JUDGMENT : DEEPAK ROSHAN, J. 1. Since common issue is involved in all these writ applications, as such all are heard together and disposed of by this common order. 2. The petitioner in all these writ applications have initially challenged the respective show cause notices (SCN) of the year 1994 to 1997 and the respective notices of personal hearing issued in the year 2022, i.e. after a lapse of about 27 to 29 years. During pendency of these writ applications the respondent-Department vide its common Order in Original (OIO) dated 17.2.2023; confirmed the demand as made in the respective show-cause notices. The petitioner thus filed interlocutory application in respective applications which was allowed by this Court and the common Order in Original dated 17.2.2023 confirming the demand in the respective show-cause notices has been impugned. 3. It may be noted at this stage itself that the personal hearing notices was issued in respect of 11 show cause notices; against one such notice dated 9.12.1993 for the period June, 1993 to November, 1993, the petitioner had moved this Court in W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023. This Court vide its order dated 14.2.2023 quashed the show cause notice along with the notice of personal hearing on the ground of inordinate delay. For brevity the details of show cause notices and its period is mentioned herein below in tabular chart. S. No. Writ Petition No. Show-cause-Notices Reference Period I.A. Nos. 1 W.P. (T) No. 826/2023 MP-13/TGS/DD/95/1127 Dated 03.01.1995 June 1994 to November 1994 I.A. 1908/2023 2 W.P. (T) No. 827/2023 MP-20/SCN/III/97/600 Dated 28.05.1997 November 1996 to December 1996 I.A. 1914/2023 3 W.P. (T) No. 828/2023 MP-20/SCN/III/97/598 Dated 28.05.1997 November 1996 to December 1996 I.A. 1907/2023 4 W.P. (T) No. 830/2023 MP-13/TGS/DD/95/5 Dated 02.01.1996 June 1995 to November 1995 I.A. 1915/2023 5 W.P. (T) No. 832/2023 MP-14/TGS/DD/92/511 Dated 30.06.1994 December 1993 to May 1994 I.A. 1916/2023 6 W.P. (T) No. 824/2023 MP-20/SCN/III/97/744 Dated 01.08.1997 January 1997 to February 1997 I.A. 1911/2023 7 W.P. (T) No. 825/2023 MP-13/TGS/DD/95/552 Dated 03.07.1995 December 1994 to May 1995 I.A. 1909/2023 8 W.P. (T) No. 829/2023 MP-20/SCN/III/97/361 Dated 25.04.1997 October 1996 I.A. 1913/2023 9 W.P. (T) No. 831/2023 MP-13/TGS/DD/95/986 Dated 18.06.1996 December 1995 to May 1996 I.A. 1906/2023 10 W.P. (T) No. 833/2023 MP13/TGS/DD/95/1584 Dated 3.12.1996 June 1996 to September 1996 I.A. 1912/2023 4. Brief chronology of events and the dispute involved in all these writ petitions is common, as such the fact and reference of W.P. (T) No. 826 of 2023 has been taken in the account. The remaining petitions are identical in all aspects except for the period in dispute involved for which a tabular chart had already been cited in the preceding paragraph. Petitioner Company is primarily engaged in the manufacture of Iron and Steel, and in order to carry out its manufacturing activity, it has developed a separate wing, popularly known as 'Growth Shop' (Maintenance Shop), through which Petitioner used to get some of its Plants and Machinery manufactured/assembled/installed. The petitioner issued work order to its Growth Shop for manufacturing, assembling, erecting and testing Electronic Overhead Cranes (for short 'EOC') for installation in the main Steel Plant of the petitioner at Jamshedpur. At the relevant point of time, excise duty was payable at different rates on parts of Crane and Crane, which were as under: Grades Chapter Heading Rate of Duty Crane 8431 20% ad-valorem Parts of Crane 8426 15% ad-valorem 5. Earlier, a Show Cause Notice dated 08.02.1984 was issued to the petitioner by the Collector of Central Excise, Jamshedpur stating inter-alia that Growth Shop was removing Electronic Overhead Crane (EOC) without payment of duty. It was further alleged that Growth Shop wrongly availed the benefit of Exemption Notification No. 118/75-CE dated 30.04.1957 as the goods cleared were not parts of Crane but a fully functional Crane. The Petitioner duly replied to the said Show Cause Notice by stating that no complete Crane was assembled/manufactured in the Growth Shop and it was assembled and installed finally at the Steel Plant of TISCO, Jamshedpur and, what was cleared was parts of Crane. Final assembly, erection and commissioning of Crane was done at Jamshedpur Plant. However, the Collector did not agree with the contentions of the petitioner and held that the goods removed by the growth shop of the petitioner was a fully functional crane and levied excise duty @ 20% ad valorem. Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred a writ petition before the Patna High Court being C.W.J.C. No. 3764 of 1985. However, the Collector did not agree with the contentions of the petitioner and held that the goods removed by the growth shop of the petitioner was a fully functional crane and levied excise duty @ 20% ad valorem. Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred a writ petition before the Patna High Court being C.W.J.C. No. 3764 of 1985. The Hon'ble Patna High Court decided the case against the petitioner and held that the goods delivered to steel plant of TISCO was, in fact, a fully functional Crane and not just parts of Crane vide its order dated 09.03.1987. Against the said Judgment of the Patna High Court, petitioner preferred a Civil Appeal before the Hon'ble Apex Court, which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 782 of 1987. During pendency of the civil appeal, the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 was enacted which changed the rate of duty as under: Grades Chapter Heading Rate of Duty Crane 8431 15% ad-valorem Parts of Crane 8426 20% ad-valorem Thus, the excise duty on cranes was reduced from 20% to 15%, per contra, excise duty on parts of crane under Chapter 8432 was increased from 15% to 20%. 6. After aforesaid change in rate and during pendency of the earlier Civil Appeal, the Commissioner of Central Excise, vide Show Cause Notice dated 13.08.1990, directed the petitioner to show cause as to why excise duty be not leviable upon the petitioner @ 20% by stating conversely that the petitioner was removing parts of Cranes and not the Crane. The SCN dated 13.8.1990 (pertaining to the period Jan 1989 to Jan 1990) was adjudicated against the petitioner and being aggrieved the petitioner moved before the learned CEGAT, Kolkata. 