JUDGMENT : (D.V.S.S. Somayajulu, J.) These Writ Appeals are filed assailing the common order passed in W.P.Nos.8225, 8226 and 15889 of 2022, dated 11.08.2022; and the similar orders passed in W.P.Nos.29640 of 2022; 29684 of 2022; 29942 of 2022; 30133 of 2022; 30319 of 2022; 31027 of 2022 and 30133 of 2022. 2. With the consent of the learned Advocate General and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents W.A.No.1036 of 2022 is taken as the lead case for arguments in these appeals. 3. This Court has heard the learned Advocate General appearing for the State, Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned senior counsel and Sri P.V.A. Padmanabham, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. In addition Sri M. Sree Rama Rao and Sri G. Jagadeeswar supplemented the submissions. 4. W.A.No.1036 of 2022 is filed against the order of the learned single Judge in W.P.No.8225; 8226 and 15889 of 2022. The writ Petitioners have sought identical prayers. The prayer in W.P.No.8225 of 2022 is as follows : “…..to issue a writ, order or direction more in the nature of Writ of Mandamus holding that the impugned proceedings Rc.No.E1/754/APEWIDC/ 2020 dt.07.03.2022 of the 1st respondent is illegal, arbitrary against Art.14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and is non est in the eye of law as per ordinance issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, it is against G.O.No.15, Finance (HR.IV FR and LR) Department dated 31.01.2022 wherein the age of Superannuation was extended from 60 to 62 years and set aside the impugned proceedings Rc.No.E1/754/ APEWIDC /2020, dt.07.03.2022 of the 1st respondent and direct the 1st respondent to continue the petitioner as Executive Engineering / Supdt. Engineer in consonance with G.O.Ms.No.15, Finance (HR.IV FR and LR) Dept. dt.31.01.2022 and to continue him upto 62 years as was done in other Corporations.” 5. Similar prayers are made in other writ petitions. The writ petitioners want a mandamus against the orders impugned by which the petitioners’ request for continuation of service till attaining the age of 62 years was negatived. 6. The facts in W.P.No.8225 of 2022 are relied upon. Similar prayers are made in other writ petitions. The writ petitioners want a mandamus against the orders impugned by which the petitioners’ request for continuation of service till attaining the age of 62 years was negatived. 6. The facts in W.P.No.8225 of 2022 are relied upon. The petitioner in the said writ petition pleads that since he is rendering service in the A.P. Education and Welfare Infrastructure Development Corporation (for short “APEWIDC”) he is entitled to the benefit of the enhanced age of superannuation, which is enhanced to 62 years by the A.P. Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984 (for short “the Act 23 of 1984”). This was initially done by Ordinance No.1 of 2022, dated 17.01.2022, which later became Act No. 4 of 2022. By this Ordinance and the Act, the age of superannuation was increased to 62 years. The writ petitioners claim that the same is applicable to them and the organization they work for. Hence they have filed the writ petitions for the reliefs mentioned above. A detailed counter affidavit was filed by the State stating that the said ordinance will not apply to the petitioners and others, who are employees of APEWIDC etc., and such other organizations. It is pointed out that the ordinance would only apply to the State Government employees and the employees mentioned in the Act No.23 of 1984 only. It is also urged that the Division Bench Judgment of this combined Court reported in G. Rama Mohan Rao and another v Government Andhra Pradesh, (2017) 3 ALT 1 (DB)=2017 SCC OnLine Hyd 54 has not been considered by the learned Judge. It is stated that this judgment is an answer to all the contentions of the writ petitioner. 7. Learned Advocate General relies upon the grounds of Appeal and makes his submissions. The essential submissions of the learned Advocate General can be summarized as follows : (a) That the Act 23 of 1984 is only applicable to the special category of employees and not to employees of the present respondents in the writ (the APEWIDC) which is a society established with its own service rules etc. The essential submissions of the learned Advocate General can be summarized as follows : (a) That the Act 23 of 1984 is only applicable to the special category of employees and not to employees of the present respondents in the writ (the APEWIDC) which is a society established with its own service rules etc. It is also submitted that when the age of retirement was enhanced earlier from 58 to 60 years, in view of the judgment of the Division Bench mentioned above, all the corporations / societies were required to secure certain approvals, Government permissions and amendments to their service rules before the age of retirement could be enhanced pursuant to the government’s decision. (b) Relying upon G.O.Ms.No.102, dated 27.06.2017, learned Advocate General submits that pursuant to the Division Bench order it is stipulated in paragraph 4 that - the Board of directors / Managing Committee should take a decision to enhance the age of superannuation; - the institution should look into their financial position and genuineness of their need to enhance the superannuation age; - in case of Residential Educational Societies the decision also should be taken on certain parameters; and - lastly, the orders would come into force prospectively from the date of issuance of orders by the competent authorities after amending relevant regulations and bye-laws. 8. Learned Advocate General, therefore, contends that unless and until these steps are taken by the individual employers, (whether they are societies or public sector undertakings), the employees are not entitled to enhancement of the superannuation age. He also points out that the APEWIDC Employee’s Service Rules were also misinterpreted by the learned single Judge and that these rules have not yet been amended as required under the Division Bench judgment or the subsequent G.O. on the subject. 