JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. D. Das, learned Senior Counsel, being assisted by Mr. H. Nath, for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. M.P. Goswami, learned Addl. P.P., Assam appearing for the State/respondent No.1 and Mr. J.I. Borbhuiya, learned counsel for the respondent No.2. 2. In this petition, under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., petitioner, Shri Indranil Baruah has put to challenge the correctness or otherwise of the order, dated 28.04.2016, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhubri in C.R. Case No.263/2016. It is to be noted here that vide impugned order dated 28.04.2016, the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhubri took cognizance of the offences under sections 120(B)/166/294/352/ 354/357/509/34 of the IPC, against the present petitioner, along with three other accused persons and issued process to him to appear before the Court and to stand trial. 3. The background facts, leading to filing of the present petition, are adumbrated as under:- “Smti Barasha Borah Bordoloi, the respondent No.2 here-in, filed a Complaint Case against the present petitioner, namely, Indranil Baruah along with four others alleging inter-alia amongst others that, on 19.12.2015, she along with her driver and Advocate came to Dhubri to cause personal service of summon upon Shri Diganta Borah, the then Superintendent of Police, Dhubri, in connection with a Title Suit No.70/2015, pending in the Court of Civil Judge, Dibrugarh. Then her Advocate met Mr. Borah in his office chamber to deliver the summons and documents. But, Shri Borah refused to accept the same. Upon being informed about such refusal by her Advocate, she decided to have direct talk with Mr. Borah and she went to the office of Mr. Borah with her driver and on her reaching there one lady constable, namely, Halima Khatun guided her respectfully to the to the office chamber of Mr. Borah. Then Mr. Borah asked the respondent No.2 to come to his residence in the evening, wherein he will receive the summons and documents in presence of his Advocate. Accordingly, in the evening, the respondent No.2, along with her driver arrived at the residence of Mr. Borah and informed her arrival to the gatekeeper as well as to Mr. Barah through his mobile. However, there was no response from the side of Mr. Borah. While she was waiting in front of his gate, at about 10 P.M., Mr. Borah along with his wife and Addl. Borah and informed her arrival to the gatekeeper as well as to Mr. Barah through his mobile. However, there was no response from the side of Mr. Borah. While she was waiting in front of his gate, at about 10 P.M., Mr. Borah along with his wife and Addl. Superintendent of Police, Sri Indranil Baruah (present petitioner) and some other people, including Constable Minu Roy, came out of his residence. Then having seen her, Mr. Borah had shouted like a mad person and pointing their service weapon at her, Mr. Borah and the Addl. S.P. Shri Indranil Baruah had threatened to kill her if she does not leave that place. The respondent No.2 also alleged that thereafter, Mr. Borah had instructed some persons over telephone to register a false case against the respondent No.2 and after a few minutes, the respondent No.2 was assaulted and pushed forcefully into a police vehicle, wherein the Addl. S.P. had abused her physically. Further, it is alleged in the complaint that Mr. Borah had ordered his subordinates to detain the respondent No.2 inside the male lock up of Dhubri Police Station, and accordingly, she was detained there up to 4:00 P.M. of next day, without food and water and she was not allowed to communicate with family members by using mobile phone. Upon the said complaint, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhubri registered a case being CR Case No.263/2016, and made over the same to the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhubri, vide order dated 20.01.2016. Then the learned Court below, on the basis of the statement of the complainant and another witnesses, recorded under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. took cognizance of the offences against the present petitioner and four others, under Sections 120(B)/166/ 294/352/354/357/509/34 IPC, and issued summons to them vide order dated 28.04.2016, and directed them to appear before the Court to stand trial.” 4. Being highly aggrieved by the order of taking cognizance, dated 28.04.2016, the petitioner approached this court questioning the correctness or otherwise of the said order on the following grounds:- (i) That, the learned Court below had committed error in law in taking cognizance of the complaint case and by issuing summons to the petitioner without following the proper procedure of law and as such the impugned order, dated 28.04.2016, is liable to be set aside and quashed; (ii) That, the learned Court below, while taking cognizance, had failed to take into account that the prosecution side had not sought for prosecution sanction from the competent authority to proceed with the case against the petitioner and taking cognizance, without the prosecution sanction is bad in law and as such the impugned order dated 28.04.2016, is liable to be set aside; (iii) That, if the alleged offence was committed while performing official duty or in purported performance of the duty, Section 197 of the Code cannot be by-passed by reasoning that the person cannot perform his official duty outside his normal jurisdiction and as such, issuance of process against the petitioner, without prior sanction, is liable to be set aside; (iv) That, a bare perusal of the complaint petition as well as initial deposition of the respondent No.2, and the statement of her witnesses, reveals that the petitioner, while discharging his official duty had