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2023 DIGILAW 789 (JHR)

Sajjad Khan, Son of Late Akbar Khan v. Employer in relation to the Management of Noonidih Project of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limiteds

2023-06-19

SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2023
JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. The instant intra-court appeal preferred under Clause-10 of Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 12.02.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(L) No.4509 of 2009, whereby, the learned Single Judge has not interfered with the award passed by the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.I, Dhanbad in Reference Case No.3 of 1997 dated 25.06.2009, by which, the reference has been answered against the workman-petitioner/appellant herein. 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, required to be enumerated, are as hereunder:- The writ petitioner/appellant was appointed in the year 1992 as Fitter under Clause 9.4.2. under National Coal Wage Agreement (N.C.W.A.) after death of his father, namely, Akbar Khan, who was a permanent employee in Sijua Area in the office of M/s B.C.C.L. The respondents came to know that the appointment so made is based upon the Matriculation Certificate, which is not genuine, therefore, the decision was taken to initiate a domestic enquiry in which charge-sheet has been submitted for submission of fake certificate by the writ petitioner and he was also put under suspension in the month of February, 1992. The writ petitioner has participated in the domestic enquiry, but the charge of submission of forgery by producing forged Matriculation Certificate has been found to be proved. The competent authority of the respondents on acceptance of the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer based upon the enquiry proceeding, has decided to dismiss the writ petitioner from service and accordingly the writ petitioner was dismissed from service w.e.f. 22/23.07.1992. The writ petitioner had raised the dispute and finally the same has been culminated into reference to the effect that whether the action of the Management of Moonidih Project of M/s B.C.C.L. in dismissing the writ petitioner from service is justified? If not, to what relief is the said workman entitled. The said reference has been numbered as Reference Case No.3 of 1997. The learned Tribunal has proceeded to adjudicate and to answer the reference finally and the reference has been answered against the workman by holding that the dismissal of the workman from service is justified by passing the award on 25.06.2009. The said reference has been numbered as Reference Case No.3 of 1997. The learned Tribunal has proceeded to adjudicate and to answer the reference finally and the reference has been answered against the workman by holding that the dismissal of the workman from service is justified by passing the award on 25.06.2009. The writ petitioner being aggrieved with the said award, has challenged the same by way of filing writ petition being W.P.(L) No.4509 of 2009, but the same has been dismissed vide order/judgment dated 12.02.2021, against which, the present intra-court appeal has been preferred. 3. Mr. M.K. Laik, learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has submitted that even accepting that the reference has been answered against the writ petitioner refusing to interfere with the order of dismissal from service of Fitter which the writ petitioner has got under the provision of National Coal Wage Agreement, but taking into consideration the very object and intent of N.C.W.A., the writ petitioner ought to have been considered by appointing in other cadre in which the Matriculation Certificate is not the essential criteria. Such submission has been made on the ground of compassion and taking the spirit of the National Coal Wage Agreement. 4. Per contra, Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-BCCL has submitted that there is no question of adjudication of the issue on compassion, since, herein the writ petitioner was provided appointment under the provision of the National Coal Wage Agreement by keeping the object and intent of the aforesaid Agreement into consideration as Fitter on accepting his eligibility criteria which he has presented to be of Matriculation. The appointment to the post of Fitter had been provided but subsequent thereto it has been known to the respondents that the writ petitioner was not Matriculate and he has tried to mislead by producing false certificate. The Management has decided to proceed by conducting a domestic enquiry and in contemplation thereof, the writ petitioner was put under suspension sometime in the month of February, 1992. The writ petitioner had participated in domestic enquiry and after giving adequate and sufficient opportunity the fact about the allegation has been found to be correct and accordingly in the domestic enquiry charge has been proved against the writ petitioner. The fairness of the domestic enquiry has not been assailed by the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner had participated in domestic enquiry and after giving adequate and sufficient opportunity the fact about the allegation has been found to be correct and accordingly in the domestic enquiry charge has been proved against the writ petitioner. The fairness of the domestic enquiry has not been assailed by the writ petitioner. The finding recorded in the domestic enquiry has been accepted by the competent authority of the respondents basis upon which the order of dismissal has been passed against the writ petitioner vide letter dated 22/23.07.1992, against which, the dispute has been raised and reference has been made as quoted and recorded hereinabove. The writ petitioner has got ample opportunity before adjudication and a certificate although was produced marked as Ext. W-2 i.e. shown to have been issued by the Bihar School Examination Board, but the original of the said certificate has not been produced. It has been contented that the Management in order to corroborate the aforesaid certificate, has called for a report from the school from where the writ petitioner has disclosed to have not passed the Matriculation examination, since as per the certificate furnished by the Headmaster of school marked as Ext.