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Gujarat High Court · body

2023 DIGILAW 807 (GUJ)

Manishkumar Ramvilas Agarwal v. State of Gujarat

2023-07-06

SANDEEP N.BHATT

body2023
JUDGMENT : SANDEEP N. BHATT, J. 1. All these applications are filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘the Code’ for short) for quashing and setting aside the complaints being Criminal Case Nos. 33269, 33268, 33253, 33262, 33263, 33264, 33265, 33252, 33266, 33267, 35578, 35579, 33271 and 33270 of 2013 respectively filed under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act (‘NI Act’ for short). 2. As the common question of facts and law are involved in all these applications, at the request of learned advocates for the parties, they are heard together and disposed of by this common oral judgment. 3. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned APP waives service of notice of rule for respondent no. 1-state and learned advocate Ms. Minoo Shah waives service of notice of rule for respondent no. 2. 4. For the sake of convenience, the facts of Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 17940 of 2018 are considered, which are as under: 4.1. A complaint came to be filed by the complainant stating that the complainant is a limited company registered under the Companies Act; that the applicants and one another are directors of one Superfine Syntex Ltd. - a limited company registered under the Companies Act; that the complainant is engaged in manufacturing and selling of polyester chips, yarn, sarees and clothes; that the applicants have purchased polyester chips vide three different invoices, for which Superfine Syntex Ltd. has undertaken to pay the due amount; three cheques for the same were issued to the complainant; however, when the cheques were deposited, the same were returned with endorsement ‘exceeds arrangement’ therefore, demand notice was issued to the accused company and their directors; reply was given to the same, however, the complainant filed the impugned criminal cases against the applicants, which are sought to be quashed by filing these applications. 5. Heard learned advocates for the parties. 5.1 Learned advocate Mr. Munshi for the applicants submitted that the applicant no. 1 is permanent resident of Kolkata; that both the applicants have given their resignation as directors dated 10.12.2012 which was considered by the said company in its resolution dated 10.12.2012 and filed the same before the ROC by filing form no. 32. 5.1 Learned advocate Mr. Munshi for the applicants submitted that the applicant no. 1 is permanent resident of Kolkata; that both the applicants have given their resignation as directors dated 10.12.2012 which was considered by the said company in its resolution dated 10.12.2012 and filed the same before the ROC by filing form no. 32. He further submitted that the applicants were never engaged into day to day activities of the said company nor are they signatories to the cheque; that the cheque given to the complainant along with the forwarding letter dated 4.1.2013 was signed by original accused no. 3 and not the applicants; that there is no averment in the complaint that the applicants are directors and in charge of the day to day affairs of the company and there is only a bald assertion made by the complainant in the complaint; that there is no averment in the complaint itself to show how the applicants were actively involved in the company and what acts and duties were performed by the applicants in the company and therefore the basic averment of Section 141 of the NI Act is not complied with; that the applicants have already tendered their resignations which are accepted by the Registrar of Companies in the year 2012. He, therefore, submitted that these applications are required to be allowed and the impugned complaints are required to be quashed by exercising inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. 5.2 He relied on the following judgments in support of his submissions: 1. K. Srikant Singh vs. North East Securities Ltd. and Another, 2007 (9) JT SC 449 2. Saroj Kumar Poddar vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another, 2007 (3) SCC 693 3. National Small Industries Corporation Ltd vs. Harmeet Singh Paintal, 2010 (3) SCC 330 4. SMS Pharmaceutical Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla and Another, 2005 (8) SCC 89 5. Rahul Chaturbhai Vaghasia vs. State of Gujarat in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 5481 of 2011 and 5482 of 2011, dated 3.2.2017 6. Per contra, learned advocate Ms. Minoo Shah for the respondent no. 2-complainant submitted that as per the instructions received, the criminal case is at the stage of cross examination of the complainant and hence the trial is at an advanced stage. She submits that the applications suffer from delay and laches; that the respondent company has also filed summary suit against the accused no. Minoo Shah for the respondent no. 2-complainant submitted that as per the instructions received, the criminal case is at the stage of cross examination of the complainant and hence the trial is at an advanced stage. She submits that the applications suffer from delay and laches; that the respondent company has also filed summary suit against the accused no. 1 company, which was allowed by the concerned court. She submitted that the applicants have participated in the negotiations and the purchases were made during their tenure as directors and it was only the payment was effected subsequently as the invoices pertain to the months of August and September, 2012. She submits that the negotiations took place in the year 2012 and the material was received by the accused no. 1 much prior to their retirement as directors and therefore the transactions were within their knowledge and therefore they cannot be absolved from their liability. 