JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri K.S. Amist, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Durga Shanker Shukla, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This appeal, at the behest of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. challenges the judgment and award dated 15.9.1994 passed by XVI Additional District Judge/ Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Allahabad in Claim Petition No. 175 of 1991 whereby the learned Tribunal has awarded Rs.1,72,000/- as compensation with interest at the rate of 15% per annum with a direction upon the appellant herein to pay the above. 3. Brief facts as culled out from the record are that on the fateful day when the incident occurred the truck insured with the appellant was overloaded and was being driven by its driver on the excessive speed. The truck dashed with the electric wire which was there and due to the overloading the wire broke and sparks were there which touched the high voltage and spread to the village whereby the wife of the respondent-claimant breathed his last due to electrocution. The driver did not stopped his vehicle though it was overloaded. The deceased was skilled labourer earning Rs. 2200/- per month and was 20 years of age. The claimant filed claim petition. The Insurance Company filed its reply but the driver and owner did not file any reply. The reply of Insurance Company was one of denial. The Tribunal framed issues and while dealing with issue No.1 the Tribunal came to the conclusion that on 4.3.1991 when the truck which was overloaded and was plying on the road in rash and negligent manner by its driver, it came in contact with low voltage electric wire. The low voltage wire broke and came in contact with high voltage wire which resulted into circulation of high voltage in low voltage wire. The high voltage circulated to the house of the deceased through low voltage wire and the deceased came in contact with the same. P.W.1, Rajesh Kumar Tripahti had seen the truck being overloaded and it being came in contact of low voltage electric wires. He was present at the place of incident. Lot of people gathered in the village and the driver of the truck ran away. P.W. 2 also deposed in similar way. P.W.1, Rajesh Kumar Tripahti had seen the truck being overloaded and it being came in contact of low voltage electric wires. He was present at the place of incident. Lot of people gathered in the village and the driver of the truck ran away. P.W. 2 also deposed in similar way. D.W.1, Uttam Sahab Yadav, mentioned that there was no accident of his vehicle on the said date and village people stopped him and feigned ignorance about the wire. He does not even remember whether the police has made challan of his vehicle or not and why he was arrested by the police. All these facts cumulatively considered by the Court to come to the conclusion that accident occurred due to the use of vehicle as defined under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the decision in Pappu and others Versus Vinod Kumar Lamba and others, reported in AIR 2018 SC 592 so as to contend that the Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the owner as the driver who was driving the vehicle in question does not have valid driving license and the vehicle was being plied against the policy conditions. 5. Learned counsel for respondent-claimants has placed reliance on the decisions in Shivaji Dayanu Patil vs. Vasschala Uttam More, 1991 0 Supreme SC 322, Kalim Khan & Others vs. Fimidabee & Others, 2018 LawSuit (SC) 571, Kaushnuma Begum vs. New India Assurance Company Ltd., 2001 LasWuit (SC) 6, First Appeal From Order No. 2520 of 2020 (U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Others) decided on 25.5.2012, Renu Devi and 5 others vs. Gurfan Ahmad and 2 others, 2022 LawSuit (All) 2019, decision of Madrash High Court in C.M.A. No. 2217 of 2015 (United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Smt. Krishnaven & others) decided on 5.10.2015, and decision of High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar in MAC App No. 52 of 2021 (State of J & K & Others vs. Mir Fathima & Others) decided on 22.9.2022 so as to rebut the grounds raised by the Insurance Company. 6. The decision cited by learned counsel for the respondent-claimants would have to be perused in the light of the principle enunciated for negligence and for remoteness of damages. 7. 6. The decision cited by learned counsel for the respondent-claimants would have to be perused in the light of the principle enunciated for negligence and for remoteness of damages. 7. The term negligence means failure to exercise care towards others which a reasonable and prudent person would in a circumstance or taking action which such a reasonable person would not. Negligence can be both intentional or accidental though it is normally accidental. More particularly, it connotes reckless driving and the injured must always prove that the either side is negligent. If the injury rather death is caused by something owned or controlled by the negligent party then he is directly liable otherwise the principle of "res ipsa loquitur" meaning thereby "the things speak for itself" would apply. 8. The Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal From Order No. 1818 of 2012 ( Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Renu Singh And Others) decided on 19.7.2016 has held as under : "16. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 17. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 17. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently. 18. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 19. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands V/s. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. 'Hit and run' cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 20. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 20. These provisions (sec.110A and sec.110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was 'new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 21. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well settled and, therefore, court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew V/s. State of Punjab, 2005 0 ACJ(SC) 1840). 22. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part the other side." emphasis added 9. The accident took place because of the use of vehicle which is similar to the cases of Shivaji Dayanua Patil (Supra) & Renu Devi (Supra). The provision of Section 165 of Motor Vehicles Act,1955 does not define the term accident and, therefore, judgment in Renu Devi (Supra) pressed into service would be helpful to the Court. The accident took place because of the use of vehicle which is similar to the cases of Shivaji Dayanua Patil (Supra) & Renu Devi (Supra). The provision of Section 165 of Motor Vehicles Act,1955 does not define the term accident and, therefore, judgment in Renu Devi (Supra) pressed into service would be helpful to the Court. The principle of res-ipsa loquitor is also required to be invoked and the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that there is remoteness of damage, cannot be accepted. 10. This takes this Court to this issue of driving license of the driver being not valid and electricity company being not made party. Here the decision in Pappu and others (Supra) will come to aid of the appellant as it was for the owner and driver to prove that the vehicle was being plied by the driver having valid driving license and only after the driving license is filed, the Insurance Company would be under an obligation to prove otherwise. 11. As far as compensation is concerned, it cannot be said that compensation awarded is on higher side. Rather the Tribunal has not considered to grant any amount under the head of future loss of income. 12. In view of the above, the appeal is partly allowed qua owner. The Insurance Company would be at liberty to recover the amount deposited from the owner of the vehicle as owner has failed to produce any documentary evidence so as to show that the driver was having license to drive the said vehicle. 13. Record and proceedings be sent back to the Tribunal forthwith. The amount kept in fixed deposit be disbursed to the claimants with interest accrued, if the same has not yet been disbursed.