-M-11, it has been disclosed that the writ petitioner has not appeared in the Matriculation examination. The Adjudicator on the basis of the aforesaid testimony, has answered the award against the writ petitioner which has been challenged by way of filing writ petition, which has also been dismissed. It has been contended by making reference of the settled position of law that the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in interference with the award is limited and the same can only be interfered with if there is perversity in the finding or on the ground of violation of principle of natural justice or there is any violation of any statutory provision, but that is not the case herein, rather, the writ petitioner is trying to make out the case on the ground of compassion that even if he has been found at fault of misleading the employer by producing false Matriculation certificate, he be considered afresh for the appointment in which the Matriculation certificate is not required. According to Mr. According to Mr. Mehta, once the decision has been taken by the respondents, affirmed by the Adjudicator regarding the conduct and when it has been found that the writ petitioner has been found to be involved in commission of fraud by producing and taking false plea of having Matriculation, there is no question of any compassion in favour of the writ petitioner. Learned counsel for the respondent-BCCL on the aforesaid premises has submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge declining to interfere with the award, therefore, requires no interference. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record and also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. The fact which is not in dispute in this case is that as per the National Coal Wage Agreement, which contains the clause under Clause 9.4.2, the offer of appointment was made in favour of the writ petitioner after eligibility/suitability for getting appointment on compassionate ground on demise of his father, in harness, who was permanent employee in Sijua area in the office of M/s B.C.C.L. The writ petitioner has joined the service, but while he was in service, it was detected that the writ petitioner has tried to commit forgery by claiming himself to be Matriculate, which is minimum educational qualification to hold the post of Fitter. The domestic enquiry has been conducted in which the charge levelled against the writ petitioner has been found to be proved and, accordingly, he was dismissed from service. The aforesaid dismissal order subjected to the reference being Reference Case No.3 of 1997, but the Adjudicator has also not found any flaws in the decision so taken by the respondent-Management and, accordingly, answered the reference against the workman, which has been declined to be interfered with by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 12.02.2021 passed in W.P.(L) No.4509 of 2009, which is the subject matter of this appeal. 6. The law is well-settled that there cannot be any direction of court of law to pass an order on sympathy, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. UT, Chandigarh; [ (2004) 2 SCC 130 ], it has been held at paragraph 36 as hereunder: “36. We have no doubt in our mind that sympathy or sentiment by itself cannot be a ground for passing an order in relation whereto the appellants miserably fail to establish a legal right. It is further trite that despite an extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction contained in Article 142 of the Constitution of India, this Court ordinarily would not pass an order which would be in contravention of a statutory provision.” 7. The reference of such judgment is being given due to the reason that the argument has been advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner by Mr. M.K. Laik, learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner that the writ petitioner ought to have been provided appointment even though he has been found to be at fault by producing the fake Matriculation certificate even though he was not Matriculate, the minimum educational qualification to hold the post of Fitter. The reason for making such submission is the object and intent of National Coal Wage Agreement which contains the condition to provide appointment on compassionate appointment in order to provide employment to the dependent of the bereaved family. 8. It is not the case herein that the respondents have not considered the very object and spirit of National Coal Wage Agreement, rather, the object is well being considered and the writ petitioner has been provided appointment by considering the eligibility of writ petitioner, as per his claim of Matriculate and accordingly appointed as Fitter, but the question is when a candidate comes not with clean hand, then what option left with the employer, is the matter of concern. 9. The production of false certificate amounts to fraud and misrepresentation on the part of the candidate (as per the definition of fraud under Section 17 of the Contract Act is active concealment of the fact). Herein the writ petitioner even though was conscious that he was not Matriculate, but he has claimed himself to be Matriculate and has also produced the photocopy of the Matriculation certificate, which has been marked as Ext. W-2 as taken on record and referred by the Adjudicator in the award. Herein the writ petitioner even though was conscious that he was not Matriculate, but he has claimed himself to be Matriculate and has also produced the photocopy of the Matriculation certificate, which has been marked as Ext. W-2 as taken on record and referred by the Adjudicator in the award. Therefore, this Court is of the view that when the writ petitioner himself is admitting that even though he was not Matriculate then his candidature ought to be considered for the post in which the Matriculation is not required, itself suggests that the writ petitioner is accepting that he is not a Matriculate. Thus the fact clarifies the commission of fraud, since the fact of the writ petitioner not a Matriculate has been corroborated by the Headmaster of the school by Ext.-M-11. 10. The law is also well-settled that the fraud vitiates the every solemn act, as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Devendra Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors.; reported in [ (2013) 9 SCC 363 ] wherein it has been held at paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, which read hereunder as: “13. It is a settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an office by misrepresenting the facts or by playing fraud upon the competent authority, such an order cannot be sustained in the eye of the law. “Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.” (Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath.) In Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley the Court observed without equivocation that: (QB p. 712) “… No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels everything.” 