JUDGMENT : The instant writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein, the part of the award, by which, instead of reinstating the workmen in service with the consequential benefits, the compensation to the tune of Rs.12,000/-was awarded to the workmen, has been assailed. 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, are required to be enumerated reads as under:- It is the case of the writ petitioner that on 14.12.2002, the Govt. of Jharkhand, Dept. of Labour & Employment by its notification no.3063 referred the following disputes for adjudication:- “Whether the dismissal of four workers Sarv Shri Somra Munda, Shri Tulsi Oraon, Tejua Oraon and Daswan Oraon of M/s Agarwal Pipe Industries Pandra, Ranchi is justified? If not what relief they are entitled to”. This reference was sent to the Labour Court, Ranchi where it was registered as Reference No.2 of 2003. The Union and the Management both appeared, filed their respective written statements and furnished their evidences also. It is the further case of the writ petitioner-workmen that since the Management was not paying even the minimum wages to the workmen and on behalf of them, a demand was raised which enraged the Management and took vindictive attitude. Thereafter, a case was filed before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Ranchi under M.W. Act and the concerned workmen gave their evidences against the non-payment of minimum wages by the Management, the Inspector of Factories are also directed the Management to pay the minimum wages to the workmen but the Management failed to do so. All these actions of the Union and the concerned workmen went against and the workmen were dismissed from service. On 22.05.1996, the charge sheets were issued to these concerned workmen and they submitted their reply on 02.06.1996. The Management found the replies to be unsatisfactory and as such on 06.08.1996, the Management appointed Sri A.K. Verma, Advocate as an Enquiry Officer. The concerned workmen objected about the appointment of an Advocate as Enquiry Officer as they were advised to have their own defence counsel but in spite of this objection, the enquiry proceeded. It was an ex-parte enquiry and enquiry officer submitted its report on 09.07.1996 and found them guilty of the charges leveled against them. The concerned workmen objected about the appointment of an Advocate as Enquiry Officer as they were advised to have their own defence counsel but in spite of this objection, the enquiry proceeded. It was an ex-parte enquiry and enquiry officer submitted its report on 09.07.1996 and found them guilty of the charges leveled against them. The domestic enquiry has been held in violation of principles of natural justice without affording proper opportunity to the concerned workmen and as such, departmental enquiry is fit to be set aside. On the basis of this enquiry report dated 09.07.1996 of the Management dismissed these workmen on 05.02.1997. Thereafter, the Labour Court, Ranchi has passed an award dated 01.07.2008, wherein, the Management of M/s. Agarwal Pipe & Tiles industries, Ranchi has been directed to pay lumsum compensation of Rs.12,000/-to each workmen instead of reinstating the workmen in service. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid, the instant writ petition has been filed. The facts of the case, as per the pleading made as referred hereinabove that the workmen who have been dismissed from service, against which, a reference has been made under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1947) vide notification dated 14.12.2002 for adjudication and submission of Award of reference that: “Whether the dismissal of four workers Sarv Shri Somra Munda, Shri Tulsi Oraon, Tejua Oraon and Daswan Oraon of M/s Agarwal Pipe Industries Pandra, Ranchi is justified? If not what relief they are entitled to”. The learned Labour Court, Ranchi after receiving the reference has called upon the Management to put forth his defence. The learned Labour Court, after hearing the parties has passed the award of compensating the workmen, writ petitioner by making payment of Rs.12,000/-to be made by the respondent-Management. If not what relief they are entitled to”. The learned Labour Court, Ranchi after receiving the reference has called upon the Management to put forth his defence. The learned Labour Court, after hearing the parties has passed the award of compensating the workmen, writ petitioner by making payment of Rs.12,000/-to be made by the respondent-Management. The learned Labour Court, Ranchi has taken into consideration the provision of sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, as per which, no employer shall, during the pendency of any proceedings arising out of any claim, take any action against any employee concerned in such claim case by altering to the prejudice of such employee, the conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; and by discharging, terminating the services in any manner or punishing whether by dismissal or otherwise of such workers, save with the express permission in writing of the Authority before whom the proceeding is pending. The Labour Court has come to the conclusive finding that the order of dismissal is without any approval as required to be approved in view of the provision of sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and accordingly, the finding has been reached that the Management ought not to have dismissed the workmen without obtaining permission from the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Ranchi during the pendency of case M.W.1/97 as per the requirement of sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. But instead of passing the order of reinstatement, the learned Labour Court has held the workmen entitled for compensation of Rs.12,000/-. The writ petition has been filed assailing the direction for making payment of compensation of Rs.12,000/-instead of order of reinstatement with consequential benefits. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-workmen has submitted that once the order of dismissal has been held to be illegal due to non-compliance of the statutory Mandate as contained under sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, then the consequence would be that the workmen would be deemed to be in service and in consequence thereof, the order of reinstatement ought to have been passed along with consequential benefits. But, the learned Labour Court, although, has come to the conclusion that the statutory command as per sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 has not been followed while dismissing the workmen from service but instead of order of reinstatement along with consequential benefits, the compensation has been directed to be paid and hence, that part of the order, suffers from illegality and as such, the same is fit to be quashed and set aside with a direction upon the respondent-Management of reinstatement in service along with consequential benefits. 4. Per Contra, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent-Management, however, has not disputed that the mandatory requirement, as stipulated under sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, has not been followed before dismissing the workmen from service, but the learned Labour Court, Ranchi since has passed an order of making compensation of Rs.12,000/-and as such, the same cannot be said to suffer from an error since the workmen have been compensated while making payment of compensation in their favour. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the permission as required to be obtained under sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, although, was sought for by making an application but it is the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Ranchi who has not accorded permission of dismissal of the workmen from service and as such, having no option, the order of dismissal has been passed. Learned counsel, therefore, has argued that the award suffers from no error. 5. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also considered the finding recorded by the learned Labour Court, Ranchi in the award passed. 6. The issue which requires consideration as to whether without observing the requirement as contemplated under sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 as incorporated by the State Amendments (Bihar) in Section 20 by insertion of Section 4-A, whereby and whereunder, it has been provided that there cannot be alteration in the condition of service to the prejudice of such employee and no decision is to be taken by discharging, terminating the services in any manner or punishing whether by dismissal or otherwise of such workers, save with express permission in writing of the Authority before whom the proceeding is pending. For ready reference, subsection 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 is being referred as under:- “(4-A) No employer shall, during the pendency of any proceedings arising out of any claim case, take any action against any employee concerned in such claim case- (a) by altering to the prejudice of such employee, the conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; and (b) by discharging, terminating the services in any manner or punishing whether by dismissal or otherwise of such workers, save with the express permission in writing of the Authority before whom the proceeding is pending.” It is, thus, evident from sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 as incorporated under the State Amendments (Bihar) that the embargo has been put to the employer during the pendency of any proceedings arising out of any claim, in taking any action against any employee concerned in such claim case by altering to the prejudice of such employee, the conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of such proceedings and by discharging, terminating the services in any manner or punishing whether by dismissal or otherwise of such workers, save with the express permission in writing of the Authority before whom the proceeding is pending. The very stipulation of sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 reflects the aforesaid statute to be mandatory in nature. This Court for the purpose of consideration of the issue and effect that in case, the order of dismissal has been passed by the establishment during the pendency of the proceedings, as required to be obtained under sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, deems it fit and proper to refer the provision of Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which has parimateria provision to that of sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. For ready reference, Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is being referred as under:- “33(2)(b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer.” It is thus, evident from the provision of Section 33(2)(b), wherein, also the embargo has been put upon the establishment/employer not to take any action against any employee concerned during the pendency of any proceedings arising out of any claim. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court has settled the law that what would be the consequence in case, the permission if not accorded by the authority or the Tribunal where the proceeding is pending. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of The Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Sharanpur Vrs. Govind, reported in AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1500, wherein, at paragraph-8, it has been held as under:- “8. Let us now turn to the words of the proviso in the background of what we have said above. The proviso lays down that no workman shall be discharged or dismissed unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. It will be clear that two kinds of punishment are subject to the conditions of the proviso, namely, discharge or dismissal. Any other kind of punishment is not within the proviso. Further the proviso lays down two conditions, namely, (i) payment of wages for one month and (ii) making of an application by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending, for approval of the action taken. It is not disputed before us that when the proviso lays down the conditions as to payment of the month's wages, all that the employer is required to do in order to carry out that condition is to tender the wages to the employee. It is not disputed before us that when the proviso lays down the conditions as to payment of the month's wages, all that the employer is required to do in order to carry out that condition is to tender the wages to the employee. But if the employee chooses not to accept the wages, he cannot come forward and say that there has been no payment of wages to him by the employer. Therefore, though S. 18 speaks of payment of one month's wages it can only mean that the employer has tendered the wages and that would amount to payment for otherwise a workman could always make the section unworkable by refusing to take the wages so far as the second condition about the making of the application is concerned the proviso requires that the application should be made for approval of the action taken by the employer. It has been urged on behalf of the respondent that the words "action liken" in this part of the proviso mean the action proposed to be taken and therefore all that the employer can do is to make an application to the tribunal asking it to approve the action proposed to be taken by it and it is only after the approval that the employer can proceed to dismiss or discharge the workman. We are however of opinion that on this interpretation there would really be no difference between subs. (2) and sub-s. (1) of S. 33 and the intention of the legislature in making the amendment in 1956 would be rendered nugatory. Moreover, it is against the rules of interpretation to add words to a provision, when the provision, as it stands, is capable of a reasonable meaning which will give effect to the intention of the legislature even on the words as they stand. Moreover, it is against the rules of interpretation to add words to a provision, when the provision, as it stands, is capable of a reasonable meaning which will give effect to the intention of the legislature even on the words as they stand. On the plain meaning of the proviso, it is clear that it gives the employer the power to discharge or dismiss the employee before obtaining the approval of the tribunal concerned; but at the same time the protection afforded to the employee by the proviso has to remain effective, it seems to us therefore that when the proviso speaks of an application for approval of the action taken, the action taken there is the order of actual discharge or dismissal made by the employer and it is for the approval of this order that the application is to be made. This is borne out by Form 'K' under R. 60 of the Rules framed under the Act which corresponds to Form XV under F. 31 of the U. P. Rules. Further the use of the word "approval" in the proviso also suggests that something has been done by the employer who seeks, approval of that from the tribunal. If the intention was that in view of the proviso the employer could not pass the order of dismissal or discharge without first obtaining the approval of the tribunal, we see no reason why the words in the proviso should not have been similar to those in sub-ss. (1) and (3), namely that no workman shall be discharged or dismissed without the express permission in writing of the authority concerned. The change therefore in the language used in the proviso to sub-s. (2)(b) clearly shows in our opinion that the legislature intended that employer would have the right to pass an order of discharge or dismissal subject to two conditions, namely, (i) payment of wages for one month and (ii) making of an application to the authority concerned for approval of the action taken. The use of the word "approval" also suggests that what has to be approved has already taken place, though sometimes approval may also be bought of a proposed action. The use of the word "approval" also suggests that what has to be approved has already taken place, though sometimes approval may also be bought of a proposed action. But it seems to us in the context that the approval here is of something done, as otherwise it would have been quite easy for the legislature to use the words "for approval of the action proposed to be taken" in the proviso. Further sub-s. (5) also suggests when it uses the words "approval of the action taken" that some action has been taken and it is that action which the employer wants to be approved by his application. The difference between sub-s. (1) and sub-s. (2) is therefore that under sub-s. (1) the employer proposes what he intends to do and asks or the express permission of the authority concerned to do it; in subs. (2) the employer takes the action and merely asks for the approval of the action taken from the authority concerned by his application. There can therefore be no doubt that sub-s. 2(b) read together with the proviso contemplates that the employer may pass an order of dismissal or