6.1 She submits that the cause of action for filing the present applications has ceased to exist as the amount which is the subject matter of the criminal complaint from which the present proceedings arise has been adjudicated against the accused no. 1 company which established the participation of the applicants for and on behalf of the accused no. 1 company. She, therefore, submits that the averments of the respondent company meet the basic ingredients are in consonance with the provisions of Section 141 of the NI Act and therefore the complaints are not required to be quashed and set aside. She, therefore, prayed to dismiss these applications. 6.2 She relied on the following citations in support of her submissions: 1. Gunmala Sales Pvt. Ltd. vs. Anu Mehta and Others, (2015) 1 SCC 103 2. Zafar Yunus Sareshwala vs. State of Gujarat in Special Criminal Application Nos. 8538 of 2022 decided on 11.4.2023 7. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 7.1 At the outset, the provisions of Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act are required to be seen, which read as under: “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. of funds in the account. 8538 of 2022 decided on 11.4.2023 7. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 7.1 At the outset, the provisions of Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act are required to be seen, which read as under: “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. of funds in the account. Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for “a term which may extend to two year” or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless: (a) The cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. (b) The payee or the holder induce course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer, of the cheque, “within thirty days” of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheques as unpaid. (c) The drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. (c) The drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation: For the purpose of this section “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.” “141 Offences by companies: (1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence: Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attribute to, any neglect on the part of, any director, Manager, secretary, or other office of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation - For the purposes of this section: (a) “Company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals. (b) “Director” in relating to a firm, means a partner in the firm.” 7.2 Now, if the facts of the present case are perused, the applicants have already resigned as directors of the company at the time of issuance of the bounced cheques, which factum, is prima facie established from the perusal of form no. (b) “Director” in relating to a firm, means a partner in the firm.” 7.2 Now, if the facts of the present case are perused, the applicants have already resigned as directors of the company at the time of issuance of the bounced cheques, which factum, is prima facie established from the perusal of form no. 32 before the Registrar of Companies. Even on bare perusal of the complaint, it transpires that there is no specific allegation about the post-dated cheques or that the present applicants are actively responsible for day-to-day affairs of the company. It is an undisputed fact that the resignation is given by the present applicants as per the record available on this petition on 10.12.2012 and the cheques were issued on 15.4.2013, which is much subsequent to the resignation given by the present applicants. It is also the fact that the company is still existing and available for recovery of the dues, if any, of the complainant. Further, the documents produced on record by the applicant in these applications remained uncontroverted and as such, these documents pertain to government record and found acceptable in the eye of law. It is also a fact that the accused no. 1-company is the drawer of the cheque and the accused no. 3 has signed it in the capacity of the director of the accused no. 1-company, therefore, the applicants, who have resigned as directors of the company much prior, have nothing to do with the same. 7.3 As regards the judgments cited at the bar, it held that the allegations made in the complaint must be very specific and the allegations that the directors are responsible for day-to-day affairs are also required to be made in very specific manner. In the case on hand, there is no specific allegation that the cheques were issued by the present applicants and it is clearly mentioned that the cheques were signed by the original accused no. 3 as director of the accused no. 1-company. 8. In the case of Gunmala Sales Private Limited (supra), it is held in paragraphs 29 to 31 by the Hon’ble Apex Court, which read as under: “29. 3 as director of the accused no. 1-company. 8. In the case of Gunmala Sales Private Limited (supra), it is held in paragraphs 29 to 31 by the Hon’ble Apex Court, which read as under: “29. When a petition is filed for quashing the process, in a given case, on an overall reading of the complaint, the High Court may find that the basic averment is sufficient, that it makes out a case against the Director; that there is nothing to suggest that the substratum of the allegation against the Director is destroyed rendering the basic averment insufficient and that since offence is made out against him, his further role can be brought out in the trial. In another case, the High Court may quash the complaint despite the basic averment. It may come across some unimpeachable evidence or acceptable circumstances which may in its opinion lead to a conclusion that the Director could never have been in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time and, therefore, making him stand the trial would be abuse of the process of court as no offence is made out against him. 30. When in view of the basic averment process is issued the complaint must proceed against the Directors. But, if any Director wants the process to be quashed by filing a