ORDER : 1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order dated 08.08.2007 passed in Appeal No. 82/2004 by Rent Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur, whereby the order of eviction dated 20.11.2004 was set aside, the petitioner-landlord has preferred the present petition under Article 226 and 227 of Constitution of India with the following prayers: i) to pass appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 8.8.2007 passed in Appeal No. 82/2004 by Rent Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur City Jaipur in the matter of Jagdish Prasad Sharma vs. Mohan Lal Soni; ii) to pass appropriate writ, order or directing giving a declaration that the order dated 20.11.2004 passed by the Rent Tribunal, Jaipur in application N. 202/2004 Mohan Lal Soni vs. Jagdish Prasad is perfectly legal and judicious and which never required interference or intervention by the Appellate Tribunal and the said order 20.11.2004 be upheld making the respondent tenant liable and responsible for vacating the premises occupied by them as tenant of the petitioner; iii) Any other order which this Hon’ble Court deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be passed in favour of the petitioner;” 2. The brief and necessary facts of the case are as follows: (i) The property in question was let out by the petitioner-landlord to the respondent tenant in the year 1973 and the rent agreement was executed on 24.05.1973. (ii) The petitioner-landlord, by way of legal notice dated 19.08.2003, demanded arrears of rent due for the period of December 2002 to July 2004 and amounting to Rs. 2200, within a period of 30 days. (iii) The notice dated 19.08.2003 also contained details of bank account of the petitioner-landlord in which the arrear amount was to be deposited. (iv) The notice dated 19.08.2003 was received by the son of the respondent-tenant on 21.08.2003. (v) The respondent-tenant deposited an amount of Rs. 3575, being the arrears of rent for the period December 2002-December 2003, on 27.12.2003. (vi) The petitioner-landlord filed a petition for eviction under Section 9(a) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (in short “RRCA”) before the Rent Tribunal, Jaipur in the month of January 2004. (vii) The Rent Tribunal, vide order dated 20.11.2004, allowed the petition filed by the petitioner-landlord and ordered eviction of the respondent-tenant by declaring the respondent-tenant as ‘defaulter’. (vi) The petitioner-landlord filed a petition for eviction under Section 9(a) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (in short “RRCA”) before the Rent Tribunal, Jaipur in the month of January 2004. (vii) The Rent Tribunal, vide order dated 20.11.2004, allowed the petition filed by the petitioner-landlord and ordered eviction of the respondent-tenant by declaring the respondent-tenant as ‘defaulter’. (viii) The respondent-tenant filed an appeal (No. 82/2004) against the order dated 20.11.2004 passed by the Rent Tribunal in Case No. 202/2004. (ix) The appeal (No. 82/2004) filed by the respondent-tenant was allowed by the Rent Appellate Tribunal vide impugned order dated 08.08.2007 and the order dated 20.11.2004 was quashed and set aside. (x) Against the order dated 08.08.2007, the present writ petition was filed by the petitioner-landlord and the same was admitted on 04.10.2012. (xi) The petitioner-landlord Mr. Mohan Lal Soni, by way of registered sale deed dated 29.01.2021, sold the property in question to Mr. Nand Lal Soni. (xii) Mr. Mohan Lal Soni died on 11.05.2021. (xiii) Vide order dated 31.10.2022, the application filed under Order 22 Rule 10 of CPC by the applicant Mr. Nand Lal Soni, for substitution of applicant as the petitioner-landlord in the present writ petition, was allowed subject to just objections which may be raised by the opposite side at the time of final hearing of the writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord, at the outset, submits that vide sale deed dated 29.01.2021, all rights, titles and interest in the property in question now vests with the present petitioner-landlord Mr. Nand Lal Soni. Learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord submits that the Rent Tribunal had exhaustively dealt with each and every aspect of the matter and had rightly concluded that the respondent-tenant was a defaulter as he failed to tender the arrears of rent in due time of the premises occupied by him. It is an admitted case that the respondent-tenant did not pay the rent for several months which compelled the petitioner-landlord to serve a legal notice as per the provision of Section 9 of RRCA. The notice dated 19.08.2003 was admittedly