JUDGMENT : 1. The appellant – State of Gujarat has preferred the present appeal under Section 378 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 7.8.2006 passed by the learned Special Judge and Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 2, Anand (hereinafter be referred to as “the Trial Court”) in Special (ACB) Case No. 1 of 2006 (Old Case No.1 of 2000), whereby the respondents-original accused persons were acquitted from the charges levelled against them under Sections 7, 12, 13(1)(d), 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 2. The facts in brief giving rise to the filing of present appeal are as under: 2.1 The complainant Mr. J.J. Patel P.I., Anti Corruption Bureau ('ACB' for short) Nadiad, has received secret information that Anand Traffic Police are giving memo of R.T.O or Court to auto rickshaw drivers who have no license and overloading passenger, and the traffic police also demanding bribe of Rs. 50/- to 100/- for not doing further legal procedure. On this fact a complaint was lodged and a trap was arranged by the ACB police party and called the panch-witness. Thereafter, they have understood the matter to the panch-witness and also shown the principles of ultra violate lamp test. Thereafter, panch-witness, P.I. Mr. Patel and other ACB staff members reached at Samarkha Cross road and stopped their jeep and requested the auto rickshaw drivers to cooperate ACB staff. Thereafter, they hold one auto rickshaw driver Chhatrasinh Umarbhai Khokhar, residing at Mogar village, Tal-Dist-Ananad whose rickshaw’s registration No. is GJ-7-V-5922 and aware him about the complaint and trap and he also agreed with the ACB staff for the same and told that yesterday Anand Traffic Police had given him memo for rickshaw and thereafter, he saw memo to them. Thereafter, complainant told the rickshaw driver that he should contact the police (Accused-1) who had given him that memo and requesting him for not going further regarding that memo, and if he want bribe amount then you should give him money in presence of panch-witness and thereafter complainant has arranged the plan for trap. Thereafter, in the trap both accused were caught with red handed and the ultraviolet lamp test was positive, on this fact the offence came to be registered under sections 7, 12, 13(1) (d) and 13(2) of Corruption Act 1988. 3. Thereafter, in the trap both accused were caught with red handed and the ultraviolet lamp test was positive, on this fact the offence came to be registered under sections 7, 12, 13(1) (d) and 13(2) of Corruption Act 1988. 3. The charge came to be framed by the Trial Court vide Exhibit 9 for the aforesaid offences against the accused persons. On being explained it to them, the accused persons have denied having committed any offence. The accused persons pleaded not guilty to the charge and pleaded for Trial and hence, the case was tried by the Trial Court. 4. The prosecution has led following oral evidence in support of its case:- Sr. No. Name of the witness Exh.No. 1 Rajnish Rai (Deputy Commissioner of Intelligent Department) 15 2 Prakashbhai Sureshbhai Patel (Panch No.1) 18 3 Vashrambhai Manabhai (Panch No.2) 22 4 Jayantilal Joitaram Patel (ACB PI) 36 5 Chhatrasinh Umarbhai (Decoy Witness) 44 6 Rustambhai Amirbhai Belim (P.I.) 49 5. The prosecution has led following documentary evidence in support of its case:- Sr. No. Documentary Evidence Exh. No. 1 Order sanctioning prosecution against accused No.1 16 2 Original Panchnama 19 3 The paper signed by panchas and P.I. Mr. Patel under which the note seized from the accused has been put are kept. 23 4 Copy of R.C. Book of Rickshaw No. GJ-7-V-5922 24 5 Copy of permit of RTO of said Rickshaw 25 6 Copy of Pollution Certificate of said Rickshaw 26 7 Copy of the report of the motor vehicle inspection of said Rickshaw 27 8 Copy of receipt of insurance of the said rickshaw 28 9 copy of license of rickshaw driver 29 10 Copy of the insurance police of rickshaw 30 11 Confidential letter written by DSP to P.I. ACB Nadiad 31 12 Xerox copy of service book of accused no. 1 32 13 Copy of the transfer order of accused No.1 to Anand Town Traffic Department 33 14 Letter written by P.I. Anand Town Police Station to P.I. ACB Nadiad 34 15 Register showing information regarding duty of the accused No.1 35 16 Copy of the yadi summoning panchas 37 17 Copy of the Seizure memo of Muddamal seized from accused No.1 38 18 Copy of seizure memo of the article seized from Accused No.2 - Ghanshyambhai Raval 39 19 Original complaint 40 20 Copy of the chargesheet 43 6. I have heard Ms. I have heard Ms. Maithili Mehta, learned APP for the appellant State of Gujarat and Mr. Salim M. Syied, learned Counsel for the respondents accused. 7. Ms. Mehta, learned APP for the appellate State has submitted that the learned Trial Judge has committed an error by ignoring the fact that though the prosecution has proved the case against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt and also committed an error while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. She further submitted that Panch No.2 has supported the case of the prosecution and therefore, the learned Judge ought to have appreciated the evidence of Panch No. 2 and convicted the accused persons for the charges levelled against them. It is further contended that p.w. 1, who is at the relevant point of time District Superintendent of Police, has after going through relevant material has given sanction to prosecute the case against the accused for the alleged offence and the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, the impugned judgment and order