JUDGMENT PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal under Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging the judgment and decree dtd. 17/1/2000 passed in A.S.No.3 of 1998 by the Senior Civil Judge, Avanigadda, reversing the judgment and decree dtd. 11/8/1997 passed in O.S.No.166 of 1991 by the District Munsif, Avanigadda. 2. This appeal has been admitted treating grounds (a), (b), (c) and (f) in the memorandum of appeal as substantial questions of law. The said grounds/substantial questions of law are as follows: '(a) Whether it is permissible to parties to adduce oral evidence in proof of title alleged to have been acquired under a will deed and gift deed without either examining a single witness or even producing the documents. (b) Whether it is permissible for the parties to claim title under a gift deed which is not registered. (c) Whether it is permissible to parties to bequeath a certain share prior to partition of joint properties. (f) Whether the appellate court has not erred in concluding that defendant did not succeed in establishing his claim over the property when it is settled law that plaintiff must succeed on his own strength and not on the weaknesses of the defendant.' 3. The plaintiff, Munnangi Raghavalu, preferred O.S.No.166 of 1991 on the file of the District Munsif, Avanigadda seeking a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendant and her friends, relatives, henchmen, servants and kith and kin from interfering and obstructing his possession over the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff claimed to be the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property on the pleading that he is the brother-in-law of Chodavarapu Subbaiah and his wife's only brother. Chodavarapu Subbaiah and Chodavarapu Venkaiah were brothers. Subbaiah had got no male issues and had only one daughter by name Lalithamba. Subbaiah brought his brother-in-law, i.e. the plaintiff, to his house at Bhavadevarapalli, Nagayalanka Mandal, Krishna District at the age of 15 years. Since thereafter, the plaintiff was looked after by Subbaiah and after the plaintiff had attained majority, he was married to Lalithamba in the year 1965. Lalithamba died in 1971 due to snakebite. Thereafter, Subbaiah performed plaintiff's marriage with his brother Venkaiah's second daughter Padmavathi in May, 1971. Since thereafter, the plaintiff was looked after by Subbaiah and after the plaintiff had attained majority, he was married to Lalithamba in the year 1965. Lalithamba died in 1971 due to snakebite. Thereafter, Subbaiah performed plaintiff's marriage with his brother Venkaiah's second daughter Padmavathi in May, 1971. In the same month and year, Subbaiah and his wife executed a Will Deed in favour of the plaintiff and, then, in June, 1971, partition took place between the two brothers. Venkaiah, second father-in-law of the plaintiff, along with his wife Seethamma, gifted Ac.1.00 cents of land in Sy.No.307, Patta No.1438 in favour of the plaintiff and his wife Padmavathi. In a cyclone that hit the area in November, 1977, Subbaiah, his wife Venkatarathnamma, Venkaiah and his wife Seethamma and the plaintiff's wife Padmavathi, died. The plaintiff, thereafter, constructed the suit house. 4. It is further pleaded that defendant is the married daughter of Venkaiah, resident of Avanigadda and she has got no right, title or interest in the plaint schedule property. However, she has unnecessarily interfered and obstructed in plaintiff's possession over the plaint schedule property. The defendant being the adjacent landowner has been trying to encroach upon the suit land with the help of antisocial elements without there being any semblance of right, title or interest in the suit schedule property. 5. The defendant contested the suit on the pleadings, inter alia, that the plaintiff never had any title or possession over the plaint A and B schedule properties and denied all material plaint allegations. The plaint averment of execution of Will by Subbaiah and his wife Raghavamma and execution of Gift Deed by Venkaiah and his wife as also the event of partition were all specifically denied. 6. The suit is filed for two properties. The first property in schedule 'A' is total extent of Ac.2.43 cents in two parts, i.e. (1) Ac.1.50 cents in Sy.No.807 in Patta No.3438 and (2) Ac.0.93 cents in Sy.No.806 in Patta No.1090. Schedule 'B' property is house with Panchayat No.452, Assessment No.418 in an extent of Ac.0.05 cents with specific boundaries. According to the plaintiff, the extent of Ac.1.00 cents of land was gifted to him by Venkaiah and his wife, whereas the remaining area of Ac.1.47 cents was bequeathed to him by Subbaiah through a Will Deed. Schedule 'B' property is house with Panchayat No.452, Assessment No.418 in an extent of Ac.0.05 cents with specific boundaries. According to the plaintiff, the extent of Ac.1.00 cents of land was gifted to him by Venkaiah and his wife, whereas the remaining area of Ac.1.47 cents was bequeathed to him by Subbaiah through a Will Deed. Insofar as schedule 'B' property is concerned, the plaintiff's case is that the house was constructed by him as the land was given to him by Subbaiah. Basing on the defendant's plea that she has acquired title to