received by respondent’s son on 21.08.2003 and thereafter, even after expiry of 30 days, no deposit was done by the respondent-tenant. Learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord contends that the Rent Appellate Tribunal have adopted an erroneous interpretation of Section 9 of RRCA. The notice dated 19.08.2003 was admittedly received by respondent’s son on 21.08.2003 and thereafter, even after expiry of 30 days, no deposit was done by the respondent-tenant. Learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord contends that the Rent Appellate Tribunal have adopted an erroneous interpretation of Section 9 of RRCA. As per the learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord, Section 9 of RRCA nowhere prescribes sending of second 30 day notice and by no stretch of imagination can the same be interpreted/included under Section 9 of RRCA, especially when the language and intention of the legislation is absolutely clear. Learned counsel contends that as the only ground for allowing the appeal filed by the respondent-tenant was based on erroneous interpretation of Section 9, the order dated 08.08.2007 needs to be set aside. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord have relied upon judgments of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Akkho vs. M.B. Augustus (S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 1/1983; decided on: 18.04.1983), Om Prakash vs. Gulkandi Devi and Ors. (S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 318/1997; decided on: 28.06.1999) and Om Prakash Saini vs. Smt. Ganga Devi Mathur & Ors. (S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 351/2009; decided on: 27.10.2009). 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-tenant, at the outset, submits that the present petition is not maintainable as the cause of action, after sale of property, does not survives. Learned counsel for the respondent-tenant contends that for the sake of argument, if it assumed that the respondent-tenant was rightly declared as a defaulter by the Rent Tribunal, then by virtue of right of default being a personal right in favour of the landlord, no cause of action exists in favour of the present petitioner who is the subsequent purchaser of the property in question and not ‘landlord’. On merits, learned counsel for the respondent-tenant submits that the tenant made every effort to deposit the rent with the petitioner-landlord, however the petitioner-landlord himself refused to accept the same on account of some dispute between the petitioner-landlord and his brother. 4.1 Learned counsel for the respondent-tenant contends that Section 9(a) of RRCA is also not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Learned counsel submits that the respondent-tenant cannot be declared as a defaulter unless the requirements of Section 9(a) are satisfied. 4.1 Learned counsel for the respondent-tenant contends that Section 9(a) of RRCA is also not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Learned counsel submits that the respondent-tenant cannot be declared as a defaulter unless the requirements of Section 9(a) are satisfied. In the present case, admittedly, the details of bank account of the petitioner-landlord are not mentioned in the rent agreement. It is argued that unless the details of the bank account are communicated to the respondent-tenant in the prescribed format, any alleged arrear cannot be counted for the purpose of determination of default. Only once the bank account details are communicated, the future arrears are to be counted for determining default. Any purported arrear prior to communication of bank details of the landlord could not be considered for determination of default, as per the first proviso to Section 9(a) of the RRCA. In the instant case, there was only one notice dated 19.08.2003. By way of said notice, for the first time, the bank details of the petitioner-landlord were communicated to the respondent-tenant. As per the learned counsel for the respondent-tenant, any period prior to the notice dated 19.08.2003 cannot be considered for determination of default as the respondent-tenant had no knowledge about the bank account in which the rent was to be deposited. Learned counsel further submits that the second proviso to Section 9(a) contemplates compulsory notice to the tenant demanding the arrears of rent. It is argued that the notice dated 19.08.2003 cannot be considered as valid notice as required under the second proviso to Section 9(a) and the Rent Appellate Tribunal rightly observed that the petitioner-landlord was required to send a second notice demanding arrears of rent before initiating