7. During pendency of the matter before CEGAT, the petitioner was issued 11 further show cause notices in respect of the same dispute between the years 1994 to 1997 pertaining to different periods of dispute. The details of the same have already been cited in paragraph-3 herein above. W.P. (T) No. 826 of 2023 relates to SCN No. MP- 13/TGS/DD/95/1127 which was issued on 3.1.1995 for the period June 1994 to November 1994. As aforesaid, altogether 11 show cause notices in respect of the same dispute between the years 1994 to 1997 were issued. On 25.1.1995, petitioner filed its reply to the said show cause notice. 8. W.P. (T) No. 826 of 2023 relates to SCN No. MP- 13/TGS/DD/95/1127 which was issued on 3.1.1995 for the period June 1994 to November 1994. As aforesaid, altogether 11 show cause notices in respect of the same dispute between the years 1994 to 1997 were issued. On 25.1.1995, petitioner filed its reply to the said show cause notice. 8. On 09.02.2000, during the pendency of the appeal before CEGAT, the Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed Civil Appeal No. 782 of 1987 filed by the petitioner company (i.e. the first round of litigation). However, on 8.12.2000, the Appeal of the petitioner before the CEGAT against SCN dated 13.8.1990 was dismissed. (Second round of litigation) Against the order dated 8.12.2000, the petitioner moved before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3973 of 2001. The Hon'ble Apex Court vide order dated 5.5.2004, partly set aside the order of the Tribunal dated 8.12.2000 (in the light of the order dated 9.2.2000 passed in Civil Appeal No. 782 of 1987) and remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for fresh examination. Thereafter, there has been no adjudication of the show-cause notice dated 3.1.1995 impugned in W.P.T. No. 826 of 2022 and similar show cause notices involved in other writ petitions; details of which have already been stated herein above. It may be noted that in file recording brought on record by the petitioner, there is no noting between the period 2000 to 2007. However, on 31.1.2007, the Additional Commissioner first recommends taking out the case from Call Book since the issue had attained finality. However thereafter on 26.10.2007 it has been recorded that since the earlier show cause notice i.e. dated 13.8.1990, was pending before Tribunal, the case may be continued in call book. The Commissioner accorded permission of the same on 26.10.2007. No further file noting has been brought on record after 20.10.2007. 9. Unexpectedly, on 30.11.2022, for the first time, after a lapse of about 28 years, a notice for personal hearing was issued, fixing the date of hearing on 15.12.2022. Similar notices for personal hearing were also issued for the other period. On 15.12.2022, since the matter was very old, petitioner filed request for adjournment of personal hearing. On 23.12.2022, a personal hearing notice was again issued fixing the date of personal hearing on 15.2.2023. 10. Similar notices for personal hearing were also issued for the other period. On 15.12.2022, since the matter was very old, petitioner filed request for adjournment of personal hearing. On 23.12.2022, a personal hearing notice was again issued fixing the date of personal hearing on 15.2.2023. 10. In respect of one show cause notice dated 9.12.1993, the petitioner moved before this Court vide WP (T) No. 308 of 2023, on the ground of inordinate delay. On 25.01.2023, W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023 was taken up for hearing before this Court wherein this Court directed the Respondents to file their Counter Affidavit. The matter was fixed for hearing on 14.02 2023. On 10.02.2023, writ petitions in respect of the remaining 10 show cause notices were also filed, including W.P. (T) No. 826 of 2023. Copy of the writ petitions were also served to the counsel for the Respondent Department on that very day itself. On 14.02.2023, this Court allowed W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023 filed by the petitioner and the original show cause notice as well as the personal hearing notice; both were quashed. The said order was dictated in open court in presence of the counsel for the Respondents. Upon allowing of W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023, the counsel for the petitioner mentioned the remaining 10 writ petitions for early hearing since the matter was listed before the Respondent on 15.2.2023 for personal hearing. On 15.02.2023, the petitioner wrote to the Respondent authorities requesting for an adjournment since writ petition against one of the show cause notices had been allowed and that the remaining 10 writ petitions were expected to be taken up shortly. The request letter given by the petitioner for adjournment is taken note of in the record of personal hearing. Nevertheless, on 17.02.2023, common impugned order in original (OIO) has been passed imposing excise duty and penalty upon the petitioner with respect to all the SCN (details of which have already been given in Para-3 herein above). On 20.02.2023, I.A. s was filed for challenging the impugned order in original (OIO) dated 17.2.2023. On 27.02.2023, three weeks' time was granted to the respondents to file counter affidavit. On 27.03.2023, this Court recorded the submission of the Respondent that the counter affidavit also contains reply to the interlocutory application. On 31.03.2023, counter affidavit was filed to both the Writ Petition as well as the interlocutory application. On 27.02.2023, three weeks' time was granted to the respondents to file counter affidavit. On 27.03.2023, this Court recorded the submission of the Respondent that the counter affidavit also contains reply to the interlocutory application. On 31.03.2023, counter affidavit was filed to both the Writ Petition as well as the interlocutory application. Thereafter on 27.04.2023 a rejoinder was filed. 