JUDGMENT Chandra Kumar Rai, J. Heard Mr. S.N. Singh holding the brief of Mr. D.S. Pandey, Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Shamim Ahmad for respondent No.3, learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondent Nos. 1and 2 and Mr. Azad Rai for respondent No.4, Gaon Sabha. 2. The brief facts of the case are that plot No. 2183 area 5 Bigha 9 Biswa situated in Village Shah, Pargana Ayahshah, Tehsil and District Fatehpur was recorded in the name of Jagdev Singh, Krishna Pal Singh s/o of Manna Singh, Virendra Singh (Minor) under guardianship of his mother Smt. Pan Kumari. A sale deed was executed on 9.2.1989 in favour of Surjan, Sri Pat son of Bhura and Chotu son of Teja by Jagdev Singh and Krishna Pal Singh. On the basis of aforesaid sale deed, Assistant Consolidation Officer vide order dated 23.5.1989 in Case No. 149 under section 12 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act ordered to record the name of vendees Surjan, Sri Pat and Chotu after expunging the name of vendor Jagdev Singh and others. After the order dated 23.5.1989 passed in the proceeding under section 12, petitioners filed an objection under section 20 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which was decided on 6.11.1991 and petitioners' father was allotted plot Nos. 2481M, 2480M, 2478/1M and 2479M total four plots area 0.142 hectare. Petitioners came in possession after death of his father in respect of aforementioned plots in the month of February 2015, respondent No.3 started interference with the possession of the petitioner on the basis of the order passed on 5.12.1989 by the Consolidation Officer in reference proceeding accordingly petitioners filed revision under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act against the order dated 5.12.1989. In the memo of revision specific ground has been taken that the order dated 5.12.1999 is illegal and no notice/opportunity has been given to the petitioner, as such, the right of the petitioners cannot be disturbed on the basis of illegal order which is liable be set aside. The Deputy Director of Consolidation vide impugned order dated 19.3.2020 dismissed the revision on the ground of limitation. Hence this writ petition. 3. The Deputy Director of Consolidation vide impugned order dated 19.3.2020 dismissed the revision on the ground of limitation. Hence this writ petition. 3. This Court on 17.6.2020 passed the following order, the order runs as follows:- "The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that when the plot no.2183 was purchased by the predecessor in interest of the respondent no.3 in the year 1984, the name of predecessor was recorded in the proceeding under Section 12 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 on 23.05.1989. Thereafter, a new khata being Khata No.350-A was carved out with four plots bearing nos. 2481, 2480, 2478/1 and 2479. This carvation of the fresh chak no. 350-A took place on 06.11.1991. Thereafter 15 years later, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the proceedings which had been initiated by the respondent no.3 could not have been initiated at all. Matter requires consideration. Sri Shamim Ahmed, learned counsel appears through Video Conferencing for respondent no.3. Respondent no.4 i.e. Gaon Sabha is represented by Sri Ashish Kumar Srivastava, Advocate. Respondents no. 1 and 2 are represented by the learned Standing Counsel. Learned counsel for the petitioners may serve the learned counsel for the respondent-4 within 48 hours. Respondents may file their counter affidavit within a period of three weeks. Rejoinder affidavit, if any, may be filed within two weeks thereafter. List this petition on the date fixed in the notice. Till the next date of listing, status quo as of today, shall be maintained." 4. In pursuance of the interim order dated 17.6.2020, contesting respondent No.3 filed his counter-affidavit along with the stay application and petitioners have filed their rejoinder-affidavit also. 5. Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order dated 5.12.1999 passed by Consolidation Officer is illegal as no notice and opportunity has been afforded to the petitioners before passing the order dated 5.12.1999. He further submitted that record of the case in which order dated 5.12.1999 was passed is not available in the record room which makes the entire proceeding suspicious. He further submitted that record of the case in which order dated 5.12.1999 was passed is not available in the record room which makes the entire proceeding suspicious. He further submitted that when the petitioners came to know about the order dated 5.12.1999, the revision under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act has been filed by the petitioners explaining the delay in filing the same but the revision has been dismissed on the technical grounds stating that the day to day delay has not been explained and there is inordinate delay in filing the revision. He submitted that impugned orders be set aside and matter be sent back to decide the dispute afresh after affording the opportunity of hearing to the parties. 6. On the other hand, Counsel for the respondent No. 3 submitted that the order dated 5.12.1999 has been passed in accordance with law, as such, no interference is required. He further submitted that there is an inordinate delay in filing the revision, as such, the same cannot be condoned. He further submitted that the equity had been adjusted under the impugned order dated 5.12.1999, as such, no interference is required. 7. I have considered the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. There is no dispute about the fact that the order dated 5.12.1999 has been passed by the Consolidation Officer and the revision under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act filed by petitioners along with the prayer for condonation of delay taking specific ground in the grounds of revision regarding his entitlement over the plot in dispute, violation of principle of natural justice as well as non-availability of record of reference proceeding, has been dismissed on the ground of limitation. 9. The grounds of revision filed by petitioners will be relevant for consideration of the controversy which are as under:- 10. Considering the ground taken in the ground of revision, the dismissal of the petitioners' revision on the technical grounds is not in the interest of justice. 11. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 Collector, Land Acquisition on Anantnag v. Kantiji and Others has held that in place of rejecting the meritorious matter on technical grounds, the adjudication should be made on merit. 11. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 Collector, Land Acquisition on Anantnag v. Kantiji and Others has held that in place of rejecting the meritorious matter on technical grounds, the adjudication should be made on merit. Paragraph No.3 of the judgement rendered in Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag (Supra) will relevant for perusal which is as under:- "The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay' The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay' The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgement sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides." 12. Affording of opportunity of hearing is mandatory in the reference proceeding which is lacking in the instant matter. 13. Learned Counsel for the respondent No.3 has failed to produce the copy of the order dated 5.12.1999 passed by the Consolidation Officer in his favour by which the rights of the petitioners have been affected. 14. Considering the entire facts and circumstances, the revisional order dated 19.3.2020 passed by respondent No.1 is liable to be set aside and the same is hereby set aside. 15. Writ petition stands allowed in part and matter is remitted back before the respondent No.1/ Revisional Court to decide the revision afresh on merit after affording opportunity of hearing to both the parties as well as calling report from the record room about the reference case No. 38 which was decided on 5.12.1999. After receipt of the report from the record room with respect to the reference case No. 38, the Deputy Director Consolidation shall decide the revision expeditiously preferable within period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order before him.