of acquittal deserves to be quashed and set aside and the accused persons be convicted for the alleged offence. She further submitted that the prosecution has produced sufficient material and in view of the documentary evidence and arguments advanced by the prosecution, the learned Trial Judge ought to have convicted the accused persons for the charges levelled against them and therefore, impugned judgment and order of acquittal is erroneous, bad in law and against the settled principles of law and therefore, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is also contended that from the bare perusal of the evidence of the witnesses, the involvement of the accused persons and the role alleged are proved beyond reasonable doubt and demand and acceptance is also established and therefore, learned Trial Judge has committed serious error by disbelieving the case of the prosecution while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. Even otherwise, impugned judgment and order passed by learned Trial Judge is against settled principles of law and hence, present Appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment and order of acquittal be reversed and the accused persons be convicted for the alleged offence as they are being public servant and prima facie material and the involvement is proved beyond reasonable doubt. She, therefore, urges that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal be set aside. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Salim M. Saiyed, learned Counsel for the respondents has supported the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and submitted that the learned Trial Judge has not committed an error in passing the order of acquittal and therefore, the Court may not interfere with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. He has also submitted that the learned Trial Judge has, rightly after appreciating the evidence led by the prosecution on record, passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, which is in consonance with the settled principles of law and therefore, no interference is required to be called for in the present Appeal. He has further submitted that it is settled principles of law that while dealing with the acquittal Appeal, the appellate Court has not to rewrite the judgment and therefore, no interference is required to be called for in present Appeal. It is further submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish demand and acceptance beyond reasonable doubt and as settled by catena of decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court that unless and until two prime ingredients are proved by the prosecution, no conviction can be awarded against person in the case under Prevention of Corruption Act. He submitted that mere acceptance and demand are not constituted the offence under the provision of Prevention of Corruption Act and therefore, on both the counts, the prosecution has failed to establish case against present respondents. Hence, impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Judge is in accordance with the settled legal principles and in consonance with the recent pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court. Hence he urges that this Court may not interfere with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and the Appeal be dismissed and the order of acquittal be confirmed. 9. I have perused the relevant materials available on record and evidence led by the prosecution and the arguments advanced by learned APP and the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents. I have also gone through the original records and proceedings of the Appeal as well as impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court. 10. 9. I have perused the relevant materials available on record and evidence led by the prosecution and the arguments advanced by learned APP and the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents. I have also gone through the original records and proceedings of the Appeal as well as impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court. 10. In the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , more particularly paragraph No. 42, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has framed the general principle regarding powers of the appellant Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. The said paragraph No. 42 reads as under:- "42.(1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 11. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 11. It is also appropriate to take in to account the observations made in paragraph No. 9 of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of U.P. vs. Ram Veer Singh and others reported in AIR 2007 SC 3075 , reads as under. "9. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. [See Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( 2002 (2) Supreme 567 )]. The principle to be followed by appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Anr. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1973 SC 2622 ), Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat ( 1996 (4) Supreme 167 ), Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana ( 2000 (3) Supreme 320 ), Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar and Ors. ( 2003 (7) Supreme 152 ), State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh ( 2003 (5) Supreme 508 , State of Punjab v. Pohla Singh and Anr. ( 2003 (7) Supreme 17 ) and V.N. Ratheesh v. State of Kerala ( 2006 (10) SCC 617 ). 