JUDGMENT : Anu Sivaraman, J. W.P.(C) No.31646/2023 is filed seeking the following reliefs : “(i) to issue a writ of certiorari calling for the records leading to the issuance of Exhibit P4 and quash the same. (ii) to declare that the act of the 1st respondent rejecting the nomination paper of the petitioner is illegal. (iii) to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing respondents 1 to 3 to accept the nomination of the petitioner and permit him to contest the election to the managing committee of the 4th respondent society as notified in Ext.P2.” After hearing the parties, an interim order was rendered therein directing respondents 1 to 3 to accept the nomination of the petitioner and to allow him to contest the election subject to result of the writ petition. 2. W.A. No.1719/2023 is filed by the 4th respondent in the writ petition, that is, the concerned Society challenging the interim order. W.A. No.1733/2023 is filed by the Returning Officer, Electoral Officer and the State Co-operative Election Commission. 3. We have heard Sri.Arjun Raghavan, the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, Sri.Liji J. Vadakedom, the learned counsel appearing for the Society as well as Sri.C.M.Nazar, the learned counsel appearing for the State Cooperative Election Commission as well as the Electoral Officer and the Returning Officer. 4. The only question which arises for consideration in the writ petition is whether Clause 34 of Ext.P5 bye-laws of the Society is contrary to the provisions of explanation to sub-rule (4A) of Rule 35A of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules (for short, 'the Rules'). We shall first enumerate the provisions of the Act and the Rules which are relevant for consideration of the issue. 5. Section 19 of the Co-operative Societies Act (for short, 'the Act') provides that no member of a society shall exercise the rights of a member unless he has made such payments to the society in respect of membership or has acquired such interest in the society as may be prescribed by the rules or the bye-laws. Section 20 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of the Act or any other law, every member of a society shall have one vote in the affairs of the society. Five situations are enumerated where such right to vote would stand restricted. Section 20 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of the Act or any other law, every member of a society shall have one vote in the affairs of the society. Five situations are enumerated where such right to vote would stand restricted. Section 28(1) provides that the general body of a society shall constitute a committee for a period of five years in accordance with the bye-laws and entrust the management of the affairs of the society to such committee. 6. The method of conduct of election to committees of cooperative societies by the State Co-operative Election Commission is specifically provided under Rule 35A of the Rules. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 35A provides for appointment of an Electoral Officer who shall be responsible for the publication of the list of members qualified to vote at the election in accordance with the provisions of the Act, Rule and bye-laws as stood on a date 60 days prior to the date fixed for the poll. The manner of preparing the list, the details to be provided therein, publication of the preliminary voters list, calling for objections, considering the same and the publication of the final voters list are provided in the sub-rule. Sub-rule (4A) provides that in the case of Regional Milk Producers Union, separate list of members qualified to vote at the election shall be prepared for each revenue district within the jurisdiction of the said union duly approved by the committee. The explanation under sub-rule (4A) reads as follows :- “Explanation-[Every A class member of a society shall be eligible to vote and contest in the election if he has subscribed to the minimum share value as prescribed in the bye-laws. Any other restriction if imposed in this regard shall be declared as null and void]. The preliminary voters list and final voters list shall contain the name and address of the society where the member is a society or corporation or a statutory or non statutory board, committee or other body of persons which is a member of another society or Government.” 7. Rule 44 provides for disqualification of membership of a committee of a society. Rule 44(1)(j) reads as follows :- “44. Rule 44 provides for disqualification of membership of a committee of a society. Rule 44(1)(j) reads as follows :- “44. Disqualification of membership of committee.-(1) No member of society shall be eligible for being elected, or appointed as a member of the committee of the society under Section 28 if he : xx xx xx (j) is disqualified under any other provisions in the byelaws of the society. The provision in the bye-laws of the society reads as under :- 8. In the instant case, the society in question is a primary credit society. The petitioner is a member who had been contesting the elections repeatedly. According to the petitioner, he had contested the elections four times before submitting the nomination for the present election. It is the contention of the writ petitioner that the explanation to sub-rule (4A) of Rule 35A applies to all restrictions of whatever nature provided in the byelaws in so far as a right of an Á Class member of a society to vote and contest in the election is concerned. It is contended that the provision contained in the bye-laws to the effect that a person cannot contest the election continuously for more than three terms is contrary to the explanation to sub-rule (4A) of Rule 35A and therefore, the said provision of the bye-laws is null and void and the petitioner is resultantly entitled to contest the election. 9. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner places reliance on a judgment of a learned Single Judge in Chandran K. M. v. State Co-operative Election Commissioner and others [ 2019 (4) KHC 308 ] to contend that this Court has specifically considered the provisions of the explanation and the bye-laws and has held that the bye-laws which provide any restriction on an A class member who has remitted the share value to exercise his right to vote or to contest in the election would be null and void. It is submitted that a reading of the judgment would show that the Kerala State Election Commission as well as the Government had taken the specific contention that the provision contained in the bye-laws that every A class member has to acquire a minimum of ten shares to be qualified to vote and contest in the elections is against the provisions of the explanation to Rule 35A(4) of the Rules. It is submitted that the Government Pleader had also contended that the prescriptions in the bye-laws which run against the provisions of the explanation would be non est in law. The learned counsel would also rely on the decision of the Apex Court in Rajnit Prasad v. Union of India and others [2000 KHC 1492] to contend that the society as well as the Election Commission have no locus standi to challenge an ad-interim order passed by the learned Single Judge since they cannot be said to be aggrieved by the order. 10. A decision of this Court in Sasisekharan Nair v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies [2006 KHC 464] is relied on to contend that even in case there is any disqualification with regard to membership in the committee, the disqualification would enure only on an order being passed under Rule 44(3). The judgment of a learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) Nos.29886 and 30314 of 2023 is relied on to contend that a condition in the bye-law which restricts the right of A class members who have subsisting loans with a tenure of three years or more to contest the elections was held to be violative of the provisions of explanation to sub-rule (4A) of Rule 35A of the Rules. The learned counsel also relies on a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Inspector General of Police v. M. V. Raghavan and others [ 2008 (1) KHC 159 ] to contend that an appeal would not be maintainable against an ad-interim order. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the Society as well as the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Kerala State Co-operative Election Commission, on the other hand, contend that an explanation to a rule can only explain or clarify the rule and cannot have any application beyond the specific ambit of the said rule. The decisions of the Apex Court in Bihta Cooperative Development and Cane Marketing Union Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar [1967 KHC 489] and in S. Sundaram Pillai and others v. V. R. Pattabiraman and others [1985 KHC 551] are relied on in support of this contention. The decisions of the Apex Court in Bihta Cooperative Development and Cane Marketing Union Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar [1967 KHC 489] and in S. Sundaram Pillai and others v. V. R. Pattabiraman and others [1985 KHC 551] are relied on in support of this contention. The learned counsel would also rely on a judgment of this Court in Raghava Kurup v. Joint Registrar [1988 KHC 548], which was specifically cited before the learned Single Judge also, wherein, the scope of the bye-laws and their correlation to the provisions of the Act and the Rules were specifically discussed. 12. We have considered the contentions advanced in extenso. From the provisions of the Act and the Rules extracted, it is clear that the election to the Managing Committee of a society has to be conducted in accordance with the bye-laws of the said society. Section 19 provides a restriction to exercise the rights of a member unless he has made payments to the society in respect of membership. Section 20 provides for votes of members. The provisions of Section 28(1) and Rule 44(1)(j) read together would indicate that apart from the other disqualifications mentioned, a person would be eligible to contest an election to the Managing Committee, if he is otherwise eligible to do so under the provisions of the Act and the Rules as also the bye-laws of the society. In this context, it would be apposite to notice how this Court had earlier considered a case of rejection of nomination of a member of a society on the basis of an identical provision in the bye-laws. 13. In Raghava Kurup v. Joint Registrar, a learned Single Judge of this Court held as follows :- “4. The petitioner challenges the rejection of his nomination as not warranted by the Act and the Rules. He points out that the bye law in question bad its genesis in R.28(1)(h) of