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2023 DIGILAW 765 (JHR)

Krishna Kisku v. State of Jharkhand

2023-06-15

SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2023
JUDGMENT : The writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India whereby and whereunder the order dated 16.02.2016 passed by the Respondent No.4 in Land restoration Case No.17/2013-14 by which the claim of restoration of the land in question filed under Section 71A of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 has been rejected. Further, the order dated 19.02.2021 by which the order dated 16.02.2016 has been quashed by the appellate authority by passing order in L.R. Appeal No.4/2016 as also the order dated 28.01.2022 passed by the revisional authority in Land Restoration Revision Case No.48/21 quashing the order passed by the appellate authority, have been sought to be quashed. 2. Brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition, which are required to be enumerated herein, read as under :- The land measuring 0.68 acre situated at Plot number 3194, 3196, 3197, 3264, 3265, 3266, 3267, 3268 and 3269 Khata No.29 Mouza Dhaiya within Dhanbad Sub Division recorded in name of Keshaw Manjhi and others (Predecessor of petitioners) in Cadestral Survey Khatiyan and as such the land is amenable under the provision of Section 71(A) of Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. It is the case of the petitioner that one Binulal Kisku, son of Late Lakhiram Kisku, had filed an application before the Chief Minister Jharkhand stating therein that the land situated in Mouza No.6 (Dhaiya) appertaining to C.S. Khata No.29 bearing C.S. Plot No.3194, 3196, 3197, 3264, 3265, 3266, 3267, 3268 and 3269 measuring 0.68 acre land has illegally been occupied by dispossessing him by Bhim Sen Agarwal and requested for restoration and thereafter the matter has been referred to the respondent No.4 and a land Restoration Case vide L. R. Case No. 17/13-14 has been registered. In the aforesaid case the respondent No.4 passed an order dated 16.02.2016 whereby and whereunder the petition for restoration of land has been dismissed. The aforesaid order dated 16.02.2016 has been passed in favour of respondent No.5 to 7 on the basis of adverse possession whereas the respondent No.4 has though came to a finding that the land has not been transferred by the petitioner. The petitioners, in the aforesaid circumstances, preferred an appeal before the appellate authority i.e. Deputy Commissioner Dhanbad vide L. R. Appeal No.4/16 against the order dated 16.02.2016 passed by the Deputy Collector Land Revenue, Dhanbad. The petitioners, in the aforesaid circumstances, preferred an appeal before the appellate authority i.e. Deputy Commissioner Dhanbad vide L. R. Appeal No.4/16 against the order dated 16.02.2016 passed by the Deputy Collector Land Revenue, Dhanbad. The respondent No.3, after hearing the parties, has passed order dated 19.02.2021 whereby and whereunder the order dated 16.02.2016 passed by the respondent No.4 has been set aside and the appeal has been allowed. Thereafter, the respondent Nos.5 to 7 preferred a revision application before the respondent No.2 vide Land Restoration Revision Case No. 48/21 against the order dated 19.02.2021 in which the respondent No.2 has passed order dated 28.01.2022 whereby and whereunder the revision application has been allowed and the order dated 19.02.2021 passed by the respondent No.3 has been set aside, against which the present writ petition has been filed. 3. It is evident from the pleading made in the writ petition as referred hereinabove, that the land measuring 0.68 acre situated at Plot No.3194, 3196, 3197, 3264, 3265, 3267 and 3269 falling under Khata No.29, Mouza Dhaiya Mouza No.6, Dhanbad Circle was recorded in the name of Keshav Manjhi and others, the predecessors of the writ petitioners in Cathedral Survey khatiyan. The aforesaid land, according to the writ petitioners, has illegally been grabbed without seeking any permission as required to be obtained under the provision of Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act, 1908) and, therefore, the application under Section 71-A of the Act, 1908 has been filed for restoration of the aforesaid land which is in illegal possession of the Respondent Nos. 5 and 6. The aforesaid application has been refused by the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms and the application was rejected on the ground that earlier to the application filed under Section 71-A, an application was also filed under Section 46 (4A) of the Act, 1908, since the land in question falls under the non-schedule area. The original authority has considered the period of limitation as provided under proviso to Section 46 (4A) wherein it has been provided that the limitation to file restoration application is 12 years but the application has been filed after lapse of 40 years and, as such, it was rejected. The original authority has considered the period of limitation as provided under proviso to Section 46 (4A) wherein it has been provided that the limitation to file restoration application is 12 years but the application has been filed after lapse of 40 years and, as such, it was rejected. The Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, therefore, has taken a ground for rejection of the 71A application by making applicability of principle of res judicata since the issue has already been dealt with while deciding the application under Section 46(4A) of the Act, 1908 which is the appropriate provision to deal with the restoration application since the land falls under the non-schedule area. The D.C.L.R. has also taken the ground in not entertaining to the application filed under Section 46(4A) of the Act, 1908 that the said application is also barred by limitation since the restoration application has been filed after lapse of 40 years. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the order dated 16.02.2016 passed by the Respondent No.4 in Land restoration Case No.17/2013-14, has preferred appeal being L.R. Appeal No.4/2016 and the said appeal has been allowed vide order dated 19.02.2021 but the revisional authority has allowed the revision vide order dated 28.01.2022 by setting aside the order passed by the appellate authority, against which the instant writ petition has been filed. 4. Mr. Amar Kumar Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, has submitted that the ground which has been taken regarding applicability of principle of res judicata, will not be applicable since the aforesaid application filed under Section 46 (4A) of the Act, 1908 was not by the writ petitioner but the aforesaid fact has not been appreciated by the revenue authorities, therefore, on this ground alone the orders impugned required interference. 5. While on the other hand, Mr. Manoj Kumar, learned G.A.-III, appearing for the respondent State of Jharkhand, has defended the order passed by the revenue authorities by taking the ground that the land admittedly falls under the non-schedule area and hence, the mandate as contained in the Act, 1908 which contains a provision under Section 46(4A) applies and, accordingly, earlier to the filing of 71A application, an application was filed by invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Section 46(4A) for restoration of the land. But, the revenue authority, by taking into consideration the specific period of limitation for filing restoration application as contained in proviso to Section 46(4A), has rejected the aforesaid application. The revenue authorities have considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter and declined to entertain the application for restoration since the fresh application filed under Section 71A cannot be said to be maintainable. 6. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the pleading as also the finding recorded by the revenue authorities in the impugned orders which are under challenge. 7. This Court, before appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the parties and the legality and propriety of the impugned orders, deems it fit and proper to refer the applicability of the specific provision of the Act, 1908 which has been inserted for the purpose of restoration of the land. The Act, 1908 contains provision for land both under schedule area and non-schedule area. The land falling under non-schedule area is to be dealt with under the provision of 46(4A) which is a self-content provision having the period of limitation for filing restoration application if the land has been transferred without seeking permission of the Deputy Commissioner as required under Section 46(4A) of the Act, 1908, for ready reference, Section 46(4A) of the Act, 1908 is required to be referred which reads hereunder as:- “46. Restrictions on transfer of their right by Raiyat. - (1) … … (2) … … (3) … … [(4-A) (a) The Deputy Commissioner may, of his own motion or on an application filed before him by an occupancy-Raiyat, who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes, for annulling the transfer on the ground that the transfer was made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1), hold an inquiry in the prescribed manner to determine if the transfer has been made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1): Provided that no such application be entertained by the Deputy Commissioner unless it is filed by the occupancy-tenant within a period of twelve years from the date of transfer of his holding or any portion thereof: Provided further that before passing any order under clause (b) or clause (c) of this subsection, the Deputy Commissioner shall give the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity to be heard in the matter. (b) If after holding the inquiry referred to in clause (a) of this sub-section, the Deputy Commissioner finds that there was no contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1) in making such transfer, he shall reject the application and may award such costs to the transferee to be paid by the transferor as he may, in the circumstances of the case, deem fit. (c) If after holding the inquiry referred to in clause (a) of this sub-section, the Deputy Commissioner finds that such transfer was made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1), he shall annul the