the impugned suspension order passed, after placing reliance on the office order dated 01.06.2022 and treating the amendment in Clause 35(i) of the Standing Orders of 1965 operative be held as valid? 10. As far as, the legal issue No.(I) is concerned, the same is covered by the order dated 11.01.2016 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this court in case of Yogendra Kumar Meena (Supra), wherein the similar issue came up before this Court and the Hon’ble Court after adverting adherence to provisions of Clause 35(vi) of Standing Orders 1965 has held as under: “Para 35 of standing orders of 1965 has been referred by both the parties thus, it would be gainful to quote the said provision for ready reference: “(vi)(a) Where on a complaint of misconduct against a workman, disciplinary proceedings against him are contemplated or are pending or where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial and the employer is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to place the workman under suspension, he may do so by serving on the workman an order in writing to that effect. Such an order shall take effect immediately on delivery to the workman. It shall be accompanied by a charge-sheet explaining in details the reasons for such suspension and the workman shall be given an opportunity of defending himself.” A perusal of para 35 reveals that an employee can be suspended against whom disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or pending or if a criminal case is under investigation or trial. It is however, necessary to serve a copy of the order on the workman in writing and such an order would take effect immediately on its delivery. The order of suspension need to be accompanied by a charge-sheet explaining the reasons of suspension. In view of the provisions aforesaid, the non-petitioner was under an obligation to accompany the copy of charge-sheet along with copy of order of suspension but it is missing in this case. The service of the charge-sheet is subsequent to the order of suspension thus, the impugned order has not been passed as per para 35 of the standing orders of 1965. Hence, it is quashed. It is more so when order does not supply reasons required as per the provisions referred above. The writ petition is allowed with the aforesaid. The service of the charge-sheet is subsequent to the order of suspension thus, the impugned order has not been passed as per para 35 of the standing orders of 1965. Hence, it is quashed. It is more so when order does not supply reasons required as per the provisions referred above. The writ petition is allowed with the aforesaid. The non-petitioner would, however, be at liberty to pass fresh order, if so wishes.” The similar view has been adopted and followed in subsequent cases came up before this Court and for which reference of order dated 14.03.2019 in case of Karan Singh Dayal (Supra) may also be given. 11. Applying the aforesaid ratio decidendi, as expounded by the Coordinate Bench in case of Yogendra Kumar Meena (Supra) to the present case, a perusal of the impugned suspension order dated 20.06.2022 itself makes it clear and leaves no room of doubt that the charge sheet though issued on the same date i.e. on 20.06.2022, but the same was not issued at the time of issuance of suspension order and certainly has been issued later on. It is undisputed fact that the charge sheet is not accompanied with the impugned suspension order. In the impugned suspension order itself it is indicated that the charge sheet shall be issued within a period of 7 days. The impugned suspension order nowhere contains the reason for placing the petitioners under suspension which is the mandate and requirement of provision of Clause 35(vi) of the Standing Orders of 1965. In the reply by respondents, it has not been contended that the charge sheet dated 20.06.2022 was attached and accompanied while issuing the suspension order, but by way of an additional affidavit submitted on behalf of respondents, it has been tried to canvass that charge sheet dated 20.06.2022 was issued on the same day i.e. on the date of issuance of the suspension order dated 20.06.2022, but such plea of respondents, obviously does not meet out the mandatory requirements of Clause 35(vi) of the Standing Orders of 1965. Therefore, in considered opinion of this Court, the ratio decidendi as expounded by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in case of Yogendra Kumar Meena (Supra) is squarely applicable to the present case and on this count alone, the impugned suspension order stands illegal and unsustainable. 12. Therefore, in considered opinion of this Court, the ratio decidendi as expounded by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in case of Yogendra Kumar Meena (Supra) is squarely applicable to the present case and on this count alone, the impugned suspension order stands illegal and unsustainable. 12. Coming to the another legal issue No.