9. Lastly, learned Advocate General submits that the provisions of the Act No.23 of 1984 are crystal clear and they only apply to those government servants, who fit within the description mentioned in Section 1 (2) of the said Act. 10. It is also pointed out that the learned single Judge did not really appreciate these contentions and came to an abrupt conclusion based upon the orders passed by other corporations like A.P. Schedule Caste Finance Corporation Ltd., A.P. Police Housing Board etc. 10. It is also pointed out that the learned single Judge did not really appreciate these contentions and came to an abrupt conclusion based upon the orders passed by other corporations like A.P. Schedule Caste Finance Corporation Ltd., A.P. Police Housing Board etc. He also submits that on misinterpretation of the Rules 18 and 20 of the service rules, the impugned order was passed without deciding the issues raised in the course of the counter affidavit. 11. Learned Advocate General, therefore, submits that unless and until the requisite permissions and decisions are taken by each of these respective corporations, bodies etc., in line with what is stated above, an employee is not entitled to enhancement of superannuation age. 12. Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned senior counsel submits that the Act is amended raising the age to 62 and consequently Rule 18 is also amended. He also argues that there is merger of the Division Bench order i.e., G. Rama Mohan Rao case (1 supra) as the SLP was disposed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in A. Veerraju and Others v State of A.P. and Others, (2019) 17 SCC 364 . He submits that the bye laws are still showing the age as 58 but the State agreed that it is enhanced to 60 as on date. So he submits that there is no need to further amend the bye laws as contended. He also urges that the function of APEWIDC is a “State” function only, that it is fully controlled by the State and the deep pervasive control of the State is clear. Hence, he submits that the employees are all involved in affairs of the state only. Hence, the Act applies as per him. 13. Sri P.V.A. Padmanabham, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, relied upon the compendium of case law. His primary contention is that the order of the Division Bench in G. Rama Mohan Rao case (1 supra) is now merged into the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in A. Veerraju’s case (2 supra) which is an SLP filed against the orders of the Division Bench. Thereafter, the matter was also considered in contempt jurisdiction and the said judgment is reported in K. Ananda Rao and Others v S.S. Rawat, IAS and Others, (2019) 13 SCC 24 . Thereafter, the matter was also considered in contempt jurisdiction and the said judgment is reported in K. Ananda Rao and Others v S.S. Rawat, IAS and Others, (2019) 13 SCC 24 . Therefore, learned counsel argues that in view of the fact that the SLP was filed, entertained and is disposed of, the order of the Division Bench is merged into the SLP order. It is no longer a precedent as per him. He contends that none of the issues raised by the learned Advocate General merit consideration and the order of the learned single Judge is therefore right. Alternatively, he also submits that Act No.23 of 1984 is also applicable to the members of the appellant, including the current respondent, since Rule 18 of the service rules clearly states that the age of superannuation is 58 years (60 years in respect of class IV employees) “as per” the Act 23 of 1984. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that by incorporation the said Act has been made applicable. Alternatively he submits that the society's rules have no statutory force and are subordinate legislation and the order of the learned single Judge interpreting the rule is correct. He also adopts the submissions of the other learned counsel. The other learned counsel argued on the same lines. COURT: 14. This Court notices that the facts in this case are not really in dispute. The present-respondent/writ petitioner is an employee of appellant-APEWIDC, which is a corporation created for the establishment of educational welfare infrastructure (3rd respondent in Writ). 15. It is also a fact that the appellant APEWIDC has its own service rules, which were framed in 2013. It is also a Corporation which is included in the 9th schedule of the A.P. Reorganization Act. The other respondents/employers are also included in the 9th schedule of this Act. 16. The first and foremost question to be decided in this case is about the applicability of Act No.23 of 1984, also known as A.P. Public Employment (Regulation of age of Superannuation) Act, 1984, to the writ petitioners. This Act was amended initially by Ordinance No.1 of 2022 and later the same became an Act No.4 of 2022, by which the age of superannuation was increased to 62 years. 