JUDGMENT : K. SOMASHEKAR, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence rendered by the Court of the Prl. District & Sessions Judge, Chitradurga, in S.C. No. 13/2014 dated 08.01.2016, convicting the appellants/accused Nos.1 to 3 for offences punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34 IPC, while acquitting the accused for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304B read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Further, the appellants/Accused Nos.1 to 3 were directed to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-each for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and in default of payment of fine amount, to undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of three months. The appellants have preferred the present appeal seeking to allow the appeal and to thereby acquit appellants/accused Nos.1 to 3 for offences punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, for the grounds urged therein. 2. Heard, the learned counsel Shri Mohan Kumara D for the appellants/accused Nos.1 to 3 and the learned Addl. SPP Shri Vijayakumar Majage for the State. Perused the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence rendered by the Trial Court in S.C. No. 13/2014 including the exhibited documents. 3. The factual matrix of the appeal is as under: It transpires from the case of the prosecution that the marriage of accused No. 1 namely Thippeswamy was performed with deceased Manjamma @ Manjula as per the customs prevailing in their society and their marriage was performed on 05.06.2010. At the time of marriage, the accused had received Rs.12,000/-as dowry. Manjamma was residing along with her husband and in-laws in her matrimonial home, after their marriage. It is stated that while leading her marital life, all the accused persons used to give physical as well as mental harassment to the deceased Manjamma, by demanding additional dowry of Rs.25,000/-. It is stated that particularly on 14.10.2013 at 8.00 a.m., all the accused persons had picked up a quarrel with the deceased Manjamma and confined her in a room bolting the door of the said room and had given physical and mental harassment to her. It is stated that particularly on 14.10.2013 at 8.00 a.m., all the accused persons had picked up a quarrel with the deceased Manjamma and confined her in a room bolting the door of the said room and had given physical and mental harassment to her. All the three of the accused namely the husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased Manjamma, are said to have hatched a criminal conspiracy to commit her murder. In the said attempt, Accused No. 1/Thippeswamy is said to have doused kerosene on Manjamma’s body and Accused No. 2/Nagendrappa had set her ablaze and it is stated that Accused No. 3/Jayamma instigated the other accused persons so as to commit the said offences. As a result of her hue and cry out of severe burns, Manjamma is said to have taken to hospital by the neighbourers. However, in view of sustaining severe burn injuries, she died while under treatment in the hospital. On the basis of the said allegations, a complaint was filed by the complainant. Thereafter, criminal law was set into motion by recording an FIR and crime was registered against Accused Nos.1 to 3 for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304B, 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 4. Subsequent to criminal law being set into motion by recording an FIR, the Investigating Officer had taken up the case for investigation and had investigated the case thoroughly. During investigation, the I.O. had conducted the spot mahazar/Exhibit P1 in the presence of panch witnesses, namely PW-1, PW-2, PW-9 and PW-24, who have subscribed their signatures to the mahazar. Further, inquest mahazar/Exhibit P10 was held over the dead body by the concerned authority in the presence of PWs 3, 10, 17 who have subscribed their signatures. Exhibit P21 is the Dying declaration said to have been recorded by PW-17/Kantharaja being the responsible Taluk Executive Magistrate. Exhibit P25 is also the statement of the deceased Manjamma which was recorded by PW-21/C.B. Murugod being the Head Constable. These two Exhibits namely P21 and P25 are the dying declarations of deceased Manjamma. Exhibit P28 is the PM report issued by PW-23/Dr. Y.C. Rudreshi, who conducted autopsy over the dead body. Exhibit P25 is also the statement of the deceased Manjamma which was recorded by PW-21/C.B. Murugod being the Head Constable. These two Exhibits namely P21 and P25 are the dying declarations of deceased Manjamma. Exhibit P28 is the PM report issued by PW-23/Dr. Y.C. Rudreshi, who conducted autopsy over the dead body. The Marriage Certificate/Exhibit P33, Marriage Invitation/Exhibit P34 inclusive of the statement of witnesses were got recorded by the I.O. These are the material documents secured by the I.O during the course of investigation. Accordingly, the I.O. laid a charge-sheet against the accused persons before the committal Court. 5. Subsequent to filing of the charge-sheet by the I.O., the Committal Court had passed a committal order as contemplated under Section 209 of Cr.P.C. and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. Accordingly, the case in S.C. No. 13/2014 was registered. Subsequently, accused persons were secured for facing of trial. The trial Court heard arguments of the learned Public Prosecutor for the State and so also, the defence counsel for accused relating to framing of charge and having found prima facie that there are certain materials to frame charge against the accused, had framed charge against the accused for the aforesaid offences. The charges were read over to the accused in the language known to them whereby the accused did not plead guilty but claimed to be tried. Accordingly, the plea of each of the accused was recorded separately. 