ORDER : 1. By way of present writ-application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the writ-applicants herein have challenged the order dated 5.5.2017 passed in Civil Misc. Appeal No.10 of 2015 by the learned District Court, Palanpur, Dist. Banaskantha seeking restoration of Regular Civil Suit No.29 of 2003 with the following prayers :- “(A) To admit and allow this petition. (B) To issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus by quash and setting aside the impugned order and Judgment of the Learned District Court Palanpur District Banaskantha in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal no 10/2015 of dated 5/5/2017 and to restore the Regular Civil Suit no 29/03 before the Learned Civil Court Palanpur. (C) The Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to grant any other appropriate relief as the nature of the circumstances of the case may require.” 2. The brief facts as stated by the writ-applicants leading to the filing of the present writ-application read thus :- 2.1 It is stated that some of the writ-applicants herein are the original plaintiffs in the Regular Civil Suit No.29 of 2003 and some of the writ-applicants are alleged legal heirs of the original plaintiff who were joined in the said suit proceedings or in the appeal proceedings. On 6.1.2003, Regular Civil Suit No.29 of 2003 came to be filed by the father of the Lakhubhai Punjabhai alongwith and eight others before the learned Civil Judge, Palanpur against the respondent No.1 – original defendant No.1 and one other person. The original plaintiffs prayed for declaration that the plaintiffs have right in the suit lands which were remaining after taking out of 06 Vighas of land pursuant to the consent decree passed in the Appeal No.35-66 before the learned Civil Court and that the defendants have no right in the said land. 2.2 The plaintiffs also prayed for recovery of possession of the suit land as well as permanent injunction against the respondent – original defendant (page-45 and 46). On 3.4.2007, the aforesaid suit as referred above came to be dismissed for default by the learned 3rd Additional Civil Judge & J.M.F.C. Palanpur (page-47 and 48). 2.2 The plaintiffs also prayed for recovery of possession of the suit land as well as permanent injunction against the respondent – original defendant (page-45 and 46). On 3.4.2007, the aforesaid suit as referred above came to be dismissed for default by the learned 3rd Additional Civil Judge & J.M.F.C. Palanpur (page-47 and 48). 2.3 On 4.9.2013, after dismissal of the Regular Civil Suit No.29 of 2003 as referred above, it is stated that the writapplicant No.1 preferred RTI application to know with regard to the status of the suit which came to be dismissed on 3.4.2007, after a period of about 06 years. 2.4 It is stated that on 7.10.2013, the writ-applicant No.1 received the reply of the said RTI application and it was informed that Regular Civil Suit No.29 of 2003 was dismissed by order dated 3.4.2007. 2.5 On 15.11.2013, the original plaintiff of the Regular Civil Suit No.29 of 2003 preferred Misc. Application No.25 of 2013 before the learned Civil Court, Palanpur for condonation of delay of 06 years and 07 months and prayed for restoration of the Regular Civil Suit No.29 of 2003 which was dismissed for default on 3.4.2007. The said application was placed on record by the learned advocate appearing for the writ-applicants during the course of hearing. 2.6. The Civil Court, Palanpur, by order dated 2.5.2015 rejected the Misc. Application No.25 of 2013 preferred by the original plaintiffs who are writ-applicants herein on the ground that the said application suffer from suppression of facts. The said application was filed as power of attorney of such person. The Court also held that no sufficient explanation was rendered in the said application for such inordinate delay and Court did not accept the explanation rendered by the applicants and rejected the said application. 2.7 Being aggrieved by the said order dated 2.5.2015 passed in Misc. Application No.25 of 2013 the applicant preferred an Appeal being Misc. Civil Appeal No.10 of 2015 before the learned Additional District Court, Palanpur challenging the order passed by the Civil Court, Palanpur dated 2.5.2015 and seeking restoration of the Regular Civil Suit No.29 of 2003. The said Appeal came to be rejected by order dated 5.5.2017 confirming the order passed by the learned Civil Court, Palanpur. 3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 5.5.2017 passed by the Appellate Court in Misc. The said Appeal came to be rejected by order dated 5.5.2017 confirming the order passed by the learned Civil Court, Palanpur. 3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 5.5.2017 passed by the Appellate Court in Misc. Civil Appeal No.10 of 2015 wherein the Appeal came to be rejected, the writapplicants herein have approached this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking reliefs as stated above. Submissions on behalf of the writ-applicants :- 4. Heard Ms. Falguni Trivedi, the learned advocate appearing for the writ-applicants. Ms. Trivedi, the learned advocate submitted that the order impugned rejecting the application for restoration of Regular Civil Suit No.29 of 2003 is required to be quashed and set aside for the reason that restoration of the civil suit would result in substantial justice that may be imparted to the writ-applicants herein and that adjudication of the suit on merit is incumbent. Submissions on behalf of the respondents :- 5. Mr. Jamshed Kavina, the learned advocate appearing for the respondents opposed the aforesaid prayers and submitted that no interference is called for in the order passed by the Court below. Placing reliance on his submission Mr. Kavina, the learned advocate submitted that; (1) The application filed before the Civil Court is filed with unexplained delay of 06 years 07 months without any cogent reason. (2) The application is filed by the power of attorney alongwith other legal heirs of the original plaintiffs and which is without permission of the Court and the said application itself would not be maintainable in eye of law. (3) No application seeking impleadment as required under the law was preferred by the writ-applicants herein and, therefore, the Court below have rightly not entertained the application filed by the writ-applicants herein. 