suit for eviction under Section 9(a) of RRCA. 4.2 Learned counsel for the respondent-tenant further submits that, without prejudice to his other arguments, the notice dated 19.08.2003 was not served to the respondent-tenant personally, but upon the son of the respondent-tenant. The same came to the knowledge of the respondent-tenant only on 01.12.2003 and the due amount of Rs. 3575, being the arrears of rent for December 2002-December 2003, was deposited in the bank account of the petitioner-landlord mentioned on the notice, on 27.12.2003, i.e. prior to the initiation of suit for eviction. The same came to the knowledge of the respondent-tenant only on 01.12.2003 and the due amount of Rs. 3575, being the arrears of rent for December 2002-December 2003, was deposited in the bank account of the petitioner-landlord mentioned on the notice, on 27.12.2003, i.e. prior to the initiation of suit for eviction. Therefore, at the time when the suit for eviction was initiated in January of 2004, there were no arrears of rent. 4.3 Learned counsel for the respondent-tenant also relied upon judgments of Apex Court in the case of N.M. Engineer and Ors. vs. Narendra Singh Virdi and Ors.: AIR 1995 SC 448 and Sheikh Noor & Anr. vs. Sheikh G.S. Ibrahim (dead) by LRs: AIR 2003 SC 4163 and judgment of Patna High Court in the case of Ram Tahal Modi vs. Ratan La: AIR 1989 PATNA 13. 5. Heard the arguments advanced by both the sides, scanned the record of the writ petition and considered the judgments cited at Bar. 6. Before adverting to the merits of the case, it is necessary to reproduce and consider the relevant provisions of the RRCA. “Section 2. Definitions- (c) “Landlord” means any person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or as an agent, trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person, or who would so receive or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant” Section 9. Eviction of tenants : Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or contract but subject to other provisions of this Act, the Rent Tribunal shall not order eviction of tenant unless it is satisfied that- (a) the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for four months. Eviction of tenants : Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or contract but subject to other provisions of this Act, the Rent Tribunal shall not order eviction of tenant unless it is satisfied that- (a) the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for four months. Provided that the ground under this clause shall not be available to the landlord if he has not disclosed to the tenant his bank account number and name of the bank in the same municipal area, in the rent agreement or by a notice sent to him by registered post, acknowledgment due: Provided further that no petition on the ground under this clause shall be filed unless the landlord has given a notice to the tenant by registered post, acknowledgment due, demanding arrears of rent and the tenant has not made payment of arrears of rent within a period of thirty days from the date of service of notice; Explanation:-For the purposes of this clause, the rent shall be deemed to have been tendered when the same is remitted through money order to the landlord by properly addressing the same; [or having been deposited with the Rent Authority] or” Further, the relevant part of sale deed dated 29.01.2021 is reproduced below: ^;g fd foØ;'kqnk lEifr lEiw.kZ dk okLrfod o HkkSfrd dCtk ekfydkuk izFke i{k foØsrk us f}rh;i{k Øsrk dks lEHkyk fn;k gS RkFkk izFkei{k foØsrk us mDr foØ;'kqnk lEifr ls lacaf/kr vly nLrkost f}rh;i{kØsrk dks lkSai fn;s gSaA vc bl foØ;'kqnk lEifr ls izFke i{k foØsrk Lo;a dk rFkk izFke i{k foØsrk ds fdlh Hkh okfjl] mRrjkf/kdkjh] LFkkukiUu vkfn dk dksbZ gd o vf/kdkj ugha jgk gS rFkk uk gh Hkfo"; esa jgsxk rFkk vc f}rh; i{k Øsrk dks ;g vf/kdkj gS fd og mDr foØ;'kqnk lEifr esa ls viuh bPNkuqlkj eafty nj eafty vkSj fuekZ.k djkosa o fufeZr'kqnk rkehjkr esa bPNkuqlkj jn~nks cny djkosa] ikuh fctyh ds dusD'ku vius uke ls ysos@VªkalQj djkos] Lo;a jgs] fdlh vU; dks fdjk;s Ikj nsosa rFkk jgu] foØ;] cD'kh'k vkfn }kjk LFkkukUrfjr dj gj izdkj dk ykHk ,oa Qk;nk vftZr djsa] blesa izFke i{k foØsrk dks fdlh Hkh izdkj dh vkifŸk ;k ,srjkt djus dk vf/kdkj ugha gksxkA ;g fd foØ;'kqnk mijksDr of.kZr lEifŸk ds ckcr vkt ls iwoZ ds izR;sd izdkj ds _.k Hkkj] >xM+k V.Vk] okn fookn] ljdkjh] v)Zljdkjh] tu lk/kkj.k vkfn ds pqdkjs o fuiVkjs dh ftEesnkjh izFke i{k foØsrk dh gksxhA^^ 7. On perusal of the sale deed dated 29.01.2021, it is abundantly clear that all rights available to the erstwhile landlord have been transferred to the present petitioner-landlord. Furthermore, the question whether subsequent purchaser can take advantage of default committed by the tenant during the period of earlier landlord have been answered in the affirmative by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the cases of Akkho (supra), Om Prakash (supra) and Om Prakash Saini (supra). 