6. Subsequently, the prosecution let in evidence by subjecting to examination of PW.1 to PW.25 and several documents were got marked as per Exs.P1 to P41 and also M.Os.1 to 7. Subsequent to closure of evidence on the part of the prosecution the accused were examined as required under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. for enabling them to record the incriminating statements which appeared against them. Accused had denied the truth of the evidence of the prosecution adduced so far. Accordingly it was recorded. Subsequent to recording the statements of the accused, the accused were called upon to adduce defence evidence as contemplated under Section 233 Cr.P.C. However, the accused did not come forward to adduce any defence evidence. Accordingly it was recorded. 7. Subsequent to closure of evidence of the prosecution and the defence, the Trial Court heard the arguments advanced by learned Public Prosecutor and so also, the counter arguments advanced by the defence counsel. Accordingly it was recorded. 7. Subsequent to closure of evidence of the prosecution and the defence, the Trial Court heard the arguments advanced by learned Public Prosecutor and so also, the counter arguments advanced by the defence counsel. On a perusal of the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 in respect of the contents at Exhibit P1 and so also the contents of Exhibit P21 relating to the Dying Declaration recorded by PW-17/Taluk Executive Magistrate namely Kantharaja and Exhibit P25 relating to the dying declaration recorded by PW-21/C.B. Murugod being the Head Constable, the Trial Court had rendered a conviction judgment against the accused for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, but rendered an acquittal judgment relating to offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304B read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. It is this judgment which is under challenge in this appeal by urging various grounds. 8. Learned counsel Shri Mohan Kumara D for the appellants/accused Nos.1 to 3 has taken us through the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses and particularly through the evidence of PW-17 and PW-25 relating to the dying declarations at Exhibits P21 and P25. The dying declaration at Exhibit P21 was recorded by PW-17/Taluk Executive Magistrate in the presence of PW-22/Dr. G.H. Rupa. She has given an endorsement stating that the deceased Manjamma was admitted to hospital after sustaining 75 to 80% burn injuries and that she was in a befit mental condition to give her statement. Accordingly, her dying declaration was recorded as per Exhibit P21. PW-21/Head Constable is said to have recorded the further statement in terms of dying declaration of deceased Manjamma as per Exhibit P25. These are the important documents which have been secured by the I.O. during the course of investigation. However, it is contended that the Doctor G.H. Rupa/PW-22 who had attested Exhibit P21/dying declaration recorded by PW-17, has not issued a certificate to the effect that the injured Manjamma was in a befit state of mind to give statement. Further, in so far as Exhibit P25/statement recorded by PW-21 also, the Doctor G.H.Rupa/PW-22 has not certified that the injured Manjamma was in a befit state of mind to give her statement. Hence, there is no documentary evidence produced to show that the deceased Manjamma was in a befit condition to give her statements. Further, in so far as Exhibit P25/statement recorded by PW-21 also, the Doctor G.H.Rupa/PW-22 has not certified that the injured Manjamma was in a befit state of mind to give her statement. Hence, there is no documentary evidence produced to show that the deceased Manjamma was in a befit condition to give her statements. Except stating that the statement of deceased Manjamma as per Exhibits P21 and P25 was recorded before the Doctor, there is no documentary evidence in proof of the same. Further, the Doctor G.H. Rupa/PW-22 though had attested Exhibits P21 and P25 stating that the ‘statement is taken before me’, there is no documentary evidence maintained by the Hospital as regards discharge of her duty in the Government Hospital as on the said date and time. Further, there is no documentary proof available to show that the deceased was in a befit state of mind to give her statement, since Manjamma had suffered severe burn injuries. 9. On hearing the message that Manjamma had sustained severe burn injuries, her neighbourers had rushed to the spot and had admitted her to Government Hospital. However, no other witnesses except PW-17, PW-21 and PW-22 have supported the case of the prosecution. Even PW-11 and PW-12 being the parents of the deceased Manjamma, have not given any contrary statements before the Trial Court or before the police. Her parents PW-11 and PW-12 have in fact deposed to the effect that deceased Manjamma was suffering from severe stomach pain as a result of which she must have committed suicide. Further, the witnesses who were relatives and neighbourers of Manjamma who were residing in the same village also, have not supported the case of the prosecution. 10. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the most important point for consideration is whether the victim was in a befit state of mind to give statement before commencement of the recording of statement and further remained in a fit state of mind till completion of the recording of her statement. Merely stating that the patient was fit, will not serve the purpose. Therefore, there must be a fitness certificate from the Doctor who examined the victim and the certificate must disclose that the victim was in a befit state of mind to give statement. Merely stating that the patient was fit, will not serve the purpose. Therefore, there must be a fitness certificate from the Doctor who examined the victim and the certificate must disclose that the victim was in a befit state of mind to give statement. It is settled law that the evidence of dying declaration has to be scrutinized with utmost care and caution in view of the fact that the maker will not be subjected to cross-examination. 11. It is the further contention of the learned counsel that there is no material to show that the appellants had an intention or motive to murder Manjamma. PW-11 and PW12 being the parents of the deceased Manjamma have stated that there was no demand of dowry or any harassment by the appellants/accused. Further, PWs 11 and 12 have also not given consistent evidence on the part of the prosecution in conformity with the dying declaration said to be given by the deceased Manjamma at Exhibits P21 and P25. In spite of the same, the Trial Court has believed the dying declaration of the deceased even without corroboration and thereby committed a serious error in convicting the accused for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and the same is liable to be set aside. 12. The entire case of the prosecution rests upon the evidence of PW-17 and PW-21 relating to the dying declaration at Exhibits P21 and P25. There are many circumstances pointing out to the innocence of the appellants being the husband and in-laws of the deceased Manjamma and also there are infirmities in the evidence of the witnesses. Hence, it is emphatically contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the judgment of conviction rendered by the Trial Court for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC requires interference, otherwise the accused being the gravamen of the accusation would be the sufferer. However, though the deceased Manjamma had died within 7 years from the date of her marriage with the first accused, the Trial Court being convinced with the evidence available on record, has acquitted the accused for offences under Section 498A IPC besides Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. However, though the deceased Manjamma had died within 7 years from the date of her marriage with the first accused, the Trial Court being convinced with the evidence available on record, has acquitted the accused for offences under Section 498A IPC besides Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. In view of the fact that the Trial Court has acquitted the accused for the aforesaid offences, the main offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC would get naturally diluted. In spite of the same, the Trial Court has rendered a conviction judgment in respect of offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. Hence, the said conviction cannot be sustained in law. On all these premise, the learned counsel for the appellants Shri Mohan Kumara D emphatically seeks for re-appreciation of the evidence including re-visiting the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence rendered by the Trial Court. 13. It is further contended that the evidence of PWs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 18 runs contrary to the evidence of PW-17/Kantharaja, the responsible Taluk Executive Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration of the deceased at Exhibit P21 and further contrary to the evidence of PW-21/C.B. Murugod, Head Constable who is said to have recorded the further statement in terms of dying declaration of deceased Manjamma as per Exhibit P25. These are the two documents on the basis of which the Trial Court has rendered conviction against the accused for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. Therefore, the entire case of the prosecution is shrouded with clouds of doubt, which does not repose confidence in the mind of the Court. PWs 10 and 11 who have been subjected to examination have not withstood the contents in their statement and have turned hostile to the case of the prosecution in Exhibits P11 and P12. PWs 12 to 16 who have been subjected to examination have also not withstood their versions of the statements, which has been got marked as Exhibits P13 to P17. Contradictory statements have been got marked and they are hostile witnesses on the part of the prosecution. Despite of it, the Trial Court has rendered a conviction judgment under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. Contradictory statements have been got marked and they are hostile witnesses on the part of the prosecution. Despite of it, the Trial Court has rendered a conviction judgment under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. Merely because there were extensive burn injuries over the body of the deceased Manjamma, it cannot be said that the injuries had been caused by Accused No. 1 by dousing kerosene on her and Accused No. 2 by setting her ablaze and at the instigation of Accused No. 3 being the mother-in-law of the deceased Manjamma. There is no evidence on record to show that the accused had meted