11. Mr. Tarun Gulati, learned counsel for the petitioner assisted by Mr. Salona Mittal has made following submissions: (i) The present dispute is squarely covered by the decision rendered in W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023 which was delivered by this Court on 14.02.2023. This Court in the said case have authoritatively held that adjudication of show cause after 29 years would be contrary to the mandate of Section 11A(11) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and would lead to unreasonable and arbitrary results. (ii) Judicial propriety and judicial discipline required the respondents to await the adjudication of the present writ applications. Though the Commissioner was aware and apprised that one writ application of same nature has been allowed by this Court but he acted in undue haste and deliberately decided the 10 show cause notices just after 3 days of the order passed in W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023. In this regard he referred to the judgment passed in the case of Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. vs. Excise and Taxation Officer, (2023) SCC Online SC 95. (iii) The aforesaid action of the respondent-Commissioner was not bona-fide and has attempted to make the present writ applications infructuous. (iv) Even accepting the Circular No. 1053/2/2017-CX dated 10.03.2017 issued by the CBEC, the same requires respondent-Department to give at least three opportunities of hearing which is not followed in the instant case. (v) The issue of call book has been decided/clarified in the order passed by this Court in W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023. Even otherwise, none of the conditions for transfer of case to call book stood fulfilled in all these writ applications. (vi) The inordinate delay after the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the year 2000/2004 cannot be countenanced. 12. Mr. Anil Kumar, learned ASGI and Mr. Even otherwise, none of the conditions for transfer of case to call book stood fulfilled in all these writ applications. (vi) The inordinate delay after the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the year 2000/2004 cannot be countenanced. 12. Mr. Anil Kumar, learned ASGI and Mr. P.A.S Pati learned counsel appearing for the CGST relied upon the counter affidavit and made the following submissions: (a) Though opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner in all these cases but the petitioner did not respond to the same and only asked for adjournment and that is the reason that the OIO has been passed. (b) The rule of call book is well established in tax matters. Whenever any issue is pending for adjudication before the Hon’ble Apex Court, the other cases relating to the same issue sent for the call book as such the contention of the petitioner that the respondents were having no authority to keep the matters pending and refer the same to call book does not sustain. (c) No case can be quashed only on the ground that the decision in that matter is pending for long. Further, no time lines are prescribed to decide any SCN; as such, adjudicating any matter solely depend on the quasi judicial authority as and when the subject case is ripe and may be taken for decision. (d) The Respondent Department is contemplating to challenge the order passed by this Court in W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023. Relying upon the aforesaid submissions he contended that all these writ applications are liable to be dismissed. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the documents available on record and the averments made in the respective affidavits and also the order passed by this Court in W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023, it appears that the issue involved in these cases is squarely covered. For brevity relevant portion of the judgment passed in W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023 is quoted herein-below: “17. We have given anxious consideration to the submission of learned counsel for the parties, taken note of the relevant material facts pleaded and borne from the records and also the CBIC circulars cited by the parties and the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner. 18. The facts as borne out from the pleadings on record need no repetition. 18. The facts as borne out from the pleadings on record need no repetition. The impugned show cause is of 9 th December 1993 (Annexure-5) issued upon the petitioner asking them to show cause as to why the appropriate excise duty amounting to Rs. 1,67,42,847.30 be not imposed upon him under the provisions of Rules 9(B), 52A, 173(B), 173(F) and 173(G) of Central Excise Rules, 1944 and Section 11A of the CEA, 1944 alleging less payment of duty due to misclassification. The respondents had kept the impugned show cause notice and ten other SCNs as indicated in the chart above in the call book on the ground that the matter was sub-judice. However, from the pleadings on record and also from the averments made in the counter affidavit, it appears that none of the conditions as enumerated in the CBIC circular/guidelines relied upon by the respondents and also by the petitioner stood satisfied for transferring the matter to the call book. It is not a case where the department had gone in appeal before the learned CEGAT or before the Apex Court, rather it was the petitioner who twice went up to the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 782 of 1987 against the first SCN dated 8th February 1984 and in Civil Appeal No. 3973 of 2001 against the SCN dated 13th August 1990. The instant SCN pertains to the period June 1993 to November 1993 and is of 9th December 1993. Learned counsel for the 11 respondents has fallen back on Clause 2 of the condition stipulated in the CBIC circular as referred to in Para 11 of their counter affidavit but he has not been able to show that at any point of time there was a stay in proceeding upon the impugned show cause notice by either the CEGAT or the High Court or the Hon’ble Apex Court. Even if by stretching the argument to the extent that the show cause notice dated 13th August 1990 was sub-judice before the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 3973 of 2001, there is no basis or explanation on the part of the respondents to have kept the show cause notice in its call book without proceeding for its adjudication after the judgment rendered in that case by the Apex Court on 5th May 2004. None of the other two conditions as indicated by the respondents at Clause 3 and 4 quoted above also stand satisfied in the present case. The respondents have not enclosed any document to show that prior approval of the Collector of excise was taken before keeping the case in the call book. There seems to be no reference of any periodic review of the call book, though the relevant CBIC circulars such as the circular dated 30th March 1998 and 20th May 2003 specifically required the Commissioners to review the cases transferred to call books on a monthly basis in circumstances where the department was confronted with a situation where provisional assessment cases were kept pending for several years. The extract of the relevant circulars are quoted here under: In circular dated 30th March 1998: “While the Board had issued instructions to Commissioners to review the cases transferred to call books on a monthly basis, it is observed that no such review is actually being done. (Board’s DO Letter F. No. 101/2/92-CX.3, dated 4th March 1992 and Board’s Circular No. 53/90-CX.3, dated 6.9.1990). 