JUDGMENT : BASANT BALAJI, J. 1. F.A.O. No. 96 of 2023 is filed by the petitioners against the order dated 31.7.2023 in I.A. No. 2 of 2023 in O.S. No. 1 of 2023 on the files of Additional District Judge-IV, Thalassery. F.A.O. No. 102 of 2023 is filed by the defendants in the above said suit. I.A. No. 2 of 2023 was filed by the plaintiffs in the suit seeking an interim injunction restraining the respondent or any associated person using the impugned trade mark “SJ Buildware” which is deceptively similar to the petitioners’ mark. (The parties are referred to as they appeared before the court below in the suit) 2. The plaintiffs filed O.S. No. 1 of 2023 for a declaration that the first plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the trademark “CJ Buildware” and that the 1st plaintiff has the exclusive right to use the said mark in relation to the business of retail showrooms for the distribution of tiles, sanitary wares, paints, electrical and plumbing materials, natural stone, and building materials and other classes of good. A prohibitory injunction is also sought restraining the defendants by themselves as also through their partners, agents, representatives, distributors, assigns, heirs, successors, and all others acting for and on their behalf from using, selling, soliciting, exporting, displaying, advertising or by any other mode or manner dealing in or using the impugned trademark “SJ Buildware” and logos or any other word/mark/label/packaging which may be identical with and/or deceptively similar to the first plaintiff’s trade mark “CJ Buildware” in relation to the said business. 3. Brief facts necessary for the disposal of the appeals are as follows: The 1st plaintiff is the Managing Partner of the 2nd plaintiff. The first plaintiff is engaged in the business of retail showrooms for the distribution of tiles, sanitary wares, paints, electrical and plumbing materials, natural stone, and building materials. The business of the first plaintiff was established in 1992 by the father of the first plaintiff. The business was started by the 1st plaintiff under the trade mark “CJ Buildware” from the year 2012. The said mark was adopted by abbreviating the name of 1st plaintiff’s grandfather, viz. The business of the first plaintiff was established in 1992 by the father of the first plaintiff. The business was started by the 1st plaintiff under the trade mark “CJ Buildware” from the year 2012. The said mark was adopted by abbreviating the name of 1st plaintiff’s grandfather, viz. Chennilathukunnel Joseph and then by combining it with the non-dictionary word ‘Buildware.” The firm has been continuously using the mark since 2012 and thus obtained an indomitable reputation for having the largest selection of tiles, sanitary ware, paints, electrical and plumbing materials, natural stone, and building materials. The first plaintiff applied for numerous trademark registrations and obtained Trademark Registration pertaining to its mark in class 35, with application No. 4153896. The plaintiffs had engaged in substantial advertising and promotion of its business with the trade mark, including visual and electronic media, in leading newspapers and other social media. 4. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 approached the first plaintiff, expressing an interest in starting a partnership firm for conducting the said business at Taliparamba. Accepting the proposal, a partnership deed was executed on 2.2.2018 under the name and style “CJ Buildware” and conducted the business till 2022. Thereafter, due to some internal disputes and differences of opinion in the management of the partnership firm, the first plaintiff expressed his intention to withdraw from the partnership, and accordingly, a release deed dated 1.1.2022 was executed. In the release deed, specific clauses were introduced regarding the use of trade mark “CJ Buildware.” 5. In clause 5 of the release deed, it is stated explicitly that the retiring partner agreed to assign to the continuing partners all the share, title, interest, and claim whatsoever they have in the said partnership business, all its assets and profits, and all other debts and claims of the partnership outstanding against other persons to be held by the continuing partners absolutely for themselves hereafter except for the Ownership in the Trade name “CJ Buildware.” 6. Clause 7 of the deed states that the retiring partner grants the continuing partners a non-exclusive, non-assignable, non-transferable, and revocable license to use the trade name “CJ Buildware” for running the existing partnership business located at Room Nos. TMC XXIII, XXIII/A, XXIII/B, XXIII/D, Taliparamba, Kuttikol, Kannur, Kerala-670141 for one year after his retirement. And continuing partners hereby agree not to use the trade name “CJ Buildware” in any business thereafter. 7. TMC XXIII, XXIII/A, XXIII/B, XXIII/D, Taliparamba, Kuttikol, Kannur, Kerala-670141 for one year after his retirement. And continuing partners hereby agree not to use the trade name “CJ Buildware” in any business thereafter. 