out physical as well as mental harassment to deceased Manjamma after her marriage nor there is any evidence to show that the accused No. 1 had doused kerosene on her and Accused No. 2 had set her ablaze and that Accused No. 3 had instigated Accused Nos.1 and 2 to do the said act since Manjamma did not fulfill the wish of the accused of getting additional dowry from her parents house. Though Manjamma had died within 7 years from the date of her marriage with Accused No. 1, the Trial Court being satisfied with the evidence on record, has proceeded to acquit the accused persons for offences under Sections 498A, 304B read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Hence, the learned counsel for the appellants contends that the charges leveled against the accused persons having not been proved by the prosecution, the Trial Court has committed a grave error in convicting the accused persons for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. Hence he prays to allow this appeal and thereby to set aside the judgment of conviction for the said offences rendered by the Trial Court and thereby to acquit the accused. 14. On the contrary, the learned Addl. SPP for the State Shri Vijayakumar Majage has taken us through the contents at Exhibit P21 of the dying declaration recorded by PW-17/Taluk Executive Magistrate and states that PW-22/Doctor has stated in her evidence that the deceased Manjamma was in a mentally befit condition and was oriented to give her statement as regards the injuries sustained by her. Further, PW-21/Head Constable had recorded the second dying declaration marked at Exhibit P25. Learned Addl. Further, PW-21/Head Constable had recorded the second dying declaration marked at Exhibit P25. Learned Addl. SPP contends that when there is more than one dying declaration, the Court has to give much importance to the earlier dying declaration than the subsequent statement. In fact in the instance case, both the dying declarations marked at Exhibits P21 and P25 very much discloses that Accused Nos.1 to 3 are the assailants who are the cause for the death of deceased Manjamma who had sustained severe burn injuries. Therefore, the question of ignoring the subsequent dying declaration recorded by the Head Constable, does not arise. These are the contentions made by the learned Addl. SPP for the State who emphatically submits that the Trial Court has rightly has rendered conviction for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and hence the grounds urged by the learned counsel for the appellants needs no interference in this appeal. 15. It is further contended that the dying declaration at Exhibit P21 was given by the deceased Manjamma who has narrated stating that the incident occurred in the scene of crime wherein the accused persons had bolted the door and hatched a criminal conspiracy and thereafter set her ablaze by dousing kerosene on her. Merely because PW-11 and PW-12 have not supported the case of the prosecution, the contents at Exhibits P21 and P25 of the dying declaration cannot be brushed aside. PW-22 has also supported the case of the prosecution in entirety disclosing specifically the nature of injuries and reasons for the death of the deceased. The principles laid down in the aforesaid citations and the procedural aspects will not help the accused to any extent. On all these premise, learned Addl. SPP for the State supports the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence rendered by the Trial Court for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, 1860 in respect of Accused Nos.1, 2 and 3. But accused No. 1 is the husband of the deceased, Accused Nos.2 and 3 are the in-laws of the deceased who have hatched a criminal conspiracy to eliminate the deceased. Accused No. 1 had doused kerosene on her person and Accused No. 2 is said to have set her ablaze and Accused No. 3 had instigated both Accused Nos.1 and 2 and assisted them in the process. Accused No. 1 had doused kerosene on her person and Accused No. 2 is said to have set her ablaze and Accused No. 3 had instigated both Accused Nos.1 and 2 and assisted them in the process. As a result of the same, Manjamma suffered severe burn injuries and though was admitted to hospital and provided treatment, she later succumbed to the injuries. Accused Nos.1 to 3 were demanding dowry from the parents of the deceased but she did not fulfill their wish of getting additional dowry from her parents house. Further, deceased Manjamma had died within 7 years from the date of her marriage with Accused No. 1. Though offences under Section 498A of IPC ended in acquittal against the accused, merely because accused were acquitted for offences under Section 498-A IPC, it cannot be a ground to seek intervention of this Court for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. On all these premise, the learned Addl. SPP for the State contends that intervention does not arise in this appeal and consequently seeks for dismissal of this appeal by confirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence rendered by the Trial Court for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. 16. In the background of the contentions made by the learned counsel for the appellants inclusive of the learned Addl. SPP for the State, it is seen that the entire case revolves around the contents of Exhibit P21 Dying Declaration of Manjamma which was got recorded initially when she was admitted to Government Hospital by her neighbourers. There can be no dispute that the Dying Declaration can be the sole basis for conviction. However, such a dying declaration has to be proved to be wholly reliable, voluntary and the maker must be in a fit medical condition to make it. But in the instant case, Exhibit P21 was the initial dying declaration given by the deceased stating Accused Nos.1, 2 and 3 were the ones who had doused kerosene and set her ablaze. 