JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. Mr. Sanjay Prasad, learned arguing counsel for the petitioner, at the outset, has sought for leave of this Court to make necessary correction in the provision of law under which the instant review petition has been filed. 2. Considering the same, let the necessary correction be carried out in course of the day. 3. The instant review petition has been filed for review of the judgment dated 18.01.2021 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 100 of 2020, whereby and whereunder, the order dated 20.09.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 3993 of 2018 had been set aside. 4. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition which requires to be enumerated herein, read as under: The father of the writ petitioner, who was permanent employee and was posted as Pump Operator at Ramkanali Colliery under the respondents-BCCL (hereinafter referred to as ‘the BCCL’) died in harness on 11.01.2015. At the time of death, the writ petitioner and her sister were minor and as such, mother of the petitioner, wife of the deceased employee had submitted her representation before the respondent for appointment of her daughter on compassionate ground. The case of the writ petitioner was considered but rejected on the ground that the age of the writ petitioner at the time of death of her father was 15 years 8 months and 24 days but there is no provision to keep female dependant on live roster. It is further case of the writ petitioner that on 27.12.2017, the writ petitioner had submitted a representation requesting therein that the ground of rejection of her claim for compassionate appointment, is illegal and arbitrary in view of the fact that she had applied for compassionate appointment on 01.06.2015 and had attained majority on 02.05.2017 and as such, a request was made to consider her case for appointment on compassionate ground. But, the said claim was rejected vide order dated 13/30.06.2018. But, the said claim was rejected vide order dated 13/30.06.2018. The aforesaid order was assailed before this Court by invoking jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein the ground has been agitated that the compassionate appointment is to be provided to unmarried daughter as per the provision contained in Para-9.4.0 of N.C.W.A and as such, the action of the respondent-BCCL, rejecting the claim of the petitioner is illegal and arbitrary in the eyes of law. Further submission has been made that her claim on the ground of gender is against the provision of Constitution of India. It has further been submitted that in terms of N.C.W.A, a male dependant, who is below the age of 18 years can be kept in live roster till he attains majority but there has been apparent discrimination in the case of female dependant as would appear from the case in hand. Per contra, a counter affidavit was filed by the respondents-BCCL. Learned counsel for the respondents-BCCL opposed the contention of the petitioner by making submission that as per the service excerpts of the deceased employee, the name of the writ petitioner did not find place in the list of dependants and after the death of the deceased employee, the family certificate was submitted by the writ petitioner in which she is shown as dependant along with her sister and mother. It has further been submitted that the mother of the writ petitioner earlier requested for compassionate appointment to be given in favour of the writ petitioner but was rejected vide letter dated 06.01.2016 on the ground that the petitioner’s age is 15 years 8 months and 24 days and she is minor and there is no provision to keep the name of female dependant in the live roster, which was never been challenged. Further argument has been made that in absence of enabling provision that if the dependant of deceased is minor and not eligible for employment on compassionate ground, then he/she can claim such employment after becoming major subsequently? The respondent cannot pass order in such cases, as the eligibility for employment is to be seen at the time of death, not subsequently. The respondent cannot pass order in such cases, as the eligibility for employment is to be seen at the time of death, not subsequently. Learned Single Judge deliberating upon the issues, has allowed the writ petition on the ground that the father of the writ petitioner died in harness on 11.01.2015 and the writ petitioner and her sister were minor, as such, the mother of the writ petitioner i.e. wife of the deceased employee submitted an application for employment in favour of the daughter on compassionate ground. The age of the writ petitioner was 15 years 8 months and 24 days and as such, her case was rejected as there was no provision for keeping a female dependant on live roster. Further on attaining the age of majority, the writ petitioner made an application on compassionate ground which was rejected on 13/30.06.2018 on the aforesaid ground. Admittedly, the writ petitioner was aged about 12 years at the time of death of her father which has not been controverted by the respondents. Learned Single Judge, has further taken into consideration the case of the writ petitioner, which was rejected merely on the ground that she is female and her name cannot be kept in live roster as she has not attained majority. Para-9.5.0 of the N.C.W.A provides condition for employment on compassionate ground to a female dependant and considering the fact that there cannot be any gender discrimination on the ground of sex, the writ petition was allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned order against which the intra-court appeal was preferred being L.P.A. No. 100 of 2020 but the said appeal was dismissed against which the present review petition has been filed. 