the Travancore -Cochin Cooperative Societies Rules, 1953 which rendered a person ineligible for appointment as a member of any society if be, after having served continuously as a committee member for a period of three terms, did not obtain previous exemption from the Registrar to stand for re-election. The rules under the (Kerala) Act re-enacted this disqualification in a modified form in R.44(1)(m), which reads as follows: "44(1) No member of the society shall be eligible for being elected, or appointed as a member of the committee of the society under S.28 if be:- (m) has been a member of the Committee for two consecutive terms, (whether for the full term of each Committee or only for part of the terms of both or any one of them) and a period of two years has not elapsed from the date of expiry of the latter of such term, unless he obtains previous exemption from the Registrar to stand for election." This sub-rule itself was omitted from the Rules by SRO. No. 16/81 published in the Kerala Gazette dated 6-1-1981. In consequence, there was no statutory bar after 6-1-1981 for a person being a member of the committee for any length of time or for any number of terms, consecutive or otherwise. The petitioner’s contention is that after the omission of R.44(1)(m), be is not barred from contesting for the fourth consecutive term, despite the provision in the bye laws to the contrary. Bye law 34 ceases to have effect automatically on the omission of clause (m) of R.44(1) and has to be ignored. (sic) 5. The bye laws of a Cooperative Society, like the Articles of Association of a Company, constitute contract not only between the Society and its members but also between the members inter se. They are binding between the members and govern their mutual relationship and rights inter se vis-a-vis the affairs of the Society (Shiv Omkar v. Bansidhar ( AIR 1956 Bom. 459 ). They rule the internal management, business or administration of the Society (Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal AIR 1970 SC 245 and Garad v. Nasik Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd. AIR 1984 SC 192 ). The provisions contained in S.28 of the Act and R.44 of the Rules have given effect to this principle. Sub-section (i) of S.28 which provides for the appointment of the committee of a Cooperative Society, directs the general body of the Society to constitute the committee in accordance with its bye laws, and to entrust the management of its affairs to such committee. Sub section (2) of the section prescribes certain disqualifications for appointment as, or for being, a member of the committee. Sub section (2) of the section prescribes certain disqualifications for appointment as, or for being, a member of the committee. Rule 44, framed under S.109(2) (xiv) of the Act, enumerates further disqualifications for membership of the committee. Inter alia, clause (j) of sub-rule (1) makes a member ineligible from such membership if he is disqualified under any ‘other’ provision in the bye laws of the Society. The bye laws may therefore add heads of disqualification which are not otherwise found in S.28(2) or R.44(1), or to put it differently, a person may be disqualified under the bye laws even though he may not be disqualified under S.28 (2) or R.44(1). This is in accord with the proposition earlier mentioned that the bye laws constitute a contract between the members, and that the terms and conditions of their inter se relationship as set forth in the bye laws should bind them. The bye laws govern so long as they are not inconsistent with the Act or the Rules. 6. It is in this background that we have to deal with bye law 34. The members of the Society have prescribed by their duly approved bye laws that no person shall be a member of the managing committee for more than three consecutive terms except with the special sanction of the Deputy Registrar. Such a bye law is authorised by R.44(1)(j). It is not inconsistent with the Act or the Rules. If so, it should govern. The petitioner was not therefore eligible to contest at the election as be had already had three consecutive terms as member of the committee. His nomination was rightly rejected by the Returning Officer. (sic) ” Admittedly, the explanation to Rule 35A(4A) has been incorporated by amendment only on 30.12.2017. Prior thereto, the provisions with effect from 26.11.2014 was that “only active members shall be included in the voters list. The members who have utilised the minimum service provided in the society during two consecutive years shall be considered as active members”. Here, therefore, the main provision of sub-rule (4) and sub-rule (4A) is specifically with regard to the preparation of the preliminary voters list and its finalisation. 14. The Apex Court has clearly held that the proper function of an explanation is to explain or elucidate what is enacted in the substantive provision and not to add or subtract from it. Here, therefore, the main provision of sub-rule (4) and sub-rule (4A) is specifically with regard to the preparation of the preliminary voters list and its finalisation. 