17. But in the instant case, Exhibit P21 was the initial dying declaration given by the deceased stating Accused Nos.1, 2 and 3 were the ones who had doused kerosene and set her ablaze. 17. As per Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there can be no dispute that dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction, however, such a dying declaration has to be proved to be wholly reliable, voluntary and truthful and further that the maker there of must be in a fit medical condition to make it. This was exhaustively addressed in decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Waikhom Yaima Singh vs. State of Manipur, JT 2011 (6) SC 355. 18. In the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nanhar vs. State of Haryana, JT 2010 (6) SC 196, it is held that “dying declaration should be such, which should immensely strike to be genuine and stating true story of its maker. It should be free from all doubts and on going through it, an impression has to be registered immediately in mind that it is genuine, true and not tainted with doubts. Further it should not be result of tutoring.” 19. Even in the case of Ram Sai vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1994 Cri. L.J. 138 (SC), it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that “where there were infirmities in declaration regarding state of deceased to make oral dying declaration and unnatural conduct of witness to whom dying declaration was allegedly given by the deceased which was disclosed to the police after two days of death of deceased, accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt.” 20. Further it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhajju vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 4 SCC 327 , wherein, it is held that “If the dying declaration has been recorded in accordance with law, is reliable and gives a cogent and possible explanation of the occurrence of the events, then the dying declaration can certainly be relied upon by the court and could form the sole piece of evidence resulting in the conviction of the accused.” 21. In the instant case, the dying declaration at Exhibit P21 recorded by PW-17/Taluk Executive Magistrate and Exhibit P25 the second dying declaration was recorded by the Head Constable. The first dying declaration at Exhibit P21 has been recorded in the presence of PW-22/Dr. G.H. Rupa, which is in a question and answer format. The deceased Manjamma had suffered severe burn injuries and was admitted to Government Hospital and she answered to the questions posed by Shri Kantharaja, responsible Taluk Executive Magistrate. There were infirmities in recording the statement of the deceased to make an oral dying declaration and unnatural conduct given by the deceased which was disclosed to the Police Officer. Subsequent to recording of Exhibit P21 by the Taluk Executive Magistrate examined as PW-17, another Dying Declaration was recorded as per Exhibit P25 by the Head Constable/PW-21. If there is no doubt in the contents made by the deceased at Exhibits P21 and P25, then the said evidence is enough to render a conviction judgment. But in the instant case, a doubt arises in the mind of the Court relating to Exhibit P21 and relating to Exhibit P25 in view of the fact that the deceased Manjamma had sustained severe burn injuries to an extent of 80% to 90%. Despite of it, her statement was recorded. Even the Doctor has given evidence that the deceased was in a fit condition to give her statement. PW-17 and PW-22 being responsible official witnesses said to have recorded the dying declaration of deceased Manjamma, the Trial Court had a responsibility to assess their evidence in a stricto senso manner keeping in view Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Jayamma and Another vs. State of Karnataka, (2021) 5 SCR 11. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Jayamma and Another vs. State of Karnataka, (2021) 5 SCR 11. In this reliance, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had addressed the scope of Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, which is held thus: “Penal Code, 1860: S. 302 r/w 34 - Allegation that on account of previous dispute between the parties, accused wit the intention to kill the victim went to her house, doused her with kerosene and set her ablaze - Acquittal by the trial court - However, the High Court on basis of the dying declaration and corroborative statement of the police officer who recorded the dying declaration and the doctor who endorsed the mental fitness of the victim to make such statement, convicted the accused u/s. 302 r/w 34 and imposed life imprisonment - On appeal, held: conviction of the accused cannot be upheld only on the basis of the dying declaration - Narration of events in the dying declaration were so accurate to be believed - Injured victim was an illiterate old person and its beyond human probabilities to have been able to narrate the minutes of the incident with such accuracy - Owing to 80% burn injuries suffered by the victim on all vital parts of the body, the possibility of her not being in a fit state cannot be completely ruled out - Police Officer did not ask the doctor to make an