acted upon the respondent No.2 and as such, prior sanction is required to initiate the case against him, which is absent in the present case; (v) That, the learned trial Court had failed to apply his judicial mind to the averments in the complaint while taking cognizance against the petitioner and as such the impugned order is liable to be set aside; (vi) That, the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala-fide and/or the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused person and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge and therefore, contended to allow the petition by setting aside the impugned order dated 28.04.2016; 5. Mr. D. Das, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner was serving as Addl. Mr. D. Das, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner was serving as Addl. S.P. at Dhubri, under the accused No. 1 of the complaint at the relevant point of time and he was discharging his official duties and carried out the order of the Superintendent of Police. Mr. Das further submits that section 197 Cr.P.C speaks about the requirement of prosecution sanction and as no prosecution sanction has been obtained by the respondent No.2, while filing the complaint, and on such count the impugned order of taking cognizance against the petitioner, is illegal and without jurisdiction and liable to be interfered with by this Court, by exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. To bolster his submissions, Mr. Das has placed reliance upon several decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Heavy reliance is placed on the decision in S. Moitra vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 584 , besides relying upon the decision in Indra Devi vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, reported in (2021) 8 SCC 768 . Under the above facts and circumstances, it is contended to allow this petition. 6. Per contra, Mr. J. I. Borbhuiya, the learned counsel for the respondent No.2, submits that the prayer being made by the petitioner in this petition and the prayer made by one of the co-accused namely, Shri Diganta Borah, in the Criminal Petition No.995/2016, being the same, and the said petition having been dismissed by this Court, after hearing learned Advocates of both the parties, the present petition with the same prayer, is not maintainable and the only recourse available to the petitioners are to approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by filing Special Leave Petition. Mr. Borbhuiya further submits that correctness of the impugned order, having been unsuccessfully challenged in this Court; it cannot be challenged again on different ground. And as such, Mr. Borbhuiya submits that the present petition against the same impugned order is not maintainable. Mr. Borbhuiya also submits that the present petitioner had served under the main accused of the complaint petition namely, Shri Diganta Borah and he is also involved in the conspiracy against the respondent No.2, and pursuant to the said conspiracy, two criminal cases were registered against the respondent No.2, being Dhubri P.S. Case No.1589/2015 and the Dhubri P.S. Case No.1590/2015, and there is specific allegation of conspiracy against them. Referring to four case laws, (i) Inspector of Police & Anr. vs. Battenapatla Vankataratnam & Anr., reported in (2015) 13 SCC 87 ; (ii) Rajib Ranjan & Ors. vs. R. Vijaykumar, reported in (2015) 1 SCC 513 ; (iii) Devinder Singh & Others vs. State of Punjab through CBI, reported in (2016) 12 SCC 87 ; (iv) Devendra Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 579 of 2019, arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.21 of 2018, Mr. Borbhuiya submits that prosecution sanction is required only when the alleged offences have been committed in discharge of the official duty. And in the present case, since the petitioner has committed the offence, while he was not discharging his official duty, the sanction, as contemplated in section 197 Cr.P.C. is not required. Further, Mr. Borbhuiya submits that hatching conspiracy and cheating, fabrication of record or misappropriation cannot be said to be done in discharge of the official duty by the public servant. Mr. Borbhuiya also referred two other case laws:-(i) State of M.P. vs. Awadh Kishore Gupta &Ors., reported in (2004) 1 SCC 691 , (ii) State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Kunwar Singh, Criminal Appeal No. 709 of 2021 arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 5517 of 2021, to contend that in a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the merit of the allegation cannot be enquired into and the evidence cannot be appreciated. Mr. Borbhuiya, therefore, contended to dismiss this petition as it is bereft of merit. 7. In his reply to the submission of Mr. Borbhuiya, Mr. Das, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the present petitioner was not the petitioner in the Criminal Petition No.995/2016, and the said petition was filed on the ground of non compliance of Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. and the present petition is being filed on the ground of want of prosecution sanction. Mr. Das further submits that the grounds in the present petition are also different from the grounds in Criminal Petition No.995/2016, and as such, the order, so passed in the said petition is not binding on him. 8. Mr. Das further submits that the grounds in the present petition are also different from the grounds in Criminal Petition No.995/2016, and as such, the order, so passed in the said petition is not binding on him. 8. In view of the averments made in the petition and also in view of the submissions, so advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as by the respondents, the questions, that arises for consideration of this court are formulated as under :- (i) Whether the present petition is maintainable in view of adjudication of similar prayer of another co-accused in Criminal Petition No.995/ 2016 ? (ii) Whether prosecution sanction is required to take cognizance of the offences against the present petitioner, under section 34/120(B)/166/167/294/352/353/354/357/504/506 and 509 of the IPC ? 