ORDER : 1. Instant writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 12.05.2016 passed by Presiding Officer, Appellate Rent Tribunal, Jaipur Metropolitan in Appeal No. 119/2015 titled as Hemlata Baxi vs. Kusum Gupta, whereby the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal upheld the findings arrived at by the learned Rent Tribunal, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur in the Original Petition No. 61/2010 vide order dated 03.08.2015 and allowed the eviction petition filed under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 in favour of the present respondent. 2. The relevant facts, necessary for the just and efficacious disposal of the instant matter, are as follows: 2.1 That Sh. R.V. Gupta, (late) husband of the present respondent, constructed several shops on Plot No. 32 in Arjunlal Sethi Colony, Jaipur. Out of the shops so constructed, Shop Nos. 32(1), 32(3), 32(4) and 32(5) were given on rent to the present petitioner vide agreement dated 01.03.1991 for the latter’s business requirement to warehouse industrial chemicals under the name and style M/s Bakshi Chemicals, at a rental consideration of Rs. 1,750/- per month. 2.2 Thereafter, the present respondent filed an eviction suit on 10.01.2007 (marked as ‘Annexure-1’) with a prayer to evict the petitioner from the aforementioned premises on the grounds of bonafide requirement and non-payment of rent. With regard to the ground of bonafide requirement, it was averred in the said suit that the respondent’s daughter-in-law required the said premises for conducting tuition classes. Hence, necessitating the eviction proceedings. 2.3 However, the said suit came to be compromised between the parties on 22.05.2009. As per the stipulations incorporated into the compromise deed, the petitioner agreed to handover and vacate the possession of Shop Nos. 32(4) and 32(5) to the respondent, after duly taking into consideration the requirement of her daughter-in-law to conduct the said tutorial classes. Furthermore, in pursuance of the aforementioned compromise deed, the rent for the remaining two shops i.e. 32(1) and 32(3) was enhanced to the tune of Rs. 2,126/- per month. 2.4 Notwithstanding the compromise deed dated 22.05.2009, the respondent filed a fresh eviction suit (marked as ‘Annexure-3’) within a short span of one year, on the same grounds as alleged in the previous suit for eviction i.e. bonafide requirement and non-payment of rent. 2,126/- per month. 2.4 Notwithstanding the compromise deed dated 22.05.2009, the respondent filed a fresh eviction suit (marked as ‘Annexure-3’) within a short span of one year, on the same grounds as alleged in the previous suit for eviction i.e. bonafide requirement and non-payment of rent. The subsequent suit was filed under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 for the vacation of the remaining two shops, namely Nos. 32(1) and 32(3). 2.5 In the said suit, the respondent-landlady alleged that her daughter-in-law began conducting coaching classes in the previously vacated premises. However, within a few days, the students began complaining of bad odour resulting from the hazardous chemical substances being stored in the adjacent shops by the present petitioner. As a result, the students refused to attend the classes; thereby, necessitating the filing of the subsequent suit for eviction by the respondent. 2.6 Upon the commencement of the eviction proceedings, the learned Rent Tribunal framed six issues. Thereafter, vide order dated 03.08.2015, the suit was decreed and it was held that the requirement, as alleged by the respondent, was bonafide. However, with respect to ground of non-payment of rent and nuisance caused as a result of the chemicals being stored in the adjacent shops, learned Tribunal held that there had been no default in the payment of rent and no health hazard was caused resulting from the bad odour in the premises. 2.7 Aggrieved by the order dated 03.08.2015, in particular qua the finding arrived at regarding the bonafide requirement on part of the respondent, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal. Vide order dated 12.05.2016, the ld. Appellate Tribunal upheld the findings arrived at by the learned Rent Tribunal. 2.8 Therefore, further aggrieved by the order(s) dated 12.05.2016 and 03.08.2015, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the dictum of the Apex Court in Baby vs. Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors.: (1998) 8 SCC 310 ; Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and Ors.: (2003) 6 SCC 675 and State of Kerala and Ors. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the dictum of the Apex Court in Baby vs. Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors.: (1998) 8 SCC 310 ; Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and Ors.: (2003) 6 SCC 675 and State of Kerala and Ors. vs. K. Sarojini Amma and Ors.: (2003) 8 SCC 526 and has submitted that in spite of concurrent findings, as arrived at by the learned Rent Tribunal and the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, the instant petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable before this Court. It was argued that despite the unavailability of the revisional jurisdiction with the High Court, it still had the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to quash the orders passed by the Tribunals if the findings of fact had been arrived at by non-consideration of the relevant and material documents, the consideration of which could have led to an opposite conclusion. Learned counsel further submitted that in the factual matrix of the instant matter, the parties entered into a compromise/rajinama vide compromise deed dated 22.05.2009, after duly taking into consideration the balance of convenience for both the sides and the necessity so arisen for the respondent. However, despite the said compromise and upon the same facts and circumstances, the respondent filed a fresh eviction suit (marked as ‘Annexure-3’) within a span of one year. Therefore, the filing of the subsequent suit is dehors of the compromise deed dated 22.05.2009 and in sheer violation of the principles of res judicata. Hence, the respondent was barred from filing the subsequent suit under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001. 4. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that during the cross examination of the respondent i.e. Kusum Gupta and her daughter-in-law i.e. Renu Gupta, it was revealed that the respondent’s daughter-in-law has been residing in Pune along with her husband and children since 2003. Moreover, her children are pursuing their education in Pune as well. Furthermore, it was also stated that she keeps visiting Jaipur every few months, without actually residing in the city on a permanent basis. Therefore, the claim of bonafide requirement arising from the need of the said premises by the daughter-in-law for conducting tutorial classes in Jaipur does not stand on its own leg. Furthermore, it was also stated that she keeps visiting Jaipur every few months, without actually residing in the city on a permanent basis. Therefore, the claim of bonafide requirement arising from the need of the said premises by the daughter-in-law for conducting tutorial classes in Jaipur does not stand on its own leg. In support of the said argument, learned counsel also apprised the court of the fact that no evidence had been brought on record by the respondent qua the commencement of the tutorial classes in the shops so vacated vide compromise deed dated 22.05.2009, so as establish the fact of prejudice and hindrance being caused by the storage of chemicals by the petitioner. Learned counsel has also relied upon the dictum of the Apex Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Mahesh Chand Gupta reported in AIR 1999 SC 2507 and has argued that the concept of bonafide need or genuine requirement warrants to be looked at through the lens of a practical approach, instructed by the realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. Hence, we must look at the terms ‘bonafide’ and ‘genuineness’, as referring to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by a ‘requirement’ is much more higher than in a mere ‘desire’. Therefore, the phrase ‘bonafide requirement’ is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim and fancies is not taken note of by the Rent Control Legislation. Hence, a mere desire cannot give effect and attract the provisions of bonafide requirement as stipulated under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001. Thus, in light of the submissions made herein-above, it was prayed that the instant writ petition be allowed and the impugned order dated 12.05.2016 be quashed and set aside; while the order dated 03.08.2015 be quashed to the extent that the learned Tribunal has erred in considering the requirement of the respondent to be bonafide and genuine. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the instant writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, learned counsel has relied upon the dictum of the Apex Court in Shamshad Ahmad & Ors. vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj reported in (2008) 9 SCC 1 . 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the instant writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, learned counsel has relied upon the dictum of the Apex Court in Shamshad Ahmad & Ors. vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj reported in (2008) 9 SCC 1 . It was submitted that though the powers of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all the Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of the law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a Court of Appeal or a Court of Error. It can neither review nor re-appreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of subordinate Tribunals like the Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior Tribunal. The said powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the inferior Tribunals within the limits of law. Hence, considering the fact that the questions of fact qua the bonafide necessity and requirement of the shops in dispute were settled by way of concurrent findings by the learned Rent Tribunal as well as the Appellate Tribunal, after duly taking into consideration the evidence placed on record along with the pleadings and cross examination conducted therein, the same should be maintained and cannot be allowed to be challenged by way a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the bar of res judicata could not be attracted to the subsequent suit for eviction filed by the respondent under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001. In this regard, it was submitted that requirement of bonafide necessity is a recurring cause of action. Hence, if a subsequent need so arises in the future, then Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be attracted to bar the proceedings so initiated, especially considering the development in the factual matrix warranting the subsequent action. In this regard, it was submitted that requirement of bonafide necessity is a recurring cause of action. Hence, if a subsequent need so arises in the future, then Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be attracted to bar the proceedings so initiated, especially considering the development in the factual matrix warranting the subsequent action. Hence, the argument of the petitioner regarding the subsequent proceedings being barred by the doctrine of res judicata does not stand on its own leg. In support of the said argument, learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in N.R. Narayan Swamy vs. B. Francis Jagan reported in (2001) 6 SCC 473 . Hence, in light of the submissions made herein-above, it was argued that the concurrent findings of fact and law, as arrived at by the learned Tribunals, are based on material and evidence available on record. Therefore, the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable before this Court. 7. Heard the arguments advanced by the both the sides, scanned the record of the case and perused the judgment(s) cited at Bar. 8. Upon a perusal of the record of the instant petition, it is observed that both the authorities i.e. learned Rent Tribunal as well as the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal have given well-reasoned and concurrent findings qua the bonafide requirement of the shops in dispute, after duly taking into account the factum of the compromise deed dated 22.05.2009 along with the due and detailed addressal of the following material considerations, before passing the impugned order(s), as challenged by way of the present writ petition: 8.1 The educational qualification of the respondent’s daughter-in-law to conduct tutorial classes, which is further corroborated by the fact that the latter has authored five text books and has previous experience in imparting education in Jaipur. 