17. This Act was amended initially by Ordinance No.1 of 2022 and later the same became an Act No.4 of 2022, by which the age of superannuation was increased to 62 years. 17. Coming to the provisions of the Act 23 of 1984 it is very clear that it is an Act passed to regulate the age of superannuation of persons appointed to “Public service and posts in connection with the affairs” of the State of Andhra Pradesh. It shall apply to the following four categories of employees as per Section 1(2) : (i) persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State; (ii) officers and other employees working in any local authority, whose salaries and allowances are paid out of the Consolidated Fund of the State; (iii) persons appointed to the Secretariat staff of the Houses of the State Legislature; and (iv) every other officer or employee whose conditions of service are regulated by rules framed under the proviso to article 309 of the Constitution of India immediately before the commencement of this Act, other than the village officers and law officers; whether appointed before or after the commencement of this Act. 18. Government employees are defined in Section 2 (3) as follows : “(3) “Government employee” includes all categories of officers and employees referred to in sub-section (2) of section 1.” 19. Initially, the age of retirement was fixed as 58, which was later enhanced to 60 and it is now enhanced to 62. 20. Admittedly, the APEWIDC has been formed as a society. It is meant to provide educational infrastructure. It is categorically asserted that the salaries of the employees of this Corporation are not paid out of the consolidated fund of the State. It is also asserted that these employees are governed by their own service rules. So the question that falls for consideration : Whether the employees of such corporations, societies etc., which may in a way be discharging some governmental functions be deemed to be persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State? LEGAL BACKDROP TO DECIDE THIS – 21. When the State of Andhra Pradesh enhanced the age, earlier it became the subject matter of the decision in the case of G. Rama Mohan Rao case (1 supra). LEGAL BACKDROP TO DECIDE THIS – 21. When the State of Andhra Pradesh enhanced the age, earlier it became the subject matter of the decision in the case of G. Rama Mohan Rao case (1 supra). The Division Bench noticed that the present corporation (APEWIDC) is also included in the schedule 9. The matter was argued threadbare before the Division Bench by a galaxy of counsels. The Division Bench framed the following questions for decision and held against the Writ Petitioners therein : (1) ARE EMPLOYEES OF STATE PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS GOVERNED BY ACT 23 OF 1984. (1A) CAN EMPLOYEES OF PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS BE SAID TO BE PERSONS APPOINTED TO PUBLIC SERVICES AND POSTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE AFFAIRS OF THE STATE. (1B) MERELY BECAUSE PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS ARE INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE STATE UNDER ARTICLE DOES NOT MAKE ITS EMPLOYEES AS GOVERNMENT SERVANTS. 22. Thereafter, after considering the submissions made the Division Bench came to the following among other conclusions : “37. …. It is only if the 1984 and the 2014 State Act are held applicable to employees of public sector undertakings, can it be held that they are entitled to continue in service till they reach the age of superannuation of 60 years. As employees of public sector undertakings are not persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, they are not governed by the provisions of the 1984 Act as amended by the 2014 State Act. While it is open to the Board of Directors/Managing Committees of each of these Corporations/Companies/Societies, in accordance with the provisions of the enactment by which they are governed and the Articles of Association/bye-laws which are applicable to them, to adopt the provisions of the 1984 Act and the 2014 State Act, and make them applicable to their employees by amending their rules and regulations, it is only thereafter can employees of these undertakings claim the right to continue in service upto the enhanced age of superannuation of 60 years. 42. As employees of Public Sector Undertakings and Government servants constitute two different and distinct classes, neither do the conditions of service prescribed for government servants automatically apply to employees of Public Sector Undertakings, nor does the plea of discrimination, or of violation of Article 14, merit acceptance. The contention that the Government cannot apply different yardsticks is therefore not tenable. As employees of Public Sector Undertakings and Government servants constitute two different and distinct classes, neither do the conditions of service prescribed for government servants automatically apply to employees of Public Sector Undertakings, nor does the plea of discrimination, or of violation of Article 14, merit acceptance. The contention that the Government cannot apply different yardsticks is therefore not tenable. While several of these corporate bodies appear to have adopted the 1984 Act, they are required to also adopt the 2014 State Act, and amend the rules and bye-laws, governing the age of superannuation of its employees, accordingly. It is only if the rules, governing the age of superannuation, are amended as prescribed under the applicable bye-laws/Articles of association would the employees of these corporate bodies then be entitled to claim the benefit of the enhanced age of superannuation. 