5. Mr. Sanjay Prasad, learned arguing counsel for the review petitioner has filed the instant petition on the ground that the reason of rejection of the claim of the writ petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground cannot be said to be proper since the same has been rejected on the ground that there is no provision under the National Coal Wage Agreement to keep the female dependant on live roster. The contention has been made that there cannot be any gender discrimination and hence on this ground alone, the order passed by this Court in L.P.A. No. 100 of 2020 is fit to be rejected. The contention has been made that there cannot be any gender discrimination and hence on this ground alone, the order passed by this Court in L.P.A. No. 100 of 2020 is fit to be rejected. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the writ-petitioner has relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in Subhadra vs. Ministry of Coal and Another, (2018) 11 SCC 201 . 6. While on the other hand, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the respondent-CCL has submitted by referring to the scope of review which according to him is very limited and can only be exercised if there is any error apparent on the face of record or any fact which could not have been brought to the notice of the court even in spite of due diligence, then only, the power of review can be exercised but after going through the entire pleading, no such case has been made out rather the case has been made out as would appear from the grounds of filing review that the reason for rejection cannot be construed to be proper since the rejection order contains the reason that the female dependant cannot be kept in live roster. It has been contended that the aforesaid fact was available to the writ petitioner right from the day when the impugned decision of the rejection of appointment on compassionate ground was passed, which was challenged by the review petitioner before the learned Single Judge by filing writ petition as also intra-court appeal. Further contention has been raised that bi-partite agreement based upon which the appointment is being sought for by the review petitioner, itself contains a condition as would appear from clause 9.5.0 of the NCWA that the male dependant if having the age of more than 12 years, will be kept in live roster, therefore, the aforesaid ground has been taken into consideration by the court while dealing with L.P.A. No. 100 of 2020. 7. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record as also the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 100 of 2020. 8. 7. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record as also the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 100 of 2020. 8. This Court before proceeding to examine as to whether the ground which has been raised can be considered to be a fit case for review of the order dated 18.01.2021, deem it fit and proper to refer certain judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the scope of review and the jurisdiction of the review court. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. Vrs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Ors., AIR 1954 SC 526 particularly at paragraph-32, it has been observed, which reads as under:- “32. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasis that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XL VII, Rule I of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified, grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason.” In Shivdev Singh Vrs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 , in a review petition filed under Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C., the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the power of review of its own order by the High Court inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction, to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. In doing so, the Court was only upholding the principles of natural justice. In doing so, the Court was only upholding the principles of natural justice. This decision indicates that the Court’s power of review while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution extends to correct all errors to prevent miscarriage of justice. In the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Sow. Chandra Kanta and Anr. Vrs. Sheik Habib, AIR 1975 SC 1500 , it has been held that:- “A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition through different counsel of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient.” It is the settled proposition as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments discussed hereinabove that the scope of review can only be done in case of discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and for any other sufficient reason and in the light of this legal position the fact of these review petitions need to be appreciated. It is evident from the aforesaid judgments that the Hon'ble Apex Court has carved out while laying down the rule regarding the principle to be followed by the review court and more particularly, the fact which is required to be seen while exercising the power of review that there must be error apparent on the face of record or the fact which is important for just and appropriate appreciation of the lis but could not have been brought to the notice of the Court in spite of due diligence. 9. This Court is now proceeding to examine the grounds upon which the instant review petition has been filed. It appears from the factual aspect that the review petitioner has claimed appointment on compassionate ground who happens to be the daughter of the deceased employee whose father died in harness on 11.01.2015. 