petition under Section 482 of the Code on the ground that only a bald averment is made in the complaint and that he is really not concerned with the issuance of the cheque, he must in order to persuade the High Court to quash the process either furnish some sterling uncontrovertible material or acceptable circumstances to substantiate his contention. He must make out a case that making him stand the trial would be abuse of the process of court. He cannot get the complaint quashed merely on the ground that apart from the basic averment no particulars are given in the complaint about his role, because ordinarily the basic averment would be sufficient to send him to trial and it could be argued that his further role could be brought out in the trial. Quashing of a complaint is a serious matter. Complaint cannot be quashed for the asking. For quashing of a complaint it must be shown that no offence is made out at all against the Director. 31. Quashing of a complaint is a serious matter. Complaint cannot be quashed for the asking. For quashing of a complaint it must be shown that no offence is made out at all against the Director. 31. In this connection, it would be advantageous to refer to Harshendra Kumar D. vs. Rebatilata Koley and Others, where process was issued by the Magistrate on a complaint filed under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act. The appellant therein challenged the proceeding by filing revision application under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code. The case of the appellant-Director was that he had resigned from Directorship. His resignation was accepted and notified to the Registrar of Companies. It was averred in the complaint that the appellant was responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company and it was on his and other Directors assurance those demand drafts were issued. Despite this averment, this Court quashed the complaint taking into account resolution passed by the company, wherein it was reflected that the appellant had resigned from the post of Director much prior to the issuance of cheque and the fact that the company had submitted Form-32. It was argued before this Court that the documents furnished by the accused could not have been taken into account. Repelling this submission this Court observed as under: 24. In Awadh Kishore Gupta, AIR 2004 SC 517 : 2003 AIR SCW 6501, this Court while dealing with the scope of power under Section 482 of the Code observed: (SCC p. 701, Para 13): 13. It is to be noted that the investigation was not complete and at that stage it was impermissible for the High Court to look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, it is not permissible for the court to act as if it was a trial Judge.” 25. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, it is not permissible for the court to act as if it was a trial Judge.” 25. In our judgment, the above observations cannot be read to mean that in a criminal case where trial is yet to take place and the matter is at the stage of issuance of summons or taking cognizance, materials relied upon by the accused which are in the nature of public documents or the materials which are beyond suspicion or doubt, in no circumstance, can be looked into by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 or for that matter in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. It is fairly settled now that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 or revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code in a case where complaint is sought to be quashed, it is not proper for the High Court to consider the defence of the accused or embark upon an enquiry in respect of merits of the accusations. However, in an appropriate case, if on the face of the documents - which are beyond suspicion or doubt - placed by the accused, the accusations against him cannot stand, it would be travesty of justice if the accused is relegated to trial and he is asked to prove his defence before the trial court. In such a matter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the matter at prima facie stage. 26. Criminal prosecution is a serious matter; it affects the liberty of a person. No greater damage can be done to the reputation of a person than dragging him in a criminal case. In our opinion, the High Court fell into grave error in not taking into consideration the uncontroverted documents relating to the appellant's resignation from the post of Director of the Company. Had these documents been considered by the High Court, it would have been apparent that the appellant has resigned much before the cheques were issued by the Company.” 9. At this stage, it is also fruitful to refer to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.P. Mani and Mohan Dairy vs. Dr. Had these documents been considered by the High Court, it would have been apparent that the appellant has resigned much before the cheques were issued by the Company.” 9. At this stage, it is also fruitful to refer to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.P. Mani and Mohan Dairy vs. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan, 2022 SCC Online SC 1238, more particularly, paragraphs 40, 41 and 47, which read as under: “40. The principles discernible from the aforesaid decision of this Court in the case of Ashutosh Ashok Parasrampuriya (supra) is that the High Court should not interfere under Section 482 of the Code at the instance of an accused unless it comes across some unimpeachable and incontrovertible evidence to indicate that the Director/partner of a firm could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques. This Court clarified that in a given case despite the presence of basic averments, the High Court may conclude that no case is made out against the particular Director/ partner provided the Director/partner is able to adduce some unimpeachable and incontrovertible evidence beyond suspicion and doubt. Specific Averments in the complaint: 41. In Gunmala