2. The Board vide its - specified the following categories of cases which can be transferred to call book: 1. Cases in which the Department has gone in appeal to the appropriate authority. 2. Cases where injection has been issued by Supreme Court/High Court/CEGAT, etc. 3. Cases where audit objections are contested. 4. Cases where the Board has specifically ordered the same to be kept pending and to be entered into the call book.” In circular dated 28th May 2003: “3. It is further directed that a one-time comprehensive review of all the pending call book cases will be done by respective CCEs. The Chief Commissioner may monitor such review periodically in their respective zones. The progress report of the call book cases should continue to mention in the MTR as well as in the monthly statements of the progress achieved in “Key Result Areas.” In circular dated 10th March 2017: “9.4 Intimation of Call Book cases to notice: A formal communication should be issued to the notice, where the case has been transferred to the call book.” 19. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer to the provisions of Section 11A of the CEA which reads as under: SECTION 11A OF THE CENTRAL EXCISE ACT, 1944 “SECTION 11A- Recovery of duties not levied or not paid or short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded: (1) Where any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded, for any reason, other than the reason of fraud or collusion or any willful misstatement or suppression of facts or contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of the rules made thereunder with intent to evade payment of duty: xxx xxx xxx (4) Where any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded by reason of: (a) fraud. (b) collusion. (c) wilful misstatement. (d) suppression of facts. (e) contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of the rules made thereunder with intent to evade payment of duty. by any person chargeable with the duty, the Central Excise Officer shall, within five years from the relevant date, serve notice on such person requiring him to show cause why he should not pay the amount specified in the notice along with interest payable thereon under section 11AA and a penalty equivalent to the duty specified in the notice. (5) Where, during the course of any audit, investigation or verification, it is found that any duty [has not been levied or paid or has been] short - levied or short - paid or erroneously refunded for the reason mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) or clause (d) or clause (e) of sub-clause (4) but the details relating to the transactions are available in the specified records, then in such cases, the Central Excise Officer shall within a period of five years from the relevant date, serve a notice on the person chargeable with the duty requiring him to show cause why he should not pay the amount specified in the notice along with interest under section 11AA and penalty equivalent to fifty per cent of such duty. xxx xxx xxx (11) The Central Excise Officer shall determine the amount of duty of excise under sub-section (10): (a) within six months from the date of notice where it is possible to do so, in respect of cases falling under sub-section (1). (b) within two year [substituted for one year w.e.f. 14-05-2016] from the date of notice, where it is possible to do so, in respect of cases falling under the proviso to sub-section (4) or sub-section (5). xxx xxx xxx 20. The issue at hand has crossed the attention of the various jurisdictional High Courts such as the Bombay High Court and the Punjab and Haryana High Court of which the judgments rendered in the cases of Eastern Agencies Aromatics Private Limited vs. Union of India and Others, Para-14 to 17 and Harkaran Dass Vedpal vs. Union of India, Para 3, 9 and 11 to 15 have been specifically relied upon by the petitioner. 21. Petitioner has also relied upon the recent judgment of the Apex Court, in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 12376 of 2022 dated 29th July 2022 arising out from a judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court wherein the show cause notice remain un-adjudicated for 11 years. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the Apex Court refused to interfere in the matter and the special leave petition was dismissed. The decision in the case of Eastern Agencies Aromatics Private Limited (Supra) relates to the delay of nine years in adjudication of a show cause notice under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 which also contains a similar provision “if it is possible to do so.” The opinion of the learned Bombay High Court at Para 14 to 17 are quoted hereunder for easy reference: 14. Perusal of the show cause notice shows that the breach alleged for initiating action for demanding the forgone import duty was on the ground of irregular exports by the exporters and breach of the provisions committed by the exporters. It is not in dispute that the Petitioner had promptly replied the show cause notice well within time in the year 2014 itself. It is further not in dispute that the Petitioner was never intimated in respect of any adjudication of the show cause notice and/or any decision of keeping the adjudication pending. It is not in dispute that the Petitioner had promptly replied the show cause notice well within time in the year 2014 itself. It is further not in dispute that the Petitioner was never intimated in respect of any adjudication of the show cause notice and/or any decision of keeping the adjudication pending. Thus, the Petitioner is justified in submitting that the Petitioner was under bonafide belief that the Respondents were not interested in adjudicating the show cause notice and that the same was dropped. Though the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have sought to justify their action to revive the show cause notice after a period of 9 years, the contentions raised by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are unreasonable and not supported by any statutory provisions. 