14. The Apex Court has clearly held that the proper function of an explanation is to explain or elucidate what is enacted in the substantive provision and not to add or subtract from it. An explanation cannot either restrict or extend the enacting part. The explanation must be interpreted according to its own tenor that it is meant to explain and not vice versa. In Bihta Co-operative Development and Cane Marketing Union Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar, the Apex Court specifically held that an explanation must be read so as to harmonise with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section. It should not be so construed as to widen the ambit of the section. 15. A reading of sub-rules (4) and (4A) would specifically make it clear that what was being sought to be explained by the explanation was with regard to the right to be included in a voters list and therefore, the eligibility to vote. Even otherwise, the explanation only says that every A class member of a society shall be eligible to vote and contest in the election if he has subscribed the minimum share value as prescribed in the byelaws. The further statement that any other restriction if imposed “in this regard” shall be declared as null and void could only mean any other restriction with regard to the right of an A class member who has subscribed to the minimum share value as prescribed in the bye-laws. Therefore, the restriction which is referred to in the explanation can only be a restriction with regard to subscription of the minimum share value by an A class member. It is specifically in such circumstances that the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that is, the decision in Chandran K. M. v. State Co-operative Election Commissioner and others and the common judgment in W.P.(C) Nos.29886 and 30314 of 2023 were rendered. 16. In the instant case, the restriction is not with regard to the right to be included in the voters list on any other restriction being imposed which is relatable to the subscription of the share value. 16. In the instant case, the restriction is not with regard to the right to be included in the voters list on any other restriction being imposed which is relatable to the subscription of the share value. The restriction is a general restriction with regard to the number of times that a person can continuously contest and become a member of a committee. The bye-law, in its wisdom, provides that a person can contest and be a member of the society consecutively only for three terms. This provision in the bye-law had been noticed by the Returning Officer and the nomination was rejected. The Writ Petition was filed challenging the said rejection of nomination by the Returning Officer and the interim order was passed. The contention that the Society and the Returning Officer are not aggrieved by the interim order would be untenable in view of the fact that in case an ineligible person is permitted to contest the elections, the integrity of the elections would stand compromised and that there is no provision for conduct of any by-elections in case the petitioner is elected and later found to be ineligible. The Society, in the circumstances, is definitely aggrieved by the interim order which affects its administration. In view of the fact that we have called for the writ petition and are deciding the issue finally, after hearing all parties, that question is no longer relevant. 17. Having considered the contentions advanced and in view of the provisions referred to as well as the decisions relied on, we are of the opinion that the true scope of explanation to Rule 35A(4A) is only with regard to the exercise of the right to vote since the main Rule is only with regard to the preparation and finalisation of the voters list. Any other interpretation as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner would be totally unwarranted. In the above circumstances, we are of the opinion that the provisions of Clause 34 in Ext.P5 bye-laws are not contrary to any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. Any other interpretation as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner would be totally unwarranted. In the above circumstances, we are of the opinion that the provisions of Clause 34 in Ext.P5 bye-laws are not contrary to any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. Therefore, the rejection of the nomination of the petitioner in the writ petition on the ground that he has been elected as a member of the Managing Committee consecutively for more than three times and did not obtain prior permission of the Deputy Registrar for contesting the elections was perfectly legal and valid. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the bye-laws were prepared long prior to the amendment in the Rules and that he had contested the elections consecutively not three times before but four times and that in the previous election held in 2019, this contention was not raised. We are of the opinion that, that will make no difference to the situation since what is being considered is the legality of an order rejecting a nomination on the available facts. There is nothing to show that the provisions of Clause 34 of Ext.P5 bye-laws have been diluted in any manner. If that be so, the mere contention of the petitioner that he had been permitted to contest the elections earlier without noticing the embargo in the bye-law cannot make any difference to the situation. The Writ Appeals are, therefore, allowed. The interim order shall stand set aside. W.P.(C) No.31646 of 2023 is dismissed.