5.1 Mr. Kavina, the learned advocate submitted that the power of attorney and the proposed legal heirs filed application in question wherein at no point of time the applicants No.1 and 2 – original plaintiffs were not alive and that the said fact was suppressed from the Court below. 5.2 Mr. Kavina, the learned advocate submitted that the Appellate Court rightly confirmed the order passed by the learned Civil Court confirming the reasons which were assigned by the Court below and that the order passed by the Civil Court in Misc. Application No.25 of 2013 dated 2.5.2015 being a reasoned order no interference is called for. 6. 5.2 Mr. Kavina, the learned advocate submitted that the Appellate Court rightly confirmed the order passed by the learned Civil Court confirming the reasons which were assigned by the Court below and that the order passed by the Civil Court in Misc. Application No.25 of 2013 dated 2.5.2015 being a reasoned order no interference is called for. 6. The aforesaid has resulted in preferring the present writ-application. 7. Heard Ms. Falguni Trivedi, the learned advocate appearing for the writ-applicants and Mr. Jamshed Kavina, the learned advocate appearing for the respondents. 8. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to position of law :- (a) In the case of Basawaraj and Anr. vs., Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 14 SC 81. Paragraphs 12 and 15 read thus :- “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect SC750 to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (b) In the case of M/s. Hotel Royal Palace through Manager Mohd. Javed Zafar Husen Qureshi, order dated 25.6.2019 in SCA No.9407 of 2019, Paragraphs 4 to 6 read thus :- “4. Having heard the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner and having gone through the material on record, prima facie, it appears that the application contains no sufficient reason at all. This application which is reflecting on page11 of the petition compilation indicates that there is a delay of 2 years and 2 months (i.e. 810 days). But then the only reasons which has been assigned is that the petitioner is residing at Mumbai and on account of business trip, it was not possible for the petitioner to track the matter properly and that brief reason has not been digested by the trial court, as having found no sufficient reason. In fact, while exercising the discretion, the trial court has considered the details of the suit proceedings and thereafter, was of the opinion that there is no sufficient reason assigned for causing the delay in filing the restoration application. That being the position, such a well reasoned order in exercise of statutory powers, the Court would not like to interfere with. As a result of this, the petition being devoid of merits, does not require any interference. 5. Additionally, the Court is also of the opinion that the delay normally is to be construed liberally. However, said principle is not applicable especially when there is no reason sufficient enough is shown. This being a case where if the delay in this peculiar set of circumstance is condoned, then it would defeat the very object of Limitation Act and, therefore, the Court would not like to venture such attempt. However, said principle is not applicable especially when there is no reason sufficient enough is shown. This being a case where if the delay in this peculiar set of circumstance is condoned, then it would defeat the very object of Limitation Act and, therefore, the Court would not like to venture such attempt. As a result of this, in considered opinion of this Court, this is not a fit case in fwhich such a long delay deserves any consideration. The object of limitation has been well defined by the Apex Court in a decision in case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in AIR 2014 SC 1612 . Relevant observations contained in Para.11, 12 and 16 are reproduced hereinafter : “11. The courts should not adopt an injustice oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. However the court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or negligence would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condoning the delay. This Court has time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 12. It is also a well settled principle of law that if some person has taken a relief approaching the Court just or immediately after the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the court at a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligent person. 13. In State of Karnataka & Ors. v. S.M.Kotravyya & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 267 , this Court rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches on the ground that he filed the petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. The Court observed that such a plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay and laches. 14. The Court observed that such a plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay and laches. 