12. In the decision in case of The State of Gujarat vs. Ashokbhai Shankerbhai Patil passed in Criminal Appeal No. 123 of 2007, the Court observed in paragraph No. 12 as under:- 12. In the recent decision in the case of K. Shanthamma v. State of Telangana reported in (2022) 4 SCC 574 it has been held as under: “10. We have given careful consideration to the submissions. We have perused the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. The offence under Section 7 of the PC Act relating to public servants taking bribe requires a demand of illegal gratification and the acceptance thereof. The proof of demand of bribe by a public servant and its acceptance by him is sine qua non for establishing the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. 11. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., this Court has summarised the well-settled law on the subject in para 23 which reads thus: “23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1) (d) (I) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.” 13 Present Appeal is failed mainly on the ground that the prosecution has not examined the material and vital witness to support its case viz. Prakashbhai Sureshbhai Patel Panch No.1, who is cited as witness in the chargesheet. Learned Trial Judge has considered this fact in detailed while dealing with issue Nos. 2 and 3 in paragraph No. 29 of the impugned judgment and order. The learned Trial Judge has observed that the prosecution has completely failed to establish the case against present accused Nos. 1 and 2 with regard to the demand and acceptance beyond reasonable doubt. 14. Further, the prosecution witness viz. panch no. 1 has turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution. Even the Rickshaw Driver viz. Chhatrasinh has also not supported the case of the prosecution. So in all counts the prosecution has failed to establish the case against present respondents original accused persons. Therefore, the learned Trial Judge has rightly acquitted the accused persons from the charges levelled against them. The learned Trial Judge has also observed that though the information received by the investigating officer, he has not recorded the same in the station diary and therefore, prima facie the allegation with regard to the traffic memo issued against Rickshaw Driver was not mentioned in the station diary and therefore, it creates a serious doubt upon the story put forward by the prosecution against the accused persons. 15. Therefore, learned Trial Judge has rightly disbelieved the case of the prosecution while dealing with all these aspects and passed the impugned judgment of acquittal. 16. At this stage, it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy vs. Dist. 15. Therefore, learned Trial Judge has rightly disbelieved the case of the prosecution while dealing with all these aspects and passed the impugned judgment of acquittal. 16. At this stage, it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy vs. Dist. Inspector of Police reported in AIR 2015 SC 3549 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically come to a conclusion that the amount of illegal gratification is the basic ingredients and it is to be proved beyond the reasonable doubt. It is further held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i)&(ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. meaning thereby the basic requirement of demand or the ailment of demand is to be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution failing which the case itself not succeed. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. 17. While considering the Appeal against order of acquittal, it is well settled principle that when two views are possible, the view which is taken by the Trial Court in favour of the accused persons normally to be sustained and no interference is to be called for while dealing with the appeal against the order of acquittal. 18. In my considered opinion, the Trial Court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the Trial Court. 19. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the Trial Court. 19. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused is connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged. 20. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the Trial Court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. 21. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the Trial Court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. 21. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it clearly transpires that the Trial Court has not committed any error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record and in acquitting the accused persons from the charges levelled against them. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence, it clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court is sustainable and the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. 22. In view of the evidence on record, it is clearly found that the Trial Court has minutely examined the evidence and has properly appreciated the evidence on record and also not committed any error of fact and law in acquitting the accused for the charges levelled against them. 23. For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal fails and stands dismissed accordingly. The judgment and order of acquittal dated 7.8.2006 passed by the learned Special Judge and Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 2, Anand (hereinafter be referred to as “the Trial Court”) in Special (ACB) Case No. 1 of 2006 (Old Case No.1 of 2000) is hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings, if any, be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.