Sales Private Limited (supra), this Court after an exhaustive review of its earlier decisions on Section 141 of the NI Act, summarized its conclusion as under: “(a) Once in a complaint filed under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act the basic averment is made that the Director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed, the Magistrate can issue process against such Director. (b) If a petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of such a complaint by the Director, the High Court may, in the facts of a particular case, on an overall reading of the complaint, refuse to quash the complaint because the complaint contains the basic averment which is sufficient to make out a case against the Director. (c) In the facts of a given case, on an overall reading of the complaint, the High Court may, despite the presence of the basic averment, quash the complaint because of the absence of more particulars about role of the Director in the complaint. (c) In the facts of a given case, on an overall reading of the complaint, the High Court may, despite the presence of the basic averment, quash the complaint because of the absence of more particulars about role of the Director in the complaint. It may do so having come across some unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or totally acceptable circumstances which may clearly indicate that the Director could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques and asking him to stand the trial would be abuse of the process of the court. Despite the presence of basic averment, it may come to a conclusion that no case is made out against the Director. Take for instance a case of a Director suffering from a terminal illness who was bedridden at the relevant time or a Director who had resigned long before issuance of cheques. In such cases, if the High Court is convinced that prosecuting such a Director is merely an arm-twisting tactics, the High Court may quash the proceedings. It bears repetition to state that to establish such case unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or some totally acceptable circumstances will have to be brought to the notice of the High Court. Such cases may be few and far between but the possibility of such a case being there cannot be ruled out. In the absence of such evidence or circumstances, complaint cannot be quashed. (d) No restriction can be placed on the High Court's powers under Section 482 of the Code. The High Court always uses and must use this power sparingly and with great circumspection to prevent inter-alia the abuse of the process of the Court. There are no fixed formulae to be followed by the High Court in this regard and the exercise of this power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court at that stage does not conduct a mini trial or roving inquiry, but nothing prevents it from taking unimpeachable evidence or totally acceptable circumstances into account which may lead it to conclude that no trial is necessary qua a particular Director.” 47. Our final conclusions may be summarised as under: (a) The primary responsibility of the complainant is to make specific averments in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. Our final conclusions may be summarised as under: (a) The primary responsibility of the complainant is to make specific averments in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no legal requirement for the complainant to show that the accused partner of the firm was aware about each and every transaction. On the other hand, the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the Act clearly lays down that if the accused is able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that the offence was committed without his/her knowledge or he/she had exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence, he/she will not be liable of punishment. (b) The complainant is supposed to know only generally as to who were in charge of the affairs of the company or firm, as the case may be. The other administrative matters would be within the special knowledge of the company or the firm and those who are in charge of it. In such circumstances, the complainant is expected to allege that the persons named in the complaint are in charge of the affairs of the company/firm. It is only the Directors of the company or the partners of the firm, as the case may be, who have the special knowledge about the role they had played in the company or the partners in a firm to show before the court that at the relevant point of time they were not in charge of the affairs of the company. Advertence to Sections 138 and Section 141 respectively of the NI Act shows that on the other elements of an offence under Section 138 being satisfied, the burden is on the Board of Directors or the officers in charge of the affairs of the company/partners of a firm to show that they were not liable to be convicted. The existence of any special circumstance that makes them not liable is something that is peculiarly within their knowledge and it is for them to establish at the trial to show that at the relevant time they were not in charge of the affairs of the company or the firm. (c) Needless to say, the final judgment and order would depend on the evidence adduced. (c) Needless to say, the final judgment and order would depend on the evidence adduced. Criminal liability is attracted only on those, who at the time of commission of the offence, were in charge of and were responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm. But vicarious criminal liability can be inferred against the partners of a firm when it is specifically averred in the complaint about the status of the partners 'qua' the firm. This would make them liable to face the prosecution but it does not lead to automatic conviction. Hence, they are not adversely prejudiced if they are eventually found to be not guilty, as a necessary consequence thereof would be acquittal. (d) If any Director wants the process to be quashed by filing a petition under Section 482 of the Code on the ground that only a bald averment is made in the complaint and that he/she is really not concerned with the issuance of the cheque, he/she must in order to persuade the High Court to quash the process either furnish some sterling incontrovertible material or acceptable circumstances to substantiate his/her contention. He/she must make out a case that making him/her stand the trial would be an abuse of process of Court.” 