transfer and eject the transferee from such holding or portion thereof, as the case may be and put the transferor in possession thereof: Provided that if the transferee has constructed any building or structure, such holding or portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall, if the transferor is not willing to pay the value of the same, order the transferee to remove the same within a period of six months from the date of the order, or within such extended time not exceeding two years from the date of the order as the Deputy Commissioner may allow failing which the Deputy Commissioner may get such building or structure removed: Provided further that where the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has constructed a substantial structure or building on such holding or portion thereof before the commencement of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1969 (President's Act 4 of 1969) he may, notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, validate such a transfer made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1), if the transferee either makes available to the transferor an alternative holding or portion of a holding, as the case may be, of the equivalent value, in the vicinity or pays adequate compensation to be determined by the Deputy Commissioner for rehabilitation of the transferor. The provision as contained under Section 46(4-A) does apply to the non-schedule area. The other provision for the purpose of dealing with the raiyati land falling in the schedule area is to be dealt with under Section 71-A which has been inserted after the amendment carried out in the original Act by bringing the Schedule Area Regulation Act, 1961 by inserting the provision of Section 71-A in the Act, applies to the schedule area. Section 71-A, therefore, provides a forum for restoration of land if the raiyati land has been transferred without seeking permission of the Deputy Commissioner as required under Section 46, the application is to be filed, for ready reference Section 71-A is required to be referred herein which reads hereunder as :- “71A. Power to restore possession to member of the Scheduled Tribes over land unlawfully transferred. Power to restore possession to member of the Scheduled Tribes over land unlawfully transferred. - If at any time, it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner that transfer of land belonging to a Raiyat [or a Mundari Khunt-Kattidaror a Bhuinhari] who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes has taken place in contravention of Section 46 [or Section 48 or Section 240] or any other provisions of this Act or by any fraudulent method, [including decrees obtained in suit by fraud and collusion] he may, after giving reasonable opportunity to the transferee, who is proposed to be evicted, to show cause and after making necessary inquiry in the matter, evict the transferee from such land without payment of compensation and restore it to the transferor or his heir, or, in case the transferor or his heir is not available or is not willing to agree to such restoration, re-settle it with another Raiyat belonging to Scheduled Tribes according to the village custom for the disposal of an abandoned holding : Provided that if the transferee has, within 30 years from the date of transfer, constructed any building or structure on such holding or portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall, if the transferor is not willing to pay the value of the same, order the transferee to remove the same within a period of six months from the date of the order, or within such extended time not exceeding two years from the date of the order as the Deputy Commissioner may allow, failing which the Deputy Commissioner may get such building or structure removed : Provided further that where the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has constructed a substantial structure or building on such holding or portion thereof before coming into force of the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969, he may, notwithstanding any other provisions of the Act, validate such transfer where the transferee either makes available to the transferor an alternative holding or portion thereof as the case may be, of the equivalent value of the vicinity or pays adequate compensation to be determined by the Commissioner for rehabilitation of the transferor: Provided also that if after an inquiry the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has acquired a title by adverse possession and that the transferred land should be restored or re-settled, he shall require the transferor or his heir or another Raiyat, as the case may be, to deposit with the Deputy Commissioner such sum of money as may be determined by the Deputy Commissioner having regard to the amount for which the land was transferred or the market value of the land, as the case may be and the amount of any compensation for improvements effected to the land which the Deputy Commissioner may deem fair and equitable.” The provision of Section 71-A does not contain any period for filing application since this Section starts from “if at any