ORDER : 1. Though the matter is listed for confirmation of the interim order, however, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that since the petitioners are facing departmental inquiry, which had been initiated after 11 years of the alleged incident and in light of the fact that the petitioners have been acquitted by the competent trial Court, the matter be decided at this stage itself, lest the petitioners’ rights would be prejudicely affected and the petitioner No.1, who has since retired, will be denied retiral dues in the guise of pending inquiry. 2. With the consent of rival parties, the matter is being finally decided. 3. Mr. Punia, learned Senior Counsel apprising the Court about the backdrop facts, stated that the petitioner No.1 was an Assistant Sub Inspector of Police whereas the petitioner No.2 was a constable at the relevant time, when the case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was registered against them. 4. In wake of the fact that a case had been registered against the petitioners, the respondents placed the petitioners under suspension vide order dated 27.07.2006 in exercise of Rule 13 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CCA Rules of 1958’). 5. It is to be noticed that while placing the petitioners under suspension, the respondents had neither initiated any disciplinary inquiry nor any reference of contemplation of an inquiry was made nor the same was initiated for considerable period of 10 years, in spite of the fact that pursuant to petitioners’ request, their suspension was revoked by way of order dated 17.02.2014. 6. Meantime, criminal case against the petitioners continued which culminated in acquittal of both the petitioners per viam order dated 11.03.2016, passed by learned Special Judge, Anti Corruption Cases, Ajmer, who gave both the petitioners benefit of doubt after dilating upon the evidence in great detail. 7. After being acquitted, the petitioners moved a representation dated 18.03.2016 before the competent authority requesting to give due salary and other benefits, including, benefits of selection Grade, which were due to them on completion of requisite years of service. Said representation was followed by another representation at 22.11.2016. 8. 7. After being acquitted, the petitioners moved a representation dated 18.03.2016 before the competent authority requesting to give due salary and other benefits, including, benefits of selection Grade, which were due to them on completion of requisite years of service. Said representation was followed by another representation at 22.11.2016. 8. Instead of acceding to petitioners’ request for grant of full salary and other service benefits, the Superintendent of Police, Nagaur decided to initiate disciplinary inquiry against the petitioners and issued a charge sheet dated 21.02.2017 framing two charges against them. Both the charges related to demand/acceptance of bribe in relation to the trap held by the Anti Corruption Bureau, for which above referred criminal case was registered against the petitioners in which they stood acquitted. 9. Mr. Punia, learned Senior Counsel argued that the disciplinary inquiry in question is illegal, arbitrary and vindictive, inasmuch as the same has been initiated after about 11 years of alleged incident and that too when the petitioners have been acquitted by the competent Criminal Court. 10. While maintaining that no case of demand/acceptance of bribe is made out against the petitioners in light of the evidence led before and considered by the competent Court, learned Senior Counsel underscored that neither at the time of suspension nor during pendency of criminal case, the respondents have ever thought of initiating disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners and argued that same has been initiated only to deny the petitioners their due benefits. 11. It was also argued that, if the respondents were of the view that disciplinary inquiry was required to be initiated against the petitioners, they ought to have initiated the same immediately while placing the petitioners under suspension, inasmuch as, all the facts including pendency of criminal case was in the knowledge of the respondents. 12. Learned Senior Counsel argued that initiation of the disciplinary inquiry at such a belated stage is illegal and prejudicial to petitioners’ interest inasmuch as after 11 years neither the petitioners nor their defence witnesses would be in a position to appear and depose before the disciplinary authority. He added that petitioner No.1, who has since retired, will not even be in a position to contest the disciplinary proceedings properly. 13. He added that petitioner No.1, who has since retired, will not even be in a position to contest the disciplinary proceedings properly. 13. In support of his contention that disciplinary proceedings initiated after an inordinate delay (of 10-11 years) are liable to be quashed, learned Senior Counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Rajendra Gupta Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6296/2006 decided on 27.01.2015 and submitted that the impugned proceedings are also liable to be quashed on the ground of delay itself, apart from being arbitrary and vindictive. 14. Mr. Anil Bissa, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State on the other hand submitted that the disciplinary proceedings cannot be quashed solely on the ground of delay. 15. He invited Court’s attention towards the circular dated 05.10.2016 and placed reliance upon judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. Vs. Akhilesh Jha & Anr., reported in (2021) 12 SCC 460, particularly para No.13 thereof to support his stand that disciplinary proceedings under challenge cannot be quashed solely on ground of delay. 16. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 17. The facts in the present case are concise and undisputed. The moot question, which has come up for consideration of the Court is, whether oppugned proceedings trigerred after 11 years of the alleged incident of acceptance of illegal gratification can be allowed to continue. 18. Concededly, the order of suspension dated 27.07.2006 does not make any whisper about pendency or contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. The same simply makes reference of Rule 13 of the Rules of 1958, with no indication or inclination of any disciplinary proceedings. 19. It is noteworthy that petitioners’ suspension was revoked on 17.02.2014 and even in such order, the only stipulation which was made was that the petitioners’ right of getting salary, etc., will be decided after the conclusion of the criminal trial which was pending before the Court. While revoking the suspension, the respondents did not reserve their right of initiating disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners. 20. It is only when the petitioners made representation for payment of due salary and claimed other benefits, the respondents woke up from their slumber and kick started the disciplinary proceedings per-viam impugned memorandum dated 15.03.2017. 