14. In A.P. State Financial Corpn. v. GAR Re-Rolling Mills and State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu this Court has observed that a writ court, while exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should not act to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud as courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith. “Equity is, also, known to prevent the law from the crafty evasions and subtleties invented to evade law.” 15. In Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Bros., it has been held as under: (SCC p. 553, para 20) “20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct.” 16. In Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Bros., it has been held as under: (SCC p. 553, para 20) “20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct.” 16. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh this Court observed that “fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim which has not lost temper over all these centuries. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in M.P. Mittal v. State of Haryana. 17. In Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi this Court held that “misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud”, and further held: (SCC p. 327, para 18) “18. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by wilfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad.” The said judgment was reconsidered and approved by this Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Girdharilal Yadav. 18. The ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit those persons who have frauded or misrepresented themselves. In such circumstances the court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining petitions on their behalf. In Union of India v. M. Bhaskaran this Court, after placing reliance upon and approving its earlier judgment in Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, observed as under: (M. Bhaskaran case, SCC p. 104, para 6) If by committing fraud any employment is obtained, the same cannot be permitted to be countenanced by a court of law as the employment secured by fraud renders it voidable at the option of the employer.” 11. When the element of fraud is there, there is no question of giving sympathy by the court of law. 12. When the element of fraud is there, there is no question of giving sympathy by the court of law. 12. This Court after having discussed the legal position coming back to the award which is available in the writ petition, wherein, the learned Tribunal has considered the aforesaid fact of having no Matriculation certificate with the writ petitioner as it appear from the discussion so made at paragraph 9 thereof, for ready reference, part of paragraph 9 is being referred as under: “9. …...... The concerned workman has also not possessing original matric certificate or school leaving certificate. He has filed photo copy. No sufficient reason has been given by the workman for not producing original certificate which has been granted by Swatantra Bharat High School, Bhaga. Moreover, the concerned workman had got opportunity to give evidence in enquiry proceedings also and by producing evidence from Swatantra Bharat High School, Bhaga or Bihar Vidyalaya Parikha Samiti, Patna of any officials who are maintaining that record because in absence of that no presumption can be taken that this certificate is genuine which has been produced by the concerned workman because when there are two certificates from the concerned school, one is for matriculation school leaving certificate and another is letter of enquiry which has been written to the management on the demand of the Enquiry Officer by the Swatantra Bharat High Schook, Bhaga (Ext.M-11) that such certificate has not been issued by this school.......” 13. It further appears from the award that the Management in order to have a purview, has also called upon a report from the school from where the writ petitioner claimed to have passed the Matriculation by calling a report from the Headmaster of the concerned school where from the Headmaster has corroborated that the writ petitioner has not passed the Matriculation examination as would appear from Ext. M-11, as has been discussed in the award at paragraph 7 to the award, which is the letter of the Swatantra Bharat High School, Bhaga wherein it has been stated that the concerned workman has not passed the Matriculation examination. No certificate has been issued regarding the concerned workman and also regarding another person, namely, Bal Kishore Shit, son of Ramdeo Shit. The learned Tribunal after taking into consideration the fact that Ext. No certificate has been issued regarding the concerned workman and also regarding another person, namely, Bal Kishore Shit, son of Ramdeo Shit. The learned Tribunal after taking into consideration the fact that Ext. W-2, which has been produced by the workman was the photocopy of the Matriculation certificate and in absence of its original, has discarded the same and by giving reliance upon the certificate issued by the Principal of the concerned school as Ext. M-11, has answered the reference against the workman. 14. This Court is, therefore, of the view that once the Tribunal has based its finding on judicial scrutiny of the documents produced before it, there is no question to consider the legality of the aforesaid award on the ground of perversity. Perversity means that if anything has been brought to the notice of the Adjudicator of the competent authority on whose end the decision is to be taken and the same has not been considered in every perspective then it amounts to perversity, the interpretation of the perversity needs reference herein. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Rengali Hydro Electric Project & others v. Giridhari Sahu & others; [ (2019) 10 SCC 695 ] has held in paragraphs 26, 27 and 28, which read as under: “26. In Durga Das Basu's Commentary on the Constitution of India, 9th Edn., in regard to the concept of no evidence, we find the following discussion: ““No evidence” does not mean only a total dearth of evidence. It extends to any case where the evidence taken as a whole is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding, or where, in other words, no tribunal could reasonably reach that conclusion on that evidence. This “no evidence” principle clearly has something in common with the principle that perverse or unreasonable action is unauthorised and ultra vires. An order made without “any evidence” to support it is in truth, made without order made without “any evidence” is worthless, it is equal to having “no evidence” jurisdiction.” (emphasis supplied) 27. In fact, in the decision relied upon by the applicants viz. S. Viswanathan [Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. S. Viswanathan, (2005) 3 SCC 193 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 372], it is, inter alia, held as follows: (SCC p. 196, para 12) “12. In fact, in the decision relied upon by the applicants viz. S. Viswanathan [Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. S. Viswanathan, (2005) 3 SCC 193 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 372], it is, inter alia, held as follows: (SCC p. 196, para 12) “12. Normally, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, is the final court of facts in these types of disputes, but if a finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence the High Court exercising a power either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. But before going into such an exercise it is necessary that the writ court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any such defect in the order of the Labour Court the writ court will not enter into the realm of factual disputes and finding given thereon.” (emphasis supplied) 28. On the conspectus of the decisions and material, we would hold as follows: the jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari is supervisory and not appellate. The Court considering a writ application of certiorari will not don the cap of an appellate court. It will not reappreciate evidence. The writ of certiorari is intended to correct jurisdictional excesses. A writ of prohibition would issue when a tribunal or authority has not yet concluded its proceedings. Once a decision is rendered by a body amenable to certiorari jurisdiction, certiorari could be issued when a jurisdictional error is clearly established. The jurisdictional error may be from failure to observe the limits of its jurisdiction. It may arise from the procedure adopted by the body after validly assuming jurisdiction. It may act in violation of principles of natural justice. The body whose decision which comes under attack may decide a collateral fact which is also a jurisdictional fact and assume jurisdiction. Such a finding of fact is not immune from being interfered with by a writ of certiorari. As far as the finding of fact which is one within the jurisdiction of the court, it is ordinarily a matter “off bounds” for the writ court. This is for the reason that a body which has jurisdiction to decide the matter has the jurisdiction to decide it correctly or wrongly. As far as the finding of fact which is one within the jurisdiction of the court, it is ordinarily a matter “off bounds” for the writ court. This is for the reason that a body which has jurisdiction to decide the matter has the jurisdiction to decide it correctly or wrongly. It would become a mere error and that too an error of fact. However, gross it may amount to, it does not amount to an error of law. An error of law which becomes vulnerable to judicial scrutiny by way of certiorari must also be one which is apparent on the face of the record. As held by this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath [Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 ], as to what constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record, is a matter to be decided by the court on the facts of each case. A finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence would be perverse and in fact would constitute an error of law enabling the writ court to interfere. It is also to be noticed that if the overwhelming weight of the evidence does not support the finding, it would render the decision amenable to certiorari jurisdiction. This would be the same as a finding which is wholly unwarranted by the evidence which is what this Court has laid down.” 15. This Court after having factual aspect of the legal position, is now proceeding to deal with the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so far as interference with the award, as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan & others; (A.I.R.SC 1964 477) in paragraph 7 of the said judgment, which reads as under: “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 .” 16. Reference in this regard also may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and Ors.; (AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233), it has been held at Paragraph-21, as hereunder: “21. ……. as to the character and scope of the writ of ‘certiorari’ and the conditions under which it could be issued. The question has been considered by this Court in ‘Parry and Co. v. Commercial Employees’ Association, Madras,’ AIR 1952 SC 179 (L):- ‘Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd.’ AIR 1952 SC 192 (M); ‘Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property New Delhi,’ AIR 1952 SC 319 (N), and quite recently in AIR 1954 SC 440 (C). On these authorities, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) ‘Certiorari’ will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in “certiorari”…….” 17 . In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Sawarn Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors.; [ (1976) 2 SCC 868 ], their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra)……… 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” 18. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” 18. This Court in view of discussions made hereinabove is of the view that the contention which has been raised on behalf of the writ petitioner that the writ petitioner is to be given benefit by appointing fresh appointment on the ground of compassion, according to our considered view, it has no substance on the basis of the reasons assigned hereinabove. 19. Further taking into consideration the position of law regarding scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as per the judicial pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court is of the view that the award passed by the Adjudicator suffers from no error. The learned Single Judge on the aforesaid premises declined to interfere with the award, which according to our considered view suffers from no error. 20. Accordingly, the instant intra-court appeal fails and is dismissed.