15. We have perused the consistent view taken by this Court, that the concerned Authority is under an obligation to adjudicate upon the show cause with expediency. In our view, unreasonable and unjustified delay in adjudication of the show cause notice is in contravention of procedural fairness and is violative of principles of natural justice. 16. We find sufficient merit in the submissions made on behalf of the Petitioner that delay in adjudication of the show cause notice constitutes breach of principle of natural justice. In the present case, show cause notice issued in the year 2013 was replied by the Petitioner well within time in the year 2014 itself. The Petitioner 14 has specifically pleaded that the previous Director of the Petitioner, who was looking after the day to day management including the import of goods expired on 19th May 2019 and that no other person was aware about the proceedings of the show cause notice. There is no dispute that the Petitioner was never intimated with respect to adjudication on the show cause notice or the same being kept in the call book. Learned counsel for the Petitioner is right in contending that the Petitioner is gravely prejudiced as the Respondents never informed the Petitioner about the show cause notice being kept in the call book and that due to passage of time the relevant papers may not be available and it will not be possible to defend the show cause notice. Petitioner is also right in contending that even otherwise pendency of proceedings was not in respect of the Petitioner. Petitioner is also right in contending that even otherwise pendency of proceedings was not in respect of the Petitioner. Hence it is obvious that revival of show cause notice will seriously prejudice the Petitioner. 17. In the present case, reasons given by the Respondents for the delay caused in seeking to revive the show cause notice do not constitute any reasonable ground and the delay caused is not sustainable, as the same is in breach of the principles of natural justice. Though in Affidavit-In-Reply it is sought to be contented that the period of limitation prescribed by the amending Act, 2018 is not applicable to the present show cause notice of the year 2013, nothing was argued before us in support of this contention. In our view, even otherwise the powers of such nature of adjudicating the show cause notice are required to be exercised within reasonable time. We do not find any justification for the inaction on the part of the Respondents for keeping the adjudication of the show cause notice pending and for seeking revival of the same after a period of 9 years. For the reasons recorded above, the show cause notice impugned in the Petition is required to be quashed and set aside and it is also necessary to prohibit the Respondent from adjudicating the show cause notice any further.” 22. Similar is the view expressed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of GPI Textiles Limited vs. Union of India, 2018 (362) ELT 388 (P&H) where the show cause notices issued under Section 11 A of the Central Excise Act 1944 were kept pending for 16 years. The present case is a gross one as the impugned show cause notice are kept pending since 9th December 1993 for 29 years and even if some explanation on the part of the respondents relating to pendency of Civil Appeal No. 3793 of 2001 till 05.05.2004 is accepted, there is no justification for not proceeding upon the impugned show cause notice for 18 years thereafter till the impugned notice of personal hearing has been served upon the petitioner. Adjudication of such a show cause notice after 29 years would be contrary to the mandate of Section 11A(11) of the CEA 1944 and would lead to unreasonable and arbitrary results. Adjudication of such a show cause notice after 29 years would be contrary to the mandate of Section 11A(11) of the CEA 1944 and would lead to unreasonable and arbitrary results. Such proceedings therefore stands vitiated due to inordinate and unreasonable delay and are accordingly fit to be quashed. Accordingly, 15 the impugned show-cause notice dated 9th December 1993 is quashed. The notices of personal hearing dated 30th November 2022 and 23rd December 2022 are also quashed. 23. The writ petition is allowed in the manner and to the extent indicated herein above. Pending interlocutory application seeking stay is closed. 14. After going through the aforesaid judgment, it clearly transpires that in paragraph No. 9, the show cause notices involved in all these writ applications have been mentioned in tabular form and this Court has taken note of the pendency of show cause notices and/or the writ petition pending for adjudication. It further transpires that W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023 was disposed of on 14.02.2023 in presence of the parties and in the open Court but for the reason best known to the respondent-Department just after couple of days on 17.02.2023, they passed the common order in original (OIO) affirming the demand as made in the 10 show cause notices. This action of the Respondent Commissioner is against the settled principles of law which demands that the Revenue Officers are bound by the decisions of the appellate authorities and that the principle of judicial discipline requires that the orders of the higher appellate authorities are followed unreservedly by the subordinate authorities. In this regard reference may be made to the case of Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held at paragraph nos. 23, 35 and 39 as under. “23. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Lakshmikumaran to the decision of this Court reported in Union of India vs. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd. 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 443 in support of the proposition that in disposing of quasi-judicial issues before them, the Revenue Officers are bound by the decisions of the appellate authorities and that the principle of judicial discipline requires that the orders of the higher appellate authorities are followed unreservedly by the subordinate authorities. 35. (1) SCC 443 in support of the proposition that in disposing of quasi-judicial issues before them, the Revenue Officers are bound by the decisions of the appellate authorities and that the principle of judicial discipline requires that the orders of the higher appellate authorities are followed unreservedly by the subordinate authorities. 