9. I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record and also gone through the case laws, referred by Mr. D. Das, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and also the case laws, referred by Mr. J.I. Borbhuiya, learned counsel for the respondent No.2. I have also carefully gone through the Annexure-I (complaint petition) and Annexure-II, the statement of the respondent No.2, recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C., i.e., and Annexure-III, the statement of her witness -CW.1. Also, I have gone through the Criminal Petition No.995/2016, and the impugned order dated 28.04.2016, passed by the learned court below in CR Case No. 263/2016. 10. There is no quarrel at the Bar that the present petitioner was not a party in the Criminal Petition No.995/2016. And indisputably, the ground, so heralded/agitated in the said petition, was different from the present petition. The present petition is being preferred on the ground of absence of prosecution sanction as required under Section 197 Cr.P.C. It also appears that the Criminal Petition No. 995/2016, was filed on the ground of non-compliance of Section 202 Cr.P.C, while taking cognizance against the petitioner of that case. As the present petitioner was not a party to the said proceeding and as the ground agitated in the said petition is also different from the grounds so taken in the present petition, this court is unable to record concurrence with the submission of Mr. Borbhuiya, the learned counsel for the respondent No.2. Instead, this court is inclined to hold that the present petition, being preferred on different ground and by different person is maintainable. Borbhuiya, the learned counsel for the respondent No.2. Instead, this court is inclined to hold that the present petition, being preferred on different ground and by different person is maintainable. Since the impugned order has adverse consequence upon the career of the petitioner, he has every right to test the correctness of the same in the court and such a right cannot be denied on the ground, so assigned by the learned counsel for the respondent No.2. The question No.1, so formulated above, stands answered accordingly. 11. That, a cursory perusal of the Annexure-I, Annexure-II and Annexure-III reveals that the case was registered under sections 34/120(B)/166/167/294/352/353/354/357/504/506/509 IPC, and the learned Court below had taken cognizance of the aforementioned offences and issued process to the petitioner to appears before him and to stand trial. The complaint petition also reveals that on 19.12.2015, the respondent No.2, went to the office chamber of the then Superintendent of Police, Dhubri District to cause service of summons of the Title Suit No.70/2015, pending in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Dibrugarh, as per the order of the said court, along with her Advocate. Then at about 3:30 P.M., on that day, her Advocate informed her about refusal of the Superintendent of Police, Dhubri to receive the summons and then she decided to have a direct talk with the Superintendent of Police, Dhubri and reached his office chamber and then the petitioner No.2-Smti. Halima Khatun had guided her to the office chamber of the Superintendent of Police, Dhubri respectfully. However, the Superintendent of Police, Dhubri refused to accept the summon and called her to his official residence, at about 7:00 P.M., to receive the summon in presence of his Advocate. Accordingly, she reached his official residence, informed the gatekeeper, and sent some messages to the Superintendent of Police, Dhubri in his mobile. But, she did not receive any response. Then she waited in front of his gate and at about 9:00 P.M., her driver went to have his dinner, but, he did not return till 10:00 P.M. and then feeling suffocation in her vehicle, she came out of the same. Then having seen her, the Superintendent of Police, Dhubri along with his wife, and Addl. Then she waited in front of his gate and at about 9:00 P.M., her driver went to have his dinner, but, he did not return till 10:00 P.M. and then feeling suffocation in her vehicle, she came out of the same. Then having seen her, the Superintendent of Police, Dhubri along with his wife, and Addl. Superintendent of Police, Dhubri Sri Indranil Baruah and some other persons, including Constable Minu Roy, came out of the residence and then the Superintendent of Police, Dhubri started shouting at her with derogatory words. It also reveals that thereafter, Dhubri P.S. Case No.1589/2015 and Dhubri P.S. Case No.1590/2015, were registered against the respondent No.2. 12. It is alleged that the two cases have been registered against the respondent No.2 in a planned manner to avoid service of summon and also to trap her by all the accused named in the Annexure-I, by repeatedly misusing their official power and position with a mala fide intention. However, nothing has been indicated in the complaint and also in the statement of respondent No.2, as to how the conspiracy was hatched. 