the plaint schedule property by way of adverse possession, the trial court concluded that she is not the owner of the property; therefore, she is claiming adverse possession. The trial court also concluded that plaintiff has not produced any registered gift deed executed by Venkaiah and his wife. Therefore, prima facie, gift of Ac.1.00 cents by Venkaiah and his wife is not proved. It is also held that plaintiff has failed to prove that he is in the son-in-law of Venkaiah and, thus, the entire claim of the plaintiff over the properties falling in the share of Venkaiah, was dismissed. Having found that Ex.A.19, Adangal for fasli 1401 discloses the plaint schedule Sy.Nos.806, 807, showing Ac.2.83 cents and Ac.3.17 cents respectively, is entered in the name of both the plaintiff and defendant as possession holders, the trial court held that none of the parties can claim exclusive possession of plaint 'A' schedule property. In the absence of the fact of partition being proved, the trial court was of the opinion that both the brothers, i.e. Subbaiah and Venkaiah enjoyed their respective shares. 7. Insofar as schedule 'B' property is concerned, the trial court, on the basis of evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2, concluded that Subbaiah during his lifetime and, thereafter, plaintiff enjoyed possession over this property and after the cyclone in the year 1977; plaintiff re-constructed the house and has proved his enjoyment by placing in evidence house tax receipts Exs.A.11 to A.18. The plaintiff was not cross-examined on these house tax receipts. Therefore, the trial court recorded a clear finding that plaintiff is residing in the plaint 'B' schedule property. It was also observed that since defendant is residing in a different village after her marriage, her possession or residence in the schedule 'B' property does not arise. The plaintiff was not cross-examined on these house tax receipts. Therefore, the trial court recorded a clear finding that plaintiff is residing in the plaint 'B' schedule property. It was also observed that since defendant is residing in a different village after her marriage, her possession or residence in the schedule 'B' property does not arise. The trial court, thus, dismissed the suit in respect of 'A' schedule property, allowed in respect of 'B' schedule property and, accordingly, granted permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff in respect of 'B' schedule property. 8. The defendant did not challenge the decree passed by the trial court rendering the trial court's finding on 'B' schedule property as final. Only the plaintiff preferred first appeal and challenged dismissal of his suit in respect of 'A' schedule property. 9. While considering the plaintiff's appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court dismissing the suit in respect of 'A' schedule property, the first appellate court considered the case of both the parties in detail and proceeded to dwell on the issue keeping in view the defendant's case of setting up adverse possession, meaning thereby, she is not the owner of the property as also the fact that, according to the defendant, she entered into sale agreement with the plaintiff agreeing to purchase part of the 'A' schedule property from the plaintiff, which goes to suggest that defendant also admitted plaintiff's ownership of the property; otherwise, she would not have entered into an agreement for purchase of part of 'A' schedule property. 10. The first appellate court, thereafter, focused its discussion on a few admitted facts, which are plaintiff's marriage with Subbaiah's daughter Lalithamba in the year 1965 and her death due to snakebite in the year 1971; plaintiff's subsequent marriage with Venkaiah's second daughter Padmavathi and that during this entire period of time, plaintiff used to reside with either Subbaiah or Venkaiah. 11. The first appellate court, thereafter, considered the documentary evidence Exs.A.1 to A.22 and set out in detail the legal implication of the entries in Ex.A.19, certified copy of Adangal. The first appellate court, thereafter, specifically referred to the admission of D.W.1 in her statement that the property shown under Ex.A.19 was divided into equal shares between the two brothers Subbaiah and Venkaiah in which both of them received Ac.3.50 cents each. Thus, the factum of partition is admitted by D.W.1. The first appellate court, thereafter, specifically referred to the admission of D.W.1 in her statement that the property shown under Ex.A.19 was divided into equal shares between the two brothers Subbaiah and Venkaiah in which both of them received Ac.3.50 cents each. Thus, the factum of partition is admitted by D.W.1. In this partition, out of the total extent of land in Sy.No.807, both the brothers got Ac.1.43 cents each, whereas from Sy.No.806, both of them got Ac.1.58 cents each. The first appellate court also noted the death of both the brothers, their respective wives and the entire family except D.W.1 in the cyclone and tidal wave in the area of Diviseema in the year 1977 and the claim of the defendant that she came into possession of her father's share of the property after his death, which fact is also admitted by P.W.1. Thus, it is admitted position, considering