endorsement of fitness of the victim before recording the statement - There is a serious contradiction between the statement of the doctor and the police officer in respect of the nature of burn injuries suffered on different body parts of the victim.” In the instant case, Manjamma had sustained 80% to 90% burn injuries. As per the evidence of PW-22 who was subjected to examination and in her presence, Exhibit P21 was recorded by the Executive Magistrate. But subsequent to her statement at Exhibit P21, PW-21/Head Constable had recorded the subsequent statement of the deceased marked at Exhibit P25. As per the evidence of PW-22 who was subjected to examination and in her presence, Exhibit P21 was recorded by the Executive Magistrate. But subsequent to her statement at Exhibit P21, PW-21/Head Constable had recorded the subsequent statement of the deceased marked at Exhibit P25. But merely because of the said dying declaration, it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved the guilt against the accused unless there is worthwhile evidence and creditworthy evidence to probabilise that the accused are the cause for the death of the deceased by dousing her with kerosene and setting her ablaze. In the said case, the vital evidence are that of PW-17 and PW-21 relating to the dying declaration of the deceased at Exhibits P21 and P25. But at a cursory glance of the entire evidence, it indicates that the theory set up by the prosecution is found to be doubtful and does not inspire confidence in the mind of the Court to render a conviction judgment against the accused for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. As already stated, the Trial Court has rendered acquittal judgment for offences under Sections 498A, 304B read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Section 304B relates to dowry death within 7 years from the date of her marriage, but the case ended in acquittal based on the evidence of the prosecution. When the offences under Sections 498A, 304B read with Section 34 IPC including offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act have itself ended in acquittal, that is dowry death within 7 years from the date of her marriage, naturally it would dilute the strength of the evidence of the prosecution as regards the main offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The motive factor and the intention as regards causing the death of the deceased is the main part to be considered in the instant case. 22. It is also relevant to refer to certain rule of interpretation that the Court must first try to ascertain the intention of the Legislature by giving to the very words used by it their original and grammatical meaning. 22. It is also relevant to refer to certain rule of interpretation that the Court must first try to ascertain the intention of the Legislature by giving to the very words used by it their original and grammatical meaning. In the interpretation of the statues, the courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. It is elementary to say that the intention of the Legislature must be gathered from the language of the act itself. It is only when there is ambiguity and when an expression used of the Legislature is capable of more than one meaning, that it is permissible for the Court to look at the preamble, even to look at the title of the act. 23. In the instant case, the accused Nos.1 is said to have doused kerosene on Manjamma and Accused No. 2 is said to have set her ablaze and they are jointly said to have committed the murder of Manjamma by dousing kerosene on her and setting her ablaze. Accused No. 3 is said to have abetted the offence by instigating Accused Nos.1 and 2 to commit the said offence since Manjamma had not fulfilled their wish of bringing additional dowry from her parental home. In order to constitute the offence of abetment, firstly there must be an abettor and the prosecution must be able to prove by facilitating worthwhile evidence as regards the said abetment. Otherwise, it would dilute the main offences. 24. The main offence is Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. However, accused have been acquitted for offences under Sections 498A, 304B read with Section 34 IPC including offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act, that is dowry death within 7 years from the date of her marriage. Hence, naturally it would dilute the main offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. In order to constitute offence under Section 302 IPC, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish that there was mens rea and actus rea. Otherwise, it cannot be construed that there was an intention for the accused to eliminate the deceased. However, the homicidal death of Manjamma is not in dispute. In order to constitute offence under Section 302 IPC, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish that there was mens rea and actus rea. Otherwise, it cannot be construed that there was an intention for the accused to eliminate the deceased. However, the homicidal death of Manjamma is not in dispute. Merely because she had sustained burn injuries, it cannot be said that the offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC has been proved by the prosecution by facilitating worthwhile and acceptable evidence. Unlawful homicide may be divided into three categories namely (i) Culpable homicide, (ii) Causing death by rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide and (iii) Suicide as under Section 305 and 306 of IPC. Culpable homicide - This section defines culpable homicide, which is of two kinds: (a) Culpable homicide amounting to murder. (b) Culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The same is based upon the evidence facilitated by the prosecution. 