35. In our view, the Revisional Authority might have been justified in exercising suo motu power to revise the order of the Assessing Authority had the decision of the Tribunal been set aside or its operation stayed by a competent Court. So long it is not disputed that the Tribunal's decision, having regard to the framework of classification of products/tax liability then existing, continues to remain operative and such framework too continues to remain operative when the impugned revisional orders were made, the Revisional Authority was left with no other choice but to follow the decision of the Tribunal without any reservation. Unless the discipline of adhering to decisions made by the higher authorities is maintained, there would be utter chaos in administration of tax laws apart from undue harassment to assesses. We share the view expressed in Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd. (supra). 39. There is nothing on record to justify either illegality or (procedural/moral) impropriety in the proceedings before the Assessing Authority or the orders passed by him, as such. As noted above, the Assessing Authority was bound by the order of the Tribunal and elected to follow it having no other option. Such decision of the Tribunal was even binding on the Revisional Authority. In such circumstances, to brand the orders of the Assessing Authority as suffering from illegality and impropriety appears to us to be not only unjustified but also demonstrates thorough lack of understanding of the principle regulating exercise of suo motu revisional power by a quasi-judicial authority apart from being in breach of the principle of judicial discipline, while confronted with orders passed by a superior Tribunal/Court. We are inclined to the view that it is not the Assessing Authority's orders but those passed by the Revisional Authority, which suffer from a patent illegality.” Thus, we hold that judicial propriety and judicial discipline required the respondent to await the adjudication of the writ petitions when facts of the present writ petitions were pari-materia to the facts of W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023 save and except the date of issuance of show cause notices and date of issuance of personal hearing. When this Court was hearing the similar issue; the respondents should not have continued the proceeding on the same subject. 15. As a matter of fact, the Commissioner has not acted in a bona-fide manner and has attempted to make the present writ petitions infructuous. When the show cause notices were kept pending for 26 -27 years; there was no reason to proceed with such great speed in passing the impugned order. In this regard reference may be made to the case of Parle International Ltd. vs. Union of India and Others passed in W.P. No. 12904 of 2019 order dated 26.11.2020 wherein the Hon’ble Court has held at paragraph Nos. 24, 25, 26, and 28 as under: “24. There is one more aspect which we would like to point out. Respondents had not taken any action pursuant to the show-cause notices for long 13 years till issuance of notice for personal hearing on 13.08.2019. After the petitioner approached this Court by filing the present writ petition on 06.09.2019 with due intimation to the respondents, respondent No. 3 went ahead and passed the order-in-original dated 11.11.2019. We fail to understand when the respondents could wait for 13 long years after issuance of the show-cause notices, there could not have been any earthly reason to proceed at such great speed and pass the order-in-original before the Court could adjudicate on the correctness of the action of the respondents. Is it open to the respondents to materially alter the subject matter of the writ petition pending before the Court and then contend that because of such material alteration, the writ petition has become infructuous and that the petitioner should avail the alternative remedy of appeal? 25. Is it open to the respondents to materially alter the subject matter of the writ petition pending before the Court and then contend that because of such material alteration, the writ petition has become infructuous and that the petitioner should avail the alternative remedy of appeal? 25. In M/s. Harihar Collections vs. Union of India, decided on 15.10.2020, this Court was confronted with a similar situation when during the pendency of the writ petition, Commissioner of Customs had passed review order on 01.10.2020 under section 129D(2) of the Customs Act, 1962. This Court held as under: “26. When this Court had taken cognizance of the grievance made by the petitioner and was in seisin of the matter fixing 06.10.2020 for consideration, it was highly improper on the part of Commissioner of Customs (Import-II) to have passed the order dated 01.10.2020 without any intimation to or taking leave of the Court. It needs no reiteration that when the court, that too the High Court, is in seisin of a matter, an administrative or executive authority cannot start a parallel proceeding on the very same subject matter at its own ipse dixit and record a finding. It would amount to interfering with the dispensation of justice by the courts. In the instant case, when the Court was set to examine the grievance of the petitioner regarding non-release of the goods despite the order-in-original, what was sought to be done was to present the Court with an order passed in the midst of such examination keeping the Court totally in the dark saying that the order-in-original suffers from illegality or impropriety directing the subordinate authority to apply to the Commissioner (Appeals) to set aside the order-in-original and then contending that the writ petition should be dismissed because of the subsequent development or that the petitioner should be relegated to the appellate forum to contest the subsequent order. As pointed out above, this amounts to interfering with the administration of justice and is thus not at all acceptable. A view may be taken that such an order should be ignored as it is contumacious.” 26. The above aspect also requires a serious consideration and therefore has been re-stated. When a matter is brought before the Court or the Court is examining the matter, respondents cannot initiate or proceed with a parallel proceeding on its own to render the court scrutiny redundant. The above aspect also requires a serious consideration and therefore has been re-stated. When a matter is brought before the Court or the Court is examining the matter, respondents cannot initiate or proceed with a parallel proceeding on its own to render the court scrutiny redundant. Such an approach is neither acceptable nor permissible. 