44. The Companies/Corporations/Societies, listed in the IX Schedule to the 2014 Central Act, are distinct legal entities and are neither departments, nor form part, of the State Government. The Board of Directors/Managing Committees of each of these legal entities govern each of these entities subject only to the provisions of the Companies Act, the Memorandum of Association and the Articles of Association in so far as Companies/Corporations are concerned, and the byelaws and the provisions of the Act whereunder the Societies were constituted in so far as Societies are concerned. The control exercised by the State Government, over such Companies/Societies, is as its shareholder, and in terms of the relevant enactments and the Articles of Association of each of these Companies, and the bye-laws of each of these Societies. Neither the 1984 Act, nor the Rules made by the Government for its employees under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, automatically apply to these Corporations/Companies/Societies. xxx xxx 192. The earlier G.Os were issued by the Government of A.P. without these legal entities amending its rules/regulations/bye-laws, governing the age of superannuation and without the prior approval of the sole/majority shareholder i.e., the State Government as required under the Articles of Association/byelaws of these legal entities. As the Rules and Regulations, by which the petitioners are governed, stipulate 58 years as the age of retirement, these employees cannot claim any right to continue in service till they attain the age of 60 years. As the Rules and Regulations, by which the petitioners are governed, stipulate 58 years as the age of retirement, these employees cannot claim any right to continue in service till they attain the age of 60 years. It is only if the request of these Companies/Corporations/Societies, for amendment of its byelaws/rules and regulations, are approved by the State Government, and the rules/byelaws/regulations are amended thereafter in accordance with law, would their employees then be governed by the enhanced age of superannuation prescribed under the Rules/bye-laws.” 23. Pursuant to this decision of the Division Bench two G.Os., were issued viz., G.O.Ms.No.112 dated 18.06.2016 and G.O.Ms.No.102, dated 27.06.2017. In G.O. Ms.No.102, dated 27.06.2017, in paragraph 4 the following is stated : “4. Government after careful examination of the matter hereby accord to give in principle approval to enhance the age of superannuation of employees working in the institutions listed in IX and X Schedule Institutions subject to the following conditions : 1. The specific decision to enhance the superannuation age from 58 to 60 years to their employees shall be taken by the Board of Directors/Managing Committees of these legal entities. 2. While doing so, these Institutions shall take into consideration their financial position and genuineness of their need to enhance the age of superannuation. 3. In case of Residential Education Societies, the decision should be based on the genuineness of their need and assessment of performance of these societies.” 24. Therefore, in view of this judgment and the subsequent actions taken by the State it is clear that the procedure stipulated in these two GOs., has to be followed in letter and spirit and the necessary resolutions and approvals have to be approved before the employees of these corporations, societies etc., can claim the benefit of enhanced age of retirement. 25. The next question is - Is this judgment good law and a precedent or has it merged into the order of the Supreme Court of India in A. Veerraju case (2 supra)? On a close examination of this order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court it is noticed that the submission of the respondent therein was that the Government had not yet given any approval for enhancement of age upto 60 years. On a close examination of this order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court it is noticed that the submission of the respondent therein was that the Government had not yet given any approval for enhancement of age upto 60 years. On the date of hearing the counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh produced before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India an order dated 09.08.2017, issued by the Government, whereby the employees of Government companies, corporations, societies were granted the benefit of continuation of age till they attain 60 years of age. Therefore, the following was held in paragraph 7 and 8 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India : “7. In that view of the matter, we do not think it necessary to retain these appeals in this Court any further. The stand of the Government is very clear. The Government Order dated 8-8-2017 permitting the employees to continue up to the age of 60 years has come into effect with effect from 2-6-2014. Therefore, all employees who have superannuated on account of attainment of age of 58 years on 2-6-2014 or thereafter are entitled to the protection of their service up to 60 years of age and naturally to all consequential benefits arising therefrom. 8. The appeals are, accordingly, disposed of. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. There shall be no orders as to costs.” 