the statements of P.W.1 and D.W.1, that both of them came into possession of the respective shares of Subbaiah and Venkaiah after their death in the year 1977, which lends credence to the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff to demonstrate his possession which includes payment of tax by the plaintiff to the Government as evidenced from Exs.A.1 to A.10, A.20 and A.21 from prior to 1980. The first appellate court has extracted the above admission of D.W.1 in the cross-examination. D.W.1 admits of sale deeds effected by herself as alleged by the plaintiff out of the shares they have received from Subbaiah and Venkaiah respectively. The first appellate court would thus, based upon its finding, considered the entire evidence, both oral and documentary and the oral statement of D.W.1, to hold that it is not fair on the part of D.W.1 to contend that P.W.1 never had any ownership rights and possession over the property of Subbaiah. Having found the authenticity of Ex.A.19, certified copy of survey bandobust issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, the first appellate court held that it was not proper for the trial court to hold that Ex.A.19 cannot be given credence. Having found the authenticity of Ex.A.19, certified copy of survey bandobust issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, the first appellate court held that it was not proper for the trial court to hold that Ex.A.19 cannot be given credence. The first appellate court, thereafter, considered the boundaries and other ground situation concerning both the items of 'A' schedule property to record a finding that the reasons recorded by the trial court rejecting the claim put forth by the plaintiff in respect of 'A' schedule property, are not based on proper appreciation of material placed before the court. Resultantly, the first appellate court allowed the suit in its entirety. 12. Learned counsel for the defendant has argued that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appeal does not involve the substantial questions of law framed by this Court. 13. The questions of law framed by this court at the time of admission of the appeal are mainly concerning the validity of the gift deed or the will deed and whether, in the absence of valid proof of the execution of both the documents and the same having not been produced in the court, the same can form basis of the findings recorded by the first appellate court. As this court mentioned the entire discussion of the first appellate court as to the nature of evidence put forth by the plaintiff to prove his case for issuance of permanent injunction, it is important to bear in mind that the first appellate court has not allowed the appeal on the basis of the gift deed or the will deed, but it has considered the prima facie title of P.W.1 over the 'A' schedule property on the basis of the revenue records and the admission of D.W.1 in her cross-examination. Thus, the first appeal has not been allowed on the basis of gift deed or will deed, but the conclusion of the first appellate court as to the possession of the plaintiff and the prima facie ownership being not based on gift deed or will deed, the substantial questions of law would not arise for determination in this appeal. The second appellate court is empowered under Sec. 100(5) of CPC to consider, at the hearing of the appeal, to decide that the case does not involve such question. The second appellate court is empowered under Sec. 100(5) of CPC to consider, at the hearing of the appeal, to decide that the case does not involve such question. The respondent has raised this objection basing upon the provision contained in Sec. 100(5) of CPC and this Court is convinced that the substantial questions of law framed by this Court for hearing of the appeal would not arise for determination. 14. It is further important to bear in mind that the defendant herself entered into sale agreement with the plaintiff to purchase some part of 'A' schedule property, meaning thereby, that she admits the prima facie title of the plaintiff over the 'A' schedule property. In such a case, the plaintiff has got the best title compared to others and thus the defendant is estopped from challenging the claim of the plaintiff seeking permanent injunction. It is settled that a party to the suit cannot be allowed to aprobate and reprobate. When, while entering into sale agreement, the defendant prima facie admits plaintiff's title to the property, it is not open for her to turn back at a subsequent point of time and set out title in herself. 15. It is also settled that the first appellate court is the final court insofar as finding of fact is concerned and the same cannot be set aside by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 100 CPC, unless the same is found to be perverse. Having examined the record, this court does not find any perversity or any defect in appreciation of evidence by the first appellate court, so as to conclude that the finding recorded by it is not borne out of record. Consequently, this court does not find that the judgment rendered by the first appellate court deserves to be set aside. 16. Accordingly, this second appeal fails and is, hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.