7. The case of the defendants was that subsequently, the defendants adopted the name “SJ Buildware” in the same premises where the previous partnership outlet was operated under the name “CJ Buildware.” The name “SJ Buildware” is deceptively similar and identical to that of the plaintiff’s “CJ Buildware” mark. The impugned mark makes an impression in the minds of laymen that the 3rd defendant is connected with the business run by the plaintiffs, and the consumers of the plaintiffs are deceived by the defendants’ act in using the word “SJ Buildware” for their partnership firm. Therefore, the plaintiffs have approached the trial court for a declaration that the 1st plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the trade mark C J Buildware and has the exclusive right to us the said mark. A decree for permanent injunction was also sought. 8. Along with the suit, an application for injunction was filed as I.A. No. 2 of 2023, wherein an interim injunction restraining the respondents/defendants or any associated person from using the impugned trademark “SJ Buildware” which is deceptively similar to the trademark of the plaintiff’s trade mark, in the interest of justice. 9. The defendants filed a counter affidavit in I.A. No. 2 of 2023. It is contended that the averment that the defendants had approached the plaintiffs to start a business in Thaliparamba is false and denied. The plaintiffs approached the defendants to expand the business and eventually the defendants conceded for the same. Though the business was running smoothly till 2022, the first plaintiff expressed his willingness to start his venture at Cherupuzha in Kannur district and executed a release deed on 1.1.2022. The defendants were unaware that the plaintiffs had already moved for registration of the trademark with the name “CJ Buildware” as a single firm, suppressing the fact that it was a partnership firm with effect from 2018 onwards. Thereafter, the first plaintiff obtained trade mark in his name suppressing that he has retired from a partnership, and the deed was executed. Through the release deed, it was agreed that the defendants shall have the right to use the name “CJ Buildware” for a period of one year. Thereafter, the first plaintiff obtained trade mark in his name suppressing that he has retired from a partnership, and the deed was executed. Through the release deed, it was agreed that the defendants shall have the right to use the name “CJ Buildware” for a period of one year. Therefore, the defendants changed the name of their partnership firm from “CJ Buildware” to “SJ Buildware” within seven months. “S” denotes the first letter of the name Shyjumon Joseph and “J” stands for the first letter of the name Joseph Augustine, who are the present partners of the partnership firm “SJ Buildware.” The defendants are operating in the same premises with the same GST number and with a mark “SJ Buildware” which is not deceptively similar to “CJ Buildware.” “SJ Buildware” is a composite mark, whereas the mark of the plaintiff’s trade mark is a word mark. The defendants are operating in a place called Kuttikol, which is about 50 KM far from the place of the plaintiffs’ business at Cherupuzha. The defendants had already acquired a good position as well as a reputation in the market Arena, with their commitment to the customers, and as such, the defendants do not require to trade on the mark “CJ Buildware.” “Buildware” is a common name in the market and the names of the prominent players in the field use the said word along with different letters. On these grounds, the defendants prayed for the dismissal of the petitions. 10. The learned Judge, after hearing both the parties and perusing the documents, allowed I.A. No. 2 of 2023 as per order dated 31st July 2023 restraining the defendants from representing or making any advertisements either in newspaper or social media claiming that SJ Buildware and CJ Buildware are one and the same company. It is aggrieved by the said order, that the plaintiff as well as the defendants come up in appeals. 11. Heard the counsel Sri. Harindranath for the appellants and Sri. Sunil V. Mohammed and Sri.Tom Pious for the respondents. 12. The counsel for the appellants in F.A.O. No. 96 of 2023 (petitioners in I.A. No. 2 of 2023) argues that the first plaintiff, as well as the defendants had entered into a partnership deed whereby the defendants along with the first plaintiff, continued the business in the name and style “CJ Buildware” from 2018 onwards till 2022. 12. The counsel for the appellants in F.A.O. No. 96 of 2023 (petitioners in I.A. No. 2 of 2023) argues that the first plaintiff, as well as the defendants had entered into a partnership deed whereby the defendants along with the first plaintiff, continued the business in the name and style “CJ Buildware” from 2018 onwards till 2022. Due to some difference of opinion in 2022, the first plaintiff withdrew from the partnership and entered into a partnership release deed dated 1.1.2022. The clauses in the release deed bind the parties. In the release deed, specifically clause No. 5, the plaintiffs agreed to assign to the continuing partners all the share, title, interest, and claim, but he gets for himself the absolute right or ownership of the trade name “CJ Buildware.” In clause 7 of the release deed itself, it was agreed between the parties that the continuing partners agree not to use the trade name “CJ Buildware” in any business for one year after the retirement of the first plaintiff. 