9. This Court is now proceeding to examine the grounds upon which the instant review petition has been filed. It appears from the factual aspect that the review petitioner has claimed appointment on compassionate ground who happens to be the daughter of the deceased employee whose father died in harness on 11.01.2015. It appears from the record that at the time of death of the employee, the writ petitioner and her sister were minor, as such, the mother of the review petitioner, wife of the deceased employee, submitted her representation before the respondent for appointment of her daughter on compassionate ground. It further appears that at the time of death of the father, the writ petitioner was aged about 15 years 08 months and 24 days, therefore, she has not been provided appointment on compassionate ground under clause 9.3.2. Further she has not been kept in live roster in view of the condition stipulated under clause 9.5.0. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the decision of the authority of not keeping her in live roster and the said claim having been rejected on the ground that there is no provision under clause 9.5.0 to keep the female dependant of the deceased employee in live roster, has filed writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 3993 of 2018 and the learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition on the ground that there cannot be any discrimination on the ground of gender/sex. The CCL, being aggrieved, has assailed the said order by filing intra-court appeal being L.P.A. No. 100 of 2020 by taking the ground that the condition stipulated under NCWA since is a bi-partite agreement and having statutory fervor in view of the provision of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as such, the same binds the parties. Further, agreement does not contain any provision of keeping the female dependant in live roster. The ground was raised in the aforesaid appeal that a direction was passed by the learned Single Judge by deviating from the concerned conditions where there is no provision to keep the female dependant in live roster but even then the direction was passed by the learned Single Judge to provide appointment to the female dependant by considering her to be in live roster. 10. 10. The Division Bench of this Court while deciding the aforesaid issue regarding the legality and propriety of the order passed by the learned Single Judge has considered the aforesaid submission and has come to the conclusion that the learned Single Judge, even though there is no provision contained therein to keep the female dependnt on live roster, has quashed and set aside the aforesaid order. The review petitioner, against the said order passed by this Court in L.P.A. No. 100 of 2020 has filed the instant review petition. 11. Learned counsel for the review petitioner has again reiterated the ground that there cannot be gender based discrimination. 12. It requires to refer herein that the position of law is settled so far as providing appointment on compassion is concerned although the appointment which is to be offered under the National Coal Wage Agreement is not in strict by way of a scheme floated by the State unilaterally but the National Coal Wage Agreement is by way of an agreement entered in between the Union and the functionaries of the Coal India Limited. The aforesaid agreement is outside the conciliation proceeding. Reference of the provision of Section 18(1) of the Act, 1947 is required to be made herein for the reason to see the significance of the terms and conditions of the NCWA and its effect, the same reads as under: “18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.- (1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.- (1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub- section (3), an arbitration award] which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration.] (3) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under sub- section (3A) of section 10A] or an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] which has become enforceable] shall be binding on-- (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, 5 arbitrator,] 8 Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part.” 13. It is evident from sub-section (1) of Section 18 that the agreement which has been arrived at in between the parties outside the conciliation proceeding will have binding effect upon the parties who are signatories to such bilateral settlement, meaning thereby, agreement arrived at outside the conciliation proceeding will be construed to be an agreement under Section 18(1) of the Act, 1947, as such, has got statutory fervor. The aforesaid fact has been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mohan Mahto Vs. Central Coal Fields Limited & Ors., (2007) 8 SCC 549 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe about the statutory fervor of the National Coal Wage Agreement as would appear from para-10 which reads as under: “10. The aforesaid fact has been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mohan Mahto Vs. Central Coal Fields Limited & Ors., (2007) 8 SCC 549 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe about the statutory fervor of the National Coal Wage Agreement as would appear from para-10 which reads as under: “10. A settlement within the meaning of sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act is binding on both the parties and continues to remain in force unless the same is altered, modified or substituted by another settlement. No period of limitation was provided in the settlement. We would assume that the respondent had jurisdiction to issue such circular prescribing a period of limitation for filing application for grant of appointment on compassionate grounds. But, such circular was not only required to be strictly complied with but also was required to be read keeping in view the settlement entered into by and between the parties. The expanding definition of workman as contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act would confer a right upon the appellant to obtain appointment on compassionate grounds, subject, of course, to compliance with the conditions precedent contained therein.” 