25. As regards Section 300 of IPC, 1860 relating to murder, there is no definition of murder in the aforesaid Section but the said Section merely takes the four more serious types of culpable homicide, basing on the mens rea and designates them murder. It is not essential for the prosecution to establish motive factor against the accused in all cases, but at some time it cannot be given to gainsaid that without adequate motive speaking normally, none is expected to take life of another human being. 26. But the motive behind the crime is a relevant fact of which evidence can be given. The absence of a motive is also a circumstance which is relevant for assigning the evidence. But the circumstances proving the guilt of the accused are however not weakened at all by the fact that the motive has not been established. It often happens that only the culprit himself knows what moved him to certain course of action. In the instant case, the dying declaration at Exhibit P21 and Exhibit P25 are required to be re-appreciated and closely scrutinized. 27. Dying Declaration where held not reliable: The manner of recording dying declaration is doubtful, and it cannot be relied upon to sustain the conviction of the accused as under Section 302 of IPC. If there are two dying declarations giving two different versions, a serious doubt is created about the truthfulness of the dying declarations. 27. Dying Declaration where held not reliable: The manner of recording dying declaration is doubtful, and it cannot be relied upon to sustain the conviction of the accused as under Section 302 of IPC. If there are two dying declarations giving two different versions, a serious doubt is created about the truthfulness of the dying declarations. The dying declaration does not reveal entire truth, and it has to be considered only as a piece of evidence on which event conviction cannot be rested solely on the basis of such doubtful dying declaration. If the dying declaration was recorded in presence of the relatives of the deceased the possibility that the deceased was tutored cannot be ruled out. 28. Manjamma sustained severe burn injuries nearly 80% to 90% of burn injuries. In the said situation, the Court ought to have assessed whether she was in a medically fit condition to give her statement. It is necessary that the Court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration, but it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. 29. A dying declaration is very important document because it amounts to a statement of the deceased verba dicta. The dying declaration cannot be treated as wholly trustworthy as it is shrouded by many doubts. The Court must be satisfied that the deceased was in the state of mind after clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. But the dying declaration should be carefully scrutinized. 30. Medical evidence requires to be corroborated by ocular testimony. The prosecution has to establish the case by producing positive medical evidence in this regard to prove that the deceased died as a result of the burn injuries caused due to the act of the accused. In the instant case, there is no corroboration on the part of the prosecution to believe the versions made by deceased Manjamma which was recorded as per Exhibits P21 and P25. In the instant case, there is no corroboration on the part of the prosecution to believe the versions made by deceased Manjamma which was recorded as per Exhibits P21 and P25. Without considering the said fact, the Trial Court has rendered conviction for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. When offences under Section 498A, 304 B read with Section 34 IPC besides Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act ended in acquittal, the prosecution, ought not to have convicted the accused for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC unless the prosecution has proved the guilt against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. If doubt is created in the mind of the Court, it must be extended in favour of the accused alone. 31. In the instant case, several witnesses have turned hostile to the case of the prosecution and their contradictory statements have been got marked. Despite the fact that no cogent and consistent evidence has been facilitated on the part of the prosecution and despite of infirmities and inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses, the Trial Court has rendered a conviction judgment for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. Hence, we are of the opinion that the judgment of conviction requires interference for the aforesaid reasons and findings. ORDER: The appeal preferred by the appellants/Accused Nos.1 to 3 under Section 374 (2) of Cr.P.C. is hereby allowed. Consequently, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence rendered by the Court of the Prl. District & Sessions Judge, Chitradurga in S.C. No. 13/2014 dated 08.01.2016 is hereby set-aside. Consequently, the appellants/Accused Nos.1 to 3 are acquitted for offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. If appellant/Accused Nos.1 to 3 have executed any bail bond, the same shall stand cancelled. Further, if appellants/Accused Nos.1 to 3 have deposited any fine amount, the said fine amount shall be refunded to the respective appellants, on due identification.