13. The counsel contends that it is only as a temporary measure that the defendants were allowed to use the registered trade name “CJ Buildware” for one year. After one year, they cannot use the name of CJ Buildware and should have changed it to a different name. But, with a mala-fide intention, the defendants changed the firm’s name as SJ Buildware, which is very deceptively similar to CJ Buildware, which is the trade name registered in the name of the first plaintiff. By incorporating the name SJ Buildware, the reputation that which the first plaintiff had gained over the years in the business in the field of sanitary and other items, is used by the defendants to capture the business of the plaintiffs, and thereby sustained loss to the plaintiffs’ business. The name given by the defendants, who were the partners to the firm is CJ Buildware, as SJ Buildware has caused loss to the plaintiff being deceptively similar. Any layman or customer would feel that the present firm, SJ Buildware is continuing the business of CJ Buildware, thereby the reputation gained by the plaintiff is taken over by the defendants by using the name SJ Buildware which is deceptively similar. 14. Any layman or customer would feel that the present firm, SJ Buildware is continuing the business of CJ Buildware, thereby the reputation gained by the plaintiff is taken over by the defendants by using the name SJ Buildware which is deceptively similar. 14. It is an admitted fact that as per clause 9 of the release deed, the first plaintiff cannot do a similar business in the name CJ Buildware in Thaliparamba for a period of five years. It was also agreed that the retiring partner shall not open directly or indirectly any outlet in the name of CJ Buildware for doing similar business in the Thaliparamba taluk. That does not mean that the defendants can use the name, which is very deceptively similar to CJ Buildware. The counsel also argued that the defendants are giving vide publicity through social media as well as print media that the SJ Buildware is a part of CJ Buildware. He further submitted that the learned Judge in the impugned order has come to a definite conclusion that the advertisement given by the defendants as SJ Buildware, being the successor firm of CJ Buildware, would come under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act. But strangely, entered into a finding that since the plaintiff has, by release deed, allowed the defendants to use the name CJ Buildware for a period of one year there is nothing wrong to make any representation that SJ Buildware is the successor of CJ Buildware. 15. The learned Judge also made a mistake in the impugned order that by changing the letter “C” to “S” makes much difference and it cannot be said that it is deceptively similar as ‘S’ stands for Shyjumon, ‘J’ stands Joseph and ‘C’ stands for ‘Chennilathukunnel Joseph’. He contended that the learned Judge ought to have found that the pronunciation of CJ Buildware and SJ Buildware would create confusion in the customers’ minds and use of SJ Buildware would result in loss to the plaintiffs. 16. The counsel relied on the judgments reported in Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. vs. B. Vijaya Sai and Others, (2022) 5 SCC 1 , Manju Monga vs. Manju Mittal, (2012) SCC Online Del. 3331 and Kamal Trading Co. and Others vs. Gillette U.K. Limited, 1987 SCC Online Bom. 754. 17. 16. The counsel relied on the judgments reported in Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. vs. B. Vijaya Sai and Others, (2022) 5 SCC 1 , Manju Monga vs. Manju Mittal, (2012) SCC Online Del. 3331 and Kamal Trading Co. and Others vs. Gillette U.K. Limited, 1987 SCC Online Bom. 754. 17. Sri.Sunil Mohammed argued that as per clause 7 of the release deed dated 1.1.2022, the defendants were permitted to use the trademark CJ Buildware for a period of one year from the date of retirement, and in clause 5, what is stated is that the retiring partners agree to assign to the continuing partners all the shares, title, interest and claim whatsoever in the partnership business and its assets and profits and all other debts and claims of the partnership outstanding against other persons, but what is retained by him is only the ownership of the trade name CJ Buildware. As per clause 8 of the said deed, the defendants agreed to change the existing name of partnership within one year from the date of execution of the document, and it is acting on the said clause that the defendants have changed the name CJ Buildware to SJ Buildware coined by taking the first 2 letters of the partners namely Shyjumon Joseph and Joseph Augustine. The defendants have fully complied with the clauses of the release deed, and name SJ Buildware is not deceptively similar to CJ Buildware. A separate logo is added to the words SJ Buildware. The trademark registration which the plaintiffs have got is only in respect of CJ Buildware, and the defendants have never used the name CJ Buildware after 1.1.2023. 