28. Thus, having regard to the discussions made above and taking an overall view of the matter we have no hesitation to hold that respondents were not justified in commencing adjudication proceeding 13 years after issuance of the show-cause notices dated 01.06.2006 and 28.11.2006. Such adjudication proceeding is therefore, held to be invalid. Consequently, impugned order-in-original dated 11.11.2019 issued by respondent No. 3 would also stand interfered with. It is accordingly set aside and quashed.” 16. It appears that the learned Commissioner has sought to justify its action by making following statement made in the Order in Original and in the counter affidavit which are quoted herein-below: Order in Original (i) Para 7.5(vii) at Page 10 of OIO “the Noticee have nothing to defend the case, they have filed Writ Petition to quash SCN C. No. MP-14/TGS/D/92/970 dated 9.12.1993, on the ground of inordinate delay in adjudication and bypassed the stablished norms.” (ii) Para 7.5(vii) at Page 10 of OIO “Further adjournment, so sought. By the Noticee cannot be accorded merely on the ground that the noticee have Writ Petition before Hon'ble High Court taking the plea of inordinate delay.” Counter affidavit (i) Page 27 “Since sufficient time as requested by the Petitioner was allowed and next date of PH was fixed as per request of the Petitioner itself, again seeking further adjournment stating that writ petition have been filed to quash the subject SCN on the ground o delay in adjudication, appeared to be not proper and did not hold merit, as there was no stay on adjudication proceedings on the subject SCNs/SODs by the Hon'ble Court. (ii) Page 57 “Taxation matters are Civil Proceedings and it is well known and established that these matters linger for long periods for different reasons especially when the matter is under dispute by either of the parties.” (iii) Page 57 - “No case can be quashed only on the ground that decision in that matter which is pending for long has not been taken. Further, it is add [sic] that no time lines are prescribed to decide such cases and the same solely depends on the quasi judicial authority as when the subject case is ripe and may be taken for decision.” 17. Such statements are unbecoming of the respondent authorities fall within the definition of ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The respondents have a duty to act fairly and reasonably even in the matters of taxation, the revenue must act rational. Reference in this regard may be made to the case of Asst. Commissioner, Anti Evasion Commercial Taxes vs. Amtek India Ltd. (2007) 11 SCC 407 Para-15 which is given below: “15. In this case though the action of the assessing officer concerned, in overlooking the documents produced coming to the conclusion about manipulation appears to be totally uncalled for and without any reasonable basis. This is a case where the officer should have been more careful and should not have acted in a manner as if he was a bloodhound and not a watchdog of Revenue. It is unfortunate that in large number of cases, orders totally bereft of rationality are being passed. They do not in any manner serve public interest, much less the interest of Revenue.” 18. The respondents have also again tried to rake up the issue of transfer of such notices (SCN) to call book, when such issue has been authoritatively decided by this Court in W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023. The file notings brought on record by the respondent also does not help them in any manner; rather, it only justifies the order passed by this Court that there existed no circumstances for transfer of cases to the call book as per the circulars issued by the department itself. In this regard we observe that there is no justification/reasoning either in the counter affidavit or the file notings as to why the show cause notices were taken out of the call book only in November, 2022. There is nothing to indicate any change in circumstances which led to taking out of the cases from the call book. In this regard we observe that there is no justification/reasoning either in the counter affidavit or the file notings as to why the show cause notices were taken out of the call book only in November, 2022. There is nothing to indicate any change in circumstances which led to taking out of the cases from the call book. Apart from the other grounds, some semblance of justification is sought to be given by the respondent in the counter affidavit where they have stated that since the issue of classification had been settled, accordingly it was decided to take the show cause notices out from the call book. At multiple places in the impugned order, it has been stated that the issue had attained a finality in 2004 itself. Regarding this stand, we hold that since the issue did attain finality in 2004 itself, there was absolutely no justification in keeping the show cause notices pending thereafter. The file notings show that though the Commissioner was apprised in 2007 that the issue had attained a finality, still a decision was taken by him on 26.10.2007 to keep the cases in the call book. Mere pendency of another matter before the Tribunal when the issue had attained a finality by the Hon’ble Apex Court, cannot be a reason to keep the SCN in the call book. A lapse of 18 years from 2004 to 2022 remains unexplained. Neither is there an explanation for any change of circumstances for taking out the notices from the call book in November 2022. In such circumstances, the SCN and the OIO cannot be countenanced. Reference is made to a recent decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Nanu Ram Goyal vs. Comm. of CGST and CEX, W.P. (C) No. 13906 of 2022, order dated 18.4.2023 Paras 30, 32, and 33. 