13. But, having gone through the two FIRs of Dhubri P.S. Case No.1589/2015, under sections 120(B)/447/294/352/353 IPC and Dhubri P.S. Case No.1590/2015, under section 120(B)/352/353/448 /294/509/506 IPC registered against the respondent No.2, and the connected records and case diaries, I find that Dhubri P.S. Case No.1589/2015 was registered against the respondent No.2 on the basis of one FIR lodged by one lady constable namely Halima Khatun and Dhubri P.S. Case No.1590/2015 was registered on the basis of an FIR lodged by constable Minu Roy and both FIRs were unsuccessfully challenged before this court in Criminal Petition No. 684/2016 and 681/2016. Further, it appears that investigation of both the FIRs culminated in filing of charge sheet against the respondent No.2. Also it appears from the record that the FIR of Dhubri P.S. Case No.1590/2015, registered under sections 120(B)/352/353/448/294/509/506 IPC, relates to the incident that took place in front of the official residence of the Superintendent of Police, Dhubri on 19.12.2015. Thus, the factum of lodging of FIR in connection with the incident that took place in front of the official residence of the Superintendent of Police and culmination of investigation in filing of charge sheet against the respondent No.2, has, in fact, strengthened the contention of Mr. Thus, the factum of lodging of FIR in connection with the incident that took place in front of the official residence of the Superintendent of Police and culmination of investigation in filing of charge sheet against the respondent No.2, has, in fact, strengthened the contention of Mr. Das, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No.2 had created ruckus in front of the official residence of the Superintendent of Police, at night, and as ordered by the Superintendent Police, the petitioner, who was Addl. Superintendent of Police at that point of time, acted upon removing the respondent No.2 from the official residence of the Superintendent of Police to the Dhubri Police Station and it was his duty to carrying out the order of the Superintendent of Police besides maintaining law and order there, and whatsoever was done, it was done in discharge of his official duty, and that being so, he is entitled to the protective shield, so provided under section 197 of the Cr.P.C. It is to be noted here that the contention of Mr. Das, the learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner is not controverted by the respondent No.2 or by the respondent No.1, i.e. the state. Under these facts and circumstances this court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner was on duty at the relevant point of time and whatsoever he had done, the same appears to be done in discharge of his official duty. 14. Further, it appears that the present petitioner is a member of the Assam Police Service and at the relevant point of time; he was serving in Dhubri District, under the Superintendent of Police. Attention of the court, at the time of hearing, was drawn to a Notification No.HMA.280/88, dated 29.05.1990, issued by the Home (A) Department of the Government of Assam, under Sub-Section (3) of Section 197(3) of the Cr.P.C. The section speaks about sanction. And a stand is being taken by the petitioner that the said notification is applicable to him also, as at the relevant time he was on duty, and the sanction required under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., was not there at the time of taking cognizance against the present petitioner. The requirement of sanction, while committing any offence in discharge of official duty is well settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions. 15. The requirement of sanction, while committing any offence in discharge of official duty is well settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions. 15. In the case of Matajog Dubey vs. H.C. Bhari, reported in (1955) 2 SCR 925 , a Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “Public servants have to be protected from harassment in the discharge of official duties while ordinary citizens not so engaged do not require this safeguard. It was argued that section 197, Criminal Procedure Code vested an absolutely arbitrary power in the government to grant or withhold sanction at their sweet will and pleasure, and the legislature did not lay down or even indicate any guiding principles to control the exercise of the discretion. There is no question of any discrimination between one person and another in the matter of taking proceedings against a public servant for an act done or purporting to be done by the public servant in the discharge of his official duties. No one can take such proceedings without such sanction.” 16. While laying down the test, which is required to be adopted to find out whether sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is required or not and to ascertain the scope and meaning of such sanction, their Lordships further held as under:- “Slightly differing tests have been laid down in the decided oases to ascertain the scope and the meaning of the relevant words occurring in section 197 of the Code; "any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty". But the difference is only in language and not in substance. The offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. No question of sanction can arise under section 197, unless the act complained of is an offence; the only point to determine is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection' between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. There must be a reasonable connection' between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. What we must find out is whether the act and the official duty are so inter-related that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty, though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation.” 