18. A reading of clause 9 of the release deed would make it clear that the plaintiff was restrained from using the name CJ Buildware in any similar business in Taliparamba taluk after his retirement for a period of 5 years. It was further agreed that the retiring partners shall not open any retail outlet directly or indirectly in the name of CJ Buildware for doing similar business. So, it makes clear that the defendants are not restrained from using the trade name CJ Buildware for the period of 5 years from the date of retirement of the first plaintiff. But accepting the clause in the release deed, they have changed the name CJ Buildware to SJ Buildware within 7 months. So, it makes clear that the defendants are not restrained from using the trade name CJ Buildware for the period of 5 years from the date of retirement of the first plaintiff. But accepting the clause in the release deed, they have changed the name CJ Buildware to SJ Buildware within 7 months. ‘CJ’ and ‘SJ’ are two alphabets of the English language. According to the plaintiff, the name stands for the name of grandfather name and 1st plaintiff, and SJ stands for the first letters of the two partners. So, there is no malafide or fraudulent intention on the part of the defendants in coining of these 2 alphabets in the name of their partnership firm by name, SJ Buildware. The contention raised by the plaintiffs that they have lost their reputation and the reputation they have gained over the years has been taken over by the defendants by naming their partnership firm by name SJ Buildware, is incorrect. The plaintiff’s firm is situated more than 50 km away from the defendants’s firm, and therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs have sustained damages due to the use of the name SJ Buildware by the defendants. He also contended that a suit under Section 29 of the Trade Mark Act is not maintainable as there is no infringement of the trade mark. The suit can only be filed under Section 27 of the Trade Mark Act. The trade name registration obtained by the first plaintiff is in the name of CJ Buildware. Buildware is a generic word and the plaintiffs cannot claim exclusive right over it. The trade mark SJ Buildware and CJ Buildware are not identical, and in order to mark a difference, they have also kept a tag mark “creating dreams” to distinguish them from the trade mark CJ Buildware. The style of the mark and fonts are also different, and there is no chance for the customers to have confusion that SJ Buildware is a part of CJ Buildware. It was also argued that the defendants have already applied before the trade marks authority for getting their trade mark registration, and it is under the category of ‘devise’ whereas the application filed by plaintiffs for trade mark registration is under the category ‘word’. It was also argued that the defendants have already applied before the trade marks authority for getting their trade mark registration, and it is under the category of ‘devise’ whereas the application filed by plaintiffs for trade mark registration is under the category ‘word’. The counsel also relied on the judgment of this Court in Mariyas Soaps and Chemicals vs. Wipro Enterprises Ltd. 2023 (4) KLT 408 , Sun Pharmaceutical Laboratories Ltd. vs. Hetero Healthcare Ltd. 2022 SCC Online Del. 2580 and S. Syed Mohideen vs. P. Sulochana Bai, 2016 (2) SCC 683 . 19. The plaintiffs, as well as the defendants have approached this court with the present FAOs challenging the order in I.A. No. 2 of 2023 in O.S No. 1 of 2023 on the files of the Additional District Court-IV, Thalassery. I.A. No. 2 of 2023 is filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 read with Section 151 of C.P.C. praying for an interim injunction restraining the defendants or any associated person from using the impugned trade mark S.J. Buildware, which is deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s trade mark. 20. The case projected by the plaintiffs in the suit and in the interim injunction application is that the CJ Buildware was started by the plaintiffs father and the name was coined as CJ since the father’s name was Chennilathukunnel Joseph. He started the business, and thereafter it was continued by the 1st plaintiff. It is the case of the 1st plaintiff that he has been continuously and extensively using the trade mark since 2012 and has obtained a reputation from the consumers. The registration in trade mark for ‘CJ Buildware’ is obtained by the plaintiffs in the year 2019. The plaintiff and the defendants entered into a partnership agreement, and a deed was executed on 2.2.2018, whereby the plaintiff and defendants became the partners. The business continued from 2018 till 2022, and due to some differences of opinion and disputes in the management of the partnership firm, the 1st plaintiff decided to retire from the partnership firm by executing a retirement deed on 1.1.2022. The plaintiff, as well as defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are the signatories to the retirement deed. 21. The business continued from 2018 till 2022, and due to some differences of opinion and disputes in the management of the partnership firm, the 1st plaintiff decided to retire from the partnership firm by executing a retirement deed on 1.1.2022. The plaintiff, as well as defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are the signatories to the retirement deed. 21. Clause