26. Thereafter, on 07.03.2019 the contempt petitions, which were pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India were also dismissed. In the course of order also, the order, dated 09.08.2017, referred to above was mentioned. Since the consequential benefits were not given and contempt applications were moved, after considering the submissions the contempt applications were dismissed. 27. In these circumstances, the question is - Is there a merger of Division Bench order? Learned counsel for the respondents submit that once the SLP is admitted; the exercise of appellate jurisdiction is left open and hereafter, the final order is passed. It is their contention that it is only the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that will prevail and the Division Bench judgment has merged into the SLP order. The leading judgment reported in Kunhayammed and others v State of Kerala and another, (2000) 6 SCC 359 relied upon and in particular paragraphs 41 and 42 of this judgment, which are as follows : “41. The leading judgment reported in Kunhayammed and others v State of Kerala and another, (2000) 6 SCC 359 relied upon and in particular paragraphs 41 and 42 of this judgment, which are as follows : “41. Once a special leave petition has been granted, the doors for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court have been let open. The order impugned before the Supreme Court becomes an order appealed against. Any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming the order appealed against. It would also not make any difference if the order is a speaking or non-speaking one. Whenever this Court has felt inclined to apply its mind to the merits of the order put in issue before it though it may be inclined to affirm the same, it is customary with this Court to grant leave to appeal and thereafter dismiss the appeal itself (and not merely the petition for special leave) though at times the orders granting leave to appeal and dismissing the appeal are contained in the same order and at times the orders are quite brief. Nevertheless, the order shows the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and therein the merits of the order impugned having been subjected to judicial scrutiny of this Court. 42. “To merge” means to sink or disappear in something else; to become absorbed or extinguished; to be combined or be swallowed up. Merger in law is defined as the absorption of a thing of lesser importance by a greater, whereby the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is not increased; an absorption or swallowing up so as to involve a loss of identity and individuality. (See Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. LVII, pp. 1067-68.)” 28. Therefore, it is the contention that the order of the Division Bench is merged into the order of this Supreme Court. Similar submissions are made by the other leading counsels too. (See Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. LVII, pp. 1067-68.)” 28. Therefore, it is the contention that the order of the Division Bench is merged into the order of this Supreme Court. Similar submissions are made by the other leading counsels too. However, a closer reading of this finding of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reveals that even if the order is a speaking or non-speaking order, once the Hon’ble Supreme Court feels inclined to apply its mind to the merits of the matter and grants leave and/or dismisses the special leave it shows the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, when the doors of the Supreme Court are opened and the petition is entertained by permitting the SLP the Supreme Court of India would look into the matter and then either dismiss the SLP or allow the same. It is only if there is “judicial scrutiny of the merits” of the order resulting in either the affirmation of the order or rejection of the order, there will be a doctrine of merger. In this case, leave was granted as the Hon’ble Supreme court of India wanted to go into the merits of the matter, but as it transpired during the course of the hearing the State of Andhra Pradesh decided to grant the enhancement of age to its employees. A government order, dated 08.08.2017, was produced before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India which thereafter proceeded to record the fact that as the State had decided to enhance the age for retirement “we do not find it necessary to retain these appeals in this Court any further”. The appeals were, therefore, disposed of. 29. In the humble opinion of this Court, there is no decision on the merits of the matter. There is no appreciation on merits by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India leading to an affirmation or rejection of the order impugned. But in view of bringing the ground realities of the fact brought to the notice of Apex Court, it might have thought, keeping the things before the court is not necessary and making findings there in those circumstances by closing the proceedings. But in view of bringing the ground realities of the fact brought to the notice of Apex Court, it might have thought, keeping the things before the court is not necessary and making findings there in those circumstances by closing the proceedings. Thus, the order was that the SLPs were simply disposed of as the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India felt that there is no need to further look into the matter and / or to test the findings of the Division Bench in view of the compliance of the State with the findings. 