JUDGMENT : NIRAL R. MEHTA, J. 1. By way of this Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the original respondent has called in question the order dated 03rd March, 2022 passed in Special Civil Application No. 3896 of 2020 and allied matters by which the learned Single Judge has quashed and set aside the order dated 09th December, 2019 passed by Labour Court, Bhavnagar and directed the Labour Court to restore all those recovery applications to their original files and decide the same after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. 2. Brief facts can be summarised as under: 2.1 The services of the respondent-employees came to be terminated, thus, Reference Case No. 495 of 1989 was filed which was adjudicated on merits and allowed in favour of the workmen. The appellant herein being aggrieved by the aforesaid, approached this Court wherein order of the Labour Court came to be confirmed and pursuant thereto, the employees were reinstated since February, 2007. Since then they are in service. 2.2 After reinstatement, workmen were not being paid in parity with permanent employees. The workmen thereby approached the Labour Court under the provisions of Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by way of Recovery Application No. 100 of 2017 seeking, inter alia, difference of wages, which came to be rejected by the Labour Court vide order dated 09th December, 2019. 2.3 Being aggrieved by the aforesaid, the respondent-workmen approached this Court by way of Special Civil Application No. 3896 of 2020 and other allied matters. The said petitions came to be allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 03rd March, 2022. 3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid, the appellant-employer is before this Court by way of present Letters Patent Appeal. 4. We have heard learned advocate Mr.Baiju Joshi for the appellant and learned advocate Mr.Aditya Pandya for the respondents in all the Letters Patent Appeals, at length. 4.1 Mr.Joshi, learned advocate for the appellant, has submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is contrary to the settled legal provisions. 4. We have heard learned advocate Mr.Baiju Joshi for the appellant and learned advocate Mr.Aditya Pandya for the respondents in all the Letters Patent Appeals, at length. 4.1 Mr.Joshi, learned advocate for the appellant, has submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is contrary to the settled legal provisions. He further submitted that the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge regarding the impugned order being incoherent is not true and correct as the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble High Court as well as decision of the Apex Court and thereby the said finding of the learned Single Judge is not justified. Mr.Joshi next submitted that the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court has rightly dismissed the application filed by the workmen under Section 33-C(2) of the Act on the pretext that there is no prior adjudication and/or no pre-existing rights. According to learned advocate for the appellant, recovery under Section 33-C(2) without any adjudication is not maintainable and learned Labour Court was perfectly justified in dismissing the same. However, learned Single Judge has committed grave error in appreciating the provision of Section 33-C(2) of the Act vis-a-vis law laid down by the Apex Court. Mr.Joshi submitted that mechanism under Section 33-C(2) is a kind of execution in nature and thus the said proceedings cannot be determined without there being any prior adjudication. Mr.Joshi submitted that in the instant case, admittedly, there is no adjudication and therefore, application under Section 33- C(2) has no legs to stand and accordingly, learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court had rightly dismissed the application. 4.2 To substantiate the aforesaid contention, learned advocate has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bombay Chemical Industries vs. Deputy Labour Commissioner, (2022) 5 SCC 629 as also the judgment of this Court in the case of PBM Polytex Ltd. vs. Dineshkumar S. Vyas passed in Special Civil Application No. 5906 of 2005 decided on 31st March, 2014. 4.3 By making above submissions, learned advocate Mr.Joshi for the appellant has prayed this Court to allow the Letters Patent Appeals as prayed for. 4.3 By making above submissions, learned advocate Mr.Joshi for the appellant has prayed this Court to allow the Letters Patent Appeals as prayed for. 4.4 Per contra, learned advocate Mr.Aditya Pandya for the respondent-workmen has vehemently opposed the present Appeals contending, inter alia, that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is perfectly justified and thereby does not require any interference. Learned advocate further submitted that while passing the impugned order, learned Single Judge has considered the scope and ambit of Section 33-C(2) and thereby has rightly restored the Recovery Applications to their original files before the Labour Court for fresh consideration. Mr.Pandya submitted that as such the learned Single Judge has merely remanded the matter to the Labour Court by keeping all the rights and contentions open for both the parties and thereby there is no prejudicial or adversarial order is passed against the appellant. Mr.Pandya further submitted that admittedly, before the Labour Court, the appellant has not raised any dispute with regard to the amount in question and therefore, in absence of any such dispute being raised, learned Labour Court could not have rejected the application of recovery on the ground of preexisting and/or prior adjudication. 4.5 To support his contention, learned advocate has relied on the following decisions: (i) Junagadh Municipal Corporation vs. Benkunwarben Tapubhai Vaghela decided by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 4796 of 2004 decided on 28th July, 2014 (ii) Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda vs. Gitaben Haribhai Darji, MANU/GJ/0220/2005 (iii) Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. Ketanbhai Dinkarray Pandya, MANU/GJ/0109/2003 4.6 By making above submissions, learned advocate Mr.Pandya for the respondent-workmen has prayed this Court to dismiss the Letters Patent Appeals. 5. We have heard learned advocates for the respective parties and have gone through the materials produced on record. No other and/or further submissions have been canvassed by the learned advocates for the respective parties except what are stated hereinabove. 6. After hearing the submissions of respective parties and having considered the materials produced on record, a short question that falls for our consideration is whether the learned Single Judge has committed any error in law as well as fact while passing the impugned order? 7. So as to consider the aforesaid question, it would be relevant to consider the provision of Section 33-C(2) of the Act: 33C. Recovery of money due from an employer. 