(II) referred hereinabove, in respect of effect of office order dated 01.06.2022 on the impugned suspension order, whereby an amendment in Clause 35(i) of Standing Orders of 1965 is sought to be made. It is apposite to reproduce the office order dated 01.06.2022, which reads as under:- jktLFkku jkT; iFk ifjogu fuxe ifjogu ekXkZ] t;iqj 302001 Øekad %& ,Q91@eq-@Je@lkek11@2022@227 fnuakd 01-06-2022 dk;kZy; vkns'k jktLFkku jkT; iFk ifjogu fuxe deZpkjh ,oa dk;Z'kkyk deZpkjh LFkkbZ vkns'k] 1965 ls 'kkflr deZpkfj;ksa dks vkns'k Øekad ,Q83@vkj,lvkjVhlh@ysc@75@1750 fnukad 16-06-1975 DykWt 35¼1½ esa fuyEcu vkns'k ds lkFk vkjksi i= tkjh djus ds funsZ'k tkjh fd, x, FksA mDr DykWt esa vkaf'kd la'kks/ku djs fuyEcu vkns'k ds 15 fnol ds Hkhrj vkjksi i= fn, tkus ds izko/kku fuxe lapkyd e.My ds fu.kZ; la[;k 58@2020 fnukad 10-11-2020 }kjk vuqeksfnr fd;k tkdj izekf.krdrkZ vf/kdkjh varxZr vkS|ksfxd fu;kstu ¼LFkkbZ vkns'k½ vf/kfu;e] 1946 jktLFkku t;iqj }kjk fnuakd 02-05-2022 dks izekf.kr fd;k x;k gSA bl izdkj jktLFkku jkT; iFk ifjogu fuxe deZpkjh ,oa dk;Z'kkyk deZpkjh LFkkbZ vkns'k] 1965 ds DykWt 35¼1½ dks fuEukuqlkj izfrLFkkfir fd;k tkrk gS % "Competent authority may suspend a worker for any act or omission of misconduct as described in standing order no. 34 by an order in writing and a charge sheet shall be served within 15 days containing specific charges on which each charge is based and asking him to state whether he desires to be heard in person." ;g vkns'k fnuakd 02-06-2022 ls ykxw gksaxsA ¼lanhi oekZ½ izca/k funs'kd Øekad %& ,Q91@eq-Je@lkek-11@2022@227 fnukad 01-06-2022 Ikzfrfyfi % fuEu dks lwpukFkZ ,oa vko';d dk;Zokgh gsrq izsf"kr gS% 1- futh lfpo] v/;{k ,oa izaca/k funs'kd egksn;] jkjkiifuxe] t;iqjA 2-leLr foHkkxk/;{k ¼½ jkjkiifuxe] t;iqjA 3- egkizc/akd¼;krk;kr@for@Vk;j@LVksj½ jkjkiifuxe] t;iqjA 4- tksuy eSusatlZ ------tksuA 5- eq[; mRiknu izca/kd] dsUnzh; dk;Z'kkyk ---------- 6- eq[; izca/kd] jkifu---- 7- vkns'k@xkMZ i=koyh txnh'k izlkn pqudj dk;Zdkjh funs'kd ¼iz'kklu½ 13. By way of the office order dated 01.06.2022, the RSRTC sought to amend Clause 35(i) of the Standing Orders of 1965. By way of the office order dated 01.06.2022, the RSRTC sought to amend Clause 35(i) of the Standing Orders of 1965. In this respect, Sections 5, 6 & 7 of the Act of 1946, deal with the procedure that how and in what manner and when the amendment in the Standing Orders of 1965 can be carried out and would come in force. For ready reference Sections 5, 6 & 7 of the Act of 1946 are being reproduced here under:- “5. Certificate of standing orders. -(1) on receipt of the draft under section 3, the Certifying officer shall forward a copy thereof to the trade union, if any, of the workmen, or where there is no such trade union, to the workmen in such manner as may be prescribed, together with a notice in the prescribed form requiring objections, if any, which the workmen may desire to make to the draft standing orders to be submitted to him within fifteen days from the receipt of the notice. (2) After giving the employer and the trade union or such other representatives of the workmen as may be prescribed an opportunity of being heard, the Certifying Officer shall decide whether or not any modification of or addition to the draft submitted by the employer is necessary to render the draft standing orders certifiable under this Act, and shall make an order in writing accordingly. (3) The Certifying Officer shall thereupon certify the draft standing orders, after making any modifications therein which his order under sub-section (2) may require, and shall within seven days thereafter send copies of the certified standing orders authenticated in the prescribed manner and of his order under sub-section (2) to the employer and to the trade union or other prescribed representatives of the workmen. 6. 6. Appeals.-(1) 3 (Any employer, workmen, trade union or other prescribed representatives of the workmen] aggrieved by the order of the Certifying Officer under sub-section (2) of section 5 may, within 4 [thirty days] from the date on which copies are sent under sub-section (3) of that section, appeal to the appellate authority, and the appellate authority, whose decision shall be final, shall by order in writing confirm the standing orders either in the form certified by the Certifying Officer or after amending the said standing orders by making such modifications thereof or additions thereto as it thinks necessary to render the standing orders certifiable under this Act. (2) The appellate authority shall, within seven days of its order under sub-section (1), send copies thereof to the Certifying Officer, to the employer and to the trade union or other prescribed representatives of the workmen, accompanied, unless it has confirmed without amendment the standing orders as certified by the Certifying Officer, by copies of the standing orders as certified by it and authenticated in the prescribed manner. 7. Date of operation of standing orders.