14. Same view has been reiterated by this Court in Jagdish Lal & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2366 , observing as under:– “Suffice it to state that appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and elected to wakeup when they had the impetus from Vir Pal Chauhan and Ajit Singh’s ratios…Therefore desperate attempts of the appellants to redo the seniority, held by them in various cadre.... are not amenable to the judicial review at this belated stage. The High Court, therefore, has rightly dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay as well.” 15. In M/s.Rup Diamonds & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1989 SC 674 , this Court considered a case where petitioner wanted to get the relief on the basis of the judgment of this Court wherein a particular law had been declared ultra vires. The Court rejected the petition on the ground of delay and laches observing as under:– “There is one more ground which basically sets the present case apart. Petitioners are reagitating claims which they have not pursued for several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be dormant and chose to sit on the fence till somebody else’s case came to be decided.” 6. In the wake of aforesaid situation and in view of the peculiar background of facts, since there is no sufficient reason assigned, the Court would not like to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner. Accordingly, the present petition being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed and the same is dismissed, with no order as to costs.” (c) In the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Anr v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in (2010) 8 SCC page-329. Paragraph-62 reads thus :- “62.On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated : (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of Tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of Appeal over the orders of Court or Tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh ( AIR 1954 SC 215 ) (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such Tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the Tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 : ( AIR 1997 SC 1125 : 1997 AIR SCW 1345) and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” (d) In the case of M/s. Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, reported in AIR 2022 SC page-422, Paragraph-18 reads thus :- “18. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal1. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal1. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. has observed:- "6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to." Analysis :- 7. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to." Analysis :- 7. This Court has considered the submissions advanced by the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. The writ-applicants preferred Regular Civil Suit No.29 of 2003. The said suit came to be dismissed by the concerned Court by order dated 3.4.2007 (pages 47 and 48) which reads thus :- “Order Called out today plaintiff or their advocate are not present. Defendant And his advocate are present. There is no any application is submitted by plaintiff’s advocate for there absence sufficient time has been given to the plaintiff for taking evidence hence this suit is hereby dismissed for default a plaintiff evidence no order as to costs pronounced in open court. This court has passed order below ex-1 below copy of this plaintiff as per ex-1 it is treated as to cancelled. Pronounced in open court. Dt.3/4/2007” 7.1 The writ-applicants – original plaintiffs filed an application under Right to Information Act wherein it came to the knowledge that the suit came to be dismissed for default by order dated 3.4.2007. The writ-applicants as stated above preferred Misc. Application No.25 of 2013 for condonation of delay of 06 years 07 months for restoration of suit whereby by order dated 2.5.2015 the Court below rejected the said application. Relevant paragraph of the said order reads thus :- “(6) Considering the above discussion, the fact has not been declared before the Hon’ble Court that the applicant no.1 and applicant no.2 have died. Moreover, the application has been given in the capacity of Power of Attorney holder of the deceased applicants. Further, the grounds for ‘condonation of delay’ stated by the plaintiff in his application appears to be neither reasonable nor satisfactory. Further, perusing the material records produced by the applicants, it appears that during the period when the suit of the applicants came to be dismissed, their power of attorney holder used to remain present before the court in the other matter. Under such circumstances, the applicants’ submission, that they were unaware about passing of order as they were unable to come to the court, cannot be accepted. Under such circumstances, the applicants’ submission, that they were unaware about passing of order as they were unable to come to the court, cannot be accepted. Further, the responsibility as to inquire about a suit instituted by an applicant rests on the applicant himself. Therefore, as the ground stated by the applicants for condonation of such a long delay, i.e. 6 years 7 months and 12 days, not being appropriate and reasonable, the application given by the applicants is not tenable. Therefore, the following order is issued.” 