21. The argument of Mr. While revoking the suspension, the respondents did not reserve their right of initiating disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners. 20. It is only when the petitioners made representation for payment of due salary and claimed other benefits, the respondents woke up from their slumber and kick started the disciplinary proceedings per-viam impugned memorandum dated 15.03.2017. 21. The argument of Mr. Bissa that disciplinary proceedings cannot be quashed on the ground of delay, would hardly cut any ice in the present factual backdrop. True it is, that Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Akhilesh Jha (supra) (relied upon by Mr. Bissa) has held that the disciplinary proceedings cannot be quashed solely on the ground of delay but then, while holding so, Hon’ble the Apex Court has held that it is upon the petitioner to establish the prejudice caused to him. 22. The petitioners have satisfied the Court about the prejudice likely to be caused to them-if the disciplinary proceedings are allowed to continue, the petitioners would be required to defend proceedings after 11 years of the alleged demand/acceptance of bribe. One cannot but be mindful of the fact that the trap was laid by the anti corruption bureau and the respondents or the petitioners are having no documentary evidence in their possession. 23. This Court finds substance in the contention of learned Senior Counsel that after 11 years of the alleged incident, neither the petitioners nor the defence witnesses of the petitioners and nor the department can recollect the facts and events that had occured 11 years ago. 24. Furthermore, petitioner No.1 has since superannuated and it will be very difficult for him to defend his case before the disciplinary authority. 25. Neither in the reply nor during the arguments, the State has demonstrated any plausible reason for the inordinate delay of 11 years in initiating the subject inquiry. The State was very much aware of the pendency of the criminal case against the petitioners, hence they cannot justify their inaction which has resulted in unwarranted harassment to the petitioners. 26. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Both the petitioners have been acquitted, maybe while granting benefit of doubt but such acquittal is unqualified and reached at by the competent trial Court after dealing with entire evidence. 26. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Both the petitioners have been acquitted, maybe while granting benefit of doubt but such acquittal is unqualified and reached at by the competent trial Court after dealing with entire evidence. This Court is not oblivious of the legal position that standard or level of proof in criminal cases is relatively high than it is in the case of disciplinary proceedings. 27. The petitioners seem to have been acquitted while giving benefit of doubt but on careful reading of the judgment dated 11.03.2016 particularly adjudication regarding points of determination No.3 and 4 (para 60 to 65) relating to recovery of amount of bribe, it is apparent that the Court has found the recovery of the amount to be suspicious and not proved. Even the prosecution has miserably failed to prove demand of bribe. It is interesting to note that the complainant Narayan Ram (PW-2) has turned hostile and even PW-1 and other prosecution witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution. 28. Considering that the charges levelled against the petitioners relate to the incident of petitioners’ apprehension/trap by the Anti Corruption Bureau and that no additional document or witness of the respondents are going to take part in the inquiry and because the list of witnesses is identical, this Court is of the considered view that continuation of disciplinary proceedings under challenge would be an abuse of process. 29. The delinquency or illegality relates to the demand and acceptance of bribe and indisputably entire material and evidence is/was with the Anti Corruption Bureau. There is no possibility of any other material/evidence with the respondents as it was entirely Anti Corruption Bureau’s raid in which no person from the respondents was involved. Hence, the respondents cannot be permitted to continue the inquiry. 30. The respondents cannot be permitted to determine petitioners’ guilt (if any) by examining the very same witnesses who appeared in the Court. When it comes to decide as to whether the petitioners demanded and accepted the bribe, the disciplinary authority cannot record a finding other than what has been recorded by the competent Court. It has to be borne in mind that the delinquency/allegation levelled alleged against the petitioners is, demand and acceptance of bribe. When it comes to decide as to whether the petitioners demanded and accepted the bribe, the disciplinary authority cannot record a finding other than what has been recorded by the competent Court. It has to be borne in mind that the delinquency/allegation levelled alleged against the petitioners is, demand and acceptance of bribe. The respondent department cannot and does not have any other material/evidence and legal competence to take a different view than the one which has been taken by the Court. 31. Perhaps, that might be the reason for which the respondents did not initiate the inquiry against the petitioners and awaited the decisions of the competent Court, with an understanding that as and when the petitioners would be convicted, they will be dismissed/removed from the service invoking Rule 19(2) of the Rules or Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 32. The respondents cannot justifiably initiate departmental inquiry simply on finding that the Court has acquitted the petitioners. Because, not only the evidence even the witnesses are the same who have testified before the Court. The same evidence by whatever standard of proof cannot lead to another conclusion or result. 33. This Court is also of the view that by not taking any action against the petitioners for 11 years, the respondents cannot initiate the disciplinary proceeding abruptly as their conduct amounts to acquiescence. The impugned proceedings have been initiated abruptly, after receipt of petitioners’ representation to pay them due salary and other service benefits. The proceedings in question are arbitrary and if allowed to continue would amount to abuse of the process. 34. As an upshot of discussion foregoing, the present writ petition is allowed. 35. The disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioners by way of memorandum dated 15.03.2017 and the memorandum of charges dated 21.02.2017are hereby quashed. 36. Consequence to follow. 37. All interlocutory applications so also the stay petition stands disposed of.