No. 5 in the retirement deed is a clause whereby the plaintiff agrees to assign to the continuing partners all the share, title, interest, and claim and whatsoever they have in the partnership business with all its assets and profits and debts and claims of the partners outstanding liabilities against other persons to be held by the continuing partners absolutely by themselves, it was specifically made clear that hereafter except for the ownership in the trade name CJ Buildware. Clause 7 is another important clause that must be read along with clause 5. In clause 7, it is agreed between the parties that the continuing partners can use the name CJ Buildware for running the existing partnership business in the building located at Thaliparambu, where the plaintiff was conducting CJ Buildware from 2012 onwards, and the continuing partners (defendants) had agreed not to use the name CJ Buildware in any business after a period of one year from the date of retirement of the plaintiff from the partnership. Thus, the parties to the deed had agreed that the firm CJ Buildware is exclusively in the ownership of the plaintiff. However, they were allowed to continue with the name for a period of one year so that the continuing partners could do the business to enable them to get the outstanding amounts due or any claim to be obtained by CJ Buildware is to be appropriated by the defendants, who are the continuing partners. After the period of one year of the retirement of the plaintiff, the defendants changed the name of the firm from CJ Buildware to SJ Buildware. The contention raised by the defendants is that they have changed the name from CJ to SJ as agreed in the deed. SJ is coined from the first letter of the partners, i.e. Shyjumon and Joseph Augustine and it is not deceptively similar to the name CJ Builware. Moreover, the font used is also different than what was used by CJ Buildware. 22. SJ is coined from the first letter of the partners, i.e. Shyjumon and Joseph Augustine and it is not deceptively similar to the name CJ Builware. Moreover, the font used is also different than what was used by CJ Buildware. 22. After hearing the plaintiffs and the defendants in the application for injunction, the learned District Judge passed an order restraining respondents /defendants from representing or making any advertisement in the newspaper or any other social media claiming that SJ and CJ are one and the same company. In paragraph No. 13, it has come to the conclusion that there is nothing wrong in making any representation that SJ Buildware is the successor or name as CJ Buildware situated in Thaliparamba as per clause of release deed because, it is agreed in clause 5 itself that the share, title, interest and all claims and all its assets and profits are assigned to the continuing partners. At the same time, in paragraph No. 13, the learned Judge had found that the advertisement that SJ is the successor of CJ would come within Section 29 of the Trade mark Act, and the learned Judge had, in fact accepted the case projected by the plaintiff. 23. It is to be noted that the apex court in Renaissance Hotel Holdings (supra) has held in paragraph Nos. 48 and 59 as follows: “48. The legislative scheme is clear that when the mark of the defendant is identical with the registered trade mark of the plaintiff and the goods or service covered are similar to the ones covered by such registered trade mark, it may be necessary to prove that it is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public, or which is likely to have an association with the registered trade mark. Similarly, when the trade mark of the plaintiff is similar to the registered trade mark of the defendant and the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark are identical or similar to the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark, it may again be necessary to establish that it cause confusion on the part of the public. However, when the trade mark of the defendant is identical with the registered trade mark of the plaintiff and that the goods or services of the defendant are identical with the goods covered by registered trade mark, the Court shall presume that it is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public. 59. In these circumstances, we are of the considered view that it was not open for the High Court to have entered into the discussion as to whether the appellant-plaintiff’s trade mark had a reputation in India and the use of the mark without due cause takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the registered trade mark. We find that the High Court has erred in entering into the discussion as to whether the respondent-defendants and the appellant-plaintiff cater to different classes of customers and as to whether there was likely to be confusion in the minds of consumers with regard to the hotel of the respondent-defendants belonging to the same group as of the appellant-plaintiffs. As held by this Court in Ruston and Hornsby, in an action for infringement, once it is found that the defendant’s trade mark was identical with the plaintiff’s registered trade mark, the Court could not have gone into an enquiry whether the infringement is such as is likely to deceive or