ORDER : I.A. No. 5109 of 2020 This application has been filed for substitution of the appellant, namely Hemendra Budhia who has died on 8th October 2019 during pendency of the present Letters Patent Appeal- L.P.A. No. 264 of 2019 was filed on 27th March 2019. In this application it is stated that Rajat Budhia is the only son of Hemendra Kumar Budhia who had made an application before the authority for Inter State Permit on the route Ranchi to Kaptipada via TATA, Jamsola, Baripada, Udala. In view of the statements made in this application, I.A. No. 5109 of 2020 is allowed to the extent that Rajat Budhia is substituted in place of his father, namely, Hemendra Kumar Budhia for the purposes of prosecuting the present Letters Patent Appeal. Let the necessary correction be done in the memo of parties during course of the day, with red ink. L.P.A. No. 264 of 2019 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been filed to challenge the order dated 14th December 2018 passed in W.P. (C) No. 2869 of 2013 which was filed by the father of the substituted appellant and W.P. (C) No. 2897 of 2013 was filed by his wife. 2. Before the writ Court, a plea was raised by the writ petitioners that the policy decision taken by the State Transport Authority, Jharkhand that the permit countersigned by the State Transport Authority, Odisha is a mandatory requirement for plying the vehicle was taken in breach of the statutory provisions under section 88(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 3. The writ Court has held as under: “(19) In the aforesaid view of the matter, the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court and relied upon by the petitioners does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case and on that basis it cannot be held that inter-state permit involved in this case is operative in the State of Jharkhand, in spite of having not been duly counter-singed by the competent authority in the State of Odisha. (20) Regarding the validity of the impugned clause of the policy, this Court is of the considered view that even de-hors such clause, the inter-state permit is required to be countersigned by the competent authority of the State of Odisha and the permit itself has been issued pursuant to the statutory agreement entered into between the two states. (20) Regarding the validity of the impugned clause of the policy, this Court is of the considered view that even de-hors such clause, the inter-state permit is required to be countersigned by the competent authority of the State of Odisha and the permit itself has been issued pursuant to the statutory agreement entered into between the two states. Accordingly in absence of such conter-signature, the permit cannot be said to be valid in the eyes of law. The impugned condition/clause which has been imposed by the policy issued by the State Government is not contrary to any of the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, rather it is in consonance with the same, and is in furtherance of the very purpose for which the agreement has been entered into between the two states pursuant to which inter-state permit has been issued to the petitioners. Moreover, it is not clear from record as to what steps the petitioners had taken for getting the permit countersigned by the state of Odisha. (21) This Court does not find any illegality in the impugned clause of the policy decision involved in this case. (22) Accordingly these writ petitions are dismissed.” 4. Mr. Sudhir Sahay, the learned counsel for the substituted appellant would refer to the Bundelkhand Motor Transport Co. vs. Beharilal Chaurasia and Another, AIR 1966 SC 455 to contend that the decision taken by the State Transport Authority, Jharkhand is illegal and cannot be given effect to deny the substituted appellant a right to ply motor vehicle on the sanctioned route “Ranchi to Kaptipada via TATA, Jamsola, Baripada, Udala.” To further elaborate this point, Mr. Sudhir Sahay, the learned counsel for the substituted appellant has contended that merely because the permit has not been countersigned by the counter-part State Transport Authority of Odisha a permit holder cannot be denied the right to ply motor vehicle within the territorial limit of the State of Jharkhand. 5. The writ Court has extensively referred to these submissions made on behalf of the substituted appellant, taken note of the statutory provisions under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the decision in Bundelkhand Motor Transport Co. to come to a conclusion that the policy decision of the State Transport Authority, Jharkhand is valid and does not warrant any interference by the writ Court. 6. to come to a conclusion that the policy decision of the State Transport Authority, Jharkhand is valid and does not warrant any interference by the writ Court. 6. A writ Court while exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall be denuded of its powers to interfere with any policy decision which is not shown as discriminatory. The powers of the writ Court to interfere with the decision of a statutory authority is hazed with several limitations and one of such limitations is that unless it is established that a decision is taken in breach of the equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution of India the writ Court shall not interfere with any decision of a statutory authority. A writ Court therefore is required to examine to satisfy its whether the prayer made in the writ petition is barred by any law or if granted may not be in public interest. A public interest therefore necessarily is distinct from the private interest. The scheme under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which is a complete Code in itself clearly provides under section 88 that the Inter-State Permit must be countersigned by the Transport Authority of the other State. 7. In our opinion the so-called policy decision taken by the State Transport Authority, Jharkhand is nothing but reiteration of the statutory provisions under section 88 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 8. While so, we do not find any reason to interfere in this matter and, accordingly, L.P.A. No. 264 of 2019 is dismissed.