8. In case of Akkho (supra), it was held that the transferee landlord can take advantage of default committed by the tenant during the period of earlier transferor landlord, and this is irrespective of the fact whether the transferee has the right to recover the earlier arrears of rent or not. 9. In the case of Om Prakash (supra), Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, after considering the Apex Court judgment of N.M. Engineers (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent-tenant, held as under: “15. I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the defendant. A careful scrutiny of the sale deed executed in favour of plaintiff No. 2 reveals that all rights, title and interest in the suit premises were transferred to plaintiff No. 2 and I am satisfied that plaintiff No. 2 can take advantage of the default committed by defendant during the period of earlier transferred landlord, and this is irrespective of the fact, whether the transferee has the right to recover the earlier arrears of rent. I support the ratio of the case of Akkho S/o. Kishanlal (supra).” 10. In the case of Om Prakash Saini (supra), Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, after considering the Apex Court judgment of Sheikh Noor (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent-tenant, observed and held as under: “It has been the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that in the instant case it is not the present respondent nos. 8 and 9 who filed the suit but they subsequently purchased the suit premise, therefore, the default committed, even if any default committed previously by the appellant will be of no help to him and therefore the trial court committed illegality in decreeing the suit. … As regards contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the previous landlord did not make any contract with respondent nos. … As regards contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the previous landlord did not make any contract with respondent nos. 8 and 9 in relation to recovery of rent and the decree of eviction was bad in law in view of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sheikh Noor and another Vs. Sheikh G.S. Ibrahim (dead) by LRs (supra) is concerned, it is suffice to say that the above authority of the Hon'ble Apex Court is not of help to the appellant for the reason that the present case is one where application under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC was moved and was allowed and amendment was made in the plaint and para 6 was inserted in the plaint and that was not denied and even subsequently defaults were made and in this regard issues which have been framed and evidence adduced by the plaintiff has been found sufficient to hold that the defendant-appellant committed second default. In the present case, the question is not of arrears of rent. The question is as to whether protection available in relation to default will still be there or not when the property is sold. … further the application moved under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC was allowed and amendment in the plaint was made and it has also come in evidence that the disputed premise was sold with all interest in the suit premises to take all actions, then in the above circumstances, in my opinion, the authorities relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant are no help to him.” 11. In view of the above quoted judgments, the preliminary objections qua maintainability of the writ petition are overruled and the writ petition is held to be maintainable. 12. On careful analysis of Section 9(a) of the RRCA, it is noted that Section 9(a) empowers the Rent Tribunal to order eviction of tenant on ground of default in payment of rent. Section 9(a) provides that eviction can be ordered only when the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the rent due from him for four months. The provisos contained in Section 9(a) casts an obligation on the landlord which have to be necessarily followed before an application for eviction can be filed. Section 9(a) provides that eviction can be ordered only when the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the rent due from him for four months. The provisos contained in Section 9(a) casts an obligation on the landlord which have to be necessarily followed before an application