17. Going by the aforesaid principle, so laid down in the case of Matajog Dubey (supra), a three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in S. Moitra vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 584 , has echoed the same rule and held that – “If the offence is committed during the course of the performance of his official duty, it would attract section 197 Cr.P.C.” 18. Thus, having arrived at the finding that the petitioner was on official duty at the relevant point of time and whatever he did he did the same in discharge of his official duty, and placing reliance upon the Notification dated 29.05.1990, and also applying the ratios, so laid down in the cases Matajog Dubey (supra), and S. Moitra (supra), as discussed in the foregoing para, it can safely be concluded that the petitioner herein is entitled to protection under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. And admittedly, the prosecution sanction was not there. Mr. D. Das, the learned Senior Counsel has rightly pointed this out during argument and I find sufficient force in the same and the case laws referred by him also strengthen his submission. I have also gone through the other case law of Indra Devi (supra), referred by Mr. Das, the learned Senior Counsel, where in the object/purpose of Section 197 Cr.P.C. has been explained as under:- “Section 197 of the CrPC seeks to protect an officer from unnecessary harassment, who is accused of an offence committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties and, thus, prohibits the court from taking cognisance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the competent authority. Public servants have been treated as a special category in order to protect them from malicious or vexatious prosecution. Public servants have been treated as a special category in order to protect them from malicious or vexatious prosecution. At the same time, the shield cannot protect corrupt officers and the provisions must be construed in such a manner as to advance the cause of honesty, justice and good governance.” 19. In the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal and ors. reported in 1990 SCR Supl. (3) 259, in paragraph No. 8.1, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 8.1. In the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal and ors. reported in 1990 SCR Supl. (3) 259, in paragraph No. 8.1, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 8.1. In the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the following categories of cases are given by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guide in myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised: (a) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (b) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code; (c) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; (d) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code; (e) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (f) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; (g) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 20. Since in the case in hand the cognizance of the offence was taken ignoring the express legal bar, engrafted in section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the present petitioner, on such count it is the abuse of the process of the court, there is requirement of exercising extraordinary or inherent powers of this court to quash the impugned order of taking cognizance against the present petitioner, to prevent such abuse of the process of court. 21. In catena of decisions Hon’ble Supreme Court held that inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is designed to achieve salutary purpose that criminal proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into weapon of harassment. When the Court is satisfied that criminal proceedings amount to an abuse of process of law or that it amounts to bringing pressure upon accused, in exercise of inherent powers, such proceedings can be quashed. In the case of Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that section 482 Cr.P.C. is prefaced with an overriding provision. The statute saves the inherent power of the High Court, as a superior court, to make such orders as are necessary (i) to prevent an abuse of the process of any Court; or (ii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Same are the powers with the High Court, when it exercises the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 22. This being the legal position, the argument, so advanced by Mr. Borbhuiya, the learned counsel for the respondent No.2, left this Court unimpressed. I have carefully gone through the case laws-(i) Awadh Kishore Gupta (Supra) and (ii) Kunwar Singh (Supra), and I find that the ratio laid down therein would not come into his aid. Abuse of the process of the Court, in the case in hand, is writ large from the record, and as such, it is the duty of this Court to prevent such misuse by exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 23. I have also carefully gone through the other case laws, referred by Mr. Borbhuiya, the learned counsel for the respondent No.2, in respect of sanction. But, I find that the ratio, laid down in the said cases, has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts and as such it would not advance the case of the respondent No.2 anymore. Borbhuiya, the learned counsel for the respondent No.2, in respect of sanction. But, I find that the ratio, laid down in the said cases, has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts and as such it would not advance the case of the respondent No.2 anymore. As no sanction has been obtained from the competent authority, before taking cognizance by the learned court below, the impugned order, dated 28.04.2016, so passed, has failed to withstand the test of correctness and as such, the same requires interference of this court. Accordingly question No.(ii) in paragraph No.10 stands answered. 24. In the result, I find sufficient merit in this petition, and accordingly, the same stands allowed. The impugned order, so far it relates to the present petitioner, stands quashed. The parties have to bear their own costs.