30. In the case referred to above, the conclusions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India are spelt out in paragraph 44(3) and 44 (6) and are reproduced hereunder : 44. To sum up, our conclusions are: xxx (iii) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of a petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter. xxx Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation. 31. In the case on hand the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not reversed the order, modified the order or even affirmed the order expressly. It did not go into the merits of the matter at all. The SLP was disposed of noting the compliance of the State. Neither party invited the Supreme Court to look into the merits of the matter. 32. This Court also derives support from paras 53-55 of the Judgment in Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji v. Union of India, (2019) 20 SCC 705 which are as follows:- “53. In our view, the principle of merger is fairly well settled. Neither party invited the Supreme Court to look into the merits of the matter. 32. This Court also derives support from paras 53-55 of the Judgment in Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji v. Union of India, (2019) 20 SCC 705 which are as follows:- “53. In our view, the principle of merger is fairly well settled. For merger to operate, the superior court must go into the merits of the issues decided by the subordinate court and record finding(s) one way or another on its merits. If this is not done by the superior court, a plea of merger has no application in such a case and the order of the subordinate court would continue to hold the field (See S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of T.N., (2002) 8 SCC 361 ). 54. In our view, this Court while disposing of the appeals by its order dated 4-8-1998 [Union of India v. P.T. Anklesaria, (2014) 14 SCC 204 , 211 (footnote 6)], did not go into the merits of the various contentions which were decided by the High Court in its order dated 6-2-1979 and disposed of the appeal on the statement made by the respondents through the Solicitor General that Respondent 1 (Union of India) would take recourse to the remedy of the civil court by filing a civil suit. 55. Indeed, in the light of such a statement made by the respondents (who were appellants in the appeal), which resulted in disposal of their appeal, the respondents themselves did not call upon this Court to examine the merits of the issues raised by them in their appeals. In such a situation, there was no occasion for this Court to apply the mind to the merits much less to record any finding on any of the issues arising in the appeal. In this view of the matter, the principle of merger could not operate.” 33. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that there is no merger and the submission of learned counsels Sri Manohar Reddy, Sri Padmanabham and others is that the order of the Division Bench order has merged into the order of the Supreme Court of India is not correct. In the opinion of this Court, the order of the Division Bench continues to hold the field. It is still good law and is a binding precedent. In the opinion of this Court, the order of the Division Bench continues to hold the field. It is still good law and is a binding precedent. Unless all the conditions stipulated therein are fulfilled the employees are not entitled to an order of enhancement of retirement age to 62. The writ appeals are allowed on this issue itself but for the sake of good order the other issues urged are touched upon briefly hereunder. 34. Even apart from all of this, this Court finds a plain reading of the Act No.23 of 1984 makes it clear that it is applicable only to the persons appointed to public service and connected with the affairs of the State and to those people whose salaries are paid out of consolidated fund. This issue is raised in the counter also. No proof is filed to show that this is incorrect. It is also admitted and clear that the service rules of the employees of this Corporation or the others are not framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. In the present case it is clear that the employees have their own service regulations. The language used in section 2 (1) of Act 23 of 1984 is very clear. Admittedly, in this case the appointments are by the officers, who are designated in the service rules; salaries are also paid by the corporation itself and are not drawn out of the consolidated fund of the State. This Section 1 (2) also contains sub clause-4 dealing with every other officer or employee whose conditions of service are required by rules framed under Article 309 immediately before the commencement of this Act and whether appointed before or after the Act. Therefore, as per this clause also employees would come under the Act if the service conditions are governed by the proviso to Article 309. It is clear from a plain language interpretation that the employees of corporations, like the present appellants, are not eligible to claim benefits of Act 23 of 1984. They have their own service regulations, which are not admittedly framed under Article 309. On this ground also this Court has to hold that the writ petitioner is not entitled to the relief. 35. One another issue is raised about the Act No.23 of 1984 being “incorporated” in the service rules. They have their own service regulations, which are not admittedly framed under Article 309. On this ground also this Court has to hold that the writ petitioner is not entitled to the relief. 