10. In view of the above settled legal position, though huge amount is involved and the applicant might be involved in many such other transactions with other persons also, in view of the fact that applicant no. 1 is resident of Kolkata and has already given resignation and filed the same before Registrar of Companies by filing Form No. 32 pursuant to Section 303(2), 264(2) or 266(1)(a) and 266(1)(b)(iii) of Companies Act, 1956 and the said Form No. 32 specifically mentions the date of resignation of applicant no. 1 as well as the applicant no. 2 who have resigned as directors from company on 10.12.2012, the cheques were deposited on 15.4.2013 and returned on 17.4.2013 and further transpires that in reply to demand notice given by the accused company dated 16.5.2013 also, it is averred that present applicants are not directors at the time of deposit or return of cheque in question and the accused no. 3 has issued the cheque in question, who is not before this Court in the present petition, the applicants cannot be arraigned as accused as they have already resigned as directors much prior to the alleged transaction. Such factum is prima-facie established by the applicant by producing the document uploaded in the government record which was not controverted enough, therefore, the ingredients of Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act are not satisfied against the present applicants and this is a fit case to exercise the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. However, it is open for the complainant to avail remedies whichever is permissible under criminal as well as civil laws against the company and other accused. 11. As regards the contention raised by the complainant that now criminal case is proceeded further, this Court cannot exercise inherent powers under Section 482 at any stage of trial, the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta and Another vs. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home and Another, (2019) 11 SCC 706 is required to be referred to. Paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the said judgment read as under: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent No. 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. vs. State of Gujarat. In the case of Joseph Salvaraj A. (supra), this Court while deciding the question whether the High Court could entertain the 482 petition for quashing of FIR, when the charge sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the 482 petition, observed: “16. Thus, from the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge-sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima-facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 15. Even otherwise it must be remembered that the provision invoked by the accused before the High Court is Section 482 Cr. or not.” 15. Even otherwise it must be remembered that the provision invoked by the accused before the High Court is Section 482 Cr. P.C. and that this Court is hearing an appeal from an order under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Section 482 of Cr.P.C. reads as follows: - “482. Saving of inherent power of the High Court - Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 16. There is nothing in the words of this Section which restricts the exercise of the power of the Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage of justice only to the stage of the FIR. It is settled principle of law that the High court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. even when the discharge application is pending with the trial court. Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced, and the allegations have materialized into a charge sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge sheet after investigation. The power is undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of process of power of any court.” 12. It is also relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami and Another vs. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 , more particularly Para 23 & 24 thereof, which read as under: “23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code. (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court. (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. Inherent power under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code. (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court. (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 24. Inherent powers under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute. Discussion of decided cases.” 13. In view of above settled position of law and after considering the facts as alleged in the complaint under Section 138 of the Act and circumstances of the present case, it transpires that continuation of further proceedings pursuant to the said complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act will cause greater hardships to the applicants and no fruitful purpose would be served if such further proceedings are allowed to be continued. The Court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with ulterior motive to pressurise accused or to settle the score. 14. Resultantly, all these applications are allowed qua the present applicants. The Criminal Case Nos. Criminal Case Nos. 33269, 33268, 33253, 33262, 33263, 33264, 33265, 33252, 33266, 33267, 35578, 35579, 33271 and 33270 of 2013 are hereby quashed and set aside qua the present applicants only. Rule is made absolute. Direct service is permitted.