8.2 That the two shops vacated in pursuance of the compromise deed dated 22.05.2009 were not subsequently rented out by the respondent and are lying vacant as of date, as well; thereby, highlighting and showcasing the genuine requirement of the respondent to use the premises for conducting tutorial classes. 8.3 That the respondent’s daughter-in-law, in her cross-examination, has expressly stated that she commutes to Jaipur quite often. Therefore, she is very capable of and interested in carrying out tutorial classes in the said shops. 8.3 That the respondent’s daughter-in-law, in her cross-examination, has expressly stated that she commutes to Jaipur quite often. Therefore, she is very capable of and interested in carrying out tutorial classes in the said shops. 8.4 That on account of bad smell resulting from the storage of hazardous chemicals, the tutorial classes could not be commenced by the respondent’s daughter-in-law. Hence, necessitating the filing of the subsequent eviction petition. 9. At this juncture, it is also pertinent to note that the learned counsel for the respondent has rightly placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in N.R. Narayan Swamy (Supra). It is a settled position of law that in eviction proceedings under the Rent Control Act, the ground of bonafide requirement is a recurring cause and therefore, the landlord is not precluded from instituting fresh proceedings. Moreover, in an eviction suit on the ground of bonafide requirement, the genuineness of the said ground is to be determined on the basis of requirement on the date of filing of the suit. Furthermore, even if a suit for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement is filed and is dismissed, it cannot be held that once a question of necessity is decided against the landlord, he will not have a bonafide and genuine necessity ever in the future. Therefore, especially considering the fact that in the instant matter, the learned Tribunals have arrived at concurrent findings qua the bonafide requirement of the respondent, after having passed speaking and reasonable order(s) upon consideration of relevant facts and evidence available on record, this Court does not deem it fit to interfere with the impugned order(s) dated 12.05.2016 and 03.08.2015. 10. It is trite that findings on the question of bonafide necessity is essentially a finding of fact. Findings recorded by the Rent Tribunal and affirmed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal are not such, which no reasonable person, on given material could reach. Law is well settled that if the courts below or the subordinate Tribunal has, in recording such finding, considered relevant evidence and eschewed irrelevant evidence from consideration and if on evidence available on record, it is possible to arrive at such finding, this court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, would not be justified in upturning that finding only because another view is possible. Supervisory power of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be confused or mistaken with appellate powers. Such power has to be used sparingly, only if the inferior court or Tribunal has misdirected itself on a question of law or fact and not for correcting any or every mistake. This is all the more necessary as this Court under its writ jurisdiction has a very restricted scope of interference as the legislature has in the Rajasthan Rent Control Act of 2001 provided remedy of only one appeal against the judgment of the Rent Tribunal before the Appellate Rent Tribunal and no further appeal has been provided from the judgment of the Appellate Rent Tribunal. The legislature has thus intended finality to be given to the judgment of the Appellate Rent Tribunal. The writ court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot therefore question the correctness of the finding of facts especially about factual aspects of reasonable and bonafide necessity, concurrently recorded by both the Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Rent Tribunal, proving such necessity for the respondent-landlady. 11. Therefore, considering the fact that the learned Tribunal(s) have passed well-reasoned, speaking and justified orders qua their findings regarding the bonafide necessity of the respondent, after duly taking into consideration all necessary materials and evidence available on record, the judgments cited by the petitioner are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 12. Accordingly, relying upon the judgments of the Apex Court in N.R. Narayan Swamy (Supra) and Shamshad Ahmad (Supra) and in view of the foregoing discussion and observations made herein-above, this Court does not find any merit in this writ petition. 13. 12. Accordingly, relying upon the judgments of the Apex Court in N.R. Narayan Swamy (Supra) and Shamshad Ahmad (Supra) and in view of the foregoing discussion and observations made herein-above, this Court does not find any merit in this writ petition. 13. However, considering the fact that the petitioner has been a tenant in the shops in question for a considerable period of time and as of date, has commercial operations running therein, this Court deems it appropriate to grant the petitioner reasonable time to vacate the rented shop by 31.03.2024 subject to their furnishing an undertaking with the Court below, within 15 days from today with an advance copy thereof to the opposite party (respondent), to pay or deposit the entire arrears of rent, if any, within a period of one month from today and will further continue to pay the monthly rental consideration @ 10% enhancement every year, till the date of actual delivery of possession of the shops in question, by 10th day of the next succeeding month or in advance to the respondent-landlady in her bank account and that the petitioner shall not sub-let, assign or part with possession of rented shop or any part thereof in favour of anyone else and would not create any third party interest in the same during the aforesaid period. If, however, the tenant fails to furnish undertaking to the above effect, the respondent-landlady would be entitled to get the judgment/decree of eviction executed forthwith in accordance with law. 14. In light of the above, the present writ petition is disposed of. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.