14. This Court is not proceeding to examine the fact as to whether on the ground of gender discrimination, the fact which has already been taken into consideration by the Division Bench of this Court can be allowed to be agitated again by filing review petition. Further, whether allowing such plea to be agitated by way of ground to file review, can it be said to be proper ground to review the order passed by the Court by taking into consideration the aforesaid fact. 15. This Court has referred the scope of review in the judgment referred hereinabove wherein there are two requirements to exercise the power of review, i.e., (i) there must be error apparent on the face of record; and (ii) that the fact which is important for just and appropriate appreciation of the lis but could not have been brought to the notice of the Court in spite of due diligence. These two conditions are not available since the specific ground is being made out that there cannot be any gender discrimination. 16. The question arises that can the party be allowed to violate the terms and conditions to which he is party. These two conditions are not available since the specific ground is being made out that there cannot be any gender discrimination. 16. The question arises that can the party be allowed to violate the terms and conditions to which he is party. Further question would be that once the terms and conditions of the agreement have been accepted, can it be allowed to deviate. The next question would be that the ground which has already been dealt with by the Division Bench of this Court while dealing with the L.P.A. No. 100 of 2020, can it be said to be fresh ground to entertain the instant review. 17. This Court on the basis of the law laid down and the fact that the writ petitioner who happens to be the female and on the said very ground, her candidature has been rejected so far as her name to be kept in live roster is concerned, since under clause 9.5.0 there is no such provision. For ready reference, clause 9.5.0 is being referred as under: “9.5.0. Employment/Monetary compensation to female dependant- Provision of employment/monetary compensation to female dependants of workmen who die while in service and who are declared medically unfit as per Clause 9.4.0 above would be regulated as under :- i) In case of death due to mine accident, the female dependant would have the option to either accept the monetary compensation of Rs.4000/- per month or employment irrespective of her age. ii) In case of death/total permanent disablement due to causes other than mine accident and medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0, if the female dependant is below the age of 45 years she will have the option either to accept the monetary compensation of Rs.3000/- per month or employment. In case the female dependant is above 45 years of age she will be entitled only to monetary compensation and not to employment. iii) In case of death either in mine accident or for other reasons or medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0, if no employment has been offered and the male dependant of the concerned worker is 12 years and above in age, he will be kept on a live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualifications when he attains the age of 18 years. During the period the male dependant is on live roster, the female dependant will be paid monetary compensation as per rates (i) & (ii) at paras above. This will be effective from 1.1.2000. iv) xxxx xxxxx xxxx v) xxxx xxxxx xxxx” 18. It also requires to refer herein that the agreement carved out a difference in between the male and female dependant so far as keeping the dependant in live roster is concerned, but so far as the issue of offering appointment on compassionate ground on attaining the age of 18 years and up to the age of 35, the male/female dependant can be provided appointment in view of the condition stipulated under clause 9.3.2. 19. This Court since is considering the review petition, as such, is of the view that the ground which has already been agitated and dealt with by the Division Bench, considering the said ground again a ground for review otherwise, it will be nothing but appeal in the garb of review which is not permissible. 20. Before parting with the order, this Court deems it fit and proper to deal with the judgment upon which the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon, i.e., rendered in the case of Subhadra vs. Ministry of Coal and Anr. (supra). 21. This Court, on perusal of the aforesaid judgment, has found from the factual aspect that the widow, namely, Subhadra, after the death of her husband had made application against the decision of the respondent of grant of monetary compensation of Rs.3000/- per month but the appellant has insisted for employment but the employment having not been provided, had approached the court of law and in that pretext, direction has been passed, therefore, the issue which is now under consideration, the fact of the instant case is quite different to that of the aforesaid case. However, in the said case also, reference of clause 9.5.0 has been made but no law has been laid down therein. 22. The law is well settled that the applicability of the judgment is to be tested on the basis of fact of that case. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, (2014) 5 SCC 75 , paragraph-47 of the said judgment reads as under: “47. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, (2014) 5 SCC 75 , paragraph-47 of the said judgment reads as under: “47. It is a settled legal proposition that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and the case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. “The court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.”” 23. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact in entirety and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court with respect to the power of review, is of the view that the instant review petition deserves to be dismissed. 24. Accordingly, the instant review petition stands dismissed.