-Standing orders shall, unless appeal is preferred under section 6, come into operation on the expiry of thirty days from the date on which authenticated copies thereof are sent under sub-section (3) of section, or where an appeal as aforesaid is preferred, on the expiry of seven days from the date on which copies of the order of the appellate authority are sent under sub-section (2) of section 6.” 14. Learned counsel for petitioners has argued that the office order dated 01.06.2022, soon after came to knowledge has been challenged by the Trade Union by way of filing an appeal on 14.06.2022, under Section 6 of the Act of 1946 before the Labour Court No.1 Jaipur and by virtue of Section 7 of the Act of 1946, the office order dated 01.06.2022 can not remain in operation during pendency of appeal. And thus, the suspension order passed by placing reliance on the office order during course of pendency of the appeal, stands bad in law. 15. And thus, the suspension order passed by placing reliance on the office order during course of pendency of the appeal, stands bad in law. 15. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents pointed out that, the office order dated 01.06.2022 had been certified by the certifying Officer under Sections 5(1) & (2) of the Act of 1946 on 02nd May 2022 as indicated in the office order itself and therefore, by virtue of Section 5(3) of the Act of 1946, this order came in effect and operation after expiry of 30 days thereafter i.e. w.e.f. 01.06.2022. It has been submitted that the appeal challenging the office order dated 01.06.2022 could have been filed within a period of 30 days. Therefore, the appeal filed by the Trade Union on 14.06.2022 is of no avail to operate the stay on the operation of the office order dated 01.06.2022. 16. This Court, after pondering over rival contentions of learned counsel for both parties, finds that in Section 5(3) of the Act of 1946 as extracted hereinabove, it is incumbent upon the certifying Officer that after certifying any order under sub-section 2, he/she shall send copies of certified standing orders within a period of 7 days to employer and to the Trade Union or other prescribed representatives of the workmen. The statutory duty casted upon the certifying Officer is mandatory as word “shall” has been used in the statutory provision. According to petitioners, the office order dated 01.06.2022 has been assailed by way of appeal on 14.06.2022 before the Labour Court it means within 30 days from issuance of the order and as soon as the same came to the knowledge. Section 6 of the Act of 1946 envisages provision of appeal. A perusal of Section 6 indicates that any person including employer, workmen, trade union or prescribed representatives of the workmen, if aggrieved by an order of certifying Officer passed under Section 5(2) of the Act of 1946, may challenge the same by way of appeal within 30 days commencing from the date after copies of such order are sent under Section 5(3) of the Act of 1946. Section 7 stipulates the provision that when the order of certifying authority would come up in operation. Section 7 stipulates the provision that when the order of certifying authority would come up in operation. It is explicitly clear that in case the order has been assailed by way of appeal, the order would come in operation on expiry of 7 days from the date of which copies of the order of appellate authority are sent to parties concerned. 17. This Court finds that it is not in dispute that the office order dated 01.06.2022 is still under challenge in appeal before the Labour Court and the appeal, at the behest of the Trade Union of the workmen, is pending. It is also not in dispute that during course of pendency of the appeal, the impugned suspension order has been passed. On the conjoint reading of Sections 5(3), 6 & 7 of the Act of 1946 coupled with facts presented before this Court, it may not be held that the office order dated 01.06.2022 has come in operation w.e.f. 02.06.2022, as the same is still under challenge in the appeal before the appellate authority. The order of dismissing stay application during pendency of appeal, may not override the effect of statutory provisions of the Act of 1946. This Court is of the considered opinion that resort taken by respondents to justify the impugned suspension order on the basis of office order dated 01.06.2022 relying upon the amendment in Clause 35(i) of the Standing Orders of 1965 is impermissible to facts of the present case and cannot be countenanced. Thus, the impugned suspension orders dated 20.06.2022 are not liable to be held valid. 18. For discussions and enunciation made hereinabove, as a result, the impugned suspension orders dated 20.06.2022 deserve to be set aside and the same are hereby quashed and set aside. Petitioners are entitled for all the consequential benefits. 19. Accordingly, the writ petitions are hereby allowed in the aforesaid terms. 20. Stay application and other pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. 21. Copy of this Order be placed in each file.