19. The Respondents have also sought to rely upon the decision rendered in the case of Union of India vs. Siddhi Vinayak Syntex Pvt. Ltd. 2022 (379) ELT 553 (SC), to submit that the issue regarding the validity of call book is pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. However, as also stated in W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023, it is the categorical submission of the Petitioner company that it is not questioning the correctness of the concept of Call Book. However, as also stated in W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023, it is the categorical submission of the Petitioner company that it is not questioning the correctness of the concept of Call Book. Rather it is the Petitioner's contention that none of the conditions stipulated for transfer of notice of call book stood satisfied. Reliance is placed on the judgment rendered by the Delhi High Court in Nanu Ram Goyal (supra) Para-28 is quoted herein-below: 28. In the facts of the present case it is not necessary for this court to examine the validity of the procedure of placing the matter in the 'Call Book' as it is apparent that there is a gross delay on the part of respondent no. 1 and there are no justified reasons for the same. 20. The Respondents have also stated that the Department has decided to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the judgment dated 14.2.2023 rendered in W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023. It is however submitted by the learned ASGI that no such Special Leave Petition has been filed as on date. Even otherwise, mere filing of any Special Leave Petition does not amount to a stay of the order of the High Court. The order of the High Court must be given effect to until and unless the same is stayed by an order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. This is well settled by the judgment rendered in the case of Kunhayammed vs. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 - Paras 14(4) and 28 are quoted herein-below: 14 ....(4) In spite of a petition for special leave to appeal having been filed, the judgment, decree or order against which leave to appeal has been sought for, continues to be final, effective and binding as between the parties. Once leave to appeal has been granted, the finality of the judgment, decree or order appealed against is put in jeopardy though it continues to be binding and effective between the parties unless it is a nullity or unless the Court may pass a specific order staying or suspending the operation or execution of the judgment, decree or order under challenge. 28. Incidentally we may notice two other decisions of this Court which though not directly in point, the law laid down wherein would be of some assistance to us. 28. Incidentally we may notice two other decisions of this Court which though not directly in point, the law laid down wherein would be of some assistance to us. In Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar vs. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat, (1969) 2 SCC 74 : AIR 1970 SC 1 this Court vide Para 7 has emphasised three preconditions attracting applicability of doctrine of merger. They are: (i) the jurisdiction exercised should be appellate or revisional jurisdiction; (ii) the jurisdiction should have been exercised after issue of notice and (iii) after a full hearing in presence of both the parties. Then the appellate or revisional order would replace the judgment of the lower court and constitute the only final judgment. In Sushil Kumar Sen vs. State of Bihar, (1975) 1 SCC 774 : AIR 1975 SC 1185 the doctrine of merger usually applicable to orders passed in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction was held to be applicable also to orders passed in exercise of review jurisdiction. This Court held that the effect of allowing an application for review of a decree is to vacate a decree passed. The decree that is subsequently passed on review whether it modifies, reverses or confirms the decree originally passed, is a new decree superseding the original one. The distinction is clear. Entertaining an application for review does not vacate the decree sought to be reviewed. It is only when the application for review has been allowed that the decree under review is vacated. Thereafter the matter is heard afresh and the decree passed therein, whatever be the nature of the new decree, would be a decree superseding the earlier one. The principle or logic flowing from the abovesaid decisions can usefully be utilised for resolving the issue at hand. Mere pendency of an application seeking leave to appeal does not put in jeopardy the finality of the decree or order sought to be subjected to exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the Supreme Court. It is only if the application is allowed and leave to appeal granted then the finality of the decree or order under challenge is jeopardised as the pendency of appeal reopens the issues decided and this Court is then scrutinising the correctness of the decision in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. 21. It is only if the application is allowed and leave to appeal granted then the finality of the decree or order under challenge is jeopardised as the pendency of appeal reopens the issues decided and this Court is then scrutinising the correctness of the decision in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. 21. The Respondents have also contended that old cases of “Petitioner's company TML Drivelines (now Tata Motors Ltd.)” had also been taken out of the call book and have been adjudicated vide order in original dated 24.1.2023 by dropping the demand. But the Petitioner did not challenge the same. The said justification given by the Respondent reflects non-application of mind. 22. Lastly the respondent’s contention that the petitioner should have come forward for adjudication of the show cause notices, inasmuch as, opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner in all these cases but the petitioner did not respond to the same and only asked for adjournment and that is the reason that the OIO has been passed. This stand of the Respondents is also not sustainable in view of the fact that this Court in W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023 have authoritatively held that adjudication of show cause after 29 years would be contrary to the mandate of Section 11A(11) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and would lead to unreasonable and arbitrary results. 23. Having regard to the aforesaid discussions and judicial pronouncements and also the fact that the issue involved in these writ applications has already been decided by this Court in W.P. (T) No. 308 of 2023, we are having no hesitation in quashing the respective show cause notices (SCN) and Notice of personal hearing as mentioned in paragraph No. 3 in tabular form and subsequent OIO i.e. common Order in Original dated 17.02.2023. The same are hereby quashed and set aside. 24. Consequently, all these writ applications stand allowed. If any I.A. is pending also closed.