for eviction can be filed. The first proviso contemplates two scenarios; one where details of bank account of landlord are mentioned in the rent agreement and another when bank details are not mentioned in the agreement. In the second scenario, the landlord is required to communicate the bank details to the tenant by way of registered post with acknowledgment due. The second proviso contemplates a notice by landlord demanding arrears of rent from the tenant before initiating eviction proceedings. Upon the receipt of said notice, if the tenant deposits the arrears of rent within 30 days, then the landlord cannot initiate the eviction proceedings under Section 9(a). The words "arrears of rent" mean the arrears as demanded by notice and the ground for eviction as contemplated Under Section 9(a) is "the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for four months". The payment and tendering of rent thus relates to rent for four months. In the event rent due from the tenant for four months is not paid, the ground as contemplated under Section 9(a) is made out. Curiously, the language of the section does not necessitate filing of separate notices to meet out the requirement of both the provisos. There is no bar, either express or implied, on filing one notice which specifies the details of bank account and demands arrears of rent. In other words, the notice contemplated under the first proviso and the second proviso of Section 9(a) can be clubbed together. Therefore, it cannot be said that arrear of rent would accrue only after notice under the first proviso to Section 9(a) is served. The contention of the respondent-tenant that he cannot be declared as defaulter for the months preceding the notice served under the first proviso to Section 9(a) is, in my considered opinion, untenable. Section 9(a) strikes a balance between rights of the landlord and the tenant. The contention of the respondent-tenant that he cannot be declared as defaulter for the months preceding the notice served under the first proviso to Section 9(a) is, in my considered opinion, untenable. Section 9(a) strikes a balance between rights of the landlord and the tenant. It provides for an opportunity of 30 days to the tenant to pay the arrears of rent and only once the tenant fails to do so, is the landlord afforded the right to initiate eviction proceedings. 13. In the case in hand, admittedly, the notice dated 19.08.2003, as contemplated under Section 9(a), was effectively served upon the respondent on 21.08.2003. The contention that the notice was not served on the respondent personally is also not a valid defence as the same was served to the respondent’s own son. Despite the same, the arrears of rent were not deposited till 27.12.2003. Therefore, in view of the discussion in the previous para, the Rent Tribunal had rightly ordered eviction of respondent tenant on account of default in payment of arrears of rent. The Rent Appellate Tribunal erred in law by holding that subsequent notice was required to be sent. No such subsequent notice is required under Section 9(a) of the RRCA. 14. In view of the above, the impugned order dated 08.08.2007 passed by Rent Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur, in Appeal No. 82/2004 deserves to be quashed and set aside and is hereby quashed and set aside. The order dated 20.11.2004 passed by the Rent Tribunal is hereby restored. 15. The respondent-tenant is granted a period of 12 months to vacate the premises. It is directed that the decree for ejectment shall not be available for execution until 31.03.2024 subject to the defendant filing undertaking on affidavits before the Executing Court to the effect that on or before 31.03.2024 he shall hand over peaceful vacant possession to the petitioner-landlord and in between shall not induct anyone else in the premises nor part with possession in favour of anyone else. He shall also be obliged to deposit the amount of use and occupation charges, if any, and upto date, regularly with the Executing Court. He shall continue to pay to the landlord, the rent falling due month by month by the 15th day of that month. He shall also be obliged to deposit the amount of use and occupation charges, if any, and upto date, regularly with the Executing Court. He shall continue to pay to the landlord, the rent falling due month by month by the 15th day of that month. Failing the filing of the undertaking or in the event of breach of any of the conditions aforesaid, the decree of ejectment shall be available for execution forthwith. 16. Accordingly, the present writ petition is allowed in above terms. Pending applications, if any, stands disposed of.