cause confusion. In an infringement action, an injunction would be issued as soon as it is proved that the defendant is improperly using the trade mark of the plaintiff.” The said case was the case in which the word Renaissance Hotel Holdings, being the name of the plaintiff was infringed by the opposite party by coining another word as Sai and renaming as Sai Renaissance for his hotel. The apex court held that even though the word Sai is included before Renaissance, it amounts to infringement of the trade mark of the plaintiff as Renaissance and interfered with the judgment of High court and held that the case squarely comes under section 29(2)(c) read with sub Section (3) of the Trade Marks Act. 24. The apex court held that even though the word Sai is included before Renaissance, it amounts to infringement of the trade mark of the plaintiff as Renaissance and interfered with the judgment of High court and held that the case squarely comes under section 29(2)(c) read with sub Section (3) of the Trade Marks Act. 24. In Manju Monga (supra), also a learned Judge of Delhi High court has held that though the plaintiff’s firm was under the name and style M/s. Manju Monga Cookery Classes and the defendant has used the word Manju Mittal’s Cookery Classes, the learned Judge held that it amounts to deceptively similar name and held that the defendant should be restrained from using the name Manju Mittal Cookery Classes, wherein the plaintiff has obtained the trade mark with the label Manju Monga Cooking Classes. So even if it is a name which is in common, a learned Judge of Delhi High court had held that there is an infringement of trade mark. 25. The law relating to injunctions is governed by the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Interlocutory injunctions are issued provisionally before the trial of the suit and continue until the trial has ended. Before any order is passed in an interim injunction application, the court does not go into general profess to anticipate the determination of the right but merely gives it as its opinion that there is a substantial question to be tried, and till the question is answered for the preservation of the property, the injunction is to be ordered. 26. To come to a conclusion as to whether the trade mark is deceptively similar to another, it is not for the court to place the two marks side by side to find out if there are any differences in the designs and whether they are of such character as to prevent one design from being mistaken from the other. It is enough if the impugned mark bears an overall similarity to the registered mark, as that would likely mislead a person, usually dealing with one, to accept the other if offered to him. It is enough if the impugned mark bears an overall similarity to the registered mark, as that would likely mislead a person, usually dealing with one, to accept the other if offered to him. In an action for infringement, the plaintiff must make out that the use of the defendant’s mark is likely to deceive between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s mark, either visually or phonetically, and if the court reaches the conclusion that there is an imitation, no further evidence is required to establish that the plaintiff’s rights are violated. 27. The crucial test to be applied for an infringement action or a passing off action is to see whether a customer of average intelligence and of imperfect recollection is likely to be confused on the first impression. It is to be noted that the first syllable of a word mark is generally the most important, and when the defendants are using such a similar prefix to that of the plaintiff with little variation in the prefix part of it, the trade marks are deceptively similar, and a cause action for prima facie infringement is complete. 28. In a matter of temporary injunction, the court does not adjudicate on the subject matter or any part of it on merits. The court considers the application in the light of the well known principles and then excises its discretion, weighing all relevant considerations without any express of opinion on the merits of the matter. 29. The principles of law relating to temporary injunctions is well recognized by the decision of the Apex Court in Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh, AIR 1993 SC 276 the relevant portion of the observation of the Apex Court extracted hereunder: “...It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the Court satisfying that: (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit, and that an act, on the facts before the Court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant. (2) the Court’s interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial. (2) the Court’s interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial. (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it. The Supreme Court further observed: ..Prima-facie case is not to be confused with prima-facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona-fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in ‘irreparable injury’ to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that ‘the balance of convenience must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties if the injunction is refused and compare it with that it is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit. The Court continued: ...The phrases ‘prima facie’ case. “balance of convenience and ‘irreparable’ loss are not rhetoric phrases for incantation, but words of width and elasticity, to meet myriad situations presented by man’s ingenuity in given facts and circumstances, but always is hedged with sound exercise of judicial discretion to meet the ends of justice....” 