time, it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner” the application under Section 71-A can be filed. The aforesaid words, i.e., “if at any time, it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner” has been interpreted by Hon'ble Apex Court that what would be the reasonable period for filing application under Section 71-A in the case of Jai Mangal Oraon v. Mira Nayak (Smt) and Others reported in (2000) 5 SCC 141 and Situ Sahu & Others v. The State of Jharkhand and Others, reported in (2004) 8 SCC 340 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that at any time does not mean that the time will be the eternity, rather, the application to be filed within the reasonable period and the reasonable period can well be not more than 40 years since in the case of Situ Sahu & Others v. The State of Jharkhand and Others (Supra) the subject matter of restoration application having been filed after lapse of 39 years. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is required to be referred herein which reads hereunder as :- “14. We shall now examine the last argument of Shri Narasimha that the transfer was fraudulent. Even on this, we are afraid that the appellants are entitled to succeed. We need not go into the details of the transaction for we may even assume that the transfer was fraudulent. Even then, as held in Ibrahimpatnam [ (2003) 7 SCC 667 ] the power under Section 71-A could have been exercised only within a reasonable time. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the present appeal, we are not satisfied that the Special Officer exercised his powers under Section 71-A within a reasonable period of time. The lapse of 40 years is certainly not a reasonable time for exercise of power, even if it is not hedged in by a period of limitation. We derive support to our view from the observations made by this Court in Jai Mangal Oraon case [ (2000) 5 SCC 141 ] which was also a case which arose under the very same provision of law. There this Court took the view that Section 46(4)(a), which envisaged a prior sanction of the Deputy Commissioner before effecting the transfer in any of the modes stated therein, was introduced only in the year 1947 (with effect from 5-1-1948) and no such provision existed during the relevant point of time when the surrender was made in that case (15-1-1942). There this Court took the view that Section 46(4)(a), which envisaged a prior sanction of the Deputy Commissioner before effecting the transfer in any of the modes stated therein, was introduced only in the year 1947 (with effect from 5-1-1948) and no such provision existed during the relevant point of time when the surrender was made in that case (15-1-1942). Obviously, therefore, no such provision existed in 1938, and the same reasoning applies.” 8. Herein, the facts of the given case is that the land in question falls in the non-schedule area and hence, the application was filed by the raiyats under Section 46(4A) but the limitation to file application under Section 46(4A) since is 12 years only but the restoration application was filed after lapse of approximately 40 years, therefore, the aforesaid application was rejected. It does not appear from the pleading made in the writ petition that the order which was passed under Section 46(4A) of the Act, 1908 has ever been assailed by the writ petitioner or the predecessor in interest, meaning thereby, the order passed under Section 46(4A) has attained its finality. But, the successor in interest, subsequent thereto, has filed a fresh application under Section 71-A for restoration of the land. The revenue authorities, by taking into consideration the fact that the restoration application which was filed under Section 46(4A), has been dealt with by its rejection on the ground of having been filed beyond the period of 12 years, i.e., after lapse of 40 years, and hence, the instant application filed under Section 71-A has been rejected. The revenue authorities have also taken the ground that the application under Section 71-A has been filed since after lapse of 40 years and hence, the same is barred by limitation. 9. This Court is not in agreement with the finding recorded by the revenue authorities to the extent that when the application under Section 71-A of the Act, 1908 was not maintainable for the reason that land falls in the non-schedule area then where is the question to entertain the application under Section 71-A and the application should have been rejected at the threshold by holding that the application under Section 71-A of the Act, 1908 is not maintainable since the applicability of Section 71-A applies only to the land falling in the schedule area. 10. 10. Be that as it may, the revenue authorities have come up with the conclusion of applicability of principle of res judicata, since the decision has already been taken by the authority concerned under Section 46(4A) which has attained its finality. As such, considering the same, the restoration application has been rejected, therefore, this Court is of the view that the orders passed by the authorities require no interference. 11. Accordingly, the instant writ petition is dismissed.