35. One another issue is raised about the Act No.23 of 1984 being “incorporated” in the service rules. Rule 18 is as follows : “Rule-18: Age of Superannuation: The Age of Superannuation unless otherwise terminated or retrenched or compulsorily retired is 58 years (60 years in respect of clause-IV employees) as per A.P. Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984. 36. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the Act is incorporated into the service of the rules. Therefore, the writ petitioner is entitled to the relief. On the other hand it is contended that there is merely a reference to the Act No.23 of 1984 and it is not incorporated. 37. The distinction between this rule and other rules is clear. If the rules are seen in the context it is clear that there is only a reference to certain rules and not an incorporation. For example under Rule 12 it is stated that Rule 22 as amended from time to time of the AP State and Subordinate Service Rules shall be applied. Similarly Rule 15 shows Rules 32 to 36 of the AP Subordinate Service Rules shall be followed for seniority. The A.P. Leave Rules as amended from time to time shall apply for leave. Therefore, it is clear that all these rules or the enactment are being referred to for a specific purpose only. For reservation Rule 22, for seniority Rules 33 to 36, for leave A.P. Leave Rules and for age of superannuation there is only a reference to Act No.23 of 1984. For incorporation the language used in such matters should be clear before this Court can come to a conclusion that it is incorporated. The language used in this Court’s opinion refers to Act 23 of 1984 but does not incorporate it. 38. As far as the Rule 20 is concerned, the learned single Judge was of the opinion that all the State service rules are applicable. The language used in this Court’s opinion refers to Act 23 of 1984 but does not incorporate it. 38. As far as the Rule 20 is concerned, the learned single Judge was of the opinion that all the State service rules are applicable. However, a clear reading of this Rule 20 shows that this rule will apply when there is a “deficiency and insufficiency” and unless otherwise specified in the rules to meet the requirements and demands, the AP Subordinate Service Rules etc., shall apply. The application of these rules is only for the purpose of removing and supplementing the deficiency or insufficiency. Therefore, in the opinion of this court Rule 20 will only be applicable if there is ‘deficiency or insufficiency’ in the current rules and the need is to remove and supplement the deficiency. Therefore, unless and until there is a deficiency or an insufficiency the State service rules will not apply. In fact no such pleading or argument is advanced about a deficiency or an insufficiency in these cases. The entire argument is about the applicability of an amendment to the Act only. 39. The single judge referred to certain orders issued by other corporations etc enhancing the age but the circumstances/conditions under which those orders were issued is not clear. If those corporations etc., had followed the order of the D.B., sought Government approval etc., is not borne out by record clear. Hence they cannot be used as a precedent to be followed. 40. This Court also finds that in the counter affidavit filed the respondent No.1 had clearly specified that they had sought a clarification from the Government of Andhra Pradesh, whether the enhancement of age from 60 to 62 would apply to corporations, associations, societies etc., on 14.02.2022. In the counter, it is clearly mentioned that the writ petition is also premature till the Government takes a decision on the matter. Even in the past it is stated that the Government issued separate orders for corporations and the societies for enhancement of age. Therefore, it is stated that the petitioner’s case will be considered on similar lines once the decision of the Government was obtained. The learned Advocate General submitted that this decision is spelt out by the memo, dated 23.09.2022, which clearly states G.O.Ms.No.15 is applicable to the employees, who are described in Section 1(2) of the Act only. Therefore, it is stated that the petitioner’s case will be considered on similar lines once the decision of the Government was obtained. The learned Advocate General submitted that this decision is spelt out by the memo, dated 23.09.2022, which clearly states G.O.Ms.No.15 is applicable to the employees, who are described in Section 1(2) of the Act only. It is also clarified by the Government that certain PSUs, Corporations etc., have enhanced the age to 62 without necessary approval and sanction and therefore, remedial action is to be taken by the very disciplinary action against this respondent. 41. In view of all the above, this Court is of the opinion that the orders of the learned single judge are not sustainable and a mandamus cannot be issued in the circumstances like this as there is no right in the writ petitioner to seek the relief. 42. These Writ Appeals are, therefore, allowed setting aside the common order passed in W.P.Nos.8225, 8226 and 15889 of 2022, dated 11.08.2022; and also the orders passed in W.P.Nos.29640 of 2022; 29684 of 2022; 29942 of 2022; 30133 of 2022; 30319 of 2022; 31027 of 2022 and 30133 of 2022. No order as to costs. 43. Miscellaneous Applications pending, if any, shall also stand dismissed.