30. The Court continued: ...The phrases ‘prima facie’ case. “balance of convenience and ‘irreparable’ loss are not rhetoric phrases for incantation, but words of width and elasticity, to meet myriad situations presented by man’s ingenuity in given facts and circumstances, but always is hedged with sound exercise of judicial discretion to meet the ends of justice....” 30. It is to be noted that the firm was conducting business from 2018 with the plaintiffs and the defendants as partners with the name CJ buildware at Thaliparamba. After the first plaintiff had retired from the firm and at the time of retirement the first plaintiff has obtained a registered trade mark for CJ Buildware knowing fully well that he had registerd trade mark, the retirement deed or release deed was executed, and the defendants were well aware that the plaintiff was the registered owner of the trade mark CJ Buildware. It is in the said circumstances the clauses 5 and 7 were incorporated in the release deed, which authorise the defendant to continue with the business for a period of one year so that the business, which is carried on in the name of CJ Buildware is continued by the existing partners and it does not affect the business though the partners have changed. When the defendants have coined the words SJ Buildware as a substitute for CJ Buildware for the same business in the same premises, it can create confusion in the minds of the consumers or purchasers that SJ Buildware is either a part of CJ Buildware or a successor of CJ Buildware. The learned Judge had failed to note that the building in which CJ and SJ are being conducted is one and the same, creating confusion among the local people. In Mercy Bigi vs. Sunilkumar, 2015 (3) KLT 938 , it was held that similarity of two trade marks is to be examined in the context of an unwary person of average intelligence with imperfect recollection. In the context of an unwary person of average intelligence with imperfect recollection, the trade name of the defendant is likely to confuse the prospective customers of the plaintiff. 31. In the context of an unwary person of average intelligence with imperfect recollection, the trade name of the defendant is likely to confuse the prospective customers of the plaintiff. 31. The learned Judge, having found that the petition under Section 29 of the Trade Mark Act is maintainable, after a detailed discussion, held that the words SJ are not deceptively similar to the word CJ and that is why the injunction application was not allowed in full as prayed by the plaintiff. The injunction order only says that the defendant shall not advertise in newspaper or social media claiming that SJ and CJ are one and the same company. It is settled law that once a prima facie case has been found that there is an infringement and a suit is maintainable, the injunction should follow; otherwise, irreparable injury and hardship will be caused to the plaintiff. As discussed earlier, though, the first two letters differ, and the second word, Buildware, is common and. also to the fact that the business is being conducted in the same premises, there is every likelihood that the customers will be confused that CJ and SJ are the same. Thus, it can only be held that SJ is deceptively similar to CJ. In such a situation, the defendants cannot take advantage of the reputation of CJ Buildware obtained by the plaintiff from 2012 onwards. Therefore, I have no hesitation in holding that the plaintiff is entitled to an ad interim injunction till the disposal of the suit, as the name S.J Buildware is deceptively similar to the trade mark CJ Buildware. Therefore, the impugned order in I.A. No. 2 of 2023 is modified, and an ad interim injunction is passed directing the defendants or any associated person or agents from using the trade mark SJ Buildware or the logo which is identical or deceptively similar to the trade mark of the plaintiff as CJ Buildware till the disposal of the suit. It is also held that the order passed by the learned Single Judge directing the defendants not to advertise in newspapers or social media, claiming that SJ Buildware and CJ Buildware are the same company, is sustained. 32. It is also held that the order passed by the learned Single Judge directing the defendants not to advertise in newspapers or social media, claiming that SJ Buildware and CJ Buildware are the same company, is sustained. 32. If the pleadings are complete and the suit is ripe for trial, the learned Judge shall make all endeavour to dispose of O.S. No. 1 of 2023, untrammelled by any of the observation made in this judgment, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. 33. In the result, F.A.O. No. 96 of 2023 is allowed, and F.A.O. No. 102 of 2023 is dismissed. 34. No order as to costs.