discharge before obtaining the approval of the authority concerned and at the same time make an application for approval of the action taken by him. It is however urged on behalf of the respondent that if the employer dismisses or discharges a workman and then applies for approval of the action taken and the tribunal refuses to approve of the action the workman would be left with no remedy as there is no provision for reinstatement in S. 33(2). We however see no difficulty on this score. If the tribunal does not approve of the action taken by the employer, the result would be that the action taken by him would fall and thereupon the workman would be deemed never to have been dismissed or discharged and would remain in the service of the employer. In such a case no specific provision as to reinstatement is necessary and by the very fact of the tribunal not approving of the action of the employer, the dismiss or discharge of the workman would be of no effect and the workman concerned would continue to be in service as if there never was any dismissal or discharge by the employer. In that sense the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer does not become final and conclusive until it is approved by the tribunal under S. 33(2).” Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. Vrs. S.N. Modak, reported in (1965) 2 L.L.J. 128 , wherein, it has been held at paragraph-5 as under:- “5. Reverting then to the question of construing Section 33 of the Act, we may refer to some general considerations at the outset. Broadly stated, Section 33 provides that the conditions of service, etc. should remain unchanged under certain circumstances during the pendency of industrial adjudication proceedings. It is unnecessary to refer to the previous history of this section. It has undergone many changes; but for the purpose of the present appeal, we need not refer to the said changes. We are concerned with Section 33 as it stands after its final amendment in 1956. Section 33 consists of five subsections. For the purpose of this appeal, it is necessary to read sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 33: “(1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall— (a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service application to them immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; or (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute— (a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer.” A reading of the above two sub-sections of Section 33 makes it clear that its provisions are intended to be applied during the pendency of any proceeding either in the nature of conciliation proceeding or in the nature of proceeding by way of reference made under Section 10. The pendency of the relevant proceeding is thus one of the conditions prescribed for the application of Section 33. Section 33(1) also shows that the provisions of the said sub-section protect workmen concerned in the main dispute which is pending conciliation or adjudication. The effect of sub-section (1) is that where the conditions precedent prescribed by it are satisfied, the employer is prohibited from taking any action in regard to matters specified by clauses (a) and (b) against employees concerned in such dispute without the previous express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. In other words, in cases falling under sub-section (1), before any action can be taken by the employer to which reference is made by clauses (a) and (b), he must obtain the express permission of the specified authority. Section 33(2) proceeds to lay down a similar provision and the conditions precedent prescribed by it are the same as those contained in Section 33(1). The proviso to Section 33(2) is important for our purpose. This proviso shows that where action is intended to be taken by an employer against any of his employees which falls within the scope of clause (b), he can do so, subject to the requirements of the proviso. The proviso to Section 33(2) is important for our purpose. This proviso shows that where action is intended to be taken by an employer against any of his employees which falls within the scope of clause (b), he can do so, subject to the requirements of the proviso. If the employee is intended to be discharged or dismissed, an order can be passed by the employer against him, provided he has paid such employee the wages for one month, and he has made an application to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by him. The requirements of the proviso have been frequently considered by Industrial Tribunals and have been the subject-matter of decisions of this Court as well. It is now well-settled that the requirements of the proviso have to be satisfied by the employer on the basis that they form part of the same transaction; and stated generally, the employer must either pay or offer the salary for one month to the employee before passing an order of his discharge or dismissal, and must apply to the specified authority for approval of his action at the same time, or within such reasonably short time thereafter as to form part of the same transaction. It is also settled that if approval is granted, it takes effect from the date of the order passed by the employer for which approval was sought. If approval is not granted, the order of dismissal or discharge passed by the employer is wholly invalid or inoperative, and the employee can legitimately claim to continue to be in the employment of the employer notwithstanding the order passed by him dismissing or discharging him. In other words, approval by the prescribed authority makes the order of discharge or dismissal effective; in the absence of approval, such an order is invalid and inoperative in law.” It is thus, evident from the aforesaid proposition, as settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the effect of non-approval by the Court/Tribunal before whom the proceeding is pending will be that the concerned workmen will be deemed to be in service. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Limited Vrs. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Limited Vrs. Ram Gopal Sharma & Ors., reported in AIR 2002 Supreme Court 643 (Constitution Bench) has been pleased to hold that proviso to Section 33(2)(b) is mandatorily to be followed. 8. This Court by taking into consideration the parimateria provision as under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as provided under sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 incorporated under the State Amendment (Bihar), is of the view that the nature of command as under sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, wherein, it has been mandated that no employer shall, during pendency of any proceedings arising out of any claim case, take any action against any employee concerned in such claim case regarding alteration in the conditions of the service or taking any adverse decision regarding dismissal, retrenchment or discharge. The stipulation so made under sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, therefore, by taking into consideration the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Limited Vrs. Ram Gopal Sharma & Ors. (supra) that the aforesaid provision is required to be followed mandatorily, wherein, at paragraph-13, 14 & 15, it has been pleased to hold by the Hon’ble Apex Court that:- “13.The proviso to Section 33(2)(b), as can be seen from its very unambiguous and clear language, is mandatory. This apart, from the object of Section 33 and in the context of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b), it is obvious that the conditions contained in the said proviso are to be essentially complied with. Further any employer who contravenes the provisions of Section 33 invites a punishment under S. 31(1) with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 1000/-or with both. This penal provision is again a pointer of the mandatory nature of the proviso to comply with the conditions stated therein. To put it in other way, the said conditions being mandatory, are to be satisfied if an order of discharge or dismissal passed under Section 33(2)(b) is to be operative. 1000/-or with both. This penal provision is again a pointer of the mandatory nature of the proviso to comply with the conditions stated therein. To put it in other way, the said conditions being mandatory, are to be satisfied if an order of discharge or dismissal passed under Section 33(2)(b) is to be operative. If an employer desires to take benefit of the said provision for passing an order of discharge or dismissal of an employee, he has also to take the burden of discharging the statutory obligation placed on him in the said proviso. Taking a contrary view that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by an employer in contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso does not render such an order inoperative or void, defeats the very purpose of the proviso and it becomes meaningless. It is well-settled rule of interpretation that no part of statute shall be construed as unnecessary or superfluous. The proviso cannot be diluted or disobeyed by an employer. He cannot disobey the mandatory provision and then say that the order of discharge or dismissal made in contravention of Section 33(2)(b) is not void or inoperative. He cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. The interpretation of statute must be such that it should advance the legislative intent and serve the purpose for which it is made rather than to frustrate it. The proviso to Section 33(2)(b) affords protection to a workman to safeguard his interest and it is a shield against victimization and unfair labour practice by the employer during the pendency of industrial dispute when the relationship between them are already strained. An employer cannot be permitted to use the provision of Section 33(2)(b) to ease out a workman without complying with the conditions contained in the said proviso for any alleged misconduct said to be unconnected with the already pending industrial dispute. The protection afforded to a workman under the said provision cannot be taken away. If it is to be held that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer without complying with the requirements of the said proviso is not void or inoperative, the employer may with impunity discharge or dismiss a workman. 14. The protection afforded to a workman under the said provision cannot be taken away. If it is to be held that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer without complying with the requirements of the said proviso is not void or inoperative, the employer may with impunity discharge or dismiss a workman. 14. Where an application is made under Section 33(2)(b), Proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimization or unfair labour practice; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not, etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as if order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section 33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said provision. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement. But on the other hand, if approval is given by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved by such an approval, he is entitled to make a complaint under Section 33A challenging the order granting approval on any of the grounds available to him. Section 33A is available only to an employee and is intended to save his time and trouble inas much as he can straightway make a complaint before the very authority where the industrial dispute is already pending between the parties challenging the order of approval instead of making efforts to raise an industrial dispute, get a reference and thereafter adjudication. Section 33A is available only to an employee and is intended to save his time and trouble inas much as he can straightway make a complaint before the very authority where the industrial dispute is already pending between the parties challenging the order of approval instead of making efforts to raise an industrial dispute, get a reference and thereafter adjudication. In this view, it is not correct to say that even though where the order of discharge or dismissal is inoperative for contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso or where the approval is refused, a workman should still make a complaint under Section 33A and that the order of dismissal or discharge becomes invalid or void only when it is set aside under Section 33A and that till such time he should suffer misery of unemployment in spite of statutory protection given to him by the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). It is not correct to say that where the order of discharge or dismissal becomes inoperative because of contravention of proviso to Section 33(2)(b), Section 33A would be meaningless and futile. The said Section has a definite purpose to serve, as already stated above, enabling an employee to make a complaint, if aggrieved by the order of the approval granted. 15. The view that when no application is made or the one made is withdrawn, there is no order of refusal of such application on merit and as such the order of dismissal or discharge does not become void or inoperative unless such an order is set aside under Section 33A, cannot be accepted. In our view, not making an application under Section 33(2)(b) seeking approval or withdrawing an application once made before any order is made thereon, is a clear case of contravention of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). An employer who does not make an application under Section 33(2)(b) or withdraws the one made, cannot be rewarded by relieving him of the statutory obligation created on him to make such an application. If it is so done, he will be happier or more comfortable than an employer who obeys the command of law and makes an application inviting scrutiny of the authority in the matter of granting approval of the action taken by him. Adherence to and obedience of law should be obvious and necessary in a system governed by rule of law. Adherence to and obedience of law should be obvious and necessary in a system governed by rule of law. An employer by design can avoid to make an application after dismissing or discharging an employee or file it and withdraw before any order is passed on it, on its merits, to take a position that such order is not inoperative or void till it is set aside under Section 33A notwithstanding the contravention of Section 33(2)(b) proviso, driving the employee to have recourse to one or more proceeding by making a complaint under Section 33A or to raise another industrial dispute or to make a complaint under Section 31(1). Such an approach destroys the protection specifically and expressly given to an employee under the said proviso as against possible victimization, unfair labour practice or harassment because of pendency of industrial dispute so that an employee can be saved from hardship of unemployment.” The learned Labour Court herein also has considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter regarding compliance of the condition stipulated under sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 inserted by way of State Amendment (Bihar), as quoted and referred hereinabove and on the basis of the aforesaid condition and also considering the fact that no permission was accorded of the dismissal of the workmen from service and as such, has given its finding that the workmen should not have been dismissed. It is, therefore, evident from the award passed by the learned Labour Court that the order of dismissal has been held to be unjustified by answering the reference of justification of dismissal of four workers. But, the second issue of terms of reference that “what relief the workmen are entitled to”, has passed award holding the writ petitioner entitled for compensation of Rs.12000/-by way of making lumpsum compensation. 9. The question, therefore, has been raised on behalf of the writ petitioner that once sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 mandates for seeking permission before passing of the order of dismissal and if there is no permission to dismiss the workmen and in that circumstances, the order of dismissal has been held to be unjustified, then in that circumstances, the workmen ought to have been given entire consequential benefits by passing the order of reinstatement. 10. 