7. So as to consider the aforesaid question, it would be relevant to consider the provision of Section 33-C(2) of the Act: 33C. Recovery of money due from an employer. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government; within a period not exceeding three months: Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit. 8. At this stage, it would also be apt to take note of the recent pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of Bombay Chemical Industries Limited (supra). The relevant paragraphs are quoted as under: “As per the settled proposition of law, in an application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate dispute of entitlement or the basis of the claim of workmen. It can only interpret the award or settlement on which the claim is based. As held by this Court in the case of Ganesh Razak and Another (supra), the labour court’s jurisdiction under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is like that of an executing court. As per the settled preposition of law without prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed claim of the workmen, proceedings for computation of the arrears of wages and/or difference of wages claimed by the workmen shall not be maintainable under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. As per the settled preposition of law without prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed claim of the workmen, proceedings for computation of the arrears of wages and/or difference of wages claimed by the workmen shall not be maintainable under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. (See Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ganesh Razak and Another, (1995) 1 SCC 235 ).” “In the case of Kankuben (supra), it is observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33-C (2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act while the latter does not.” “Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, when there was no prior adjudication on the issue whether respondent No. 2 herein was in employment as a salesman as claimed by respondent No. 2 herein and there was a serious dispute raised that respondent No. 2 was never in employment as a salesman and the documents relied upon by respondent No. 2 were seriously disputed by the appellant and it was the case on behalf of the appellant that those documents are forged and/or false, thereafter the Labour Court ought not to have proceeded further with the application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court ought to have relegated respondent No. 2 to initiate appropriate proceedings by way of reference and get his right crystalized and/or adjudicate upon.” 8.1 Considering the aforesaid legal proposition of law enunciated by the Apex Court, it appears that the Apex Court, in clear terms, held that the Labour Court, under the provision of Section 33-C(2), can only interpret the award or settlement on which the claim is based. The Labour Court’s jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) is like that of executing court. Therefore, without prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed claim of the workmen, proceedings for computation of arrears of wages and/or difference of wages claimed by the workman shall not be maintainable under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. However, the Apex Court has, in clear terms, clarified that if the benefits sought to be enforced under Section 33-C(2) is as that of a pre-existing benefits or one flowing from pre-existing right, then in that case it is well within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to exercise powers under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act. 8.2 In view of the aforesaid proposition of law, in our considered opinion, the Labour Court, while exercising powers under Section 33-C(2), cannot pass an order where there is dispute about the pay-scale, wages, conditions of service, whether the workman is in employment or not etc. In short, the Labour Court cannot, while exercising powers under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act, embark upon any kind of inquiry in a disputed questions of fact. Now, if we advert to the facts of the present case, admittedly, before the Labour Court the appellant has not raised any dispute whatsoever in nature, neither lead any oral or documentary evidence to controvert the application of the workmen filed under the provision of Section 33-C(2). In absence of any dispute, in our view, the claim put forth by the workmen is undisputed. Thus, can fall within the scope and ambit of Section 33-C(2). In the instant case, the workman approached the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act for recovery of the daily wages which is required to be paid as per the daily wages schedule prescribed under the rules and regulations and made applicable to the other co-workers. A workman is entitled to his remuneration/salary as per the minimum standard of daily wages. Thus, the said right can be said to be flowing from pre-existing right. Therefore, as such, in absence of any dispute being raised by the employer, amount under the daily wages can very well be calculated and for which no evidence is required to be laid. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the Labour Court could not have rejected the application of the workman under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act. Therefore, as such, in absence of any dispute being raised by the employer, amount under the daily wages can very well be calculated and for which no evidence is required to be laid. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the Labour Court could not have rejected the application of the workman under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act. Hence, the order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be faulty on any count. 8.3 Another angle of the matter if considered, the learned Single Judge, in the impugned order in Para-14, observed as under: “14. As noted hereinabove, since the issues, which are finally answered, do not reconcile with the findings, it would be appropriate to remand the matters to the Labour Court. The impugned orders dated 09.12.2019 passed by the Labour Court, Bhavnagar in respective recovery applications are quashed and set aside. The applications are ordered to be restored to their original files. It will be open for the respective parties to take all available contentions in the recovery applications. The Labour Court shall decide the respective recovery applications, after affording opportunity of hearing to both the parties.” 8.3.1 Thus, in our considered opinion, learned Single Judge has merely remanded the matter to the Labour Court by keeping all the rights and contentions open of the respective parties. Therefore, in our considered opinion, order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be prejudicial or adversarial to any party. 9. I answer the question accordingly. 10. For the foregoing discussion, the present Letters Patent Appeal is bereft of any merit and is accordingly dismissed.