7.2 Being aggrieved by the said order the writ-applicants preferred Misc. Civil Appeal No.10 of 2015 which came to be rejected by the Appellate Court by order dated 5.5.2017. The operative part of the said order reads thus :- “: REASONS :- (11) Perused the citations referred by both the Ld. Advocates. Perused the lower court record, applications, reply and documentary evidences as discussed above. Despite Menat Lakhubhai Punjabhai, the original applicant No.1 and Revabhai Punjabhai, the applicant No.2 have died, these facts have not been declared before the Court in time and the applicant acting as a power of attorney for the deceased applicants has filed the application and the ground for delay shown by the applicants in the application for condonation of delay does not appear reasonable and satisfactory. As a matter of fact, the suit has been dismissed in 2007 and the power of attorney for this applicant appeared in Suit No.274/2000 in another Court and in Appeal No.41/2007 filed in that case and despite that, he falsely states that the Ld. Advocate did not inform about the application. When the plaintiff himself has filed a suit, the responsibility as to enquire about the suit lies upon the plaintiff himself and thus, the grounds shown for delay of six years seven months and twelve days are not proper and reasonable. As stated by the appellant himself, he did not inform the lower Court about the death of the plaintiffs in time despite having knowledge about it as the plaintiffs were his relatives and thus, the grounds shown in this application do not appear proper and reasonable. Further, I agree with the argument that the applicants should not suffer on account of the error committed by the Ld. Advocates in the form of the citations produced by them. Further, I agree with the argument that the applicants should not suffer on account of the error committed by the Ld. Advocates in the form of the citations produced by them. But in this way, the delay has been caused by the present applicants only and despite they had been informed, they have tried to show that they have filed this application after exercising the right to information. But, since it is a negligence on their part and if the application showing insufficient and unreasonable grounds is allowed in the present circumstances, the respondents will not ever get justice and as a result of unnecessary carelessness of the applicant, the respondents will have to waste their time and money and in this way, an approach that causes injustice to the respondents due to carelessness of the applicant cannot be adopted. If the respondents have to suffer the consequences of the carelessness of the respondents, the ends of justice cannot be secured and thus, since the grounds for delay shown in the application of the applicants are insufficient and unreasonable, it does not appear appropriate to allow the said application and therefore, the present application is dismissed. (9) At the end of the above discussion, I give my decision for the Issue No.1 in negative and pass the following order with respect to the Issue No.2. : FINAL ORDER :- 1: The present M.C.A. filed by the appellant (original plaintiff) is hereby dismissed. 2. The impugned order passed by the Court of Ld. Additional Senior Civil Judge, Palanpur under the application of Exhibit-5 in R.C.S. No.374/2000 on 10/08/2007 is hereby confirmed. 3. A copy of this judgment be sent to the concerned Court. This order is pronounced in open Court today on this 5th day of May, 2017 under my signature. Palanpur Date: 05/05/2017” 7.5 Considered the position of law and the facts of the present case. This Court while exercising its extraordinary discretion is not inclined to re-appreciate and re-read the findings arrived at by the Courts below which are concurrent in nature. The findings arrived at by the Court below are findings of fact. No error of law could be said to have been committed by the Courts below in rejecting the application filed by the writ-applicants herein. The findings arrived at by the Court below are findings of fact. No error of law could be said to have been committed by the Courts below in rejecting the application filed by the writ-applicants herein. This Court also, at this stage, while considering the documents on record cannot loose sight of the fact that the Regular Civil Suit No.29 of 2003 came to be dismissed for default by order dated 3.4.2007. It is the case of the writ-applicants herein that it came to the knowledge of the writ-applicants through RTI application which was filed in the year 2007 that the Regular Civil Suit No.29 of 2003 was dismissed for default by order dated 3.4.2007. The writ-applicants thereafter preferred Misc. Application No.25 of 2013 seeking condonation of delay of 06 years 07 months for restoration of Regular Civil Suit No.29 of 2003. It is noted that the said application for condonation of delay is also barred by delay and latches. The Court below considered the application as referred above and held that no sufficient cause is made out for condoning the delay of 06 years 07 months in seeking restoration of Regular Civil Suit No.29 of 2003. The Court below while rejecting the said application by order dated 2.5.2015 also considered the fact that the applicant failed to inform the concerned Court about death of the original plaintiff in time despite having knowledge about it as the plaintiffs were his relative and the said ground for seeking condonation of delay in preferring the application was not found to be proper and reasonable by the concerned Court. The grounds stated in the application according to the concerned Court were insufficient and unreasonable and the Court deemed it fit not to condone the delay. The application seeking condonation of delay as referred above came to be filed in the capacity of power of attorney holder of the deceased applicant. It is further held that during the period when the suit came to be dismissed the power of attorney holder used to remain present in the Court for other matter and in such circumstances it could not be said that the applicant were not aware about the order dated 3.4.2007 dismissed for default passed in the Regular Civil Suit No.29 of 2003. 8. 8. Considering the reasons as stated above and settled position of law, this Court is not inclined to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The present writ-application is not entertained and the same is dismissed.