10. This Court, in order to appreciate the aforesaid argument, is of the view on the basis of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove that the proposition has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court regarding effect of non-approval of the order of dismissal and in that eventuality, the concerned workmen will be deemed to be in service and thereby, they are entitled for consequential benefits. The learned Labour Court, therefore, according to the considered view of this Court, has not passed the award which can be said to be proper since once the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that the order of dismissal should not have been passed due to non-approval/permission of the authority before whom the proceeding was pending and as such, it was incumbent upon the Labour court to pass the award of reinstatement in service along with consequential benefits in the light of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments as referred hereinabove, wherein, it has been laid down that in absence of any approval of dismissal to be given by the adjudicator of the Tribunal, the concerned employee will be deemed to be in service. The learned Labour Court, therefore, has committed error in not passing the award regarding reinstatement of workmen in service with consequential benefits. The learned Labour Court, however, has put reliance upon the order passed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India reported in Labour Appellate Tribunal, 1954, in which, it was held that dismissal order in contravention of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act is bad in law, therefore, I am of the opinion that under the above fact and circumstances and legal position, the workmen are entitled to get some compensation in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, reported in 1990 (2) 226 and also in the light of decision of Madras High Court, reported in 1998 (1) L.L.J. P. 907. 11. So far as the ground taken by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that the application was filed before the authority seeking permission but since the permission has not been accorded, hence, the order of dismissal has been passed. 11. So far as the ground taken by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that the application was filed before the authority seeking permission but since the permission has not been accorded, hence, the order of dismissal has been passed. Even, on the basis of this argument, no relief can be granted to the Management due to the reason that this shows the admission on the part of the Management that the permission has not been accorded by the authority where the proceeding was pending. Even accepting that the application was made and if the permission was not granted, the same is to be considered by the authority concerned as to whether the permission is to be granted or not and no one can compel that the permission be granted as because permission depends upon the various aspects of the matter. If no decision has been taken as the learned counsel for the respondent is taking the ground then the question arises that why the respondent Management has not approached to the Higher Forum by raising the grievance of inaction on the part of the authority where the proceeding was pending. 12. Be that as it may, the question herein is that the permission has not been accorded as required to be obtained under sub-section 4-A of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. 13. It is the settled position of law that the quasi-judicial authority is to act as per the statutory command on the basis of principle that a thing is to be done as provided under the statute, as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh and Ors., reported in AIR (1964) SC 358, wherein, it has been held at paragraph-8 as under: 8. “....its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted....” In the case of Babu Verghese and Ors. vs. Bar Council of Kerala and Ors., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 422 , wherein, it has been held at paragraph nos. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted....” In the case of Babu Verghese and Ors. vs. Bar Council of Kerala and Ors., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 422 , wherein, it has been held at paragraph nos. 31 & 32 as under: “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor who stated as under: “[W]here a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.” 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-judge bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognized as a statutory principle of administrative law.” Further, in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala & Ors., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 633 , wherein, it has been held at paragraph 27 as under: “..... it is a normal rule of consideration that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself....” Likewise, in the case of State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ambay Cements & Anr., reported in (2005) 1 SCC 368 , wherein, it has been held at paragraph 26 as under: “....it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. It is [15] also settled rule of interpretation that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and followed.....” 14. It is [15] also settled rule of interpretation that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and followed.....” 14. But, this Court, after going through the aforesaid judgments is of the view that it is settled position of law that dismissal in absence of approval/permission of the Court where the proceeding is pending, has not strictly been dealt with therein, hence, the order passed by the learned Labour Court, Ranchi so far as it relates to making payment of compensation of Rs.12,000/-to be paid by way of lumpsum compensation, is hereby, quashed and set aside. 15. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed. 16. The Management, in consequence thereof, is hereby directed to reinstate the workmen in service, if they have not attained the age of superannuation along with consequential benefits. 17. However, if the workmen have already attained the age of superannuation, the consequential benefits in terms of the salary/wages on making proper calculation of the same, be released in their favour within the period of three months’ from the date of receipt of copy of the order.